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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 250627, December 07, 2022 ]
SANDRA JANE GAGUI JACINTO, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA ELOISA SARMIENTO FOUTS, RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
INTING, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders dated July 24, 2019[2] and November 28, 2019[3] of the Branch 73, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 18-60992. The questioned Orders denied the Motion to Quash[4] the Information[5] filed by Sandra Jane Gagui Jacinto (petitioner) for lack of merit on the ground that Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, applies to lesbian relationships.
The case stemmed from the following Information[6] dated June 8, 2018 filed against the petitioner for violation of Section 5(a) in relation to paragraph 2 Section 6(a), of RA 9262 and Section 5(k) of RA 8369:[7]
That on or about the 14th day of January 2018, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MARIA ELOISA SARMIENTO FOUTS, her live-in partner by pushing her forcefully with swaying aims and crushing her hands repeatedly with the door of the car, thereby causing upon her physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of I [sic] less than thirty (30) days and incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.Petitioner and Maria Eloisa Sarmiento Fouts (respondent) were in a relationship for 16 years. Respondent alleged that petitioner broke up with her on December 24, 2017 while they were celebrating Christmas in Hongkong. When they got back to the country, petitioner would come to their house in Antipolo City just to get her things then leave to spend the night with her lover. Respondent then asked petitioner to stop using her credit cards because the latter still owed her P3,000,000.00.[9]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Later, petitioner started to demand that respondent leave the house and forced the latter to sign a deed of absolute sale over the property in her favor. Respondent refused to leave and sign the document. On January 12, 2018, because of respondent's continued refusal to leave the house, petitioner became angry and violent that she threatened to break everything and burn the house down. Petitioner's threats caused respondent to suffer chest pain and difficulty in breathing that she was brought to the hospital to seek medical attention.[10]
Petitioner visited respondent in the hospital on the next day and tried to make amends. When they went home, respondent averred that petitioner forced her to take Rivotril, a drug that caused her to feel weak and groggy. On January 14, 2018, when respondent regained consciousness, she was already naked with petitioner on top her taking photos and videos of her. She then begged petitioner to delete the photos fearing that the latter might kill her or have her killed. Respondent followed petitioner to her car, but the latter repeatedly crushed her hand with the door of the car and pushed her hard so that she fell to the floor. She suffered fracture on her left wrist and thereafter underwent surgery and physical therapy.[11]
For her part, petitioner countered that the complaint against her was filed to seek leverage for a case for reconveyance, annulment of title, and damages that she filed against respondent before the RTC of Antipolo City. She insisted that she alone purchased and built the house in Antipolo City and that respondent merely stayed therein after their break-up to seduce and provoke her.[12]
Petitioner further narrated that after respondent was discharged from the hospital, the latter seduced petitioner to have sex with her and asked her to take pictures of them while they were naked. When petitioner asked respondent to delete the pictures, the latter became hysterical and followed petitioner towards her car. Respondent grabbed petitioner's hands to prevent her from entering the car and she fell to the ground as petitioner tried to escape.[13]
Thus, on June 8, 2018, an Information for violation of Section 5(a) in relation to 2nd paragraph Section 6(a), of RA 9262 was filed in the RTC against petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash[14] the Information on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense because RA 9262 does not apply to lesbian relationships.[15]
The Ruling of the RTC
On July 24, 2019, the RTC issued the first assailed Order denying the motion to quash on the ground that Section 3(a) of RA 9262 is clear that any person could be liable for violation of its provisions whether the violator is a man or a woman. Citing the case of of Garcia v. Drilon[16] (Garcia), the RTC explained that the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman under Section 3(a) encompasses lesbian relationships.[17]
Petitioner sought reconsideration,[18] but the RTC denied it in the second assailed Order[19] dated November 28, 2019.
Hence, the petition before the Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the July 24, 2019 and November 28, 2019 Orders of the RTC insofar as it found that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships.
The issue submitted before the Court is whether the RTC erred in denying the motion to quash filed by the petitioner on the ground that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships.
Petitioner asserts that reliance of the RTC in the case of Garcia in ruling that RA 9262 applies in the case is misplaced. According to her, the petitioner in Garcia was a husband who assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses. Thus, the pronouncement of the Court that RA 9262 also applies to lesbian relationships was a mere obiter dictum in Garcia as it was not upon the question brought before the Court on petition.[20] Petitioner adds that to assert that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships is to protect one woman in a relationship and deny the other woman of the same protection.[21]
Petitioner further claims that: (1) the RTC's interpretation of the phrase "any person" in Section 3(a) of the law is patently erroneous;[22] (2) the enumeration after the phrase "any person" has one denominator in that they refer to the male sex – husband, former husband, or a person with whom the woman has or had dating or sexual relationship, or shares common child with; (3) following the principle of ejusdem generis, the "person" referred to under Section 3(a) cannot be a woman;[23] and (4) the recent proposal by the Congress to amend RA 9262 to expand the scope of the law to include "partners and their children" further strengthens the position that same sex relationships are not covered under the law.[24]
In seeking for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner argues that the continuation of the trial in the RTC would probably work injustice to her. She laments that she will be tried under a defective information and that the resolution of the petition will eventually determine whether trial in the RTC should proceed or not.[25]
In her Comment,[26] respondent counters that the petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is an improper remedy because the denial of a motion to quash is unappealable. Being an improper remedy, the petition must be dismissed outright.[27]
Further, respondent avers that RA 9262 is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity;[28] there is no room for interpretation in the use of the phrase "any person". It is without regard to gender or sexual orientation so long as the person has or had a dating relationship with the victim.[29] Respondent also argues that the pronouncement of the Court in Garcia is not a mere obiter dictum because one of the issues submitted in the case was the validity of the classification between men and women that would justify the protection given by RA 9262.[30] It was meant to provide protection to women and children as offended parties and not as perpetrators.[31]
Considering that the petition is improper and lacks merit, respondent likewise opposes the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by the petitioner. Respondent insists that petitioner failed to establish that she is entitled to the relief demanded, more particularly, that she has a clear and unmistakable right to be protected.[32]
In her Reply,[33] petitioner submits that the petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy, the issue raised being a question of law.[34] She reiterates that the issue in Garcia is a mere obiter dictum as the case therein did not, in any way, involve lesbian relationships;[35] and that RA 9262 does not yet cover homosexual relationships.[36]
The Court's Ruling
The Court denies the petition on two grounds: first, for being an improper remedy; second, for lack of merit.
The denial of a motion to quash
information is an interlocutory
order; hence, not appealable.
Section 1 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein as may be allowed by the Rules. It is also explicit as to what judgments or final orders are not appealable, thus:
No appeal may be taken from:It is a fundamental principle that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory in nature. As such, it is not appealable nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari[37] in light of the other available legal remedies.[38] In Enrile v. Manalastas[39] (Enrile), the Court explained that "[t]he remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law."[40](a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order; xxx
Certainly, the petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which is not the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the RTC denying petitioner's motion to quash the information filed against her. The Orders, being interlocutory in nature, are not appealable pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and, following Enrile, the proper remedy is for the petitioner to go to trial and appeal from the adverse judgment against her, should one be rendered by the RTC.
The Court also notes that the petition was directly filed before Us to assail the RTC Orders. Assuming that the Court take an exception and treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65, it should nonetheless be dismissed for blatant disregard of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
RA 9262 applies to lesbian
relationships.
At any rate, the Court deems it proper to discuss the issue raised in the petition if only to reiterate the earlier pronouncement in Garcia that RA 9262 applies to lesbian relationships.
The Information filed in the RTC against the petitioner is anchored on Section 5(a) of RA 9262, viz.:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:On the other hand, Section 3(a) thereof defines violence against women and their children as follows:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; xxx
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,Petitioner's main contention is that the facts charged in the information filed against her in the RTC do not constitute an offense because RA 9262 does not apply to lesbian relationships. However, this issue was already settled in the case of Garcia in this wise:
(a) " Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxx
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.[41] (Emphases in the original.)Contrary to petitioner's submission that the foregoing disquisition in Garcia was a mere obiter dictum, the Court notes that one of the issues raised in Garcia is the supposed discriminatory and unjust provisions of RA 9262 which are likewise violative of the equal protection clause.[42] The foregoing discussion of the Court as to the applicability of the law to lesbian relationships is clearly a resolution of the particular issue raised in Garcia and not a mere obiter dictum or an opinion of the Court. The statement of the Court that "[t]here is likewise no merit to the contention that RA 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit" further amplifies that the issue of whether RA 9262 only applies to male perpetrators was indeed raised in the said case.
Applying the case of Garcia, the motion to quash information filed by the petitioner on the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense utterly lacks basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa (Chairperson) and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
Dimaampao,* J., on official leave.
Singh, J., please see my concurring opinion.
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24.
[2] Id. at 27-29; issued by Acting Presiding Judge Leili Cruz Suarez.
[3] Id. at 26; issued by Presiding Judge Gay Marie F. Lubigan-Rafael.
[4] Id. at 30-37.
[5] Id. at 53-54.
[6] Id. at 53-54.
[7] Family Courts Act of 1997, approved on October 28, 1997.
[8] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[9] Id. at 192.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 192-193.
[12] Id. at 193.
[13] Id. at 194.
[14] See Motion to Quash, id. at 30-36.
[15] Id. at 31.
[16] 712 Phil. 44 (2013).
[17] Rollo, p. 28.
[18] See Motion for Reconsideration dated October 22, 2019, id. at 38-51.
[19] Id. at 26.
[20] Id. at 10-12.
[21] Id. at 14.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 15.
[24] Id. at 16.
[25] Id. at 19.
[26] Id. at 337-353.
[27] Id. at 339.
[28] Id. at 341.
[29] Id. at 343.
[30] Id. at 344.
[31] Id. at 345.
[32] Id. at 348-349.
[33] Id. at 365-372.
[34] Id. at 366.
[35] Id. at 368.
[36] Id. at 370.
[37] Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar, 695 Phil. 110 (2012).
[38] Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 235994, March 5, 2018 (Notice).
[39] 746 Phil. 43 (2014).
[40] Id. at 48.
[41] Supra note 16, at 103-104.
[42] Id. at 77.
SINGH, J:
I concur that Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (Anti-VAWC Act) protects all women from intimate partner violence, including women in lesbian relationships.
A contrary interpretation of the Anti-VAWC Act would discriminate against a certain class of women simply because they do not conform to society's traditional conception of what relationships should be – one between a heterosexual man and a heterosexual woman. Similarly, a contrary interpretation will disregard the purpose for which the Anti-VAWC Law was enacted – to protect women from one of the most common and most horrific forms of violence and discrimination. This protection is not conditioned on an abused woman's gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation.
The core question for this Court's resolution is whether the Anti-VAWC Act applies to lesbian relationships.
The petitioner, Sandra Jane Jacinto (Jacinto), asserts that it does not because if the Anti-VAWC Act applies to lesbian relationships, that would mean that the law protects one woman in a relationship while denying the other woman the same protection.[1]
Jacinto also argues that the use of the term "any person" in Section 3 (a) of the Anti-VAWC Act should be interpreted to refer to men only because the enumeration in Section 3 (a) has "one denominator in that they refer to the male sex – husband, former husband, or a person with whom the woman has or had dating or sexual relationship, or shares a common child with..."[2] Further, Jacinto claims that the recent proposal by Congress to amend the Anti-VAWC Act to include "partners and their children" further strengthens the position that same sex relationships are not covered under the law.[3]
I concur with the Resolution rejecting this interpretation.
The text of the law is clear. Section 3 (a) provides in part –
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,Where the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application.[5] Here, Section 3 (a) is unequivocal, it refers to "any person" who commits violence (as defined by the law) against a woman with whom "the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship..." The terms "any person" and "the person" should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. They literally pertain to a person without any qualification as to this person's gender, gender expression, or sexual preference. To be sure, Section 3 (a) also contains the phrase "against a woman who is his wife, former wife..." The use of the pronoun "his" is not meant to qualify "any person" as male. It should be noted that under Philippine law, same-sex marriages are not recognized and thus, only men and women can legally marry.[6] This is the context within which the phrase "his wife, former wife" was used.
(a)" Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.[4]
This is not the first time that this Court has had occasion to confirm that the Anti-VAWC Act applies to women in lesbian relationships. As the Resolution correctly states, the Court already explained in Garcia v. Drilon[7] (Garcia) that the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman in Section 3 (a) encompasses lesbian relationships.[8]
Nonetheless, if there was any ambiguity in the language of the law (there is none), this is put to rest by the legislative intent behind the Anti-VAWC Act. During the meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2723 and House Bill Nos. 6054 and 5516, the following discussion confirmed the Congressional intent to extend the protection of the Anti-VAWC Act to women in lesbian relationships:
REP. ABAYON. May I just have a clarification here, Madam Chair, because there might be a case that will be brought before the courts. I just want to clarify whether we are really strict on the definition under letter (e) because the words used is "husband and wife." Does that mean that this refers only to a man and a woman or woman-to-woman would be included? Because this might – we should know here what is really our interpretation. Because if we really consider that a woman-to-woman relationship can still be called as husband and wife relationship, then there might be no more problem in the interpretation brought before the court. So, the intent here of the legislators should be stated in the journal in this Bicam so that there would be no wrong interpretation in the course of a case that might be filed later.Conscious of the importance of legislative intent in interpreting laws, and aware of the possibility that a case may be one day filed in court claiming that the Anti-VAWC Act applies only to women in heterosexual relationships, the Bicameral Committee made it a point to record the legislative intent that the Anti-VAWC Act covers lesbian relationships. As the law is clear and the legislative intent is unequivocal, this Court cannot but read the Anti-VAWC Act in accordance with its language and intent.
x x x x
REP. SARENAS. Madam Chair, I don't know. If just for the record we could say that lesbian relationships are included because we are using the conjunctive word "or" and therefore "or" are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis. So, that would cover because we do know women's crisis centers' report that there are many abuses done against women by their lesbian partner. So, it is not limited to husband and wife by the mere fact that we're using the conjunctive "or" so the that lesbian relationship would already be covered by the parties that are romantically involved over time in a continuing basis. If for the record, we are agreed on that it is not. It's a little vague but it should cover.
REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO. No, as a matter of fact, Madam Chair, if you look at Section 3, that is the way it was defined by the Senate, "committed by any person against." Meaning to say, any person can be a man or a woman. The offender can refer to a man or a woman. That's why it can be covered. So we don't touch it, it's covered.
REP. ABAYON. No, no, Madam Chair, we have to clarify here. Because the way I look at it, the Senate version does not seem to cover such woman-to-woman relationship. Which is which now? So that when a case is brought before the court, there might be a problem on this definition because a husband and wife - - And then, if we refer to the dictionary, a husband is always a man, but there are cases which is now woman-to-woman which a woman would act as a man and which in our ordinary parlance will be considered as a husband insofar as that woman partner is concerned. So, we have to clarify here so that there will be no problem anymore when a ease is brought before the court on the issue of definition. So, what is really our legislative intent, to cover or not? So, we have to be consistent here. The Senate would agree on the coverage, then I think we have no more problem on that because when the journal of the bicam will be taken up and part of the intent will be the pivotal point that the court will decide, then there will be no more issue. So, that's why I want to clarify it here. What is really our intent?
REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO. Madam Chair, my reading is that based on the wording adopted by the Senate using "any person" in defining sexual – in defining violence against women and children, it will cover and it does cover both men and women. And under this "dating relationship," I do not even think that the wording here is really inconsistent with the definition of violence because you say, living as husband and wife, when a lesbian couple live together, one of them takes the role of the husband. So they live as husband and wife. But I am glad that Congressman Abayon has raised that point because we would like to make it clear that the offender in this proposed bill can be either a man or a woman.
THE CHAIRPERSON (SEN. EJERCITO-ESTRADA). You know, in the definition of violence against women, it states here that: "refers to any act or series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife" – "who is his wife"
REP. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO. Actually, ma'am, I think it is covered by the dating relationship kasi nakalagay dito or basically ang definition natin ng "dating relationship" covers two areas: a situation where parties live as husband and wife; and then another situation where the relationship refers to the two people romantically involved over time. So I think that would cover actually – that would cover both eh. Kung ang interpretation natin dito sa definition natin but exactly the point of Congressman Abayon is for us to settle here in the bicam in order for the court when they decide on the definition kung covered ba sila or hindi, ano ang intent natin? To cover them or not. 'Yun 'yung, I think, 'yun 'yung ano natin dito.
REP. ABAYON. Madam Chair, actually, my own interpretation here – is my own interpretation, I repeat, is really that we cover both relationships. Why? Because the definition is very clear, "or against a woman with whom the person has or had" and then we go also "or are romantically linked." So that – I just would like to clarify because this might be a cause of definition wherein a lawyer will define in the other way. That is why we really have to put this as what is really our legislative intent so that there will be now – the decision of the courts will rely on the transcript of the journal in the event a case is brought which I believe many cases will be brought. So this now should be settled. We would like to know if the Senate will agree on the interpretation of the House on the issue.
THE CHAIRPERSON (SEN. EJERCITO-ESTRADA). So we agree on it.
REP. ABAYON: So, thank you for that, Madam Chair. So this is now clear that a woman-to-woman relationship is covered as long as that woman would act as a husband and romantically linked or rather "or." Thank you, Madam Chair. [9]
The interpretation that the Anti-VAWC Act applies to both heterosexual and lesbian relationships is also consistent with the Constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws.[10] Indeed, interpreting the Anti-VAWC Act to protect only women in heterosexual relationships would discriminate against a class of women solely on the basis of their gender and sexual preference.
The Equal Protection Clause dictates that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,[11] the Court explained:
...The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[12]The purpose of the Anti-VAWC Act is clear. Section 2 of the Anti-VAWC Act states:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.Recognizing that intimate partner violence is one of the worst forms of violence and discrimination inflicted on women, the Anti-VAWC Act was enacted to provide penalties for various forms of intimate partner violence committed against women and affords abused women a set of remedies not only so that their abusers may be penalized but also so that women will be granted immediate refuge in the form of protection orders.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.[13]
As it is the protection of women from intimate partner violence that is the avowed purpose of the Anti-VAWC Act, for this law to cover only women who are in heterosexual relationships would be discriminatory to an entire class of women who are in lesbian relationships.
Distinguishing between abused women in heterosexual relationships and abused women in lesbian relationships is not a valid classification. There are no substantial distinctions between these two classes. Intimate partner violence is no less horrific if it occurs within lesbian relationships. Nor are women in lesbian relationships less oppressed and thus, in need of lesser protection. Victims of intimate partner violence in same-sex relationships may have distinct experiences of abuse compared to their heterosexual counterparts but these victims similarly suffer stressors albeit unique to their sexual minority status such as homophobia, transphobia, and in certain cases, the fear that their sexuality may be disclosed to others.[14] Indeed, whether an abused woman has a heterosexual relationship or a lesbian relationship is a superficial difference. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."[15]
If the purpose of the Anti-VAWC Act is to protect women from one of the worst kinds of violence suffered by women in general, with the ultimate goal of aiding in eradicating gender discrimination, then the protection afforded by the law must necessarily extend to all women, regardless of gender, gender expression, and sexual orientation. To withhold the protections afforded by the Anti-VAWC Act to women in lesbian relationships on the basis solely of the fact that their abuser is also a woman is discriminatory. It would mean that the State only affords protection to those who conform to what society regards as "normal" and, in effect, invalidates and penalizes those who are "different." This would effectively affirm to this entire class of women (as well as members of the LGBTQI community in general) that they are right to fear going to the authorities to report their abuse; that their choices are less valid and merit less protection from the law; that the law views them as less than heterosexual women. The law cannot be read in this way.
Nor should the Anti-VAWC Act be read in a manner that would allow women who abuse their same-sex partners to escape liability. Gender is relevant under the Anti-VAWC Act only with respect to the gender of the victim of intimate partner violence. The protection of the law is triggered when a woman is the victim of intimate partner violence regardless of whether the relationship is heteronormative or not. The law is blind as to the gender of the abuser. It does not function to perpetuate the gender-based stereotype that all women have no agency and thus require protection even in instances where they commit violations of the law. The law recognizes that women have free will and are capable of independent thought and action and will, therefore, be held liable for the consequences of their act. That, too, is gender equality.
I echo what Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen said in his Concurring Opinion in Acharon v. People:[16]
Truth be told, our law cruelly defines the normal. This Court has started to take steps to address this where possible. In a concurring opinion from Republic v. Manalo, we have acknowledged that couples of all genders may constitute loving families:The protections afforded by the Constitution ensure that people are free from arbitrary governmental interferences, that people are free to make choices about how they live their lives, that people are free to embark on their own manner of pursuit of happiness. Our laws and our courts guarantee these not just by preventing and penalizing acts that directly threaten fundamental freedoms; they also guarantee these by ensuring that minorities who pursue choices that do not conform to the generally accepted template of what happiness should look like are not discriminated against for these choices; and that their unique experiences are not invalidated by laws that are blind to their plight.The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already far from the living realities of many couples and children. For instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the various types of care that various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in many loving households.In Republic v. Cagandahan, this Court upheld the trial court's allowance of the respondent's change of name and recognized the situation of intersex individuals:
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who arc dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.Recently, this Court promulgated the Rules on the Use of Gender-Fair Language in the Judiciary and Gender-Fair Courtroom Etiquette in an effort not to "perpetuate gender stereotypes, which rest on unfounded generalizations regarding the characteristics and roles of binary and non-binary genders, but indisputably influence the perspectives of the judges and litigants alike."
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case. (Citation omitted)
We continue to fight toward genuine and meaningful equality for men and women, as well as those who are nonbinary. It is vital to this movement that we take apart the structures that perpetuate the abuse of women.[17]
I reiterate the pronouncement of the Court in Garcia:
...[T]he history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment.[18]The Anti-VAWC Act is a progressive piece of legislation and should not be interpreted in a manner that would reinforce gender biases against minorities. By interpreting the Anti-VAWC Act to cover all women subject to intimate partner violence regardless of the gender, gender expression or sexual orientation of the victim and the abuser, the Court recognizes that even women who do not conform to what is generally defined as "normal" or traditional relationship structures are protected by the law. When the law states that it protects women who are victims of domestic abuse, it protects all women without qualification.
I vote to deny the Petition.
[1] Resolution, p. 4.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Emphasis supplied.
[5] Dubongco v. Commission on Audit, 895 SCRA 53 (2019).
[6] FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, art. 1.
[7] 712 Phil. 44-176 (2013).
[8] Resolution, p. 8.
[9] Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations, Minutes of Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2723 and House Bill Nos. 6054 and 5516 (2004), 13th Congress pp. 38-46; emphases supplied.
[10] CONST., art. III, sec. 1.
[11] 651 Phil. 374-773 (2010).
[12] Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
[13] Emphases supplied.
[14] Adam M. Messinger, Invisible Victims: Same-Sex IPV in the National Violence Against Women Survey, Journal of Interpersonal Violence (2011), available at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epdf/10.1177/0886260510383023> (last accessed on January 10, 2023).
[15] CARLO L. CRUZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 128 (2003 ed).
[16] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021.
[17] Citations omitted.
[18] Citations omitted.