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SECTION 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. – Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5) from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 5. Contents and Form of the Certificate of Nomination. – The Certificate of Nomination of a PP, sectoral party, organization or Coalition shall contain the following:

a. Name of the PP, sectoral party, organization or Coalition;

b. Name of the Chairperson/President/Secretary-General of the nominating PP, sectoral party, organization or Coalition;

c. Name and Address of all the nominees;

d. A certification that the nominees have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that they are not candidates for any elective office or have lost in their bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections;

e. A documentary stamp in the amount of Thirty Pesos (Php30.00);

f. The signature and attestation under oath, either by the Chairperson, President, Secretary-General or any other duly authorized officer of the nominating PP, sectoral party, organization or coalition.

....

SECTION 10. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. – A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections. No change of names or alterations of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the Commission except in cases where the nominee dies, becomes incapacitated, or there is valid withdrawal and substitution of nominees as provided in the succeeding sections, in which case, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. (Emphasis supplied)

Jurisdiction is a court's competence "to hear, try and decide a case." It is granted by law and requires courts to examine the remedies sought and issues raised by the parties, the subject matter of the controversy, and the processes employed by the parties in relation to laws granting competence. Once this Court determines that the procedural vehicle employed by the parties raises issues on matters within its legal competence, it may then decide whether to adjudicate the constitutional issues brought before it.

Jurisdiction alone will not require this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute. As held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the power of judicial review remains subject to this Court's discretion in resolving actual controversies:

[W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, as a rule, this Court only passes upon the constitutionality of a statute if it is "directly and necessarily involved in [a] justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned."

Courts decide the constitutionality of a law or executive act only when the following essential requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners must possess locus standi; third, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. These requisites all relate to the justiciability of the issues raised by the parties. If no justiciable controversy is found, this Court may deny the petition as a matter of discretion.

This justiciability requirement is "intertwined with the principle of separation of powers." It cautions the judiciary against unnecessary intrusion on matters committed to the other branches of the government.

....

Again, jurisdiction in itself will not automatically merit a ruling on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions. Invocations of "transcendental importance" will not affect this Court's competence to decide the issues before it, and raising this Court's competence to decide issues of constitutionality will not necessarily require it to do so. Rather, this Court's exercise of its power of judicial review will depend on whether the requirements for invoking such power have been adequately met.^[2] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." When a case is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction over it.

There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when:

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review. (Citation omitted)

We may no longer act on petitioner's prayer that his name be included in the certified list of candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39 days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013 elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.^[5] (Citations omitted)

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both "built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government." In addition, economic reasons justify the rule. Thus:

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, interest being "material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about the question involved." Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought.^[7] (Citations omitted)

Petitioners try to justify its direct recourse to this court by arguing that the issues raised in their petitions are of "transcendental importance."

To determine if an issue is of transcendental importance, this court is guided by the parameters set forth in Francisco v. House of Representatives:

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.

A mere allegation of transcendental importance will not suffice to convince this court to take cognizance of a case. Petitioner SJS, in its memorandum, point out that since this court had taken cognizance of G.R. No. 156052, there is no more need to present other arguments to convince this court that the matter at hand is of transcendental importance.

Petitioners are mistaken. Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations.

Petitioners, however, merely stated:

This Honorable Court, again in the prequel case of Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008, made the following statements —

The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was emphasized, considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here. The parties were after all given ample opportunity to present and argue their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away with the delays concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as the final arbiter of all legal disputes.

The foregoing was an undeniable recognition by this Honorable Court of the importance of this case as it mentioned "its impact on public interest" that justified its taking cognizance of the original petition because the issue would most likely reach it anyway "as the final arbiter of all legal disputes." Thus, petitioners need not stretch its argumentation to convince this Honorable Court about the transcendental importance of this case.

For this court to brush aside the rules of procedure in view of the "transcendental importance" of a case, petitioners must be able to show that "the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence." This they failed to do.^[13] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy choices made by the Executive, Legislative, and other constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes its role in a democracy if it is asked to substitute its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable and representative bodies where there is no unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot lose this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners' invocation of our jurisdiction and the justiciability of their claims must be presented with rigor. Transcendental interest is not a talisman to blur the lines of authority drawn by our most fundamental law.^[14]

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.^[16] (Emphasis in the original)

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.^[17] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.^[18] (Emphases supplied)

[I]n the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What it proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.^[20] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.^[22] (Emphasis supplied)

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.^[23] (Emphasis in original, citations omitted)

The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it.

Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would suffice if government is able to demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the availability of less restrictive measures [must have been] considered." This demands a conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for attaining its avowed interest. It is enough that the means employed is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the government may apply.

Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually — not only conceptually — being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government contemplated on the means available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.

....

The governmental interests to be protected must not only be reasonable. They must be compelling.^[24]

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.^[26] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing — if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest. Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one's registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by holding continuous registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months. To make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to the extent of setting up off-site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and conducted the same on Sundays. Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation following the procedure laid down in Section 28 of RA 8189.

That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest.^[28] (Emphasis supplied)

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

....

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-­and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement — are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the officers — who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before if can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.^[31] (Emphasis in the original)

It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association. This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft, viz.:

Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined concept of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes to expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of projecting his message to the public. But interest and commitment are evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the means of effective expression changes, but the expressive quality remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a candidate by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking the nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely that which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public action, were he to be selected by the voters.

It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The Court found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was infringed when the state effectively denied a party access to its electoral machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas. And at some juncture his supporters and fellow party members may decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately related with the concept of making expression effective. Party access to the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from doing so because those nominees are civil servants.

Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of individual expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative possibilities that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review.^[35] (Citations omitted)

Article VI
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

....

Article IX

C. The Commission on Elections
SECTION 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.

SECTION 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

SECTION 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

The core principle that defines the relationship between our government and those that it governs is captured in the constitutional phrase that ours is a "democratic and republican state". A democratic and republican state is founded on effective representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must be given full consideration. We must always be sensitive in our crafting of doctrines lest the guardians of our electoral system be empowered to silence those who wish to offer their representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our people to mature as citizen in our electorate.

....

There are two types of representatives in the House of Representatives. Those in the first group are "elected from legislative districts". Those in the second group are "elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations."

The differences in terms of representation are clear.

Those who are elected from legislative districts will have their name in the ballot. They present their persons as the potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual qualifications that will be assessed by COMELEC on the basis of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Should there be disqualification it would be their personal circumstances, which will be reviewed, in the proper case, by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The individual representative can lose subsequent elections for various reasons, including dissatisfaction from those that initially elected him/her into office.

Incidentally, those who present themselves for election by legislative districts may or may not be supported by a registered political party. This may give them added political advantages in the electoral exercise, which includes the goodwill, reputation and resources of the major political party they affiliate with. However, it is not the nature of the political party that endorses them that is critical in assessing the qualifications or disqualifications of the candidate.

The elected district representative in the House of Representative is directly accountable to his/her electorate. The political party s/he affiliates with only shares that political accountability; but, only to a certain extent. Good performance is usually rewarded with subsequent election to another term. It is the elected representative, not the political party that will get re-elected. We can even take judicial notice that party affiliation may change in subsequent elections for various reasons, without any effect on the qualification of the elected representative.

The political party that affiliates those who participate in elections in legislative districts organize primarily to have their candidates win. These political parties have avowed principles and platforms of government. But, they will be known more through the personalities and popularity of their candidates. Often, compromises occur in the political party's philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate.

This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.

The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party list system's intentions are broader than simply to "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented become lawmakers themselves".

Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed individual candidate over platforms and political programs. Political parties were convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the national to the local level that gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement the electoral campaigns of their members. Most elections were choices between competing personalities often with very little discernible differences in their interpretation and solutions for contemporary issues. The electorate chose on the bases of personality and popularity; only after the candidates were elected to public offices will they later find out the concrete political programs that the candidate will execute. Our history is replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked cohesion on the basis of principle. In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and marginalized large parts of our population.

The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been intended to enhance and further entrench the same system. It is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable true representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a "democratic and republican state".^[38] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is the nurturing ground to mature genuine political parties and give them the experience and the ability to build constituencies for other elective public offices.

In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by constitutionally entrenching the ability of political parties and organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the benefit of those who have been marginalized and underrepresented in the past. It makes it possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to principle and platform rather than their family affiliation. It encourages more collective action by the membership of the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the party be controlled only by a select few.

Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst ... who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" that the party list system was enacted. Rather, it was for everyone in so far as attempting a reform in our politics.

....

Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those who are marginalized or underrepresented. Neither do they only have for their constituency those "who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity". In truth, all of us, regardless of economic class, are constituents of ecological advocacies.

Also, political parties organized along ideological lines—the socialist or even right wing political parties—are groups motivated by their own narratives of our history, a vision of what society can be and how it can get there. There is no limit to the economic class that can be gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political platforms. Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they have the constituency that can win them a seat will enrich the deliberations in that legislative chamber. Having them voice out opinions--whether true or false--should make the choices of our representatives richer. It will make the choices of our representatives more democratic.

Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are marginalized and underrepresented, but they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic class. Just a glance at the history of strong political parties in different jurisdictions will show that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will provide their rationale and continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform their movement forward.

Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may care for the marginalized and underrepresented, but they are not themselves--nor for their effectivity in the House of Representatives should we require that they can only come from that class.

Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement of their platforms. Rather, it should be seen as clear examples where interests and advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative districts, cry out for representation.^[40] (Citations omitted)

The UDHR provides:

Article 21. 
 

(1)	Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
 

(a)	To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b)	To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c)	To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

[T]he scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
....
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.^[41]

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot — the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].

....

Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."

The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.^[46]

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well­ defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.^[49] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on ... baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

....

"[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."^[50]

No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

....

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.^[51] (Citations omitted)

(1)	the phrase "a person who has lost his bid for elective office in the immediately preceding election" under Section 8 of RA 7941;
(2)	the phrase "have lost in their bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections" under Section 5(d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 10717; and
(3)	the phrase "or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections" under Section 10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 10717.[9]

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

MR. RODRIGO. x x x In the light of the phrase "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," do I take it that this party list system and sectoral representation provision will not take effect until an enabling act or an implementing legislation shall have been enacted by Congress?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the first Assembly will be in March or April. But when we say, "AS PROVIDED BY LAW," it could really mean that it may be by ordinance appended to this constitution or an executive order by the incumbent President or, as the Gentleman has said, by law provided by the incoming Congress. So, it could be any of these ways.

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, we are all witnesses to the difficulty in arriving at a consensus of these very novel ideas on the disputes that we have had. And up to now, there is no real consensus yet. Does the Commissioner believe that we should really try to go into the details by enacting an ordinance to the Constitution? x x x

MR. MONSOD. We just want to establish the principle of the party list system with sectoral representation in the present Constitution. x x x

MR. RODRIGO. Considering our time constraint and the many other provisions that we have not yet discussed, does the Commissioner believe that we are in a position to draft, study, and enact a virtual piece of legislation, with all details, regarding the implementation of this party-list system and sectoral representation, so that it will be finished in time for the approval of this Constitution? Should we not abandon that idea and leave this matter to the legislature?

MR. MONSOD. I believe that it is really not a very complicated system, and it is possible. But I will yield to the time problem, if there is really a time problem. Certainly, I do not think that this Commission would want to put an ordinance that is half-baked.^[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. x x x.^[19] (Italics in the original)

x x x First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," x x x ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"), and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," x x x. Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. x x x Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decision[-]making," x x x that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."^[45] (Emphasis supplied, and citations and italics omitted)

Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-­ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code [(OEC)] on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2003 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.^[48] (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied, and italics in the original)

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate's freedom of choice, is found both in the Constitution and the law. After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.^[50] (Citation and emphasis omitted, and underscoring supplied)

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy. – a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Accordingly, our assailed Decision's submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms – those of expression and association – lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express one's political views through candidacy, as to invoke a rigorous standard of review. Bart v. Telford pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one's interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection. Moreover, one cannot bring one's action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.

Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.^[52] (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original, and underscoring supplied)

We unhesitatingly reaffirm the x x x holding that Congress had, and has, the power to prevent x x x others x x x from holding a party office, working at the polls, and acting as party paymaster for other party workers. An Act of Congress going no farther would, in our view, unquestionably be valid. So would it be if, in plain and understandable language, the statute forbade activities such as organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party convention. Our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees.

Such decision on our part would no more than confirm the judgment of history, a judgment made by this country over the last century that it is in the best interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited. That this judgment eventuated is indisputable, and the major steps in reaching it may be simply and briefly set down.^[55] (Emphasis supplied)

Unlike ordinary breach-of-the-peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, § 818 is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, § 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that § 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers x x x. Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that § 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.^[56] (Emphasis supplied)

x x x [The SCOTUS] held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees' expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions. Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest­-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question.^[57] (Citations omitted)

[T]hat the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public employees substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights.^[59] (Citation and emphasis omitted, and underscoring supplied)

Far from recognizing candidacy as a "fundamental right," we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot "does not, of itself, compel close scrutiny." "In approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." In assessing challenges to state election laws that restrict access to the ballot, this Court has not formulated a "litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause." Decision in this area of constitutional adjudication is a matter of degree, and involves a consideration of the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests the State seeks to protect by placing restrictions on candidacy, and the nature of the interests of those who may be burdened by the restrictions.

Our ballot access cases, however, do focus on the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the "availability of political opportunity." This Court has departed from traditional equal protection analysis in recent years in two essentially separate, although similar, lines of ballot access cases.

One line of ballot access cases involves classifications based on wealth. In invalidating candidate filing-fee provisions, for example, we have departed from traditional equal protection analysis because such a "system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic status." "Whatever may be the political mood at any given time, our tradition has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their economic status." Economic status is not a measure of a prospective candidate's qualifications to hold elective office, and a filing fee alone is an inadequate test of whether a candidacy is serious or spurious. Clearly, the challenged provisions in the instant case involve neither filing fees nor restrictions that invidiously burden those of lower economic status. This line of cases, therefore, does not support a departure from the traditional equal protection principles.

The second line of ballot access cases involves classification schemes that impose burdens on new or small political parties or independent candidates. These cases involve requirements that an independent candidate or minor party demonstrate a certain level of support among the electorate before the minor party or candidate may obtain a place on the ballot. In these cases, the Court has emphasized that the States have important interests in protecting the integrity of their political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies, in ensuring that their election processes are efficient, in avoiding voter confusion caused by an overcrowded ballot, and in avoiding the expense and burden of run-off elections. To this end, the Court has upheld reasonable level-of-­support requirements and classifications that turn on the political party's success in prior elections. The Court has recognized, however, that such requirements may burden First Amendment interests in ensuring freedom of association, as these requirements classify on the basis of a candidate's association with particular political parties. Consequently, the State may not act to maintain the "status quo" by making it virtually impossible for any but the two major parties to achieve ballot positions for their candidates.

The provisions of the Texas Constitution challenged in this case do not contain any classification that imposes special burdens on minority political parties or independent candidates. The burdens placed on those candidates subject to § 19 and § 65 in no way depend upon political affiliation or political viewpoint.

It does not automatically follow, of course, that we must apply traditional equal protection principles in examining § 19 and § 65 merely because these restrictions on candidacy do not fall into the two patterns just described. But this fact does counsel against discarding traditional principles without first examining the nature of the interests that are affected and the extent of the burden these provisions place on candidacy. Not all ballot access restrictions require "heightened" equal protection scrutiny. The Court, for example, applied traditional equal protection principles to uphold a classification scheme that denied absentee ballots to inmates in jail awaiting trial. Thus, it is necessary to examine the provisions in question in terms of the extent of the burdens that they place on the candidacy of current holders of public office.^[63] (Emphasis supplied, and citations omitted)

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and under­represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well­-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the [HOR]. x x x

x x x x

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. x x x

x x x x

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-­list system will be the entry point to membership in the [HOR] for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

x x x x

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and [RA] 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the [HOR]. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

x x x x

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the [HOR], of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-­defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

x x x x

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and [RA] 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and [RA] 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.^[68] (Citations omitted, and emphasis and italics in the original)

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. – No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.

The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

The party-list system was an innovation introduced by the drafters of the Constitution to diversify representation in the [HOR]. It was meant to "open the system," in recognition of the real need to provide an effective platform to those who belong to marginalized sectors of society, such as labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth, and also to provide an avenue to those who had been unable to gain seats in the legislature because of the dominance of the traditional and well-established political parties. x x x

x x x x

x x x RA 7941 states that the "State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the [HOR] by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020.)

SECTION 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. — Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5) from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. xxx

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is reasonable classification. It must be shown, therefore, that the classification (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.^[1]

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced." It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."

We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.

• Is there a legitimate government interest behind the classification?
  
• Is the classification rationally related to this legitimate government interest?^[12]

• Does the challenged provision, on its face or in its impact (i.e., since the equal protection right may be infringed not only by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decision-maker applying it), create a distinction? and,
  
• If so, does the distinction impose burdens or deny a benefit?

Nomination of Party-List Representatives. — Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5) from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list.