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The Case
Petitioner Glen Orda y Loyola (petitioner) assails the Amended Decision^[1] dated July 21, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 12760 entitled People of the Philippines v. Hon. Kristine B. Tiangco­-Vinculado, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 16, and Glen Orda y Loyola which granted the People's Motion for Reconsideration against the grant of petitioner's proposal to enter into plea bargaining in the three drugs cases against him.

Antecedents
Petitioner was separately charged with violations of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,^[2] viz:^[3]

Criminal Case No. C-87-16

(Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165)
"That on or about the 25^th day of February 2016, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 ARGIE ESICO a ("poseur buyer"), in consideration of the sum of P300.00 one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "BB-GO-1" containing 0.310 [gram] of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" a dangerous drug without authority to sell and distribute the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

Criminal Case No. C-88-16

(Violation of Section 11 Article II of RA 9165)
"That on or about the 25^th day of February 2016, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession and control six (6) pieces heat­ sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance of suspected shabu marked as "P-GO-2", "P-GO-3", "P­GO-4", "P-GO-5", "P-GO-6", and "P-GO-7", of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "SHABU" a dangerous drug with a total weight of 0.164 [gram], without being authorized by law to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

Criminal Case No. C-89-16

(Violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165)

"That on or about the 25^th day of February 2016, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, without being authorized by law, have under his possession and control one (1) piece improvised tooter transparent glass pipe marked as P-GO-8, and one (1) piece rolled aluminum foil marked as P-GO-9, one (1) piece disposable lighter marked as P-GO-10 considered as drug equipment, instrument, apparatus and/or paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous drugs into the body.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

The cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Roxas City.^[4]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges.^[5]

During the trial, petitioner expressed his intention to enter into plea bargaining to all the charges pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, or the Adoption of Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases. For Criminal Case Nos. C-87-16 and C-88-16, he intended to plead guilty to two counts of violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, with an imposable penalty of six months and one day to four years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 50,000.00.^[6] As for Criminal Case No. C-89-16, he proposed to plead guilty to violation of Section 15 of the same law.^[7]

Too, as mandated by A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, petitioner underwent a drug dependency evaluation which yielded the following results:^[8]

DIAGNOSIS/DIAGNOSES

Methamphetamine Use Disorder, Mild

RECOMMENDATION

MR. GLEN L. ORDA has been found to be a drug dependent and is hereby recommended to undergo OUTPATIENT REHABILITATION at Department of Health Treatment and Rehabilitation Center-Iloilo for a period of not less than six (6) months to one (1) year with discharge or completion contingent upon the evaluation and recommendation of the treatment team. It is further recommended that he will undergo an After Care Program after completion of his primary rehabilitation program for a period of 18 months with discharge from the program contingent upon the evaluation and recommendation of the treatment team. Violation of any of the center's rules and regulation will result in the imposition of proper sanction.^[9]

Meantime, the People, through the public prosecutor, interposed its objection to the proposal since: (1) in Criminal Case No. C-87-16, the plea­ bargaining proposal is not in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 27^[10] dated April 10, 2018 which only allows an accused charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 to plea bargain to Section 11 (3), Article II of the same Act, with an imposable penalty of 12 years and one day to 20 years, and a fine of PHP 300,000.00; and (2) in Criminal Case Nos. C-88-16 and C-89-16, though in consonance with Department of Justice Circular No. 27, violated Section 2,^[11] Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires the consent of both the prosecutor and the police officers to any plea of guilty to a lesser offense.^[12]

The Ruling of the Trial Court
By Decision^[13] dated February 4, 2019, the trial court granted petitioner's proposal for plea bargaining, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. C-87-16 accused Glen Orda y Loyola alias "Lapong" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA No. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment consisting of six (6) months and one (1) day to three (3) years and to pay a fine of P10,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. C-88-16, accused Glen Orda y Loyola alias "Lapong" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA No. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment consisting of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and to pay a fine of P10,000.00; and

3. In Criminal Case No. C-89-16 accused Glen Orda y Loyoa alias "Lapong" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 and is hereby sentenced to six (6) months or drug treatment and rehabilitation.

Accused's detention period and his yet to be served drug treatment and rehabilitation shall be credited in his service of sentences. Unless he has already served the maximum penalties involved, he is advised to avail the benefits of probation and be released on recognizance.

Accused is mandated to report to the DOH Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, Brgy. Rumbang, Pototan, Iloilo for the proper orientation of the terms and condition of his OUTPATIENT drug treatment and rehabilitation within fifteen (15) days from his release.

The sachets of shabu and drug paraphernalia are confiscated to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Region VI, Iloilo City for proper disposal. They buy-bust money shall be turned over to the national treasury.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

The trial court essentially ordained that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC should prevail over Department of Justice Circular No. 27 considering that the former was issued in the exercise of the Supreme Court's rule-making authority, especially for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading practice, and procedure in all courts, including plea bargaining in drug cases, as mandated by Section 5 (5),^[14] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.^[15] Too, the consent of the police officers should be dispensed with since violation of Republic Act No. 9165 is a public crime and, as such, the State is deemed to be the offended party. The public prosecutor is the representative of the State and thus, his or her comment to the proposal for plea bargaining of the petitioner will suffice.^[16]

Petitioner was immediately rearraigned thereafter.^[17] The People's Motion for Reconsideration was denied under Order^[18] dated February 22, 2019.

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought the nullification of the trial court's dispositions via a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.^[19] It maintained that as provided in the rules and pertinent jurisprudence, the consent of the State is required to sustain a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Hence, the trial court's alleged disregard of the prosecution's objection to petitioner's plea bargaining constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.^[20]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Under its assailed Decision^[21] dated November 29, 2019, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. It ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted petitioner's proposed plea bargaining,^[22] for plea bargaining is always addressed to the sound discretion of the judge as mandated under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. If the objection to the plea bargaining will weaken the drug campaign of the government, then the judges may overrule such objection because they are constitutionally bound to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.^[23] Ultimately, the trial court strictly adhered to the Supreme Court's framework on plea bargaining despite the opposition of the prosecution.^[24]

But respondent's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration^[25] dated January 20, 2020 was granted by the Cou1t of Appeals under its Amended Decision^[26] dated July 21, 2021, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent is GRANTED. Accordingly, the dispositive portion of our 29 November 2019 Decision is hereby amended, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 4 February 20 l9 Decision of the Hon. Kristine B. Tiangco-Vinculado, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Roxas City, in Crim. Case Nos. C87-16, C-88-16, and C-89-16 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Roxas City, is ORDERED to proceed with the trial on the original charges in Crim. Case Nos. C87-16, C-88-16, and C-89-16.

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

The Court of Appeals held that a plea of guilty to a lesser offense would never become valid without the conformity of the prosecutor. In the absence of a mutual agreement to plea bargain, the proper course of action would be the continuation of the proceedings.^[27] Too, Department of Justice Circular No. 27 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. Rather, it merely served as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains.^[28] In any event, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted petitioner's proposal to plea bargaining to lesser offenses sans the consent of the prosecution.^[29]

The Present Petition
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the foregoing dispositions of the Court of Appeals via Rule 45. He essentially avers that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the proposed plea bargaining on the offenses charged. In fact, courts have the authority to overrule objections since they are constitutionally bound to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.^[30] Verily, the trial court's exercise of sound discretion is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.^[31]

Our Ruling
We reverse.
 

The recently issued Department of Justice Circular No. 18 now conforms to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework

Foremost, the issues raised in this Petition have already been addressed and resolved in the recent consolidated cases of Montierro v. People and Baldadera v. People.^[32] In these cases, Cypher Baldadera and Erick Montierro were separately charged with violation of Section 5, Article 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. During the pendency of their cases, the Court promulgated Estipona v. Lobrigo.^[33] which essentially allowed plea bargaining in drugs cases. Incidental thereto, Montierro and Baldadera accordingly filed their respective proposals for plea bargaining, offering to enter a guilty plea to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, in accordance with the Court's plea bargaining framework. The prosecution nevertheless interposed its objection, citing the provisions of Department of Justice Circular No. 27. Ultimately, however, the Court held that consistent with the amendments introduced by Department of Justice Circular No. 18, the prosecution's objection to Montierro's plea bargaining proposals, which was based solely on the superseded provisions of Department of Justice Circular No. 27, may now be considered to have been effectively withdrawn.

Indeed, Department of Justice Circular No. 18 is a significant development in the framework on plea bargaining in drug cases as it introduced amendments which harmonized conflicting portions under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Thus:

AM 18-03-16-SC dated May 4, 2018		DOJ 27 dated June 26, 2018		DOJ 18 dated May 10, 2022
Offense charged in Information	Acceptable Plea Bargain	Offense charged in Information	Acceptable Plea Bargain	Offense charged in Information	Acceptable Plea Bargain
Section 5 Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs Penalty: Life Imprisonment to Death Fine: PHP 500,000.00 to PHP 10,000,000.00	Section 12 Possession of Equipment Apparatus, and Other Penalty: 6 months and 1 day to 4 years Fine: PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 50,000.00	Section 5 Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs Penalty: Life Imprisonment to Death Fine: PHP 500,000.00 to PHP 10,000,000.00	Section 11 (3) Possession of Dangerous Drugs Penalty: 12 years and 1 day to 20 years Fine: PHP 300,000.00 to PHP 400,000.00	Section 5 Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs Penalty: Life Imprisonment to Death Fine: PHP 500,000.00 to PHP 10,000,000.00	Section 12 Possession of Equipment Apparatus, and Other Penalty: 6 months and 1 day to 4 years Fine: PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 50,000.00

Notably, the recently issued Department of Justice Circular No. 18, which amended Department of Justice Circular No. 27, now conforms to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC specifically as regards the acceptable plea bargain on Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (to Section 12 of the same law).

In fine, following Montierro, the prosecution's objection to petitioner's plea bargaining proposal in Criminal Case No. C-87-16 may now be deemed to have been effectively withdrawn. Anent Criminal Case Nos. C-88-16 and C-89-16, though in conformity with Department of Justice Circular No. 27, the proposal violated Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure since it lacks the required consent on the part of the public prosecutor.
 

Approval of a Plea Bargaining proposal is ultimately subject to the sound discretion of the court

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the plea bargaining in criminal cases, thus:

SECTION 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

Jurisprudence has always referred to plea bargaining as a process of arriving at "a mutually satisfactory disposition of a case."^[34] Hence, mutual consent of the prosecution and the offended party, on one hand, and the defendant, on the other, has always been emphasized as a condition precedent or an indispensable requirement to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense.^[35]

More, plea bargaining in criminal cases is a rule of procedure which falls within the Court's exclusive rule-making power under Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.^[36] It advances the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and benefits both the State and the accused.^[37] On one hand, the State is, inter alia, able to secure a conviction without expending scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources. On the other band, the accused is able to avoid trial, reduce his or her possible exposure, and limit the penalty which would probably be imposed on him or her.^[38]

Here, petitioner manifested his intention to enter into plea bargaining during the trial court proceedings. In Criminal Case Nos. C-87-16 (for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165) and C-88-16 (for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165), he proposed to plead guilty to two counts of violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. And in Criminal Case No. C-89-16 (for violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165), he proposed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 15 of the same law. Despite the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court proceeded to grant his proposal to plea bargain. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed, but subsequently granted the Petition on reconsideration. It ruled that a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be sustained without the conformity of the prosecutor, as here.

Again, though the mutual consent of the State and the accused has always been a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense,^[39] trial courts have the discretion whether to allow the accused to make such plea.^[40] To be sure, the exercise of such discretion is independent from the requirement of mutual consent.^[41] Indeed, if the approval of plea bargaining proposals is made entirely contingent upon the consent of the prosecution—which has generally been withheld due to issuances such as Department of Justice Circular No. 27 which contravened A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC—then the Court's constitutionally-endowed rule-making power would be rendered nugatory.^[42]

As impartial tribunals, trial courts are objectively in the best position to disinterestedly assess whether the facts, the evidence, and the circumstances of the accused necessitate a plea bargaining agreement, and ultimately, to determine its propriety in each case. Thus, their duty necessarily includes the discretion to approve the accused's plea of guilty to a lesser offense over the objection of the prosecution when such objection has no valid basis, or is not supported by evidence, or if the objection solely tends to undermine the Court's plea bargaining framework, or that the objection is solely to the effect that it will weaken the drug campaign of the government.^[43]

On this score, the Court in Montierro set forth the following guidelines for plea bargaining in drugs cases:

1. Offers for plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by way of a formal written motion filed by the accused in court.
   
   
2. The lesser offense which the accused proposes to plead guilty to must necessarily be included in the offense charged.
   
   
3. Upon receipt of the proposal for plea bargaining that is compliant with the provisions of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the judge shall order that a drug dependency assessment be administered. If the accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after a drug dependency test, then he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the period of his/her after-care and follow-up program if the penalty is still unserved. If the accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, then he/she will be released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his/her sentence in jail minus the counselling period al rehabilitation center.
   
   
4. As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.
   
   
   
   1. Though the prosecution and the defense may agree to enter into a plea bargain, it does not follow that the courts will automatically approve the proposal. Judges must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea bargaining taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused.
   
   
5. The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:
   
   
   1. the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times; or
      
      
   2. when the evidence of guilt is strong.
   
   
6. Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed plea bargain does not conform to the Court ­issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.
   
   
7. Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if any.
   
   
8. If the prosecution objects to the accused's plea bargaining proposal due to the circumstances enumerated in item no. 5, the trial court is mandated to hear the prosecution's objection and rule on the merits thereof. If the trial court finds the objection meritorious, it shall order the continuation of the criminal proceedings.
   
   
9. If an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under RA No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to Section 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply.

In sum, the Court clarifies that the consent of the parties is necessary in the plea bargaining process. The approval of the accused's plea of guilty to a lesser offense, however, is ultimately subject to the sound discretion of the trial court.^[44] Thus, petitioner's plea bargaining depends on the trial court's assessment of their qualifications, along with the foregoing guidelines, and not whether the public prosecutor will interpose his or her objection thereto. Verily, we find it necessary to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioner is qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 21, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 12760 is REVERSED insofar as it NULLIFIED the Decision dated February 4, 2019 in Criminal Case Nos. C-87-16; C-88-16, and C-89-16. These cases are remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Roxas City, which is directed to determine the qualification of petitioner GLEN ORDA y LOYOLA based on the Guidelines heretofore stated, and thereafter, resolve anew his plea bargaining proposals.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Kho, Jr., J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.

---

^[1] Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura­-Yap and Associate Justice Lorenza Redulla Bordios, rollo, pp. 167-178.

^[2] The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

^[3] Rollo, p. 108.

^[4] Id. at 76.

^[5] Id. at 33.

^[6] Id. at 72.

^[7] Id. at 133.

^[8] Id. at 72.

^[9] Id. at 72-73.

^[10] Adoption of the Plea-Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases.

^[11] Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent or the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

^[12] Rollo, p. 73.

^[13] Id. at 75.

^[14] Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

xxx

^[15] Rollo, p. 74.

^[16] Id. at 73.

^[17] Id. at 133.

^[18] Id. at 76.

^[19] Id. at 43-68.

^[20] Id.

^[21] Id. at 132-148.

^[22] Id. at 144.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id. at 147.

^[25] Id. at 149-163.

^[26] Id. at 167-178.

^[27] Id. at 174.

^[28] Id. at 176

^[29] Id. at 174.

^[30] Id. at 20.

^[31] Id. at 25.

^[32] G.R. No. 254564 and G.R. No. 254974, July 26, 2022.

^[33] See 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
 
^[34]See Sayre v. Xenos, 871 Phil. 86 (2020).

^[35] Id.

^[36] See Montierro v. People, G.R. No. 245564, July 26. 2022 citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999).

^[37] Id. citing Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
 
^[38] Id.

^[39] Id. citing People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992).

^[40] Id. citing Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 376 (2008).

^[41] Id.

^[42] Supra note 36 & 34.

^[43] See People v. Montierro, G.R. No. 245564, July 26, 2022.

^[44] Id.

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KHO, JR., J.:

I concur in the ponencia insofar as it remands the case to the court of origin to determine petitioner Glen Orda y Loyola's (petitioner) entitlement to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining. I also concur in the ponencia's disquisition^[1] that pursuant to the Court En Banc's ruling in People v. Montierro^[2] (Montierro), the prosecution's objection in this case — which was based on Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27, S. 2018^[3] — is deemed withdrawn by the fact of enactment of DOJ Circular No. 18, S. 2022.^[4]

To recall, in Montierro, the Court En Banc, speaking through Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, took judicial notice that on May 10, 2022, the DOJ issued DOJ Circular No. 18, which explicitly revoked the earlier-issued DOJ Circular No. 27, S. 2018 (and in effect, includes the revocation of the DOJ Circular No. 61 as well). A salient feature of DOJ Circular No. 18, S. 2022 is that the DOJ aligned its plea bargaining framework with that of the Court, i.e., A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Recognizing this recent development, the Court En Banc categorically ruled that "[w]ith the amendments introduced in DOJ Circular No. 18, [S. 2022,] the prosecution's objection to [therein accused's] plea bargaining proposals, which was based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27, [S. 2018,] can now be considered as effectively withdrawn."^[5]

This notwithstanding, the Court En Banc ruled that the trial courts should not have hastily approved therein accused's plea bargaining proposals over the objection of the prosecution. Rather, the trial courts should have first resolved the objection of the prosecution before approving such proposals, which resolution includes a determination of: (a) whether the evidence of guilt against therein accused is strong; and (b) whether therein accused are recidivists, habitual offenders, are known in the community as drug addicts and troublemakers, have undergone rehabilitation but suffered relapses, or have been charged many times. The Court En Banc further instructed that the presence of any of these circumstances would bar therein accused from availing of the benefits of entering into a plea bargain with the State. Given the foregoing, the Court En Banc; concluded that the criminal cases against therein accused should be remanded to the court of origin to afford the latter an opportunity to determine whether or not therein accused are qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining.^[6]

However, I tender my dissent in the ponencia insofar as it directs the court of origin to "determine the qualification of [petitioner] based on the [Montierro guidelines], and thereafter, resolve anew his plea bargaining proposals."^[7] In this regard, I find it apropos to reiterate my Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Montierro where I explained that the guidelines provided by the majority in Montierro "gives the trial courts uninhibited discretion in approving or denying plea bargaining proposals, which in turn, unduly oversteps on the authority of the Executive Department, more particularly, the DOJ — to prosecute crimes."^[8]

Pertinent portions of my Opinion in Montierro, which essentially posit that the plea bargaining process is not a purely procedural function within the realm of the Judiciary as it is, in fact, an interplay of the powers of the Judiciary and the Executive, read as follows:

IV.

The Contrary View
x x x x

I thus respectfully opine that the plea bargaining process should be viewed ill the following prism:

1) Plea bargaining is a process involving multiple parties, namely: (a) the accused who seeks to avail of the process; (b) the private offended party, in certain crimes, whose consent is indispensable to a valid plea bargaining agreement; (c) the handling prosecutor as representative of the DOJ – and in the bigger picture, as representative of the Executive Department – whose task is to prosecute offenses and whose consent is equally indispensable to a valid plea bargaining agreement; and (d) the trial court as representative of the Judicial Department, whose critical task is to ensure that all the requisites of a valid plea bargaining agreement under the Rules are present before approving the same.

2) If the accused wishes to plead guilty to a lesser offense, he should make his intentions known to the handling prosecutor, who in turn should determine whether plea bargaining is proper. In making such determination, the handling prosecutor should take into consideration, among other things: (i) whether the lesser offense to which the accused seeks to plead guilty to is necessarily included in the offense charged or determine the proper lesser charge to which the accused can plea; (ii) internal rules or guidelines within the DOJ that govern plea bargaining and the giving of consent to any plea bargaining agreement; (iii) whether the evidence of guilt is strong; and (iv) the conformity of the private offended party, in proper instances. Further, the handling prosecutor may also consider whether a plea bargaining agreement will serve the interests of justice if the accused is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug dealer and a troublemaker, had undergone rehabilitation but suffered a relapse, has been charged many times, or any other relevant and material situation, depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case.

3) If the handling prosecutor is not amenable to the offer to plea bargain, he should signify his refusal to give consent in writing. The accused and/or the offended party cannot compel the handling prosecutor to give such consent. However, they may elevate the matter of the handling prosecutor's refusal to give consent to the Prosecutor General/City/Provincial Prosecutor who exercises the power of control and supervision over such handling prosecutor, and later on, to the Secretary of Justice, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If such refusal is sustained at the level of the Secretary of Justice, the accused may, if he/she so wishes, assail the same through an appeal to the Office of the President or petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse or discretion, whenever appropriate.

4) The refusal of the handling prosecutor all the way to the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the President to give the consent to a plea bargaining agreement does not empower the trial courts to overrule the same, in respect and deference to the DOJ's power to prosecute offenses which is purely an Executive function. The duty of the trial courts in such cases is to proceed to trial.

5) If the handling prosecutor, and the private offended party in proper cases, agree to the offer of the accused to plea bargain, they shall put their agreement in writing, i.e., draft the plea bargaining agreement, and submit the same to the trial court where the case is pending for consideration.
 
6) Upon submission of the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court shall have the duty and responsibility to determine whether the plea bargaining agreement satisfies all the requisites for a valid plea bargaining agreement under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, including ascertaining whether there is indeed consent from the prosecutor and private offended party in proper cases, and whether their consent were voluntarily and intelligently given. It is also the duty and responsibility of the trial court to ensure that the accused fully understands and accepts the consequences of his plea to a lesser offense including the penalty thereof, as well as to determine whether the lesser offense which the accused shall plead guilty to is necessarily included in the offense charged. Again, owing to the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the express provision of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, this is the critical function of the trial courts in the plea bargaining process, consistent with the principle that courts should act as impartial tribunals in the dispensation of justice.

7) If the court handling the criminal case determines that all requisites are dutifully complied with, then it shall approve the pica bargaining agreement, and promulgate a ruling convicting the accused of the lesser offense to which he pleaded guilty to. Otherwise, the court shall reject the plea bargaining agreement and continue with the trial.

V.

Disagreement with the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Guidelines
Given the foregoing discussions, I now explain my disagreement with the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh guidelines, as provided in the ponencia.

To recall, the fourth guideline provides:

4. As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval or the court. Regardless or the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance or the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.^[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Contrary to what the guideline states, the approval to plea bargain is not entirely dependent to the sound discretion of the court. To reiterate, plea bargaining involves an interplay of the great powers of the Executive and Judicial Departments. It is essentially a two (2)-step process:

First, once the accused submits a plea bargaining proposal, it is up to the Executive Department, through the DOJ and its prosecutors, that wields prosecutorial power, to determine whether it should give its consent to the same; and

Second, once the Executive Department (and the private offended party, in proper cases) gives its consent, it is now up to the Judicial Department to ensure and verify that all requisites for a valid plea bargaining agreement are present. If in the affirmative, then the courts should approve the plea bargaining agreement; otherwise, it should be rejected.

Thus, the first step involves the discretion of the Executive Department, whose discretion in giving or not giving its consent, should be respected by the court as a co-equal body. As already adverted to, the involvement of the Judicial Department in the plea bargaining process is only when the accused, the handling prosecutor, and the private offended party in proper cases, have mutually agreed on a plea bargaining agreement and the same is submitted to the court where the criminal case is pending for its approval or disapproval – which is encapsulated in the second step as above-described. Thus, the plea bargaining process is a shared responsibility of the Executive and Judicial Departments.

With respect to the fifth guideline, it reads:

5. The Court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:

a) the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times; or

b) where the evidence of guilt is strong.^[10]

lt is respectfully submitted that the factors affecting the character of the accused, such as, if the accused is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but suffered a relapse, has been charged many times, when the evidence of guilt is strong, or any other relevant and material event or circumstance, should not be considered as automatic disqualifications on the part of the accused to avail the benefits of plea bargaining. This is for the Executive, through the handling prosecutor, to carefully evaluate and determine whether such factors may disqualify the accused from availing plea bargaining. Considering that the right to prosecute belongs to the Executive Department, the prosecution must be given a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.^[11]

Anent the sixth and seventh guidelines, they respectively read:

6. Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed plea bargain does not conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

7. Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if any.^[12]

As also discussed above, the determination of which offenses may be plea bargained and what may constitute as "lesser offenses" to which a plea bargain may be made, as well as the giving of consent to a plea bargaining on the part of the prosecutor, are substantive aspects of plea bargaining. These are necessarily part and parcel of the prosecutorial power which rightfully belongs to the prosecutors of the Executive Department, which in turn represents the State – and the People of the Philippines for that matter. Thus, the courts should not be allowed to overrule the objection of the prosecution to any plea bargaining proposal of the accused or to disapprove any plea bargaining agreement if all the requisites of plea bargaining under the Rules are present, including in drugs cases. For the Court to allow this to happen is tantamount to the authorization of an undue and dangerous intrusion into the powers of the Executive Department.

It bears reiterating that the role of the Judicial Department in a criminal case is not to champion the cause of the State and the People of the Philippines – its critical role is justly limited to being an impartial tribunal that ensures the orderly conduct of proceedings and to adjudicate in accordance with prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.

Thus, the Judicial Department should not arrogate upon itself the substantive power to determine what is an acceptable "lesser offense" to which the accused may plead guilty to in lieu of the original charge against him/her, and to approve the plea bargaining proposal over the objections of the prosecutors or to disapprove the plea bargaining agreement notwithstanding the presence of all the requisites of plea bargaining as contained in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. If allowed to do so, the trial courts will effectively supplant the wisdom of the Executive Department in the prosecution of criminal cases, a responsibility imposed upon it by no less than the Constitution, thereby resulting in an impermissible overreach into the realm of the Executive Department.

For these reasons, and after a circumspect reflection, I respectfully submit that it now appears that the Court's very own plea bargaining framework for drugs cases, i.e., A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, may have unduly overstepped into the boundaries of Executive power insofar as it provided, among others, a determination as to which violations of RA 9165 may be subject to plea bargaining, including the corresponding lesser offense to which the accused may plead guilty to.

At this juncture, it is acknowledged that the guidelines provided in this case were explicitly made applicable only to plea bargaining in drugs cases. However, I respectfully opine that the Majority's resolution of this case might present a dangerous precedent for the court to intrude into substantive matters of plea bargaining of other crimes, which to again reiterate, are purely within the domain of the Executive Department – under the mistaken notion that all aspects of plea bargaining are purely procedural in nature, particularly in the light of the explicit pronouncement in the ponencia that any plea bargaining framework that the Court may promulgate should be accorded primacy.^[13] With all due respect, this should not be countenanced as it is unconstitutional.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, I fully agree with the ponencia, insofar as it orders the remand of the criminal cases against Montierro and Baldadera to the respective courts of origin for further proceedings because said courts approved their respective plea bargaining proposals over the objections of the prosecution. Particularly, the respective courts of origin should be tasked to determine whether or not the prosecution in those cases still have any objections to the plea bargaining proposals of Montierro and Baldadera, taking into consideration the recent issuance of DOJ Circular No. 18[, S. 2022] and in the event the prosecution and Montierro and Baldadera would enter into plea bargaining agreements, for the trial courts to determine the presence of all the requisites of plea bargaining on said agreement under the Rules, and pass judgment accordingly.

Thus, and in light of my position in Montierro, it is humbly opined that the ponencia should have limited the ruling in this case to the following: first, the prosecution's objection to petitioner's plea bargaining proposal — which is solely based on DOJ Circular No. 27, S. 2018 — is considered as effectively withdrawn in light of the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 18, S. 2022; and second, the instant case is remanded to the RTC in order to give the latter court the opportunity to ascertain whether or not petitioner is qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining, pursuant to the plea bargaining process stated in my opinion in Montierro and quoted above.

ACCORDINGLY, I VOTE to REMAND Criminal Case Nos. C-87-16, C-88-16, and C-89-16 to the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 16 to ascertain whether or not petitioner Glen Orda y Loyola is entitled to the benefits of plea bargaining.

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^[1] See ponencia, p. 8.

^[2] G.R. Nos. 254564 and 254974, and A.M. Nos. 21-07-16-SC and 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[3] Entitled "AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002'" dated June 26, 2018.

^[4] Entitled "REVISED AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002'" dated May 10, 2022.

^[5] See People v. Montierro, supra. See also ponencia, p. 8.

^[6] See People v. Montierro, id.

^[7] See ponencia, p. 12.

^[8] See page 9 of my Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montierro, supra.

^[9] See People v. Montierro, supra note 1.

^[10] See id. at 31.

^[11] Montelibano v. Yap, 822 Phil. 262, 273 (2017) [Per J. Martires, Third Division], citing Bumatay v. Bumatay, 809 Phil. 302 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].

^[12] See People v. Montierro, supra note 1.

^[13] See People v. Montierro, id.