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Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not frequently true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.

But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.^[8] (Citations omitted)

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity.

....

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.^[10] (Citations omitted)

The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.^[12]

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self­preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.^[14]

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.^[18]

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.

In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:

Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases.... The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same....

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in People v. Godoy:

It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings ....

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.

Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove it.^[22] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

[L]egislative inquiry must respect the individual rights of the persons invited to or affected by the legislative inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of legislative inquiry must be carefully balanced with the private rights of those affected. A person's right against self-incrimination and to due process cannot be swept aside in favor of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.

It must be stressed that persons invited to appear before a legislative inquiry do so as resource persons and not as accused in a criminal proceeding. Thus, they should be accorded respect and courtesy since they were under no compulsion to accept the invitation extended before them, yet they did so anyway. Their accommodation of a request should not in any way be repaid with insinuations.

The basic rules of decorum and decency must govern any undertaking done in one's official capacity as an agent of the State, in tacit recognition of one's role as a public servant. However, the deportment and decorum of the members of any constitutional organ, such as both Houses of Congress during a legislative inquiry, are beyond the judicial realm. All this Court can do is exercise its own power with care and wisdom, acting in a manner befitting its dignified status as public servant and never weaponizing shame under the guise of a public hearing.^[28]

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.^[35]

The first situation involves a statute that flagrantly violates the right to freedom of expression and its cognate rights. Freedom of expression is the cornerstone of a democratic government and occupies the highest rank in the hierarchy of civil liberties. Section 4 of the Constitution states, "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances." Consequently, a facial challenge is permitted in cases involving freedom of expression and its concomitant rights to prevent prior restrictions on free speech or overly broad language that has a chilling effect on free speech.

In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti­-Terrorism Council, this Court explained:

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights ....

The second scenario permits judicial review in the absence of actual facts when a violation of fundamental rights is so grievous or imminent that judicial restraint would lead to serious violations of fundamental rights. In these instances, the violation of rights must be so egregious and pervasive that almost any citizen could raise the issue. In Parcon-Song v. Parcon, this Court held:

There are exceptions, namely: (a) when a facial review of the statute is allowed, as in cases of actual or clearly imminent violation of the sovereign rights to free expression and its cognate rights; or (b) when there is a clear and convincing showing that a fundamental constitutional right has been actually violated in the application of a statute, which are of transcendental interest. The violation must be so demonstrably and urgently egregious that it outweighs a reasonable policy a deference in such specific instance. The facts constituting that violation must either be uncontested or established on trial. The basis for ruling on the constitutional issue must also be clearly alleged and traversed by the parties. Otherwise, this Court will not take cognizance of the constitutional issue, let alone rule on it...

The third instance in which judicial review is appropriate despite the absence of actual facts is when a Constitutional provision invokes emergency or urgent measures. By its very nature, emergency or urgent measures are temporary thus allowing it to avoid judicial review even if its capable of repetition. This contemplates situations in which waiting for an actual dispute or injury to occur may result in irreversible damage or harm to an individual. However, with the risk that the relevant measure would be repealed or rendered obsolete, the filing of a lawsuit or seeking judicial recourse would be futile. In such a situation, this Court may determine the applicable doctrine regarding the provision. This may be applied, but is not limited to, challenges regarding the suspension of habeas corpus, the declaration of martial law, and the exercise of emergency powers.^[39]

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right belongs as well — if not more — to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though if be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view "induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. " To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad mutters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.^[41] (Emphasis supplied)

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.^[43]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that"[w]hen statutes regulate or prescribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a stature drawn with narrow specificity."

....

As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.^[44] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 367 U.S. 733. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.^[46] (Emphasis in the original)

We rule that not every violotion of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person's private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.

....

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.^[47] (Emphasis in the original)

Section 18. Contempt. - (a) The Chairman with the concurrence of at least one (1) member of the Committee, may punish or cite in contempt any witness before the Committee who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely or evasively, or who unduly refuses to appear or bring before the Committee certain documents and/or object evidence required by the Committee notwithstanding the issuance of the appropriate subpoena therefor. A majority of all the members of the Committee may, however, reverse or modify the aforesaid order of contempt within seven (7) days. (Emphasis supplied)

SEN. LACSON: Do you have documents to show your proof of payment doon sa mga suppliers?

MR. ONG: We have all those documents as long as it's--- wala naman pong rights or--- maba-violate sa amin, we are more than willing to cooperate.

SEN. LACSON: Okay. How much in total did you pay the four suppliers? Doon sa mga dumating, iyong na-procure ninyo and supplied to the PS-DBM, magkano iyong binayaran ninyo sa mga suppliers?

MR. ONG: Mr. Chairman, wala po kasi sa amin iyong mga --- sa akin, wala talaga sa akin ang record. I think I have to access our accounting records.

SEN LACSON: No. But ikaw ang nakikipag-usap sa mga suppliers, may idea ka kung magkano iyong presyo na binayaran mo doon, hindi ba?

MR. ONG: Mr. Chairman, kasi medyo ano po iyon, trade secret na iyon. Parang hindi po kami komportable na ibulgar na po sa publiko.

....

THE CHAIRPERSON: Kaya nga, di sabihin mo na. Makikipagcooperate, tinatanong ka na, hindi mo naman sinasagot.

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, I myself alone cannot answer that question kasi kumpanya po kami. Allow us to have a meeting on it, tapos pag-usapan namin and we need guidance with our accountants and lawyers. Definitely, pag kinakailangan naming makipag-cooperate sa COA, gagawin po namin iyon.

SEN. LACSON: Mr. Linconn Ong xxx did you have any document... mayroon kayong parang joint venture agreement with Mr. Yang?

MR. ONG: We do have agreement po.

SEN. LACSON: Yes. Do you have a copy of that agreement?

MR. ONG: I don't have it with me, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LACSON: What kind of agreement do you have with Mr. Yang?

MR. ONG: Hindi ko po talaga maalala noong, noong mga --- specific content na iyan, Mr. Chairman, but sana po maintindihan ninyo na kami po, sa community naming minsan --- totoo po iyan. Pagka- minsan may mga transaksiyon kami na rninsan verbal-verbal talaga- negosyante lang po.

SEN. LACSON: No. But in this particular case, iyong supplies ng mga PPEs, sinabi mo, mayroon kayong pinirmahan na agreement with Mr. Yang. Ang tanong ko, anong klaseng agreement? Anong klase iyong pinirmahan ninyong dokumento? Anong form? Is it a joint venture agreement?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, I'm not really privy or hindi ko talaga ma­ recall ngayon kung ano iyong content, but we have- we do have kasulatan po.

SEN. LACSON: A very important document, hindi mo matandaan kung anong form? Joint venture ha? Contract ba? Hindi mo man lang maalala kung ano iyon?

MR. ONG: Mayroon po talagang ganoon.

SEN. LACSON: Anong klase nga?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, hindi ko po maka- hindi ako maka-ano, hindi maka-kasi baka po mali iyong masabi ko ngayon, tapos iyong iba naman iyong nakita ko.

SEN. LACSON: Can you produce that and submit it to this Committee?

MR. ONG: Hanapin ko po, sir. Yes po, yes po.^[50] (Emphasis supplied)

SEN. LACSON: Six hundred twenty-five thousand pesos. Ang tanong ni Senator Drilon, [PHP] 625,000, tapos ang nire-rernit ninyo, sabi mo, galing din sa corporation ninyo, sa Pharmally. Maliwanag iyan, hindi sa ibang corporation, hindi kayo nangutang at lahat. Saan nanggaling iyong perang nire-remit ninyo sa China. Sabihin na nating galing sa bangko rito -

MR. ONG: Opo, opo.

SEN. LACSON: Ang sagot ninyo po, galing sa corporation ninyo. Ang liit ng capital ng corporation ninyo, 625. That's the question. How do you reconcile that?

MR. ONG: Okay, Mr.Chairman, can I- pwede na po ba akong magpaliwanang?

SEN. LACSON: All right. Go ahead.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Kanina ka pa nagpapaliwanag, hindi naman kita pinipigilan.

MR. ONG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Marami po kasing series of transaction iyon. So, mayroon naman po kaming naiipon na pera. So, that's our pondo. And then at the same time, sa mga series of transactions, pagka medyo malaki na po iyong project, kinakailangan din po namin mangutang sa mga kaibigan. So, hindi ko po dine-deny na mayroon kaming mga utang sa labas.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Hindi naman iyon ang problema. Bilyon bilyon ang tina-transact ninyo, marami kayong kaibigan. Kailangan ring ipaliwanag kung saan rin kinuha noong mga kaibigan ninyo iyang perang iyan. Magpapaliwanag kayo sa Money Laundering Council.

SEN. DRILON: Yes. Just to go back to Mr. Lincoln Ong. Here is a resource person who is clearly lying on the record because he says the funds were corporate fimds, corporate funds of Pharmally. But the audited financial statement indicates that beginning of 2020. they had only 625,000 which is the paid-up capital. Clearly, the corporation had no capacity to pay the initial order of 54 million. So, it is not true at all and there is a deliberate effort to mislead the Committee by saying these are corporate funds. We asked him, "Who advanced this payment?" He said it was from bank accounts of Union Bank or something. "Who owns the bank accounts?" He is already evasive. This witness, Mr. Chairman, is clearly lying— is clearly lying. And in the case of Arnault, which is a 1950 case, this Senate has the power to detain, as we have detained, people until they tell us the truth. This witness is both evasive and refuses to answer or telling a lie. And, therefore, he has been declared in contempt earlier. We move that the contempt order be now executed and we send our sheriffs, our security people, to arrest Mr. Ong right now.^[51] (Emphasis supplied)

SEN. LACSON: Twenty-two years. Okay. My next question is, when, how and why did you become involved with Pharrnally.

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he doesn't know and he has no relation to Pharmally.

SEN. LACSON: I would like to remind Mr. Yang that he is under oath, Mr. Interpreter.

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Yang is aware that he is under oath. And it is only through the news that he found out about the existence of Pharmally Pharmaceutical.

SEN. LACSON: So, he maintains that he has nothing to do, nothing to do at all with Pharmally. Is that correct?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang] MR. YANG.

[responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. Mr. Chairman, what Mr. Yang said is that, initially, he doesn't know of the existence or the whereabouts or anything about Pharmally Pharmaceutical. Later they did approach him for some assistance.

SEN. LACSON: So, it is not true that he has nothing to do or he had nothing to do with Pharmally?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, your question pertains to the corporation or on the operations? We just like to clarify on that ...

SEN. LACSON: First, the corporation, Pharmally Pharmaceuticals.

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. Mr. Chairman, we'd like to clarify in terms of the registration or setup of Pharmally Pharmaceutical, Mr. Yang has nothing to do with it.

SEN. LACSON: That is correct. But does he have anything to do with the operations of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals at any point?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, in terms of operations, Mr. Yang has not been involved or he has no idea.

SEN. LACSON: Does he know Huang Tzu Yen, the chairman of Pharmally?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese]
 
MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] During that 2017, he met Mr. Huang Tzu Yen, together with his father. And after that, they have no any communications.

SEN. LACSON: Does he know a certain Linconn Ong?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese)

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Yes. He knows Mr. Linconn Ong, Mr. Chairman.

....

SEN. LACSON: Did he have any business dealings with Mr. Linconn Ong whether in his personal capacity or in his capacity as one of the incorporators of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese]

 MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, no.

SEN. LACSON: No business dealings with Mr. Linconn Ong?

MR. HUNG: Mr. Chairman, can you just be more - sorry, can you just repeat the question?

SEN. LACSON: Did they have any business dealings with Linconn Ong, whether in his personal capacity or as a stockholder incorporator of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese].

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang would like to ask in terms of what specific period you were pertaining to?

SEN. LACSON: In the supply of PPEs, medical supplies like face masks, shields, et cetera in relation to the transaction.

SEN. LACSON: .... in relation to the transaction dealings of Pharmally with the PS-DBM, to be specific.

MR. HUNG: So, Mr. Chair. just to clarify. Your question is, if he has any dealing or anything to do with the transactions pertaining to PS­ DBM and Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

SEN. LACSON: Yes, PPEs - supply of PPEs. supply of surgical masks, face shields, face masks.

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang would like to say that when Pharmally did get their contracts, he has nothing to do with any of those contracts or awards.

MR.YANG: [speaking in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: Then, eventually, Mr. Linconn did approach Mr. Yang and then he helped him-them -or Mr. Yang introduced friends to Linconn who could help them with their supplies.

SEN. LACSON: That is correct. That is the point I was trying to point out, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Michael Yang was the one who acted as a go-between or middleman between Linconn Ong or Pharmally Pharmaceuticals and the suppliers from China. Is that correct?

MR. HUNG: So, Mr. Chair. Your question, again, that Linconn and —

SEN. LACSON: No. Mr. Michael Yang acted as a middleman between Pharmally Phannaceuticals through Mr. Linconn Ong and the Chinese suppliers of the medical supplies in relation to the procurement.

MR. HUNG: [interpreting Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced and let them discuss things on their own.

SEN. LACSON: So that was his only role? He introduced the suppliers to Linconn Ong and then be had nothing do with the supplies anymore?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced them and then they discussed things on their own.

SEN. LACSON: And he stopped all his participation?

MR. HUNG: I'm sorry, come again, Mr. Chairman?

SEN. LACSON: And he stopped all his participation in the dealings between the Chinese suppliers of the medical supplies that mentioned and Mr. Linconn Ong? He just left them on their own?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang] MR. YANG.

[responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced as to where or who they close their dealings. He does not know who or where did he actually purchase those stocks.

SEN. LACSON: And he never guaranteed with his Chinese suppliers the credibility or the ability of Mr. Linconn Ong to pay them?

MR. HUNG: [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. HUNG: [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG: [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. So, Mr. Yang only introduced and then they negotiated on their own. And then probably, he first initially introduced friends, introduced some other friends for them to negotiate all of their dealings.^[52]

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or informative.^[56] (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 18. Contempt. — . . . A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he/she agrees to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge himself/herself of that contempt.

(b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the Committee and the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

To detain means to hold or keep in custody. On the other hand, to arrest means to seize, capture or to take in custody by authority of law. Thus, the power to detain is the power to keep or maintain custody while the power to arrest is the power to take custody. The power to detain implies that the contumacious witness is in the premises (or custody) of the Senate and that he will be kept therein or in some other designated place. In contrast, the power to arrest presupposes that the subject thereof is not before the Senate or its committees but in some other place outside.

The distinction is not simply a matter of semantics. It is substantial, not conceptual, for it affects the fundamental right to be free from unwarranted governmental restraint.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee speak only of a power to order the detention of a contumacious witness, it cannot be expanded to include the power to issue an order of arrest. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to limit the exercise of legislative investigations to the procedure established and published by the Senate or its committees will be for naught.^[59]

The arrest of a citizen is a deprivation of liberty. The Constitution prohibits deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Senate or its investigating committees can exercise the implied power to arrest only in accordance with due process which requires publication of the Senate's Rules of Procedure. This Court has required judges to comply strictly with the due process requirements in exercising their express constitutional power to issue warrants of arrest. This Court has voided warrants of arrest issued by judges who failed to comply with due process. This Court can do no less for arrest orders issued by the Senate or its committees in violation of due process.^[61]

RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES
IN AID OF LEGISLATION
x x x x

SECTION 18. Contempt. —

(a) The Chairman with the concurrence of at least one (1) member of the Committee, may punish or cite in contempt any witness before the Committee who refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely or evasively, or who unduly refuses to appear or bring before the Committee certain documents and/or object evidence required by the Committee notwithstanding the issuance of the appropriate subpoena therefor. A majority of all the members of the Committee may, however, reverse or modify the aforesaid order of contempt within seven (7) days.

A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he/she agrees to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge himself/herself of that contempt.

(b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the Committee and the Senate.^[8] (Emphasis supplied)

RULES OF THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
ARTICLE 6
INVESTIGATIONS
x x x x

SECTION 6. Contempt. — (a) The Committee, by vote of a majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee, including refusal to produce documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely or evasively. A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he [or she] agrees to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge himself [or herself] on that contempt.

(b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the Committee and the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.

The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial department. It has been said that the methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with the public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the determination of the legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of a constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has been properly exercised. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902)

These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be [invoked] are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.^[15]

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform their investigative function are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in [Nazareno] that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."^[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations [are] intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton. 204; 5 Led., 242.)^[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

THE CHAIRPERSON. Bakit ba lumilihis ka?

MR. ONG. Sige po.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Anong sige po? Hindi mo pa sinasagot anong pangalan. Iyan ang mahirap, pag nagsisinungaling, nagkakalubak­ lubak ka.

MR. ONG. Hindi po ako nagsisinungaling, Mr. Chair. Ang tawag po naming doon sa —

THE CHAIRPERSON. Huwag mong sagutin iyon. Sinasabi ko lang iyon dahil iyon ang impression ko. Ilang araw mo na kaming pinapasyal. Ito ano, anong pangalan?

MR. ONG. Ang tawag ko po doon sa pangalan ng supplier ay si "Brother Tiger." Mayroon po siyang Chinese name. I have to confirm it.

x x x x

THE CHAIRPERSON. Okay, sige, ipasyal mo kami. Sasagot ako sa iyo. Sige. Magkano ang binayad mo sa kanya? Sabi sa iyo...kayo diyan.

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, trade secret po iyon, baka po puwedeng —

THE CHAIRPERSON. No, no, walang secret dito. Corruption investigation ito.

MR. ONG. Costing po kasi namin iyon, Mr. Chairman.

x x x x

SEN. DRILON. Mayroon silang seven billion na cost of sales. So hindi talaga secret ito dahil dine-declare nila sa finanacial statement nila, "Cost of sales, seven billion." Kasama diyan iyong binayad siguro doon sa 500,000. So kalokohan iyong sinasabi ni Mr. Ong na trade secret.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Magkano ba ang halaga ng ibabayad mo dapat?

MR. ONG. I'm sorry, Mr. Chair. I'm really sorry.

x x x x

SEN. DELA ROSA. Bakit takot kang sabihin kung ano iyong tinatanong ni Senator Gordon na—Bakit mahiya kang malaman ng taongbayan kung magkano ang kinita mo? Hindi naman illegal iyong kumita ka dahil negosyante ka, bakit ayaw mong sabihin kung magkanong ibiniyad mo kay—iyong sabi mong Brother Tiger? Para hindi magduda ang taongbayan sa hearing na ito na mayroon kang tinatago, sabihin mo kung magkanong ibinayad mo at magkano ang kinita mo. Bakit illegal ba iyong kumita? You're a businessman, kikita ka diyan, basta hindi ka lang—hindi lang nagkakaroon ng ghost delivery. Tatanungin kita tungkol sa ghost delivery, ghost delivery ba ito o hindi?

MR. ONG. Hindi po, Mr. Chairman.

x x x x

SEN. DELA ROSA. Magsalita ka kung ano iyong tinatanong ng Chairman natin. Sabihin mo kung magkano ang kinita mo, wala namang problema diyan dahil negosyo ito.

x x x x

SEN. RECTO. Thank you very much.

Material iyong tanong ng ating Chairman kung magkanong binayaran mo sa supplier in the same month may local na kompanya na nag­ supply at P13. Okay. Ito ang supply ninyo, ang presyo, bente-siyete. Ang local supplier, 13.50. Okay. Kaya palagay ko kung mayroon kayo—sabi nga, negosyo naman ito, sabi nga ni Senator Bato, puwede mo bang sagutin kung magkano nga naman ang binayaran ninyo doon sa Tiger for the supply?

MR. ONG. Opo, Mr. Chairman. Opo, Mr. Chairman. Ang naalala ko po, mga nasa P23 po.^[33] (Emphasis supplied)

THE CHAIRPERSON. And Mr. Linconn Ong, when you got that, how much did you sell it to—you were quoted 27.35, right?—27.72. So, you made a profit of how much? Twenty-seven minus 11.

MR. L. ONG. Mr. Chariman, hindi ko po—

THE CHAIRPERSON. Answer my question, 27.72 minus [11.95]?

MR. L. ONG. Mr. Chairman, hindi po 11. Paki-clarify ulit kay Mr. Ke.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Ayan ang resibo. Tingnan mo nasa papel mo—nasa harap mo.

MR. L. ONG. Ano po?

THE CHAIRPERSON. Iyan ang mga resibo. Controlling document, iyan o.

MR. L. ONG. [27.72] po ang presyo namin sa gobyerno.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Pinatungan mo iyong [11.95] at ibinenta mo ng P27.72, correct?

MR. L. ONG. I think iyong cost po namin, 23.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Alam mo iyan ang mahirap sa nagsisingunaling. Na-confront ka na ng papel, nakalagay kung magkano. So, kumita ka nang malaki diyan. Correct?

MR. L. ONG. Mr. Chairman, pwede ba, please lang, paki-tanong ulit si TigerPhil nang maayos.

THE CHAIRPERSON. I think the document speaks for itself. Sinasabi mo 23, pero we have documents to show that you got it for [11.95]. Iyan ang nakalagay, "Sold to Pharmally." Nakikita mo ba? Basahin mo iyong dokumento, nasa harap mo.

MR. L. ONG. Hindi ko po makita.^[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his[/her] contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him[/her] on trial for an offense, the nature of which he[/she] is given no fair warning.^[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his [or her] constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.^[49] (Emphasis supplied)

"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U. S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you were sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witnesses." Mason was again called and he refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:

In the present case the witnesses certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.^[50] (Emphasis supplied)

I.	"Testifies falsely or evasively" not a vague standard

Evasive means tending or seeking to evade; elusive; intentionally vague or ambiguous. The reason for evasiveness may be to avoid something unpleasant. When a pleading requiring response is evasive, the other party can ask the court to order for an unambiguous and definite pleading.

"A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed hut which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired", [USCS Fed Rules Civ Proc R 12.]^[1]

II.	The Senate's inherent power to cite and punish for contempt in inquiries in aid of legislation

Period of imprisonment for
contempt during inquiries in
aid of legislation

The contempt power of the legislature under our Constitution is sourced from the American system. A study of foreign jurisprudence reveals that the Congress' inherent power of contempt must have a limitation. In the 1821 landmark case of Anderson v. Dunn, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) held that although the offense committed under the inherent power of contempt by Congress may be undefinable, it is justiy contended that the punishment need not be indefinite. It held that as the legislative body ceases to exist from the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution, then it follows that imprisonment under the contempt power of Congress must terminate with adjournment.^[3]

Subsequently, in Jurney v. MacCracken, the SCOTUS clarified that the power of either Houses of Congress to punish for contempt was not impaired by the enactment of the 1857 statute. The said law was enacted, not because the power of both Houses to punish for a past contempt was doubted, but because imprisonment limited to the duration of the session was not considered sufficiently drastic as a punishment for contumacious witnesses. The purpose of the statutory contempt was merely to supplement the inherent power of contempt by providing for additional punishment. On June 22, 1938, Section 102 of the Revised Statutes was codified in Section 192, Title II of the U.S. Code.^[4]
xxxx

xxx The Court also discussed the nature of Congress' inherent power of contempt as follows:

xxx We have said that the power to find in contempt rests fundamentally on the power of self-preservation. That is true even of contempt of court where the power to punish is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Where more is desired, where punishment as such is to be imposed, a criminal prosecution must be brought, and in all fairness to the culprit, he must have thrown around him all the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. Proceeding a step further, it is evident that, while the legislative power is perpetual, and while one of the bodies composing the legislative power disappears only every three years, yet the sessions of that body mark new beginnings and abrupt endings, which must be respected.^[5](Emphasis in the original) xxxx

Later, in Neri v. Senate (Neri), the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to­ day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it xxx^[6]
xxxx

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.^[7]

Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of contempt during legislative inquiry. While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the Constitution.^[8] (Emphases supplied) xxxx

III.	Void Senate Order to cite and punish for contempt for testifying falsely or evasively during the  inquiry in aid of legislation

• disobeying any order of the Committee or refusing to be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members,
• testifying falsely or evasively,
• unduly refusing to appear or bring before the Committee certain documents and/or object evidence required by the Committee notwithstanding the issuance of the appropriate subpoena therefor

Section 18. Contempt. - (a) The Chairman with the concurrence of at least one (1) member of the Committee, may punish or cite in contempt any witness before the Committee ....

Section 6. Contempt. - (a) The Chairman, with the concurrence of at least one (1) member of the Committee, may punish or cite in contempt any witness before the Committee ....