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Oppugned in the consolidated cases before Us is the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10963,^[4] or the "Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion" (TRAIN) Act, which amended RA No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. The TRAIN Act was the first package of the Duterte administration's Comprehensive Tax Reform Program.^[5] Prior to its enactment, the precursor tax reform bills of RA No. 10963, i.e., House Bill (HB) No. 5636 and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1592, were certified as urgent by former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte). This tax measure was primarily intended to fund the government's accelerated spending under its "Build, Build, Build" program.^[6]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 236118, hereafter referred to as "Tinio, et al.," were, at the time, legislators and principal authors of several bills which were eventually substituted by HB No. 5636. They lodged the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court^[7] to strike down the TRAIN Act for having been passed by Congress and signed by President Duterte in violation of the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules of the House of Representatives (House). Before this Court, Tinio, et al. claim that the unconstitutionality of the assailed statute is a matter of transcendental importance and that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except to avail of the instant Petition.^[8] Aside from being Members of the House, they ground their legal standing as citizens and taxpayers, and as representatives of the public in general.^[9] In the main, they proffer that the passage of the law was unconstitutionally railroaded when the TRAIN Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) Report was ratified despite the supposed glaring lack of quorum in the House on the night of 13 December 2017.^[10] Concomitantly, considering that the bill was never properly passed by the Congress, President Duterte's act of signing the same into law was likewise tainted with grave abuse of discretion.^[11] In the same vein, Tinio, et al. pray for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the TRAIN Act as it would purportedly "cause grave injustice and irreparable violation of the Constitution and the rights of the people."^[12]

On the other hand, petitioners in G.R. No. 236295 (for brevity, "Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba") filed a separate Petition for Certiorari,^[13] also under Rule 65, as consumers and in representation of other consumers who claim to be adversely affected by the pass-on excise taxes on diesel, coal, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and kerosene imposed by the TRAIN Act. In availing of the remedy of certiorari, they invoke the expanded judicial power of the Court to determine whether or not the act of the Legislature, i.e., supposedly passing the challenged law without the required quorum and votes, was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.^[14] Moreover, some provisions in the Act, such as the excise tax on coal,^[15] avowedly did not originate from the House, in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.^[16] Furthermore, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba asseverate that the excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene are regressive and constitute taxes on subsistence, which particularly burden low-income and poor families considering that these directly impact the costs of basic necessities.^[17] As such, the impositions are downright confiscatory, baseless, discriminatory, and violative of the right of the people to due process of law and equal protection of the laws.^[18] They further posit before this Court that the constitutionality of the law is a matter of transcendental importance and is imbued with public interest.^[19] On the basis of suffering "grave and irreparable injury," they similarly pray for the issuance of injunctive reliefs pending the resolution of the controversy to halt the implementation of the law and to maintain the last, actual, peaceable, and uncontested state of things prior to its enactment.^[20]

For their part, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), submitted, pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated 23 January 2018 consolidating the two Petitions, a Consolidated Comment,^[21] beseeching their dismissal, the same being riddled with several procedural infirmities as petitioners: (1) improperly availed of the special civil action for certiorari; (2) violated the principle of hierarchy of courts; (3) failed to present an actual case or controversy; (4) raised political questions; (5) failed to implead Congress as an indispensable party; and (6) violated the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit in G.R. No. 236118 since it impleads President Duterte as a respondent.^[22]

On the constitutional challenges, respondents assert that the TRAIN Act was both validly passed by Congress and signed by the President.^[23] They postulate that the BCC Report was ratified in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules of the House of Representatives.^[24] Resolute in their stance that the Court is precluded from inquiring into the existence of a quorum, respondents zero in on the conclusive nature of House Journal No. 48, detailing the events of the 13 December 2017 session as well as the enrolled bill doctrine.^[25] They further aver that the excise tax on coal is not a rider pursuant to the Constitution and Section 83, Rule XXIX of the Rules of the Senate^[26] and avow that the exaction on oil products is imbued with significant revenue, regulatory, and remedial policy considerations.^[27] For the respondents, the TRAIN Act is progressive and does not violate the due process clause.^[28]

In opposing the application for injunctive relief, respondents contend that petitioners fail to show sufficient cause to overcome the presumption of validity of the TRAIN Act and that granting the same would constitute a prejudgment of the main case.^[29]

In their Reply,^[30] Tinio, et al. maintain that: (1) certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of the TRAIN Act pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence;^[31] (2) direct resort to this Court is allowable given that several exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts are attendant to the case at hand;^[32] (3) the issues raised are not political questions because they involve ascertaining whether respondents' actions were done within the bounds of the Constitution and the Internal Rules of the House;^[33] (4) there is no need to implead the entire Congress as parties to the case considering that what is precisely being assailed is not a true congressional act but the actions of a select group of legislators actually present in the plenary hall, who "railroaded" the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report;^[34] and (5) President Duterte should not be dropped as respondent given that the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit was not carried over to the Constitution and, assuming that it continues to exist, the doctrine should not operate to prevent the Court from examining the legality of the President's actions.^[35] Ultimately, Tinio, et al. submit that, even assuming that their Petition is procedurally infirm, the transcendental public interest surrounding the case behooves the Court to resolve the constitutionality of the TRAIN Act.^[36]

On the substantive aspect, Tinio, et al. take issue with respondents' reliance on the entries in the journals of both Houses of Congress and the enrolled bill, avowing that they should not prevail over actual evidence showing a clear lack of quorum and the conduct of a vote on the night of 13 December 2017.^[37] Moreover, respondents propounded no proof of their claim that the TRAIN Act is "pro-poor" and progressive.^[38] Conversely, Tinio, et al. advance that inflation and costs have continuously been on the rise ever since the passage of the TRAIN Act and its deleterious effects are presently felt by the most vulnerable sectors.^[39] Necessarily, this goes to show that the TRAIN Act violates Section 28(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which mandates Congress to "evolve a progressive system of taxation."^[40] Tinio, et al. reiterated their prayer for the issuance of a restraining order to halt the implementation of the TRAIN Act.^[41]

Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba filed their own Reply,^[42] avouching that: (1) certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the unconstitutionality of the TRAIN Act;^[43] (2) genuine issues on the constitutionality of a law serves as an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts;^[44] (3) there is an actual case or controversy because the passage of the TRAIN Act violates the Constitution, and the its provisions, which are confiscatory and oppressive, violate the rights of the people;^[45] (4) the review of the act of Congress in this case is not a political question since the issue delves exactly into the validity of the exercise of its discretionary power;^[46] (5) both Houses of Congress are properly impleaded in this case through their respective heads;^[47] and (6) their Petition did not implead President Duterte, but, in any event, misjoinder of parties is not a cause for the dismissal of an action.^[48]

Similarly, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba dispute respondents' postulations on the merits of the case. They intransigently aver that the passage of the TRAIN Act was invalid due to the absence of a quorum in the House.^[49] The Constitutional directive of requiring a majority of each House of Congress to constitute a quorum to do business necessarily extends to the ratification of bills.^[50] So, too, they stand firm on their position that the issue of existence of a quorum is a justiciable question, which the courts may validly pass upon.^[51] Controverting the Journal cited by respondents, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba asseverate that it did not contain a categorical statement proving that a quorum still existed at the time the ratification of the BCC Report was undertaken.^[52] They remain unruffled in stating that the provision imposing excise tax on coal is a clear rider as it was not included in the House version of the TRAIN bills, not to mention that it was not intended by the House to form part of the amendments to the Tax Code,^[53] and that the provisions imposing excise taxes on coal, LPG, kerosene, and diesel must be struck down for being null and void considering that they violate the equal protection clause.^[54] These provisions specifically and expressly discriminate against the poor while favoring the rich given that the objects of the tax are essential commodities and are components to other basic necessities.^[55] With the prices of commodities escalating and the purchasing power of underprivileged families remaining the same, the resulting increased burden amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.^[56] Petitioners then echo their prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs.^[57]

In the interregnum, Tinio, et al. filed on 16 November 2018 an Urgent Motion to Resolve,^[58] while Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba set forth a 2nd Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo Ante Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction^[59] dated 3 December 2018, which the Court noted in the Resolution^[60] dated 4 June 2019.

After a painstaking analysis of the voluminous records of the case, the Court discerns eight conundrums posed for its resolution:

I

May the Court take cognizance of the consolidated Petitions?

II

Did petitioners violate the principle of hierarchy of courts?

III

Is Congress, as an institution, an indispensable party which should have been impleaded in the Petitions?

IV

Did Tinio, et al. violate the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit in their Petition?

V

 Was the TRAIN Act validly enacted into law?

VI

Is the provision amending Section 151 of the Tax Code a rider?

VII

Is the TRAIN Act violative of the due process clause?

VIII

Is the TRAIN Act violative of the equal protection clause and Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution?

The issues shall be discussed in seriatim.

It is now well-ensconced that the Court's judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution has been expanded beyond its traditional scope of merely adjudicating controversies arising from competing demandable legal rights, to also determining whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In attempting to wrest away the instant cases from the Court's reach, the OSG contends that the Petitions raise political questions which are not justiciable given that they involve the wisdom, justice, and expediency of the challenged legislation – matters which are wholly within the realm of the Congress' discretion.^[61]

The OSG’s contention fails to persuade.

The expanded concept of judicial power was brought about precisely because of the use and abuse of the political question doctrine during the Martial Law era under former President Ferdinand Marcos.^[62] Presently, an act of any branch or instrumentality of the government may be assailed if the same was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, especially if such acts purportedly violate the Constitution and the fundamental rights guaranteed therein.^[63] By discharging its positive duty to adjudicate any question on the constitutionality of the acts of the government, the Court assures that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld at all times.^[64]

Corollary thereto, it is well settled that the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are indeed the proper remedies to "set right, undo, and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions."^[65]

Concededly, the Court does not have unbridled authority to rule on just any claim of constitutional violation. Before the power of judicial review may be invoked, four exacting requisites must be proved, viz.: "(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case."^[66]

After a scrutinous assay of the pleadings submitted, the Court hereby rules and so holds that the above four requisites have been complied with.

First. There is an actual case or controversy.

An actual case or controversy "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute."^[67] Stated otherwise, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."^[68] This requisite is complied with when "there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts."^[69]

Related thereto is the prerequisite of ripeness. In order for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action."^[70] The petitioner must demonstrate that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."^[71]

Tinio, et al. bewail that their rights as legislators and representatives of the people were violated when the leaders of the House railroaded the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report and effectively bypassed the safeguards set by the Constitution in the enactment of laws. Thus, they claim direct injury at the hands of respondents.^[72] Additionally, they aver that the imposition of regressive taxes has led to inflation on the prices of basic commodities and services, which is felt most pronouncedly by the marginalized sectors.^[73]

For their part, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba avouch that the additional impositions on coal, diesel, kerosene, and LPG under the TRAIN Act have already injured them, as well as the whole nation. From the jeepney drivers who rely on diesel fuel, to households who rely on LPG and kerosene, and even to power generation plants who rely on coal for fuel, which pass on the added costs to the end-consumers, the effects of the law have already trickled into every citizen's daily life.^[74]

Irrefragably, the TRAIN Act has been in effect during the last four years. Its impositions, assuming that the same are indeed unconstitutional, have already impacted everyone, including petitioners and the stakeholders they reportedly represent. At the very least, the claim of Tinio, et al. that they have already suffered a direct injury from respondents when they were allegedly silenced and ignored in the ratification process of the BCC Report constitute an actual case or controversy. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the consolidated Petitions submit an actual case or controversy that is already ripe for adjudication.

Second. Petitioners have locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.^[75] In assessing locus standi, the Court has recognized both traditional suitors, i.e., those who stand to suffer direct or immediate threat of injury by a challenged measure, and non-traditional suitors, i.e., those who bring a suit in representation of parties not before the Court.^[76]

Tinio, et al. have the requisite traditional standing as legislators considering that the purported invalidity in the passage of the law by a handful of Members of the House violated their prerogatives as legislators and contravened the Constitution itself. Undoubtedly, legislators have a legal standing to ensure that the prerogatives, powers, privileges, and the duties vested by the Constitution in the Legislature, as an institution, remain inviolate.^[77]

Moreover, both petitioners contend that they, and the people they represent, i.e., their respective representations and the consumer-public as a whole, have already been injured by the TRAIN Act. These personal and substantial interests in the subject matter, whether in the traditional or the non­ traditional sense, indubitably give them legal standing to question the law.^[78]

In any event, the imposition of new taxes and the increase of existing taxes, such as those from the numerous excise tax provisions in the TRAIN Act, have far-reaching implications both to the taxpaying public and the government who rely on the revenues generated thereby. This necessitates the relaxation of the requirement of locus standi in order for the matter to be definitively resolved for the public good.^[79]

Third. The question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity.

The very recent case of Calleja v. Executive Secretary^[80] instructs that this requisite does not mean elevating the matter directly with this Court; rather, the question of unconstitutionality should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Nevertheless, the same case found that such requisite was still met in the Petitions filed therein since the issue was technically raised at the first instance.^[81]

Here, both Petitions assail the constitutionality of the TRAIN Act at the first instance. Hence, the requisite of "earliest opportunity" is complied with.

Fourth. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the cases.

The final requisite dictates that "[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law."^[82] This requirement is rooted on two constitutional principles: the principle of deference and the principle of reasonable caution in striking down an act by a co-equal political branch of government.^[83] Consequently, "to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative."^[84]

The instant consolidated Petitions allege constitutional violations in both the enactment process of the law and in the actual provisions thereof. Forsooth, the issue of constitutionality of the TRAIN Act is the very lis mota of the cases.

Having established that the cases at bench meet the requisites for the Court's exercise of its expanded power of judicial review, it now behooves this Court to determine if the Petitions suffer from other procedural infirmities as would merit their immediate dismissal.

The OSG postulates that the consolidated Petitions should be immediately dismissed for violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts without any justification for such deviation.^[85]

Petitioners, on the other hand, do not deny non-compliance with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts but assert that compelling exceptions are extant, justifying a direct resort to this Court.

Tinio, et al. advance the argument that the "urgent resolution of the constitutional issues on quorum and other requirements in legislative enactment procedures, as well as the substantive invalidity of the TRAIN Law on the ground of regressivity necessitate direct resort to the Court."^[86] In addition, they posit that"[w]here the constitutional violations are committed by no less than the heads of the executive and legislative branches of government, such violations must be stricken down by no less than the Supreme Court."^[87] So, too, do they aver that the following exceptions apply: (a) there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (d) there is exigency in certain situations; (e) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (f) there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (g) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."^[88]

Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba aver that direct resort is allowable given that "the Petition raised the very issue of constitutionality of the TRAIN Law. It also involves the grave abuse of Congress and the Executive Department in passing a tax measure that violates both the inherent limitations of the taxing power of the State, as well as the Constitutional provisions on the due process and equal protection."^[89] Stripped of verbiage, they anchor their claim of exception on genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time.^[90]

It cannot be stressed enough that issues on constitutionality of laws may likewise be brought before the courts of general jurisdiction given that judicial power resides not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts. Apropos is the axiomatic dictum, "We are the court of last resort, not the first."^[91] With respect to assailing the constitutionality of tax laws and regulations, however, exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Tax Appeals.^[92]

Nevertheless, this Court has also ruled that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and there are several exceptions which would justify non-application thereof, namely:

1. there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
   
   
2. the issues involved are of transcendental importance, such that the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence;
   
   
3. in cases of first impression;
   
   
4. the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
   
   
5. the time element presented in the case cannot be ignored;
   
   
6. when the subject of review is an act of a constitutional organ;
   
   
7. when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and
   
   
8. when the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.^[93]

As aptly pointed out by petitioners, several of the above-mentioned enumerations apply. Most significantly, the first and second exceptions obtain in the present Petitions. Along this grain, both petitioners have consistently recounted that the enactment of the TRAIN Act was riddled with abnormalities which have transgressed the boundaries set by our fundamental law. Even more pressing are the inveighed effects of the law, which allegedly operate to tax the poor out of existence. The gravity of these claims are matters that require the swift action of the highest court in the land. Perforce, direct resort may be excused in this instance.

Warding off any chances that the Petitions may prosper, the OSG also seeks the dismissal of the cases on the ground that petitioners failed to implead Congress as an indispensable party.^[94]

As earlier adumbrated, Tinio, et al. assert that the entirety of Congress is not an indispensable party herein. This is consistent with their theory that the passage of the TRAIN Act was not a valid plenary act of the Legislative owing to the lack of quorum and the lack of the required votes. Thus, they are adamant that respondent House leaders, as those responsible for the invalid ratification of the BCC Report, are the real indispensable parties.^[95]

On the other hand, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba proffer that they clearly impleaded both Houses of Congress through their respective heads, then Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez) and Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III (SP Pimentel), as representatives of the entire membership of both Houses, and not in their personal capacities.^[96]

In identifying indispensable parties, the Court has held that:

Indispensable parties are those with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence. The interests of such indispensable parties in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that their legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity and a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if they are not joined.^[97]

Contrary to the assertions of Tinio, et al., the entirety of Congress has material interest in the challenge to the constitutionality of the TRAIN Act. While the purported violations were seemingly done by only a handful of legislators, the reliefs sought by petitioners would nonetheless result in the overturning of an otherwise presumably valid statute. Certainly, unless and until the Court declares otherwise, every statute passed by Congress is presumed to be constitutional and deserves to be accorded respect and obeisance.^[98] As the Court ordained in Rep. Lagman v. Senate President Pimentel,^[99] the entire body of Congress, and not merely the respective leaders of its two Houses, would be directly affected when a congressional act is struck down.^[100] However, Lagman also teaches that inasmuch as Congress was impleaded as a respondent in the other consolidated Petition, there can be substantial compliance with the requirement of impleading an indispensable party.^[101]

Here, the Petition filed by Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba impleads Speaker Alvarez and SP Pimentel in their official capacities "in representation" of the House and the Senate, respectively.^[102] To the Court's mind, this more than adequately satisfies the procedural requirement of impleading Congress to afford it due process in defending the validity of the TRAIN Act.

On the final procedural issue, the OSG submits that the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 236118 should be dismissed for violating the doctrine of presidential immunity as then President Duterte was impleaded therein.^[103]

Tinio, et al. maintain that President Duterte should not be dropped as a respondent as the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit finds no basis in the 1987 Constitution.^[104] In any event, even assuming that such doctrine was adopted in the present Constitution, it cannot be used to prevent the courts from examining the legality of presidential acts, leaving persons injured without any recourse. They underscore that this is especially true for purported violations of Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution since the President is the "last guard of the gate" before a law is passed. Avowedly, a contrary ruling would weaken the Court's power of judicial review.^[105]

The presidential immunity from suit is an elementary doctrine — "The President may not be sued during his tenure or actual incumbency, and there is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the Constitution or law. This privilege stems from the recognition of the President's vast and significant functions which can be disrupted by court litigations."^[106]

The case of De Lima v. President Duterte^[107] is particularly instructive, wherein the Court held that "unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions prevents us from making any distinctions. We should still be guided by our precedents."^[108]

Accordingly, it is of no moment that President Duterte was impleaded for his actions done pursuant to Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution; the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit in our jurisdiction makes no qualification. Thusly, Tinio, et al. erred in impleading President Duterte during his tenure.

All the same, this procedural faux pas would not operate to cause the immediate dismissal of the Petitions. Rather, the President should simply be dropped as a party respondent.^[109]

Having passed upon the procedural hurdles posed by the respondents, the Court shall now delve into the substantive issues of the present Petitions.

Foremost among the substantive matters foisted by the consolidated Petitions is whether or not the TRAIN Act was validly passed. A negative resolution of this issue would forestall any examination on the succeeding questions as the entire law would be rendered null and void. To resolve this jugular issue, however, the Court must re-examine traditional constitutional principles in light of the evolving times but not without great care, which would ensure that the spirit animating the Organic Law is ever preserved.

It is primal that legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by Congress, pursuant to the mandate of the 1987 Constitution.^[110] Section 1, Article VI states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.^[111]

Appositely, Section 16(2), Article VI requires the presence of a quorum before either of the Houses can transact its business –

SEC. 16. . . .

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

Taken altogether, these two provisions ordain the basic safeguard that legislative power may only be exercised by the collegiate body of Congress. Simply put, only the Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.^[112] In Belgica v. Ochoa,^[113] the Court struck down as unconstitutional the provisions in the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, which conferred post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, and which effectively allowed them to individually exercise the power of appropriation, a power lodged in the Congress as a whole.^[114] Indeed, the importance of Congress' conduct of its business as a collegial body cannot be gainsaid. On this score, petitioners are correct in asserting that a quorum is "the basic procedural hurdle to ensure that the House acts with the collective will of the body, and not just that of one Member, or few Members, or a select group only."^[115]

Nevertheless, equally axiomatic is the Constitutional precept that empowers the Congress to determine and adopt its own rules of proceedings.^[116] In this regard, Section 75, Rule XI of the Internal Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 75. Quorum. - A majority of all the Members of the House shall constitute a quorum. The House shall not transact business without a quorum. A member who questions the existence of a quorum shall not leave the session hall until the question is resolved or acted upon, otherwise, the question shall be deemed abandoned.^[117]

The foregoing provision is consistent with the quorum requirement provided in the immediately preceding constitutional provision.

The thrust of petitioners' theory is that the TRAIN Act breached Section 16(2), Article VI, insisting that there was an "utter lack of quorum" when the House ratified the TRAIN BCC Report on the night of 13 December 2017,^[118] thereby making the TRAIN Act null and void.^[119] They beseech the Court to take cognizance of this particular issue and avouch^[120] that the determination of the presence of a quorum is a justiciable subject as "hinted" in Arroyo v. De Venecia,^[121] viz.:

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§ 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.^[122]

To substantiate their theory of the law's invalidity, Tinio, et al. adduce before this Court a video recording of the 13 December 2017 session, which was later on uploaded to the YouTube channel of the House. The lack of quorum during the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report was seemingly self-evident in the said recording. The video was bolstered by a photograph of the session hall taken by Representative Tinio, showing that it was near-empty.^[123]

On the strength of such pieces of evidence, petitioners implore this Court to declare an act of Congress as invalid for being an ostensible violation of a constitutional provision. Implicit in the relief sought is the entreaty to look into the events of the 13 December 2017 session proceedings and then definitively declare, based on the evidence submitted, that there was no quorum during the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report.

The Court refuses to pander to petitioners' theory.

Prefatorily, it is imperative that this particular legal issue be reframed in such a way that it would reflect what petitioners are actually assailing in the instant controversy.

It is uncontroverted that the 13 December 2017 session of the House commenced with the declaration of a quorum, consistent with Sections 72 and 74 of its Internal Rules of Procedure.^[124] When the roll was called at 4:00 p.m., 232 out of the 295 members responded.^[125] Plain as day, no question was raised in this regard. Journal No. 48^[126] released by the House Journal Service (Plenary Affairs Bureau) on that day provides a clear and explicit account of the presence of quorum during such session, the pertinent portions thereof divulge—

ROLL CALL

On motion of Rep. Arthur R. Defensor Jr., there being no objection, the Chair directed the Secretary General to call the Roll and the following Members were present:

. . . .

With 232 Members responding to the Call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.^[127]

Journal No. 48 further stipulates that the session was suspended at 7:44 p.m., and then resumed at 10:02 p.m. Upon resumption, the matters on the Suspension of Consideration of House Concurrent Resolution No. 9 and the Authority to Conduct Committee Meetings and Hearings During the Recess were taken up, with the BCC Report having been ratified shortly thereafter, upon motion, and without objection.^[128] Prior to ratification, not a single objection was raised with respect to the presence of a quorum, and it was only when the BCC Report was considered for ratification that objections were heard. The session was then adjourned at 10:05 p.m.^[129]

In both Petitions, petitioners provide the Court a detailed account of what supposedly transpired "at around 10:45 in the evening" of 13 December 2017, and thereafter implore that the "events on the floor during the last three minutes of the session in question" be examined.^[130]

Given the foregoing disquisitions, it is hard to miss that the formulation of the legal issue as one which simply involves the passage of a law that violates the quorum requirement under the Constitution is an oversimplified and misleading presentation of the controversy at bench. For one, it forces the Court to assume that the absence of a quorum is an established fact in the resolution of this controversy. As to be discussed below, this remains a question of fact which must be resolved vis-à-vis fundamental doctrines relating to the evidentiary value of certain official documents. In any case, assuming that this controversy provides an opportunity to set exceptions to said doctrines, there must be clear and convincing evidence that would sway the Court to consider invalidating an official act. For another, such articulation fails to take into account the nuances attendant in these cases, including the fact that the purported violation occurred in the middle of a session which was validly constituted. This is a critical consideration because it enables the Court to factor in the internal nature of the proceedings and the fact that established rules and regulations are already in place, which cannot be simply brushed aside. As such, this pressing issue culminates to a quandary involving the primary doctrine of separation of powers.

Properly restated, the consolidated Petitions beg the pivotal question — Did or did not the House "lose" its quorum during the 13 December 2017?

Incipiently, the Court acknowledges the power of the House to establish the manner by which quorum is determined and the majority is counted.

Indeed, Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution authorizes each House of Congress to determine the rules for the conduct of its own proceedings. As a necessary consequence of this provision, it is also within the powers of the House to employ its own particular method of determining the presence of a continuing quorum to be able to conduct its affairs, including the power to resolve any issues arising therefrom. By virtue of such authority, it may implement a system whereby once a quorum had been established at the beginning of the session, certain procedural barriers must be overcome before any declaration that the same had been "lost" during the proceedings may be made. Such state of quorum thenceforth persists unless properly challenged, and quorum is recounted via a roll call.

Any question relating to quorum, which was raised in the middle of a valid and regular session, therefore, should be properly characterized as an internal issue that must be addressed exclusively by the House. This is due to the fact that its resolution is entirely dependent upon the parameters of its own Internal Rules and historical practices. For instance, Section 76 of the Internal Rules provides for the available remedy in instances where there is no quorum after the roll call, thus:

Section 76. Absence of Quorum. - In the absence of a quorum after the roll call, the Members present may compel the attendance of absent Members.

In all calls of the House, the doors shall be closed. Except those who are excused from attendance in accordance with Section 71 hereof, the absent Members, by order of a majority of those present, shall be sent for and arrested wherever they may be found and conducted to the session hall in custody in order to secure their attendance at the session. The order shall be executed by the Sergeant-at-Arms and by such officers as the Speaker may designate. After the presence of the Members arrested is secured at the session hall, the Speaker shall determine the conditions for their discharge. Members who voluntarily appear shall be admitted immediately to the session hall and shall report to the Secretary General to have their presence recorded.^[131]

Section 71 of the same Rules, in turn, indicates that in exceptional cases, absent Members of the House are still deemed present and counted towards quorum when they are attending committee hearings, upon notification to the Secretary General, or are on official missions, as approved by the Speaker, viz.:

Section 71. Attendance in Sessions. - Every Member shall be present in all sessions of the House unless prevented from doing so by sickness or other unavoidable circumstances duly reported to the House through the Secretary General.

While the House is in session, the following shall be deemed present:

a.	Members who are attending committee meetings as authorized by the Committee on Rules, in accordance with Section 35 hereof, upon written notification to the Secretary General by the concerned committee secretary;
b.	Members who are attending meetings of:
	b.1.	The Commission on Appointments;
	b.2.	The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
	b.3.	Bicameral Conference Committees
c.	Members who are on official mission as approved by the Speaker.[132]

Clearly, the physical absences of these Members do not militate against their attendance in a particular session and do not automatically translate to the fact of quorum being "lost," especially so when they have had their presence recorded during the initial roll call.

In this regard, this Court discerns that the instant Petitions are mere attempts to enforce the Internal Rules of the House, disguised as a constitutional attack against an official act of Congress. Significantly, petitioners allege that their objection to the ratification of the BCC Report on the basis of a lack of quorum was not heard, and even ignored.^[133] In sooth, these averments are directed towards a disregard of Sections 74 and 75 of the Internal Rules, the provisions of which assume importance once a member raises a question relating to quorum:

Section 74. Roll Call. — The names of Members shall be called by surnames alphabetically. When two (2) or more Members have the same surnames, the full name of each shall be called. If there are two (2) or more Members with the same names and surnames, their legislative districts or party-list affiliations shall also be called.

Section 75. Quorum. — A majority of all the Members of the House shall constitute a quorum. The House shall not transact business without a quorum. A Member who questions the existence of a quorum shall not leave the session hall until the question is resolved or acted upon, otherwise, the question shall be deemed abandoned.^[134]

Relevantly, Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, which has been considered as a supplement to the Rules^[135] and has been considered to hold persuasive effect in our jurisdiction,^[136] provides that the question of quorum must still be properly raised as a point of order:

The question of a quorum is not considered unless properly raised x x x, and it is not in order for the Speaker to recognize for a point of no quorum unless the Speaker has put the pending question or proposition to a vote.^[137]

It appearing that the question of quorum in this instance was never officially taken as a point of order, it was thus neither formally questioned nor was a roll call performed according to the Internal Rules. Based on the Internal Rules, quorum, specifically the lack thereof, is determined by the calling of the roll, i.e., "[i]n the absence of a quorum after a roll call."^[138] Therefore, the instant cases, at their core, simply involve an objection of a member who was not recognized. Since the conduct of the objection proceedings anchored on the absence of a quorum is a purely internal matter, it is not subject to review by this Court but rather under the exclusive control of the House.

Plain as a pikestaff, any exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court with respect to the determination of a quorum during an ongoing session of Congress becomes an interference into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. The case of Belgica v. Ochoa^[139] provides an enlightening discourse on this matter, viz.:

[T]here is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch or government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "[o]n branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; and "[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions.^[140]

It bears emphasis that while the Constitution demands the presence of a majority in order to establish a quorum that would allow Congress to conduct business including, inter alia, the ratification of conference committee reports, it does not, however, mandate the method by which the same is counted or sustained, or how the majority is ascertained, whether at the start or in the middle of official proceedings. Contrarily, what the Constitution sanctions under Section 16(3) of Article VI is that both Houses of Congress may establish their own rules in the conduct of their proceedings. Ineluctably, rather than imposing definite procedural rules, the Constitution grants a wide latitude of discretion upon both Houses of Congress to conduct their own affairs. In effect, it is within the competency of the House to prescribe any method to ascertain the presence of a majority as a condition to transact business.

This interpretation finds support in the case of United States v. Ballin,^[141] where the Supreme Court of the United States (US) held that under the constitutional quorum requirement of Article I, § 5, "[a]ll that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when that majority are present the power of the house arises."^[142] Substantial esteem is accorded to the House in deciding how the existence of a majority shall be computed. Because "[t]he Constitution has prescribed no method of making this determination,"^[143] it is "within the competency of the house to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain x x x the presence of a majority, and thus establishing the fact that the house is in a condition to transact business."^[144] The US Constitution leaves it to each chamber to select a method for counting a quorum, so long as that method is "reasonably certain to ascertain" the "presence of a majority" such that the chamber is, constitutionally speaking, "in a position to do business."^[145]

In the Philippine context, the Court had determined that it is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal rules: "[p]arliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern."^[146] "Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases."^[147] Time and again, the Court declared that there was no grave abuse of discretion when what has been alleged to have been violated in the enactment of the law are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the constitutional requirement for the enactment of a law, that is, Sections 26 and 27, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, pertaining to the existence of the quorum.^[148]

Besides, the establishment of flexible practices of a continuing quorum or a virtual quorum is not prohibited by the Rules of the House of Representatives, so long as the House has the capacity to transact or is in a position to do business using such practices. It may, for instance, adopt rules establishing virtual sessions or attendance whereby physical presence in the session hall may be completely dispensed with. Nowhere in the Rules does it bar such practice, as all it entails is that a "majority of all the Members of the House shall constitute a quorum," and that the "House shall not transact business without a quorum.^[149]

Truly, it is not within the realm of the Court's duty to probe and eventually invalidate each and every action taken by the House during a questioned session, where lack of quorum was alleged. A contrary ruling would result in most actions of either House becoming immediately constitutionally suspect, thereby impeding efficient continuity of government affairs.

To recapitulate, once a quorum was established at the beginning of a House session, assailing the same is an internal matter best left to the judgment of the congressional body. Whichever method the House employs to count the majority of its members for purposes of determining the existence of a quorum is within its powers to constitute, with the qualification that such method "reasonably certain to ascertain the presence of a majority such that the chamber is, constitutionally speaking, in a position to do business."^[150] In the cases at bench, it cannot be stressed enough that among the succession of matters taken up into a vote, quorum was challenged only when the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report was motioned upon.

Upon this point, Section 161 of the Internal Rules state that "[t]he parliamentary practices of the Philippine Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Senate of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa shall be suppletory to these rules."^[151] Long and established practice of the branches of government must be accorded great weight, in deference to the elementary doctrine of separation of powers.^[152] What Congress may do by express rules, it may do also by its own custom and practice.^[153] In effect, the Court must shirk from exercising its power to review the wisdom, nay the manner by which the House conducts its business. Should this conduct of business include a legislative practice of recognizing the persistence of a quorum unless definitively established otherwise based on the procedures laid down in its Internal Rules, the Court is not in the position to invalidate the same, as it cannot look into the internal operations of Congress and correct any irregularity in procedure, or established practice therein. As expounded below, the Court is restricted to what is available for it to assess, i.e., the enrolled bill and the Journals.

Withal, since the issue on quorum involves an internal matter of the House, the application of Arroyo v. De Venecia^[154] becomes inescapable. In the said case, Representative Arroyo attempted to question the existence of a quorum during the ratification of the bicameral conference committee report on RA No. 8240, but the same remained unheeded. Petitioners claim that the passage of RA No. 8240 in the House had been "railroaded" as Representative Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the Chairman declared Representative Albano's motion to adjourn the session therein was approved. The resemblance of Arroyo's mise-en-scène to those of the instant cases is crystal clear.

Contrary to petitioners' postulation, no rights of private individuals are involved in the instant controversy ''but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court."^[155] Accordingly, the Court is duty-bound to make a straightforward application of the doctrine in Arroyo that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of non-compliance with rules of procedure which itself made.

While it may be argued that the controversy at bench is distinct from Arroyo in that the instant Petitions directly question the existence of a quorum during the 13 December 2017 session, the Court finds and so holds that the mere filing of a case raising the existence of quorum does not automatically mean that it should accept the invitation to look into the proceedings of a co-equal branch of government. In actual fact, the Court has invariably ruled against looking beyond the contents of certain official documents.

In any case, in imploring the Court to carve out an exception and invalidate an act of Congress due to purported irregularities, it was incumbent for petitioners to substantiate their averments with clear and convincing evidence. As the Court will now discuss, petitioners failed in this regard.

The enrolled bill doctrine and the conclusiveness of the contents of Congressional Journals apply in this case. Therewithal, petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of validity accorded to an enacted law, which is an official act of a co-equal branch of the government.

As earlier pronounced, the existence or non-existence of a quorum at any point during the session of Congress, is a question of fact, which must be proved by the party alleging the same. Addressing such issue requires the Court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of petitioners, including an assessment of the "probative value of the evidence presented."^[156]

Appropriately, the resolution of the Court must take into consideration the applicable provisions of the Internal Rules of the House of Representatives, given that the defiance of the quorum requirements was presumably realized in the middle of the 13 December 2017 session. There are certain legal provisions under the said Rules which are inextricably linked to the determination of a quorum. As heretofore stated, Section 71, for example, provides legal basis to say that there may be other members who are not in the session hall but who may nonetheless be "deemed present." This provides an additional layer of complexity, which petitioners must overcome before the Court can grant the reliefs sought.

When what is involved is specifically the passage of a law by Congress, the task of ascribing any infirmity that could serve as a basis for invalidation becomes an even more daunting challenge. As a corollary to the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary has historically exercised utmost restraint in cases where it was requested to pry into the proceedings of Congress. This being so, the Court has given the highest deference to the evidentiary value of two legislative documents, namely, the enrolled bill and the congressional journal.

Jurisprudence teems with cases where the Court has regarded as conclusive of its due enactment the signing of the bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President, and the ensuing certification thereof by the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed. This is known as the enrolled bill doctrine.^[157] In Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines vs. Secretary of Education,^[158] the raison d'être behind the enrolled bill doctrine was succinctly clarified viz.:

The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, [as in the instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."^[159]

After conducting a survey of jurisprudence on the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court, in that same case, arrived at the conclusion that such legal precept has been strictly adhered to in this jurisdiction—

Claims that the required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not been obtained, that irregularities attended the passage of the law, that the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was different from that signed by the President, that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill, and even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously" inserted by the conference committee, had all failed to convince the Court to look beyond the four corners of the enrolled copy of the bill.

As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College, petitioners' reliance on Astorga is quite misplaced. They overlooked that in Astorga, the Senate President himself, who authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. Without such attestation, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the Court was constrained to consult the entries in the journal to determine whether the text of the bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.^[160]

By the same token, Congressional Journals have been considered to have a binding effect upon the Court.^[161] Section 16 (4) and Section 26 (2), Article VI of the Constitution expressly require that Congress maintain such document, viz.:

SECTION 16. . .

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. x x x.

SECTION 26. . .

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. . .

In the early case of the United States v. Pons,^[162] the Court recognized that, from their very nature and object, legislative records "are as important as those of the judiciary."^[163] Addressing the argument that the Journal in the said case failed to reflect the exact time that the assailed law was approved, the Court had to stress that the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records is grounded on public policy, to wit:

But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. x x x. If the clock was in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon entertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken for all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters.^[164]

Accordingly, the Court decreed that an inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are clear and explicit, "would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature."^[165]

The binding effect of legislative journals, as edifyingly enunciated in United States v. Pons, was affirmed in subsequent cases, such as The Philippine Judges Assn. v. Hon. Prado^[166] and Arroyo v. De Venecia.^[167]

Quite palpably, in the present cases, both the enrolled bill and Journal No. 48 do not mention any infirmity in the passage of the law. As earlier noted, Journal No. 48 is clear and explicit in showing that there was a quorum during the 13 December 2017 session. On the other hand, as to the portion of the proceedings being questioned by petitioners, the pertinent part of Journal No. 48 provides for the following account:

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

The session resumed at 10:02 p.m., with Deputy Speaker Abu presiding.

SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 9

On motion of Representative Defensor, there being no objection, the Body suspended consideration of House Concurrent Resolution No. 9.

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND HEARINGS DURING THE RECESS

In accordance with the amended provisional House Rules, on motion of Representative Defensor, there being no objection, the Body approved to authorize all Committees to conduct meetings or public hearings, if deemed necessary, during the House recess from December 16, 2017 to January 14, 2018.

MOTION OF REPRESENTATIVE DEFENSOR

Thereupon, Representative Defensor moved that the Body ratify the Conference Committee Report on the-disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 5636 and Senate Bill No. 1592, or the proposed Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN).

RATIFICATION OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 5636 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1592

On motion of Representative Defensor, there being no objection, the Body considered and subsequently ratified the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 5636, entitled:

"AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 5, 6, 22, 24, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34, 79, 84, 86, 99, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 148, 149, 155, 171, 232, 237, 254, 264, AND 288; CREATING NEW SECTIONS 148-A, 150-A, 237-A, 264-A, 264-B, AND 265-A; AND REPEALING SECTIONS 35 AND 62, ALL UNDER THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED";

and Senate Bill No. 1592, entitled:

"AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 5, 6, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 74, 79, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 116, 128, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 232, 236, 237, 249, AND 288; CREATING NEW SECTIONS 148-A, 150-A, 237-A, 264-A, 264-B, AND 265-A; ALL UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8424, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Representative Defensor, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Monday January 15, 2018.

It was 10:05 p.m.^[168]

The records ineluctably evince the presence of a quorum of the House when the session began, and neither Tinio, et al. nor anyone else among the Members raised the point of no quorum up to the time the BCC Report was moved to be considered. In the absence of strong proof to the contrary, the quorum established at the beginning of the session, as it so appears in the relevant Journal, is presumed to subsist. Thus, formally, the presence of a quorum had not been disproven; the presumption that it existed remains.^[169]

Upon a straightforward application of the foregoing elementary doctrines on the journal and the enrolled bill, the Court cannot look into the proceedings of Congress in fealty to the principle of separation of powers.

Still and all, even assuming that the Court looks past the foregoing doctrines and invalidate an act of Congress due to serious irregularities, it was incumbent for petitioners to convince the Court by substantiating their averments with sufficient proof. In this respect, the Court accentuates that what they are assailing herein is an official act of a co-equal branch of government. It is thus incumbent upon them to overcome the daunting hurdle borne by the strong presumption of validity of such act. Under prevailing case law, an official act of government can only be overturned by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the act is done with irregularity, viz.:

Case law states that "[t]he presumption of regularity or official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness," as in this case.^[170] (Emphasis and underscoring omitted)

In impugning the proceedings during the 13 December 2017 session, petitioners essentially contend that the Journal does not reflect the actual events on the floor that day. They cash in on the livestream video uploaded on the YouTube channel of the House, asserting that no more than ten Members were present when the BCC Report was ratified. As such, the constitutional quorum requirement was not met.^[171] They also proffer a photograph of one of petitioners in-frame, showing a "near-empty session hall".^[172]

To the Court's mind, such pieces of evidence, for a multitude of reasons, are insufficient to overcome the presumed validity of the acts of the House in passing the TRAIN Act.

At the outset, the Court perceives that, unlike the Journal, which the Constitution makes imperative to be kept by Congress and which is required to record specific matters taken up during the proceedings, the broadcasting of such proceedings appears to be for the primary purpose of information dissemination to the public. Apropos is the mandate of the Speaker under Rule IV, Section 15(d) of the Rules of the House of Representatives^[173] to establish an efficient information management system—

RULE IV
The Speaker

SECTION 15. Duties and Powers. — The Speaker, as the political and administrative head of the House, is responsible for the overall management of the proceedings, activities, resources, facilities and employees of the House.

. . . .

d.

establish, as far as practicable, an efficient information management system in the House, utilizing, among others, modern digital technology, that can: 1. facilitate access to and dissemination of data and information needed in legislation inclusive of facilitating real time translation of plenary proceedings in the major Philippine dialects and languages; 2. provide a simplified and comprehensive process of gathering, recording, storage and retrieval of data and information relating to activities and proceedings of the House; 3. sustain a public information program that will provide accessible, timely and accurate information relating to the House, its Members and officers, its committees and its legislative concerns inclusive of facilitating, as far as practicable, broadcast coverage of plenary and committee proceeding[.][174]

Appositely, Rule XXII of the Internal Rules embodies the provisions with respect to the Broadcasting of the House:

RULE XXII
Broadcasting the House

SECTION 148. Closed-Circuit Viewing of Floor Proceedings. — The House shall establish a system for closed-circuit viewing of floor proceedings of the House in the offices of all Members and in such other places in the House as the Speaker considers appropriate. Such system may include other telecommunications functions subject to rules and regulations issued by the Speaker.

SECTION 149. Public Broadcasting and Recording of Floor Proceedings.—

(a)	The House shall administer a system for complete and unedited audio and visual broadcasting, recording, and live streaming through the internet of the proceedings of the House. The system shall include the distribution of such broadcasts and recordings to news media, for the storage of audio and video recordings of the proceedings, and for the closed-captioning of the proceedings for hearing-impaired persons. Any such public broadcasting and system of recording of floor proceedings shall be subject to rules and regulations issued by the Speaker;
(b)	All television and radio broadcasting stations, networks, services, and systems including cable television systems that are accredited to the House radio and television correspondents' galleries, and all radio and television correspondents who are so accredited, shall be provided access to the live coverage of the House; and
(c)	Coverage made available under this section, including any recording may not be:
	(1)	used for any political purpose;
	(2)	used in any commercial advertisement; and
	(3)	broadcast with commercial sponsorship except as part of a bona fide news program or public affairs documentary program.[175]

At this juncture, the Court is tasked to juxtapose the video recording sanctioned by the Internal Rules of the House vis-à-vis the Congressional Journals required by the Constitution itself.

Albeit sanctioned by the Internal Rules of Procedure of the House, the video recording described therein neither serves the same purpose as the Congressional Journals nor does it have a binding effect upon this Court, unlike the aforementioned Legislative Documents. At the risk of belaboring the point, the Journal is required to be kept as a record of Congress' proceedings by no less than Section 16(4), Article VI of the Constitution earlier quoted. This is precisely why such document is required to contain a detailed written account of the events that transpired on a particular session, from the call to order initiated by the Speaker until the adjournment thereof. Notably, the correctness of the entries in the Journal, such as the presence of a quorum and the ratification by the majority of a resolution, is required to be certified by none other than the Secretary General.^[176] The foregoing considerations thus explain why the Journal has been historically considered as binding on the Court with respect to the events chronicled therein.

All the same, even if the Court examines the probative value of petitioners' evidence independent of the Congressional Journal, the above conclusion would remain unchanged in view of the insufficiency and inherent limitations of the evidence presented by petitioners.

It does not escape the attention of the Court that the video recording merely shows a specific area of the session hall during the 13 December 2017 proceedings. Ostensibly absent from the frame captured by the video is the rest of the hall, and the activities being conducted therein. If at all, the video recording, unlike Journal No. 48, tends to prove only the specific acts and incidents which transpired during the proceedings that were captured thereby, such as the fact that a motion for ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report was indeed made or that someone from the floor made a remark regarding the existence of a quorum during such ratification. These limitations blow to smithereens petitioners' avowed accuracy of the video recording with respect to the actual events that transpired on the night of 13 December 2017. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the Court may consider any factor which affects the accuracy or integrity of the electronic data message in determining its evidentiary weight.^[177]

In the same vein, the video recording brings to light the undeniable truth that there was no significant difference as to the number of participants as shown during the start of the proceedings, when the quorum was unquestioned, on one hand, and the portion of the proceedings where the quorum was supposedly lost, upon the other. In sooth, the video reveals a substantial number of unoccupied and empty seats in the session hall not only at the end of the video, but also during the beginning of the proceedings. In actual fact, one of the speakers at the start of the session is none other than petitioner Antonio Tinio himself. It therefore defies logic that petitioner Tinio seemed to recognize the House's quorum to tackle his business but reject the same with regard to the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report.

Moving on to the photograph^[178] annexed in the Petition filed by Tinio, et al., the Court, at the outset, holds that its probative value is suspect as it may be considered a form of self-serving evidence,^[179] having been taken by petitioners themselves out of court who were free to use whichever angle they may find supportive of their contention. Notably, the picture does not even have a timestamp as to when it was taken. Thus, other than petitioners' bare allegation that it was taken right after session was adjourned, such averment has no leg to stand on. There was nothing preventing the Members of the House from moving out of the frame at such moment the photograph was taken, especially since the session had been already adjourned.

There is another factor that pulls the rug from petitioners' feet — due to the unparalleled impact that may result from the ruling in their favor, it behooved petitioners to establish the supposed lack of quorum, not only with clear and convincing evidence as above discussed, but also with accuracy. For instance, in Avelino v. Cuenco,^[180] the issue was decided by the Court with the definitive knowledge that only 12 out of the 24 senators were present. Likewise, in Zamora v. Caballero,^[181] a case which petitioners themselves rely on, the subject resolutions were nullified since only six out of the 14 members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan voted on the motions. In contrast, herein petitioners were content in providing the Court with a mere estimate of the number of legislators claimed to be present during the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report.^[182] Juxtaposed against available precedent, petitioners' anemic assertions fade into thin air.

To forestall any other disputation, the subsequent approval of Journal No. 48 blows away the cobwebs of doubt relating to the purported irregularities in the proceedings.

As a final inflection on this matter, the subsequent approval of Journal No. 48, which provides an account of the proceedings that transpired during the 13 December 2017 Session, during the subsequent 15 January 2018 session removes any doubt as to the validity of the ratification of the TRAIN BCC Report.

While an objection was raised during the following session of the House with respect to such lack of quorum, it remains an undisputed fact that majority of the Members approved Journal No. 48, as demonstrated by the contents of Journal No. 49 dated 15 January 2018^[183]—

MOTION OF REPRESENTATIVE BONDOC

Rep. Juan Pablo "Rimpy" P. Bondoc then moved for the approval of Journal No. 48 of December 13, 2017.

OBJECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE TINIO

Rep. Antonio L. Tinio objected to the aforesaid motion.

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE TINIO

Given five minutes by the Chair to explain his objection upon Representative Bondoc's motion, Representative Tinio asked the Secretariat to amend the portion entitled "RATIFICATION OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON HOUSE BILL NO. 5636 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1592" on page 12 of Journal No. 48 in order to reflect (1) his and Rep. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate's numerous objections to said ratification and (2) his objection to said ratification on the basis of lack of quorum.

MOTION OF REPRESENTATIVE BONDOC

Representative Bondoc moved that the House first vote on his motion to approve Journal No. 48.

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE TINIO

Representative Tinio also contested the statement in the aforecited portion of Journal No. 48 that the Body ratified said Committee Report and argued that no voting had taken place thereon. He asked the Secretariat to correct the use of the word "ratified" as he cited the House Rules on (1) the ratification of a Conference Committee Report by a majority vote of the Members of the House, there being a quorum; and (2) the conduct of a voting on motions or questions where the Speaker shall first say, "as many as are in favor, say aye" and thereafter say, "as many as are opposed, say nay" after the affirmative vote is counted.

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE BONDOC

Representative Bondoc remarked that based on the records of the Secretariat, the December 13, 2017 session had a quorum of 232 Members; and the requirement as mentioned by Representative Tinio was thus met in said session.

DIVISION OF THE HOUSE

With Representative Bondoc reiterating his previous motion, the Chair called for a division of the House.

APPROVAL OF JOURNAL NO. 48

With majority of the Members voting in favor of Representative Bondoc's motion, the Body approved Journal No. 48 dated December 13, 2017.^[184]

The Court notes that out of the total 295^[185] Members and the 232 who were present during the 13 December 2017 session, only three legislators, i.e., Tinio, et al., are assailing the passage of the TRAIN Law. The following observation by the Court in Arroyo v. De Venecia^[186] is thus worth echoing:

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.^[187]

In précis, even assuming that the Court should look beyond what was written in the Journal and that the enrolled bill doctrine may be disregarded, petitioners' evidence utterly falls short of passing judicial muster. To ingeminate, the mere filing of a case raising the existence of a quorum as an issue does not automatically enjoin the Court to accept the invitation to pry into the proceedings of a co-equal branch of government. Petitioners bear the burden in convincing the Court to exercise its exceptional judicial power to review such assailed acts by substantiating its averments with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioners miserably failed in discharging this bounden duty.

The threshold issue surrounding the enactment of the TRAIN Act having been settled, the Court must now examine the inherent validity of the provisions therein.

Is Section 48 of the TRAIN Act, which amends Section 151 of the Tax Code, unconstitutional for being a prohibited rider to the TRAIN Act?

Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba intransigently asseverate that Section 48 did not originate from the House as required under Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.^[188] Moreover, it was never intended by the House to form part of the amendments to the Tax Code based on the clear title of HB No. 5636.^[189]

On the other hand, the OSG posits that prevailing jurisprudence ordains that the Constitution only requires that the revenue bill must originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but does not limit the extent of amendments that may be introduced by the Senate.^[190]

Concededly, the amendment introduced to Section 151 of the Tax Code, which increases the excise tax rates for domestic and imported coal and coke, inter alia, is only present in SB No. 1592.^[191] It is not contained in the title of HB No. 5636.^[192] However, does this fact alone constitute a violation of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

The Court resoundingly answers in the negative.

Section 24, Article VI thereof, provides that "[a]ll appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."

In the seminal case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,^[193] the Court had the occasion to clarify that Section 24, Article VI only requires that the initiative of filing of revenue bills must come from the Lower House, viz.:

To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality or legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

. . . .

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.^[194]

This doctrine was again echoed in the landmark case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ermita,^[195] where the Court upheld the Senate's introduction of several amendments to the Tax Code which were absent from the version of the House. The Court therein ratiocinated that "Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill."^[196] It was likewise noted that the amendments introduced by the Senate served the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills, i.e., "to bring in sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our country's serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes."^[197] Consequently, the Court upheld the changes introduced by the Senate for being "germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills."^[198]

As applied in these consolidated Petitions, there is undoubtedly no constitutional prohibition for the Senate to introduce new provisions not originally found in the House version of the eventual TRAIN Act.

In any case, the amendment to Section 151 of the Tax Code introduced by SB No. 1592 likewise serves the stated purpose of HB No. 5636. It is evident from the Committee Report^[199] and the sponsorship speeches^[200] for HB No. 5636 that the main thrust of the law includes rationalizing internal revenue taxes and ensuring that the government is able to provide better infrastructure, health, education, and social protection by raising sufficient revenues through the expansion of the value-added tax (VAT) base and the increase on several excise taxes. This purpose is shared by the increase in excise taxes for coal. Notably, both HB No. 5636 and SB No. 1592 contain provisions for the earmarking of the incremental revenues to be generated by the law which are targeted not only for infrastructure projects but also for social welfare programs,^[201] further bolstering the idea that the two Houses of Congress were more or less in agreement as to their objectives for amending the Tax Code.

In a nutshell, petitioners' contention that Section 48 of the TRAIN Act is a prohibited rider falls through.

The penultimate issue revolves around the purported violation of due process. The principal argument of Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba is that the imposition and/or increase in excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unfair, and its direct and indirect effects amount to confiscation of property without due process of the law.^[202] Not only are diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene directly used by consumers, but these are also key components for other basic commodities and services such as food, electricity, and transportation.^[203] This overall increase in prices is felt most acutely by low-income and poor families, especially those in the rural areas. Contrary to the arguments proffered by the OSG, the increase in the minimum threshold for income tax exemption bears no effect to these underprivileged families. Prior to the law's amendment, low-income households were already tax-exempt. Thus, their overall purchasing power remained the same, but the prices for their basic needs continue to rise. Similarly, the unconditional cash transfer intended to cushion the effects of the TRAIN Act is not enough to offset the added burden to these marginalized families. If anything, the existence of this provision is an implied admission that there is a compelling need to soften and augment the negative impacts of the law.^[204]

The OSG refutes this disputation, insisting that these provisions have policy considerations precisely anchored on the general welfare of the people.^[205] For households in the first to seventh income deciles, they will receive the unconditional cash transfers from the increments in the government's revenues generated by the TRAIN Act for the first five years of its implementation. They would also benefit from the social welfare and benefits programs that will be funded by the law.^[206] Based on the impact analysis conducted by the Department of Finance (DOF) on the TRAIN Act, the poorest five deciles would even see positive increases in their income as a result of these counter-measures.^[207] On the other hand, for wage earners who comprise 83% of taxpayers, the increase in their take-home pay from the re-adjustment for the income tax exemption threshold will more than compensate for the price increase in commodities.^[208]

In the oft-cited case of Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Assn., Inc. (CREBA) v. Hon. Executive Sec. Romulo,^[209] this Court recognized that the Legislature's plenary power to tax, which includes the discretion to determine "the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation."^[210] While generally unlimited in its range, the power to tax is still circumscribed by constitutional limitations, such as the due process clause under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."^[211]

The interplay of this constitutional safeguard vis-à-vis the presumption of constitutionality afforded to tax legislation requires that in order to invalidate a revenue measure by virtue of the due process clause, the same must amount to a confiscation of property.^[212] A mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice, there must be such persuasive proof of the factual foundations to such an unconstitutional taint.^[213] Ostensibly, the foregoing test is easily applied when the statute pertains to income tax, as this generally only requires an evaluation of whether or not the measure results in the taxation of capital rather than on realized gain. It becomes far more complex when the law involves indirect taxes such as that assailed in the present cases at bench. As pointed out by petitioners, the added economic burden foisted on consumers by the increase in the price of diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene is very real and permeates to other basic commodities and services. However, does this amount to unconstitutionality?

The Court is constrained to hold otherwise.

While petitioners presented statistics and surveys to advance their cause, none are truly determinative of the cumulative effects of the TRAIN Act on low-income households. The Court echoes its earlier stance that the burden of proof rested with petitioners to lay down persuasive factual foundations for the challenged law's unconstitutionality. This, they failed to do.

Indeed, the excise tax provisions on diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene cannot be considered in isolation and must be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the law. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."^[214] Specifically, Section 82 of the law provides the earmarking of the incremental revenues to be generated by the TRAIN Act:

SEC. 82. Section 288 of the NIRC, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 288. Disposition of Incremental Revenue. —

. . . .

(F) Incremental Revenues from the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN). — For five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the yearly incremental revenues generated shall be automatically appropriated as follows:

(1) Not more than seventy percent (70%) to fund infrastructure projects such as, but not limited to, the Build, Build, Build Program and provide infrastructure programs to address congestion through mass transport and new road networks, military infrastructure, sports facilities for public schools, and potable drinking water supply in all public places; and

(2) Not more than thirty percent (30%) to fund:

(a) Programs under Republic Act No. 10659, otherwise known as 'Sugarcane Industry Development Act of 2015' to advance the self-reliance of sugar farmers that will increase productivity, provide livelihood opportunities develop alternative farming systems and ultimately enhance farmers' income;

(b) Social mitigating measures and investments in: (i) education, (ii) health, targeted nutrition, and anti-hunger programs for mothers, infants, and young children, (iii) social protection, (iv) employment, and (v) housing that prioritize and directly benefit both the poor and near-poor households;

(c) A social welfare and benefits program where qualified beneficiaries shall be provided with a social benefits card to avail of the following social benefits:

(i) Unconditional cash transfer to households in the first to seventh income deciles of the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR), Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, and the social pension program for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the unconditional cash-transfer shall be Two hundred pesos (P200.00) per month for the first year and Three hundred pesos (P300.00) per month for the second year and third year, to be implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(ii) Fuel vouchers to qualified franchise holders of Public Utility Jeepneys (PUJs);

(iii) For minimum wage earners, unemployed, and the poorest fifty percent (50%) of the population:

(1) Fare discount from all public utility vehicles (except trucks for hire and school transport service) in the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the authorized fare;

(2) Discounted purchase of National Food Authority (NFA) rice from accredited retail stores in the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the net retail prices, up to a maximum of twenty (20) kilos per month; and

(3) Free skills training under a program implemented by the Technical Skills and Development Authority (TESDA).

Provided, That benefits or grants contained in this Subsection shall not be availed in addition to any other discounts.

(iv) Other social benefits programs to be developed and implemented by the government.

Notwithstanding any provisions herein to the contrary, the incremental revenues from the tobacco taxes under this Act shall be subject to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7171, otherwise known as 'An Act to Promote the Development of the Farmers in the Virginia Tobacco Producing Provinces.' and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8240, otherwise known as 'An Act Amending Sections 138, 139, 140 and 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for Other Purposes.'

An interagency committee, chaired by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and co-chaired by DOF and DSWD, and comprised of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Transportation (DOTr), Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Housing Authority (NHA), Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA), Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Energy (DOE), NFA, and TESDA, is hereby created to oversee the identification of qualified beneficiaries and the implementation of these projects and programs: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries under Subsection (c) hereof shall be identified using the National ID System which may be enacted by Congress.

Within sixty (60) days from the end of the three (3)-year period from the effectivity of this Act, the interagency committee and respective implementing agencies for the above programs shall submit corresponding program assessments to the COCCTRP. The National Expenditure Program from 2019 onwards shall provide line items that correspond to the allocations mandated in the provisions above.

At the end of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, all earmarking provisions under Subsection (F), shall cease to exist and all incremental revenues derived under this Act shall accrue to the General fund of the government.^[215]

As can be easily inferred from the foregoing, there are numerous monetary and social welfare measures specifically designed to assist households in the marginalized sector in coping with the effects of the TRAIN Act. Inevitably, the direct and indirect benefits must also be considered against the increase in the price of commodities in order to determine whether or not the overall impact of the law is truly oppressive and confiscatory as to amount to a violation of the due process clause.

Quite tellingly, petitioners do not even consider the impact of the numerous social welfare provisions designed to aid the poor in the form of fuel vouchers for public utility jeepney drivers, fare discounts for public utility vehicles, discounted purchase price for rice, the free skills training offered by the Technical Skills and Development Authority, or the other social benefits programs that may subsequently be developed. Petitioners only bring to the fore the insufficiency of the unconditional cash transfer provision under the newly amended Section 288 (2) (c) (i) of the Tax Code. Aside from their bare assertion, however, they proffer no concrete evidence to buttress their claim. Moreover, contrary to petitioners' advanced position, it is not incumbent on respondents to prove that the law's effects are constitutional as all statutes carry the presumption of constitutionality.

Au contraire, the OSG maintains that the overall impact of the law was carefully studied by the DOF when it proposed the tax reform package to Congress. The Committees on Ways and Means in both Houses of Congress also apparently considered the interests of various sectors and the overall impact of the law in crafting the provisions of the TRAIN Act and decreed the same would uplift the conditions of the public as a whole.^[216] These same considerations were presumably carried over by the entirety of the Legislative branch when the law was passed in its current form.

The impact of the challenged provisions of the TRAIN Act, the law's overall effects, and whether or not it is ultimately beneficial for the Filipino people ultimately go into the wisdom of the law, which is beyond the Court's power to inquire into.^[217] To reiterate, the Court's solemn function in exercising its expanded power of judicial review over the Executive and Legislative branches, is limited to determining whether both have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern."^[218]

The Court is not prepared to substitute its own judgment with the wisdom and sufficiency of the TRAIN Act's provisions, especially when it appears from the available records that its impact has been thoroughly studied and considered not just by Congress, but also by the Executive branch through the DOF.

Certainly, without persuasive proof, the Court is unable to pierce past the presumption of constitutionality afforded to the TRAIN Act on supposed due process violations.

Finally, petitioners both avouch that the TRAIN Act violates the equal protection clause.^[219] Tinio, et al. argue that inflation and prices have been continuously rising ever since the law was passed and this deleterious economic burden is felt pronouncedly by the most vulnerable sectors.^[220] Meanwhile, Laban Konsyumer and Dimagiba claim that the excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene expressly discriminate against the poor while having no impact on the rich.^[221] They likewise assert that the foregoing excise taxes directly violate Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution Act for being "regressive."^[222]

The OSG belies petitioners' claims,^[223] citing that there are no provisions in the TRAIN Act specifically and expressly discriminating against the poor while unduly favoring the rich.^[224] Besides, the rule on uniformity of taxation does not call for perfect uniformity or equality because this is hardly attainable. The Congress was motivated by multifarious factors when it increased excise taxes on diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene and acted with due regard to the effects thereof to ordinary Filipinos.^[225] As to the alleged violation of Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, the OSG posits that the foregoing provision is not a negative standard or judicially enforceable right which constitutes a basis to declare a legislation unconstitutional. The provisions of the TRAIN Act were intended by Congress to be progressive, and in actual fact, the data prepared by the DOF demonstrate that the TRAIN Act was designed so as to not trigger extreme price shocks especially in terms of prime commodities.^[226]

The Court rules and so holds that petitioners have failed to adduce proof of a clear and unequivocal breach of the equal protection clause.

As mentioned in Abakada Guro Party List,^[227] it has long been established that the State may make reasonable and natural classifications in exercising its power of taxation; such exercise enjoys the presumption of validity, "[w]hether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection."^[228] Generally, the Court will not interfere with such power "absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness."^[229]

It cannot be stressed enough that the provisions in the TRAIN Act, which allegedly drive up prices to the detriment of the marginalized and the poor, were not intended to discriminate against them in particular. Indeed, there are no classifications found therein. As the OSG unerringly puts forth, there are no specific or express provisions which disfavor against the low-income households. In truth, petitioners beseech this Court to look beyond the face of the law and factor in the "real-world effects" of the assailed provisions. Lamentably, petitioners adduce not a morsel of compelling proof of this supposed targeted discrimination. While the implementation of a tax statute may yield varying results depending on several factors, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down absent clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.^[230] Without sufficient proof, petitioners' polemics are purely hypothetical, argumentative, and one-sided. "The Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain."^[231]

All the same, and as above-stated, Congress appears to have already had the prescience about some issues with respect to the law's implementation and has, in fact, introduced safeguards therein to cushion the effects for the more destitute sectors of society by amending Section 288 of the Tax Code. Contrary to petitioners' assertion that this safeguard measure, in itself, is a recognition of the discriminatory nature of the law, the Court holds that this serves to illustrate the reasonableness and soundness in which Congress enacted the TRAIN Act.

Ergo, in the absence of a clear showing that a tax violates the equal protection clause, the Court, in obeisance to the doctrine of separation of powers, must defer to the discretion and judgment of Congress on this point.^[232]

Next, the excise tax provisions of the TRAIN Act may not be struck down for being regressive.

While the OSG mistakenly asserts that the excise tax provisions for diesel, coal, LPG, and kerosene are progressive, it correctly argued that in any event, its regressive nature is not a ground to declare the law unconstitutional.

A tax is progressive when the rates go up depending on the resources of the person affected.^[233] Conversely, a tax is considered regressive when it does not consider the taxpayer's ability to pay.^[234] All indirect taxes, such as excise tax and VAT, are undoubtedly regressive by their very nature.^[235] Such taxes eat away at the same portion of income, whether big or small.^[236] In both Abakada Guro Party List^[237] and British American Tobacco v. Camacho,^[238] the Court recognized that these kinds of taxes do hit the lower income groups the hardest. However, this is not a reason to declare such a law unconstitutional.

Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that "[t]he rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation."

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance^[239] enunciates that the foregoing Constitutional provision does not prohibit the imposition of regressive taxes but merely directs Congress to evolve a progressive system of taxation:

The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are ... to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 Second ed. [1977]) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, § 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, § 28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, § 3, amending § 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, § 4, amending § 103 of the NIRC).^[240]

"Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to 'evolve a progressive system of taxation.' . . . These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights."^[241]

Ineluctably, the TRAIN Act may not be invalidated based on Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

A Final Cadence

The Court is not unaware of its fairly recent pronouncement in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,^[242] where the policy of strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts was reverberated. To be sure, the resolution of the instant Petitions is not thrusted on determination of facts, as the challenges to the constitutionality of the TRAIN Act were resolved through the application of well-settled constitutional principles.

All the same, the Court sternly reminds the public, especially the members of the bench and the bar, to strictly adhere to doctrine of hierarchy of courts, especially when the issues and arguments asserted are rooted in several factual underpinnings that must be carefully sifted and weighed in a full-blown trial. As this Court decreed in Gios-Samar, "when a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case."^[243] Such questions must first be submitted to either the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.^[244]

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not turning a blind eye to the travails of the most vulnerable members of the society. It acknowledges that the effects of the TRAIN Act may be felt more acutely by some more than others. Nevertheless, it is not within its province to supplant a presumably constitutional statute absent compelling proof of its invalidity. On this score, it must be highlighted that the principal check against an abuse of the power to tax resides primarily in the responsibility of the legislature to its constituency.^[245]

The Court's reminder in Abakada Guro Party List bears reiteration here:

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.^[246]

THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS CONSIDERED, the Court hereby declares as CONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 10963, otherwise known as the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Act. Accordingly, the Court resolves to:

(1)	DISMISS the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 236118 and G.R. No. 236295;
(2)	DENY petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction contained in both Petitions; and (3)
(3)	DENY the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo Ante Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 3 December 2018 filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 236295.

The Court also resolves to DROP former President Rodrigo Roa Duterte as a party respondent in G.R. No. 236118.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, C.J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, SAJ., see separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., see dissent.
Rosario,^* J., on official leave.

^[1] Marcos II v. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 253, 267 (1997).

^[2] This phrase was coined by the statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero in his political speech Pro Lege Manilia at the height of the Roman Empire's war against King Mithridates VI of Pontus circa 66 B.C.E. (see On Pompey's Command from The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, literally translated by C. D. Yonge (1856), available at <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0019%3Atext%3DMan.%3Achapter%3D7> [last accessed on June 21, 2022]).

^[3] See Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, 865 Phil. 384, 396 (2019).

^[4] Entitled, AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 5, 6, 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 74, 79, 84, 86, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 116, 127, 128, 129, 145, 148, 149, 151, 155, 171, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 232, 236, 237, 249, 254, 264, 269, AND 288; CREATING NEW SECTIONS 51-A, 148-A, 150-A, 150-8, 237-A, 264-A, 264-R, AND 265-A; AND REPEALING SECTIONS 35, 62, AND 89; ALL UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8424, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (2017).

^[5] Department of Finance, The Tax Reform/or Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Act, December 27, 2017, available at <https://taxreform.dof.gov.ph/news_and_updates/the-tax-reform-for-acceleration-and-inclusion-trainact/#:~:text=THE%20TAX%20REFORM%20FOR%20ACCELERATION%20AND%20INCLUSION%20(TRAIN)%20ACT.,-Date%20Posted%20%3A%20December&text=President%20 Rodrigo%20Roa%20Duterte%20signed,19%2C%202017%2C%20in%20Malacanang.> (last accessed on June 21, 2022).

^[6] "PRRD certifies tax reform bill as urgent." Department of Finance. Posted on May 29, 2017. Accessed at <https://www.dof.gov.ph/prrd-certifies-tax-reform-bill-as-urgent/> Last accessed on June 21, 2022.

^[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 3-39.

^[8] Id. at 6.

^[9] Id. at 8.

^[10] Id. at 5-6.

^[11] Id. at 6.

^[12] Id. at 6-7 and 30-31.

^[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 3-47.

^[14] Id. at 5-7.

^[15] Id. at 20.

^[16] Id. at 5-6.

^[17] Id. at 4-6, and 19.

^[18] Id. at 6.

^[19] Id. at 10.

^[20] Id. at 41-42.

^[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 160-237; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 135-209.

^[22] Id. at 165-166; and id. at 140-141.

^[23] Id. at 166; and id. at 141.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id.

^[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 167; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 142.

^[27] Id. at 166; and id. 141.

^[28] Id.; and id.

^[29] Id. at 167; and id. at 142.

^[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 406-480.

^[31] Id. at 407-411.

^[32] Id. at 412-416.

^[33] Id. at 416-419.

^[34] Id. at 419-420.

^[35] Id. at 420-423.

^[36] Id. at 423-425.

^[37] Id. at 425-451.

^[38] Id. at 451.

^[39] Id. at 451-466.

^[40] Id. at 467-473.

^[41] Id. at 473-475.

^[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 331-366.

^[43] Id. at 332-335.

^[44] Id. at 335-337.

^[45] Id. at 337-338.

^[46] Id. at 339-340.

^[47] Id. at 340-341.

^[48] Id. at 341-342.

^[49] Id. at 342.

^[50] Id. at 342-344.

^[51] Id. at 343-344.

^[52] Id. at 344.

^[53] Id. at 357-363.

^[54] Id. at 345.

^[55] Id. at 345-350.

^[56] Id. at 355-357.

^[57] Id. at 364.

^[58] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 2), pp. 516-525; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 482-489.

^[59] Id. at 526-533; and id. at 491-497.

^[60] Id. at 534-537; and id. at 498-499.

^[61] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 173-174; and id. at 148-149.

^[62] See Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Hon. Aquino III, 850 Phil. 1168, 1182 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[63] See Calleja v. Hon. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].

^[64] See Ifurung v. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales, 831 Phil. 135, 152 (2018) [Per J. Martires, En Banc], citing Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].

^[65] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067, 1087-1088 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. Emphasis and underscoring omitted, citing Araullo v. President S.C. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[66] Supra note 64, at 152.

^[67] Supra note 65, at 1090, citing Belgica v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 519 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. Emphasis and underscoring omitted.

^[68] Id.

^[69] See Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578 et al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].

^[70] Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) v. Philippine (GPH), 801 Phil. 472, 486 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[71] Id.

^[72] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 5-9.

^[73] Id. at 4-6.

^[74] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 337-338.

^[75] Private Hospitals Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v. Exec. Sec. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747, 784 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

^[76] See Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578 et al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].

^[77] See Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 439 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[78] See Secretary of Finance Purisima v. Rep. Lazatin, 801 Phil. 395, 411-414 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

^[79] See Diaz v. The Secretary of Finance, 669 Phil. 371, 383-384 (2011) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].

^[80] Supra note 63.

^[81] Id.

^[82] Parcon-Song v. Parcon, 876 Phil. 364, 400 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing Ty v. Hon. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81, 103 (1995) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]. Italics omitted.

^[83] See Id. at 401.

^[84] See Lozada v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230383, July 13, 2021 [Per J. Inting, En Banc].

^[85] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 170-172; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 145-147.

^[86] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 413.

^[87] Id.

^[88] Id. at 415.

^[89] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 336.

^[90] Id. at 336-337.

^[91] Fuertes v. The Senate of the Philippines, 868 Phil. 117, 142 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[92] See Banco De Oro v. Rep. of the Phils., 793 Phil. 97, 118 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[93] Rep. Lagman v. Sec. Ochoa, 888 Phil. 434, 483-484 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, 751 Phil. 301, 331-335 (2015); quotation marks omitted.

^[94] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 174-176; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 149-151.

^[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 419-420.

^[96] Id. at 370-371; rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 340-341.

^[97] Roy v. Chairperson Herbosa, 800 Phil. 459, 497-498 (2016) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[98] See Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, 760 Phil. 519, 551 (2015) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

^[99] 825 Phil. 112 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

^[100] See id. at 186.

^[101] Id.

^[102] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 3 and 10.

^[103] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 176-177; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 151-152.

^[104] Id. at 420-421; and id. at 388-389.

^[105] Id. at 421-423; and id. at 389-391.

^[106] Supra note 97 at 183-184.

^[107] 865 Phil. 578 (2019) [Per CJ Bersamin, En Banc].

^[108] Id. at 605. Emphasis supplied.

^[109] Rep. Lagman v. Senate Pres. Pimentel, supra note 97, at 183.

^[110] Belgica v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 67, at 545-546.

^[111] Id.

^[112] Id.

^[113] Id.

^[114] Id. at 554-555.

^[115] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 17.

^[116] CONST., ART. V, SEC. 16 (3) provides:

Section 16 (3). Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

^[117] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 62.

^[118] Id. at 16.

^[119] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 30.

^[120] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 343.

^[121] 343 Phil. 42 (1997) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[122] Id. at 60.

^[123] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 106.

^[124] SECTION 72. Order of Business. — The daily Order or Business shall be as follows:

1. Roll call;
2. Approval of the Journal of the previous session;
3. First reading of bills and resolutions;
4. Referral of committee reports, messages, communications, petitions and memorials;
5. Unfinished Business;
6. Business for the Day;
7. Business for a Certain Date;
8. Business for Thursday and Friday;
9. Bills and Joint Resolutions for Third Reading; and
10. Unassigned Business.

The daily Order of Business shall be posted in the House website and, as far as practicable, sent through electronic mail to the Members one (1) hour before the commencement of session.

SECTION 74. Roll Call. — The names of Members shall be called by surnames alphabetically. When two (2) or more Members have the same surnames, the full name of each shall be called. If there are two (2) or more Members with the same names and surnames, their legislative districts or party-list affiliations shall also be called.

^[125] See Consolidated Comment; Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 178; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), p. 153; See also Journal No. 48, 17^th Congress, Second Regular Session; id. at 239-241; and id. at 211-213.

^[126] Id. at 238-252; and id. at 210-224.

^[127] Id. at 239-241; and id. at 211-213.

^[128] Id. at 249-250; and id. at 221-222.

^[129] Id. at 250; and id. at 222.

^[130] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 10-13.

^[131] Id. at 62.

^[132] Id. at 61.

^[133] Id. at 13 and 21.

^[134] Id. at 62.

^[135] See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 305 Phil. 686, 751 (1994) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[136] See Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 58-59 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta].

^[137] Commentary to Art. VI, §310, Jefferson's Manual, available at https://www.govinfo.go/content/ pkg/HMAN-112/pdf/HMAN-112-jeffersonman.pdf (last accessed 11 July 2022).

^[138] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118), p. 62.

^[139] 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[140] Id. at 535. Emphasis and underscoring omitted.

^[141] 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

^[142] Id. at 6.

^[143] Id.

^[144] Id. at 1.

^[145] Id. at 5.

^[146] Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra note 119, at 61.

^[147] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra note 133, at 751-752.

^[148] Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra note 119 at 60-61.

^[149] Section 75, Rules of the House of Representatives, 16^th Congress, rollo (G.R. No. 236118, Vol. 1), p. 62.

^[150] See U.S. v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892).

^[151] Rollo, (G.R. No. 236118, Vol. 1), p. 73. Emphasis supplied.

^[152] See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).

^[153] See Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).

^[154] Supra note 119.

^[155] Id. at 65.

^[156] See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 183 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

^[157] See Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) v. Secretary of Education, 841 Phil. 724, 791 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[158] Id.

^[159] Id., citing Arroyo vs. De Venecia, supra note 119.

^[160] Id. at 791-792, citations omitted.

^[161] See The Philippine Judges Assn. v. Hon. Prado, 298 Phil. 502, 511 (1993) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

^[162] 34 Phil. 729 (1916) [Per J. Trent].

^[163] See id. at 733.

^[164] Id. at 734.

^[165] Supra note 159, at 511.

^[166] Id.

^[167] Supra note 119.

^[168] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 249-250; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), pp. 221-222.

^[169] See REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 131, Section 3, par. (q), which states that the presumption that the ordinary course of business has been followed is satisfactory if not contradicted and overcome by other evidence.

^[170] Consular Area Residents Ass'n., Inc. v. Casanova, 784 Phil. 400, 417 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division], citing Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

^[171] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 20.

^[172] Id.

^[173] 16^th Congress, also adopted by the 17^th Congress.

^[174] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 44.

^[175] Id. at 70-71.

^[176] See Sec. 18 (g), Rule VI of the Internal Rules which provides:

SECTION 18. Duties and Powers. — The duties and powers of the Secretary General are:

. . . .

(g) to keep and to certify the Journal of each session which shall be a clear and succinct account of the business conducted and actions taken by the House: Provided, That Journals of executive sessions shall be recorded in a separate book and kept confidential.

^[177] See RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, Rule 7, Sec. 1.

^[178] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 106.

^[179] See 6:03:54-6:06:43 of the video.

^[180] 83 Phil. 17 (1949).

^[181] 464 Phil. 471 (2004) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].

^[182] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 20.

^[183] Id. at 307-356; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), pp. 279-328.

^[184] Id. at 307-356; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295, Vol. 1), pp. 279-328.

^[185] Consolidated Comment; Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 178; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), p. 153; See also Journal No. 48, 17^th Congress, Second Regular Session; id. at 239-241; and id. at 211-213.

^[186] Supra note 119.

^[187] Id. at 70.

^[188] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 6.

^[189] Id. at 357-363.

^[190] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 222-224; and rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 197-199.

^[191] See Senate Bill No. 1592 of the 17^th Congress, sec. 32.

^[192] See Title of House Bill No. 5636 of the 17^th Congress.

^[193] Supra note 133.

^[194] Id. at 741-743; italics omitted.

^[195] 506 Phil. 1 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

^[196] Id. at 101.

^[197] Id. at 102.

^[198] Id. at 103.

^[199] See Fact Sheet of Committee Report No. 229 on House Bill No. 5636 of the 17^th Congress.

^[200] See House of Representative Congressional Record Vol. 4: Record No. 93, 23 May 2017, pp. 3-5.

^[201] See Section 36 of House Bill No. 5636 and Section 4 of Senate Bill No. 1592 of the 17^th Congress which amend Section 283 of the Tax Code.

^[202] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 23-26 and 354-357; and rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 384-387.

^[203] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 25.

^[204] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), p. 355; and rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 385.

^[205] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), p. 184; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), p. 159.

^[206] Id. at 184-187; and id. at 159-162.

^[207] Id. at 185-187 and 192-195; and id. at 160-162 and 167-170.

^[208] Id. at 187-192; and id. at 162-167.

^[209] 628 Phil. 508 (2010) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

^[210] Id., at 529.

^[211] See id. at 530 and 544.

^[212] See id. at 530.

^[213] Id.

^[214] Phil. International Trading Corp. v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

^[215] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 299-301; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), pp. 271-273.

^[216] See House of Representatives Congressional Record Vol. 4: Record No. 93, May 23, 2017, pp. 3-5; and Senate Journal No. 23, September 27, 2017, pp. 435-440.

^[217] See Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 441-442 (1968) [Per J. Fernando].

^[218] Id. at 441.

^[219] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 467-473; and rollo (G.R. No. 236295), pp. 435-441.

^[220] Id. at 451-466; and id. at 419-433.

^[221] Rollo (G.R. No. 236925), pp. 345-350.

^[222] Rollo (G.R. No. 236118, vol. 1), pp. 467-473; and rollo (G.R. 236925), pp. 345-346.

^[223] Id. at 166; and id. at 141.

^[224] Id.; and id.

^[225] Id. at 220-222; and id. at 195-197.

^[226] Id. at 195-206; and id. at 170-181.

^[227] Supra note, at 192.

^[228] Id. at 129.

^[229] Id.

^[230] See id. at 130.

^[231] See id. at 129.

^[232] See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra note 133.

^[233] Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Exec. Ermita, supra note 192, at 133.

^[234] Id. at 233.

^[235] Id. See also British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 603 Phil. 38 (2009) [Per Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].

^[236] Id. at 55.

^[237] Supra.

^[238] Supra.

^[239] 319 Phil. 755 (1995).

^[240] Id. at 796-797.

^[241] Supra note 133, at 766.

^[242] 849 Phil. 120 (2019) [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].

^[243] Id. Emphasis supplied.

^[244] See Id.

^[245] See Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Assn., Inc. v. Hon. Executive Sec. Romulo, 628 Phil. 508, 530 (2010).

^[246] Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ermita, supra note 192, at 135. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.