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On July 16, 2019, the Court rendered a Resolution^[1] nullifying the Contracts of Services accorded to respondent Helen P. Macasaet (Macasaet) for consultancy services rendered for the Enterprise Information Systems Plan from the years 2010 to 2014 –

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the subject eight (8) Contracts of Services with Ms. Helen P. Macasaet, for Information and Communications Technology consultancy services in relation to the Supreme Court's Enterprise Information Systems Plan, VOID ab initio.

Ms. Helen P. Macasaet is hereby DIRECTED to reimburse all the amounts received as consultancy fees from the subject eight (8) Contracts of Services with the Supreme Court of the Philippines amounting to Eleven Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P11,100,000.00) less whatever taxes were withheld within thirty (30) days from finality of this Resolution, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the expiration of the same thirty (30) days period until the same shall have been fully paid.

SO ORDERED.^[2]

Now before the Court is Macasaet's Motion for Reconsideration.^[3] Macasaet insists that the service contracts in issue are valid. She maintains that she should not be made to reimburse the fees she received on alleged grounds of good faith, unsubstantiated finding of her liability, and unfairness. She argues for her entitlement to payment for the services she rendered based on quantum meruit, at the very least.^[4]

The Court grants the Motion for Reconsideration in part.

The Contracts were all entered into in good faith, as Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa precisely notes, and with such point the Court En Banc completely concurs. Thus being the case, it is also opportune to clarify further that the involvement of the following, among other similarly concerned but unnamed Court officials, in the eight subject Contracts were thoroughly untainted with bad faith:

1.	Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, in her capacity as former Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, having acted as the Court's signatory to the eight subject Contracts;
2.	Atty. Ma. Lourdes Oliveros, in her capacity as former Judicial Staff Head of the Office of the Chief Justice, having –
	(a)	Witnessed the signing of the eight subject Contracts,
	(b)	Recommended with Atty. Edilberto A. Davis the issuance of the Certificate of Final Completion for the first Contract of Service,
	(c)	Recommended to the former Chief Justice the approval of the April 16, 2014 Memorandum as regards the need for a technical and policy consultant for the implementation of the Updated Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP), leading to Macasaet's continued engagement, and
	(d)	Referred to the Procurement Planning Committee the Terms of Reference for the consultancy on the implementation of the Updated EISP;
3.	Atty. Michael B. Ocampo, in his capacity as former Court Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice, having –
	(a)	Recommended with Atty. Edilberto A. Davis the issuance of the Joint Memorandum dated September 12, 2013 and Memorandum dated May 20, 2014, which determined Macasaet as the most qualified among the proposed consultants, and consequently recommended Macasaet's engagement for procurement,
	(b)	Certified to the completion of the deliverables for the first Contract of Service,
	(c)	Issued the April 16, 2014 Memorandum as regards the need for a technical and policy consultant,
	(d)	Witnessed the signing of the eight subject Contracts,
	(e)	Recommended the issuance of the Certificate of Completion for the eight subject Contracts, and
	(f)	Recommended with Atty. Edilberto A. Davis the extension of Macasaet's Contracts of Service;
4.	Mr. Edilberto A. Davis, in his capacity as former Acting Chief of the Office of the Management Information Systems Office, having –
	(a)	Recommended Macasaet as consultant for the Court's disputed Enterprise Information Systems Plan project,
	(b)	Recommended with Atty. Ma. Lourdes Oliveros the issuance of the Certificate of Final Completion for the first Contract of Service, and
	(c)	Prepared and signed with Atty. Michael B. Ocampo the Joint Memoranda recommending Macasaet as such consultant;
	(d)	Recommended with Atty. Michael B. Ocampo the extension of Macasaet's Contracts of Service;
5.	Atty. Maria Carina M. Cunanan, in her capacity as former Assistant Chief of the Office of Administrative Services and Chairperson of the Procurement Planning Committee, having –
	(a)	Issued the September 4, 2013 Memorandum recommending to the former Chief Justice the approval of the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the subject consultancy agreement, and
	(b)	Referred to Hon. Raul B. Villanueva the approved authority for the procurement of Macasaet's consultancy services, the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) therefor, and the TOR;
6.	Hon. Raul B. Villanueva, in his capacity as former Deputy Court Administrator and Chairperson of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC-CS), having recommended to the former Chief Justice that the BAC-CS would not be involved in the procurement of Macasaet's consultancy services;
7.	Ms. Estrella D. Eje, in her capacity as former Chief Judicial Staff Officer, having issued the CAF for the first Contract of Service;
8.	Court of Tax Appeals Associate Justice Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, in her capacity as former Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO), having noted the CAF for the first Contract of Service; and
9.	Atty. Ruby C. Esteban-Garcia, in her capacity as Assistant Chief of the FMBO, having issued the CAF for the second Contract of Service.

However, the eight subject Contracts of Services are void, and this is a finding which the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse.

It remains that Atty. Eden T. Candelaria held no proper authority from the Court En Banc when she signed for the latter and contracted with Macasaet in the eight Contracts, despite the legal requirements in Sections 4 (b)^[5] and 5^[6] of Executive Order No. 423,^[7] and beyond the enumerated cases and matters which the Chief Justice alone may act upon as allowed in Administrative Matter No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised).^[8] Macasaet's technical qualifications, despite being in the higher – or even in the highest – tiers in her corporate profession, simply did not fit the government rules and standards in hiring and procurement. No CAFs accompanied the third up to the eighth Contracts of Services, contrary to Secs. 46,^[9] 47,^[10] and 48^[11] of Book V, Title I, Subtitle B of the Administrative Code of 1987.

These facts are sufficient to invalidate the eight subject Contracts of Services. Macasaet not having advanced any new argument or reason to dispute these findings for the Court to uphold the Contracts on reconsideration, their nullity is deemed uncontroverted and permanent.

The issue left here for the Court's reconsideration and final determination is Macasaet's entitlement to payment for services actually performed, and, if so, how much.

The amount of PHP 11,100,000.00 allegedly equivalent to the reasonable fees owing to Macasaet under the void Contracts of Services has already been paid to her. With Macasaet's refusal to recognize the Court's earlier directive to return the said amount, this practically constitutes a claim of money based on quantum meruit against the Supreme Court.

In contracts with the government involving public funds, a party thereto is allowed under case law^[12] to be reasonably reimbursed for their services rendered based on quantum meruit despite the eventual nullification of the contract.

When a money claim is based on quantum meruit, the amount of recovery should be the reasonable value of the thing or services rendered, regardless of any agreement as to value.^[13] Determination of such reasonable value is purely a factual matter, which demands reception and evaluation of competent evidence.^[14] Formulating findings of facts, however, is usually a duty better left to the competence of trial courts and agencies specializing on the subject matter. Unless outside the perimeter of the general rule,^[15] the Supreme Court shall remain a scale of pure law, not a trier of facts and evidence.

Debts and claims based on quantum meruit against the government are within the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA). Commonwealth Act No. 327,^[16] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445,^[17] states in pertinent part:

Section 26. General jurisdiction. — The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. x x x

This audit jurisdiction of the COA was more specifically classified as original and delineated under Sec. 1, Rule II of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedures of the COA:

Section 1. Original Jurisdiction. — The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:

a) money claim against the Government; x x x

By original, one may argue that the COA's jurisdiction over these quantum meruit claims against the government is not exclusive, in that other tribunals may properly take cognizance of the same if instituted before them first. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, precludes such immediate resort to higher authorities.

It was ratiocinated in Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.:^[18]

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. x x x.

x x x x

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.^[19]

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. D.M. Consunji, Inc.^[20] summed up the relevant pieces of jurisprudence in which claims under the principle of quantum meruit were referred to the COA's expertise:

Notably, in several cases, involving money claims against government agencies based on quantum meruit, the claims were properly filed or referred to the COA.

In Royal Trust Construction v. COA,^[21] the Court directed the COA, in the interest of substantial justice and equity, "to determine on a quantum meruit basis the total compensation due to the petitioner for the services rendered by it in the channel improvement of the Betis River in Pampanga and to allow the payment thereof immediately upon completion of the said determination."

In Eslao v. COA,^[22] the Court directed COA "to determine on a quantum meruit basis the total compensation due to the contractor for the completed portion of the two public works projects involved and to allow the payment thereof immediately upon the completion of said determination."

In Melchor v. COA,^[23] the Court directed the COA to allow in post-audit the payment of P344,430.80 for the work done by the contractor. The COA was "likewise directed to determine on a quantum meruit basis the value of the extra works done, and after such determination, to disallow in post-audit the excess payment, if any, made by the petitioner to the contractor. The petitioner shall be personally liable for any such excess payment."

In the narration of facts in EPG Construction Co. v. Vigilar,^[24] the DPWH, which opined that payment of petitioner's money claims should be based on quantum meruit, referred petitioner's money claims to the COA, which acted on the same.

In Movertrade Corporation v. COA,^[25] the Court affirmed the COA's ruling of inapplicability of the quantum meruit principle since there was a written contract entered into by the parties, and eventually denied petitioner's money claim on the ground of breach of contract.

Moreover, the COA itself issued Resolution No. 86-58, dated 15 November 1986, which expresses its Policy on the Recovery by Government Contractors on the Basis of Quantum Meruit. The first Whereas clause explicitly recognizes the existence of money claims against the government on the ground of quantum meruit, to wit:

WHEREAS, in the adjudication of claims arising from void government contracts, the issue that is sometimes presented to the Commission on Audit for resolution is whether or not recovery against the government under such contracts may be allowed on the basis of the quantum meruit principle[.]^[26] (Original citations omitted.)

All of the foregoing, notwithstanding, the Court itself will decide and compute Macasaet's claim under quantum meruit.

Firstly, it bears noting that the roster of jurisprudence relaying quantum meruit claims against the government to the expertise of the COA did not involve claims against the Court.

Next, the rule that primary or original jurisdiction vested by law upon the specialized government agency shall be respected and exercised are subject to settled exceptions. These exceptions are listed in Commission on Audit v. Ferrer:^[27]

[The following are] the exceptions to the general rule on COA's primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government, viz.: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.^[28]

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.^[29]

Here, the Court has already assumed the duties of a trier of facts and evidence when it issued the Decision in present dispute. It received earlier on and has on hand all the papers and documents necessary to come up with the fair and correct amount appurtenant to Macasaet under the voided Contracts. Thus, it would be superfluous – needlessly bothersome, even – to require the COA to compute the monetary value of Macasaet's reimbursement for her services rendered.

Also, to refer the full disposition of Macasaet's claim to the COA shall defeat the Court's judicial fiscal autonomy.

Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit^[30] defines fiscal autonomy as:

[R]eal fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference[.]^[31] (Emphasis supplied.)

Again, the Court does not discount the COA's authority and competence in matters of government audit. However, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-­Javier has carefully pointed out the relevance of Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court^[32] (Re: COA Opinion) in Macasaet's case at hand. Re: COA Opinion already drew the bounds of the COA's scope in audit examinations involving judicial fiscal autonomy:

The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution.

This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters.

x x x

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,^[33] we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

x x x

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. (Original citations omitted and emphasis supplied.)

The fiscal liberty of the Judiciary is fundamental to its being and meaning as an entity created, protected, and empowered by the Constitution. Moreover, it would inure to the practical benefit of both the Court and Macasaet if the COA's involvement would be dispensed with and the computation will be left to the competence of the Court's in-house fiscal and accounting departments. It is, thus, best to leave the auditing task to the Court's own personnel instead of the COA.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED IN PART. The Resolution dated July 16, 2019 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The Office of Administrative Services is hereby DIRECTED to:
   
   
   
   1. DETERMINE, on a quantum meruit basis, the total compensation due to Helen P. Macasaet on the consultancy services done for the Enterprise Information Systems Plan of the Judiciary from the years 2010 to 2014, and
      
      
   2. SUBMIT to the Court an Evaluation, Report and Recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, copy furnished the Commission on Audit;
   
   
2. Upon such determination of the said amount by the Office of Administrative Services, Helen P. Macasaet:
   
   
   
   1. Is ALLOWED to retain the same, and
      
      
   2. Is DISALLOWED to retain the amount in excess thereof, if any, and is to RETURN the said excess amount to the Court within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.

The subject eight Contracts of Services with Helen P. Macasaet for Information and Communications Technology consultancy services in relation to the Supreme Court's Enterprise Information Systems Plan remains VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
M. Lopez,^* J., on official leave.

---

^* On official leave.

^[1] Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 804-839.

^[2] Id. at 838.

^[3] Id. at 1016-1038.

^[4] Id. at 1029.

^[5] SECTION 4. Approval of Government Contracts Entered Into Through Alternative Methods of Procurement. —

1. x x x
   
   
2. For Government Contracts Involving An Amount Below Five Hundred Million Pesos (P500 Million). — Except for Government contracts required by law to be acted upon and/or approved by the President, the Heads of the Procuring Entities shall likewise have full authority to give final approval and/or to enter into Government contracts of their respective agencies, entered into through alternative methods of procurement allowed by law. Provided, that the Department Secretary certifies under oath that the contract has been entered into in faithful compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
   
   The Heads of the Procuring Entities may delegate in writing this full authority to give final approval and/or to enter into Government contracts involving an amount below Five Hundred Million Pesos (P500 Million) entered into through alternative methods of procurement allowed by law, as circumstances may warrant (i.e., decentralization of procurement in a Government Agency), subject to existing laws and such limitations imposed by the Head of the Procuring Entity concerned (Section 5(j), Republic Act No. 9184).

^[6] SECTION 5. Authority to Bind the Government. — All Government contracts shall require the approval and signature of the respective Heads of the Procuring Entities or their respective duly authorized officials, as the case may be, as required by law, applicable rules and regulations, and by this Executive Order, before said Government contracts shall be considered approved in accordance with law and binding on the government, except as may be otherwise provided in Republic Act No. 9184. For Government contracts required by law to be acted upon and/or approved by the President, Section 6 of this Executive Order governs the process by which such Government contracts shall be considered entered into with authority, and binding on the Government.

The Heads of the Procuring Entities or their respective duly authorized officials, as the case may be, shall be responsible and accountable for ensuring that all Government contracts they approve and/or enter into are in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations and are consistent with the spending and development priorities of Government.

All Government contracts entered into in violation of the provisions of law, rules and regulations, and of this Executive Order shall be considered contracts entered into without authority and are thus invalid and not binding on the Government.

^[7] Repealing Executive Order No. 109-A Dated September 18, 2003 Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Review and Approval of All Government Contracts to Conform with Republic Act No. 9184, Otherwise Known as "The Government Procurement Reform Act," April 30, 2005.

^[8] Referral of Administrative Matters and Cases to the Divisions of the Court, the Chief Justice, and Chairmen of the Divisions, April 22, 2003.

^[9] SECTION 46. Appropriation before Entering into Contract. — (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure;

x x x

^[10] SECTION 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. — Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.

^[11] SECTION 48. Void Contract and Liability of Officer. — Any contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the two (2) immediately preceding sections shall be void x x x.

^[12] Geronimo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224163, December 4, 2018; RG Cabrera Corporation, Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 797 Phil. 563 (2016); Department of Public Works and Highways v. Quiwa, 675 Phil. 12 (2012); Vigilar, v. Aquino, 654 Phil. 755 (2011); Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects, 511 Phil. 654 (2005); EPG Construction Co. v. Vigilar, 407 Phil. 58 (2001); Melchor v. Commission on Audit, 277 Phil. 801 (1991); Eslao v. Commission on Audit, 273 Phil. 97 (1991); Royal Trust Construction v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 84202, November 23, 1988 (Resolution).

^[13] Metro Laundry Services v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252411, February 15, 2022 (Resolution).

^[14] Id.

^[15] Analogous application to this case is the exceptions to the general rule that the Supreme Court may address only pure questions of law in a petition for review on certiorari, enumerated in Office of the Ombudsman v. Bernardo, 705 Phil. 524, 534-535 (2013): "(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the findings set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record."

^[16] Entitled "AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE AUDITOR GENERAL SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF APPEAL THEREFROM." Approved: June 18, 1938.

^[17] Entitled "ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES." Dated: June 11, 1978.
 
^[18] 722 Phil. 315 (2013).

^[19] Id. at 324-328.

^[20] G.R. No. 222423, February 20, 2019.

^[21] Supra note 12.

^[22] Id.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id.

^[25] 770 Phil. 79, 87 (2015).

^[26] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. D.M. Consunji, Inc., supra note 21.

^[27] G.R. No. 218870, November 24, 2020.

^[28] Id.

^[29] Oclarino v. Navarro, G.R. No. 220514, September 25, 2019.

^[30] 750 Phil. 288 (2015).

^[31] Id. at 328.

^[32] 692 Phil. 147 (2012).

^[33] 284 Phil. 245 (1992).

---

CAGUIOA, J.:

At the outset, I maintain that there are sufficient legal bases to declare valid the eight Contracts of Services (subject contracts) between Ms. Helen P. Macasaet (Ms. Macasaet) and the Court involving the Court's Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP), as stated in my Dissenting Opinion to the July 16, 2019 Resolution^[1] (assailed Resolution):

In sum, a careful examination of the records of the instant case, as well as a thorough review of the applicable laws, rules and regulations, would show that, contrary to the findings of the [Office of the Court Attorney (OCAt)] Report and the ponencia, the subject contracts are indeed valid.

[1] These contracts were sufficiently covered by [Annual Procurement Plans (APPs)] as required under R.A. 9184. [2] The procurement of the subject contracts also followed the requirements under R.A. 9184, its [Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)], and the Manual of Procedures regarding the level of participation undertaken by the [Bids and Awards Committee for Consultancy Services (BAC-CS)] in the Negotiated Procurement process, and with respect to the other applicable procedural and documentary requirements.

[3] Further, there are no infirmities regarding the consultancy fees granted to Ms. Macasaet. [4] The requirement of issuing [the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAFs)] had also been sufficiently met. [5] Moreover, there was no splitting of contracts extant in the instant case. [6] Finally, there is no doubt that the Chief Administrative Officer had the authority to sign the subject contracts on behalf of the Court.^[2]

Nevertheless, while the ponencia maintains that the subject contracts are void, I welcome the ponencia's ruling, as unanimously concurred in by the Court En Banc, that the subject contracts were all entered into in good faith^[3] and that Ms. Macasaet should be compensated, at least on the basis of quantum meruit.^[4] It is on these premises that I write this Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

To recall, the assailed Resolution declares the subject contracts void on the following grounds: 1) lack of authority of the government signatory; 2) lack of qualifications of Ms. Macasaet; 3) excessive amount of consultancy fees; 4) incurrence of obligation and the expenditure of public funds without the proper appropriation; and 5) absence of the required CAFs. Despite these findings, the Court may nevertheless recognize — as it now does — certain badges of good faith on the part of the Court officials involved and Ms. Macasaet herself, which are borne out by the records. 
 

On the lack of authority of the government signatory

Even if the subject contracts are categorized as void for having been signed by Atty. Eden Candelaria (Atty. Candelaria) as the former Chief Administrative Officer without the written "full authority" of the Court En Banc or the then Chief Justice, it may nevertheless be acknowledged that Atty. Candelaria had ample basis to believe in good faith that the authorization granted to her by the Chief Justice was sufficient authority for her to sign the Contracts of Services. As I had stated in my Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Resolution:

Indubitably, for the Court to now claim that it is the Court En Banc that is the Head of the Procuring Entity and the former Chief Justice was not authorized to enter into the subject contracts – after its silence for the entire duration of the contracts and after the consultant had already completed the services required of her – goes against the principles of fairness and equity.

In support of this position, the ponencia cited A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) dated April 22, 2003 on the Referral of Administrative Matters and Cases to the Divisions of the Court, the Chief Justice, and to the Chairmen of the Divisions for Appropriate Action or Resolution ...

....

Based on this, the ponencia posits that the Chief Justice is not authorized by the Court En Banc to independently act on behalf of the Supreme Court to enter into government contracts that are highly technical, proprietary, primarily confidential, or policy[-]determining such as the subject contracts. Thus, according to the ponencia, the subject contracts should have been authorized by the Supreme Court En Banc which has administrative power over all courts and personnel thereof, and not merely by the former Chief Justice.

On this note, however, attention is invited to the latter part of the above-quoted provision, to wit: "(i) [s]uch other matters where the decision, action, or resolution thereon or approval thereof is vested in the Chief Justice ... or those which are traditionally vested in the Chief Justice as head of the Judiciary."

Evidently, the provision relied upon by the ponencia itself expressly recognizes the Chief Justice as the head of the Judiciary. Thus, contrary to the ponencia's erroneous assertion that the Head of the Procuring Entity is the Supreme Court En Banc, there is already an express recognition that the Chief Justice is the head of the Judiciary.

This interpretation is not novel as the sitting Chief Justice has been generally and traditionally regarded as the Head of the Procuring Entity. Even the Supreme Court En Banc made this recognition in its Resolution dated December 4, 2012 in A.M. No. 12-9-4-SC...

....

Even at present, the bidding documents released by the [Supreme Court Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)] refers to the Chief Justice as the Head of the Procuring Entity. Accordingly, that the Chief Justice is the Head of the Procuring Entity is, as it should be, indisputable. To insist otherwise is totally nonsensical.

The ponencia further stated that assuming arguendo that the former Chief Justice had the authority to delegate the power to enter into the subject contracts, there was still no showing that Atty. Candelaria was authorized in writing by the former Chief Justice to act as signatory of the Court in entering into the Contracts of Services with Ms. Macasaet. The ponencia found that the series of Joint Memoranda prepared and signed by [Atty. Michael B. Ocampo (Atty. Ocampo) of the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ)] and [Mr. Edilberto A. Davis (Mr. Davis) of the Management Information Systems Office (MISO)] cannot be considered as a delegation by the former Chief Justice of full authority to Atty. Candelaria to act and sign on behalf of the Supreme Court. Although the former Chief Justice signed the Joint Memoranda to signify her approval, it did not contain any express delegation of authority to Atty. Candelaria to sign the Contract of Services with Ms. Macasaet.

Such view is wholly mistaken. The records would show that aside from an implied authority and designation to act as signatory, Atty. Candelaria was, in fact, also given an express written authority as required by law.

....

As the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, [Atty. Candelaria] is likewise authorized to sign Contracts for Infrastructure Projects recommended by the BAC. Aside from these is the all­-encompassing duty to do related tasks that may from time to time be assigned by the Chief Justice, Associate Justices, or the Clerk of Court.

With respect to the subject contracts, Atty. Candelaria explained that the former Chief Justice, as Head of the Procuring Entity, already approved the award of the subject contracts to Ms. Macasaet and that the said contracts were already prepared by the OCJ indicating the Deputy Clerk of Court and the Chief Administrative Office as the Court's representatives. If this is not an implied authority and designation to act as a signatory for and in behalf of the Court, then what is?

More importantly, aside from the abovementioned implied authority and designation to act as signatory, it is undisputed that she was also given the written authority required by law. An action slip was issued to Atty. Candelaria by Atty. Ocampo of the OCJ stating that the former Chief Justice is authorizing Atty. Candelaria to sign the contract of services of Ms. Macasaet.^[5] (Emphasis supplied)

The abovementioned findings abundantly show the badges of good faith on the part of Atty. Candelaria. There can be no doubt that she acted with an honest belief that she had been duly authorized to sign the subject contracts. 
 

On the lack of qualifications of Ms. Macasaet

As for the ruling that the procurement of the services of Ms. Macasaet was also in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9184, among the findings of the assailed Resolution are: i) that Ms. Macasaet was not qualified to be considered a Highly Technical Consultant in relation to the implementation of the Updated EISP Project, and ii) that the nature of the work involved in the subject contracts is not highly technical.

In this regard, I had occasion to make the following discussion in my Dissenting Opinion as regards the inaccuracy of such classification:

Jurisprudence holds that the nature of the functions attaching to an office or a position ultimately determines whether such position is policy-­determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical. In the instant case, the functions pertaining to Ms. Macasaet under the subject contracts do not merely refer to conducting an in-depth, critical, exhaustive, and comprehensive review and assessment of the EISP project and other related [information and communication technologies (ICT)] and computerization projects. Part of Ms. Macasaet's functions under the subject contracts was the making of actual recommendations for the updating of this complex and multifaceted technological system.

The highly technical nature of the review and updating of the EISP project was, in fact, recognized and underscored by the Court En Banc itself when, in its June 23, 2009 Resolution in A.M. No. 08-11-09-SC, the Court En Banc described the EISP as a comprehensive framework of several ICT initiatives, involving the development of new information systems and provision of state-of-the-art [information technology (IT)] equipment. It must be stressed that the project pertains not only to the Court alone, but to the entire judiciary, composed of all the courts and its adjunct offices around the Philippines. The Court En Banc explained that:

The EISP is intended to serve as the framework of ICT initiatives of the Judiciary for the next five years (Yr. 2010-2014). It contains the present ICT needs of the Judiciary and proposed solutions vis-à-vis the [organization's] mandate, objectives, and programs through the development of new Information Systems (IS) and provision of additional state­-of-the-art IT equipment. It also includes functional and technical requirements of the systems, cost estimates, and a discussion on the implementation plan and change management framework.

Aside from the Court En Banc manifestly saying that the project involves an in-depth assessment of "functional and technical requirements of the systems," the fact that the EISP project is a highly technical and policy-determining endeavor, where trust and confidence are significant factors, is further underscored by the Court En Banc's own explanation that the EISP is an initiative that goes into the fulfillment of the judiciary's "mandate, objectives, and programs." Hence, as the EISP is a priority program of the Court, being an innovative initiative that would greatly aid the judiciary in achieving its mandate, Ms. Macasaet's functions under the subject contracts to assess and update the EISP clearly entailed work that was highly technical and primarily confidential or policy[-]determining, where trust and confidence is necessarily required.^[6] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

From the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the BAC-CS, as chaired by then Deputy Court Administrator Raul B. Villanueva, acted with sufficient basis and in good faith when it posited in its May 15, 2014 Memorandum that the subject procurement is highly technical in nature and therefore did not need to pass through the regular process of engaging consultants being conducted by the BAC-CS.^[7]

As for the ruling that Ms. Macasaet was not qualified because she had no academic degree in any field directly related to ICT and that her ICT training were only from several short-term courses, the following points raised in my Dissenting Opinion can be used as basis to characterize Ms. Macasaet's hiring as, at the very least, based on a difficult question:

... While Ms. Macasaet's educational background indeed shows that she does not hold any degree directly related to ICT, the [Terms of Reference (TOR)] for the Consultancy on the Implementation of the Updated EISP expressly required, among others, that the consultant sought must: (1) have an advanced degree in business management or any ICT­-related degree; and (2) be a certified customer relationship management system (CRM) specialist and manager. The records show that Ms. Macasaet holds a Master's degree in Business Administration from the Ateneo de Manila University Graduate School of Business and is a certified CRM specialist and manager. In other words, based on her educational background, Ms. Macasaet was qualified for the consultancy under the TOR.

Moreover, her lack of academic degree in a field directly related to ICT hardly makes her less of an expert in the field as, in fact, the records show her sterling record in the ICT industry. On this note, the Court quotes the following statements by Ms. Macasaet, unrebutted by anybody, as regards her qualifications:

I have industry experience stretching more than 30 years. I am also one of the pioneers in the ICT profession both as an end-user and as a solutions provider; ...

....

In those jobs, I have successfully delivered some of the most challenging ICT projects such as:

– As CIO-Consultant, I resolved the biggest ICT disaster in Philippine history, the GSIS Database Crash...

....

More importantly, however, it should be emphasized that Ms. Macasaet's qualifications were, as they should be, gauged against the TOR for the Consultancy on the Implementation of the Updated EISP.

In addition to the requirements on an advance degree and CRM specialization, the TOR requires that the consultant: (1) must have at least 10 years of experience in developing, managing, implementing, or consulting on enterprise and management information systems, customer relationship management systems and related ICT projects for the government or private sector (experience as Chief Information Officer of a business/government entity is necessary); (2) must have an experience in implementing enterprise-wide ICT projects, preferably nation-wide in scope; and (3) must have had extensive participation in formulating ICT policy and e-governance framework in the country, whether in an official or advisory capacity. Based on these required qualifications in the TOR, Atty. Ocampo and Mr. Davis chose Ms. Macasaet as the most qualified among the proposed consultants for the EISP Project, to wit:

....
(c)	She has had extensive participation in formulating ICT and e-governance policies in the country, having served as the business community's representative to the Information Technology and E-Commerce Council of the Philippines, Chairperson of the ICT Governance Framework Technical Working Group in the National Competitiveness Council, member of the National IT Advisory Council to the Department of Science and Technology-Information and Communication Technology Office, and ICT Governance Co-Chair of the Judicial Reform Initiative of the Management Association of the Philippines.
(d)	Ms. Macasaet has implemented enterprise- and nationwide ICT projects, including those involving a major commercial bank and lending company (a major pawnshop), both of which have units located all over the Philippines. This experience in nationwide ICT projects is very relevant considering the organizational set-up of the judiciary and the locations of its various courts.
(e)	Finally, Ms. Macasaet['s] previous consultancy resulted in the Updated EISP Work Plan. She is in a position to guide the Court in implementing the Updated EISP Work Plan because of the knowledge that she has acquired (i.e., information on the Court's infrastructure, computerization projects, ICT policies, etc.) during her previous consultancy.[8] (Emphasis supplied)

These circumstances are evidently sufficient basis to describe the act of Atty. Ocampo of the OCJ and Mr. Davis of the MISO, in recommending Ms. Macasaet as the most qualified among the other proposed consultants, to be an act in good faith and not motivated by an evil intent. 
 

On the excessive amount of consultancy fees

As regards the finding that Ms. Macasaet's compensation was unreasonable, one of the grounds relied upon by the assailed Resolution was that the consultancy fees were contrary to the ceiling of compensation provided under Depatiment of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular No. 2000-11. In this regard, I maintain that the concerned Court officials, including Atty. Ocampo and the members of the Procurement Planning Committee (PPC), as headed by Atty. Maria Carina A. Matammu-Cunanan (Atty. Cunanan), had sufficient basis to recommend the approval of the consultancy fees of Ms. Macasaet, to wit:

It is noteworthy that DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 was issued almost three (3) years before the effectivity date of R.A. 9184, which was the basis for the procurement of Ms. Macasaet's Consultancy. The OCAt should not have relied on DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 since it was no longer in line with R.A. 9184, which became effective in 2003, as well as the Procurement Manual on Consulting Services issued under Section 6 of [R.A.] 9184, ...

....

As can be gleaned from above, the [Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB)] was mandated to prepare the standardized procurement manuals. Thus, on June 14, 2006, the GPPB adopted and approved the Generic Procurement Manuals (including the Manual of Procedures), which states that all government offices are mandated to use the procurement manuals issued by the GPPB as a reference guide in the conduct of its actual procurement operations effective January 2007. Verily, at the time of the procurement of the First Contract of Services with Ms. Macasaet, government offices were already mandated by Section 6 of R.A. 9184 to use the procurement manuals issued by GPPB. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the GPPB is chaired by the DBM Secretary himself.

In relation to this, Section 2 of the Manual of Procedures discusses how to compute the cost of consultancy. It states that the following factors should be considered in determining the basic rates: (i) salary history; (ii) industry rates; and (iii) two hundred percent (200%) of the equivalent rate in the Procuring Entity as the floor.

Thus, it is obvious that the 120% ceiling cited by the OCAt based on DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 and the Manual of Procedures issued by the GPPB are contradictory to each other. It must also be noted that it was Atty. Ocampo's contention that under the Manual of Procedures, the procurement entity will not just use the 200% salary rate as floor (as opposed to a ceiling), but may also consider the previous salary history of the consultant and industry market rates. Indeed, with respect to the latter, the Manual of Procedures states that "[t]he end-user must estimate the cost of consulting services through cost research in the local market." Since the Manual of Procedures issued by the GPPB is a later rule and it is wholly inconsistent with the earlier rule stated in DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11, as a rule of construction, DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 is deemed repealed by the Manual of Procedures. Moreover, the Manual of Procedures was issued under the statutory authority of R.A. 9184, which cannot be overridden by a mere administrative issuance of the DBM, especially a prior one.

Further, as admitted by the OCAt itself, DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 has been revoked by DBM Circular Letter No. 2017-9 under the following terms:

1.0	The procurement of consulting services, either through an Individual Consultant or a Consultancy Firm, is covered by the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 9184 and its 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
2.0	As such, agencies shall be guided by the provisions of RA No. 9184, its IRR and the Generic Procurement Manuals, Volume 4 — Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Consulting Services, issued by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) on June 14, 2006, or its later edition, in the engagement of consultants.
3.0	RA No. 9184 and its IRR, including the Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Consulting Services, contain the step-by-step procedure in the procurement process and the factors to be considered in determining the appropriate "Approved Budget for the Contract" (ABC), and the bases for computing and arriving at the cost of consultancy or consultancy rate, among others.
4.0	In view hereof, National Budget Circular No. 433 dated March 1, 1994 and Circular Letter No. 2000-11 dated June 1, 2000, which prescribe the guidelines on the hiring of consultants and in setting the compensation of individual professional consultants, are hereby revoked.

While acknowledging that DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 was revoked, the OCAt's boorish insistence that it still governs the standard compensation of consultants from 2011 until May 16, 2017 when DBM Circular No. 2017-9 was issued is totally unavailing.

The ponencia maintains that before the revocation of DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 by DBM Circular Letter No.2017-9, the compensation to be paid to individual professional consultants could not exceed the 120% ceiling set by DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11. While DBM Circular Letter No. 2017-9 refers to the Manual of Procedures to guide agencies in determining consultancy rates, this could not have been applicable before DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 was expressly revoked.

Regrettably, the ponencia fails to appreciate the import and clarification made in DBM Circular Letter No. 2017-9 which plainly and quite categorically states that the provisions of DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 were inconsistent with [R.A.] 9184, its IRR, and the Manual of Procedure. To reiterate, DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 has already been repealed by [R.A.] 9184. Needless to say, the DBM itself acknowledged that it is not DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11 which governs the determination of the cost of consultancy, rather it is governed by R.A. 9184, its IRR, and the Manual of Procedures.^[9] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Again, this disquisition is available to justify the act of the concerned Court employees as one done in good faith. To be sure, it cannot be gainsaid that Atty. Ocampo acted in good faith in his reliance on the GPPB Manual of Procedures under the belief that the same had already superseded DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11.

On the lack of proper appropriation

On the issue on appropriation, the assailed Resolution found that when the second Contract of Services was entered into on May 23, 2014, the APP for 2014 did not include the line item for "Technical and Policy Consultants" for purposes of procurement, and was only included when the APP was subsequently revised on September 23, 2014 in accordance with the Memorandum of PPC.^[10] However, as I threshed out in my Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Resolution, there is sufficient ground to believe that there is no lack of support for the second Contract of Services under the 2014 APP:

... [I]t must be emphasized that in the 2014 APP, which was approved by the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 10-1-10-SC, a total of P436,448,080.00 was already specifically allotted for the EISP. Further, in the approved budget under the 2014 APP, funds were allotted for the further development of infrastructure and application systems under the EISP.

To stress, the engagement of technical and policy consultants was part and parcel of the 2014 APP's allocation for the further development of infrastructure and application systems under the EISP. The very rationale and underlying purpose for the hiring of consultancy services under the subject contracts was precisely the further development of the EISP system. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the Second Contract of Services was without any basis in the 2014 APP as it was pursued for the further development of infrastructure and application systems under the EISP — an item provided for in the 2014 APP. Otherwise stated, even without the amended 2014 APP, with the 2014 APP having already provided allotments for the further development of infrastructure and application systems under the EISP, the Second Contract was entered into in accordance with an approved APP.

More importantly, even assuming arguendo that the 2014 APP did not cover the Second Contract of Services, the OCAt Report itself readily acknowledged that in another Resolution dated September 23, 2014 in A.M. No. 10-1-10-SC, the Court En Banc approved an amended procurement plan for 2014 (amended 2014 APP), which provided additional funds for infrastructure and application systems development for the implementation of the EISP:

...

With the OCAt Report expressly recognizing that an amended 2014 APP sufficiently covered the hiring of consultancy services under the Second Contract of Services, even assuming arguendo that the previously approved 2014 APP failed to cover the Second Contract, it cannot reasonably be said that there is no procurement plan that supports the execution of the Second Contract in violation of R.A. 9184 because the amended 2014 APP refers and pertains to the entire fiscal year, and not only the period subsequent to its issuance. It must be noted that under R.A. 9184, the law states that APPs relate to the entire duly approved yearly budget.^[11] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Thus, even though the assailed Resolution ruled that"[w]hile it is true that the APP refers to and pertains to the entire fiscal year, and that an APP may be revised in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the IRR, the fact remains that before procurement is actually undertaken, such procurement must have been included in the existing APP of the Procuring Entity,"^[12] such reasoning does not diminish nor detract from the reality that the concerned Court officials acted under their honest belief that there was sufficient support for the second Contract of Services under the APP.

On the absence of the required CAFs

Lastly, as regards the ruling that no CAF accompanied the third to eighth Contracts of Services, I maintain my position in my Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Resolution that the CAF requirements had been sufficiently met, to wit:

...[T]he provision on CAF [in Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code] requires that "[n]o funds shall be disbursed, and no expenditures or obligations chargeable against any authorized allotment shall be incurred or authorized in any department, office or agency without first securing the certification of its Chief Accountant or head of accounting unit as to the availability of funds and the allotment to which the expenditure or obligation may be properly charged." Two things are apparent: first, there is no particular form required to be followed for the issuance of the CAF; and second, unlike the Certificate Showing Appropriation which is required to be issued before entering into the contract, no such requirement appears regarding the CAF. On the contrary, a plain reading of Section 40 readily reveals that the certification by the chief accountant as to availability of funds must be done before funds are disbursed and expenditures or obligations chargeable against authorized allotments are incurred or authorized.

Based on these premises, it appears that the 3rd to 8th Contracts duly complied with the CAF requirement. Below are the pertinent statements made by Atty. Ocampo:

60.	Third, the [OCAt] report failed to state that every monthly payment to Ms. Macasaet is covered by an Obligation Request, a form that has a certification from the Supreme Court budget officer on the availability of funds. Each monthly payment is also supported by a Disbursement Voucher, where the Supreme Court chief accountant likewise certifies the availability of the funds for the consultancy fees. (See Annexes S and T for the Obligation Request and Disbursement Voucher covering the August 24 to September 23 monthly fee of Ms. Macasaet. The same forms are used in all other monthly payments.) All other alternative modes of procurement such as shopping, small value procurement, and procurement through the Procurement Service are also certified in the same manner (see sample Obligation Request and Disbursement Voucher attached as Annexes U and V).
61.	As a final point, before any payment was made to Ms. Macasaet, the [OCJ] and the [MISO] certified that the deliverables under her contract had been submitted and attached supporting documents. The certification and supporting documents then passed through the [Office of Administrative Services (OAS)], and the finance, budget, and accounting and divisions of the [Fiscal Management and Budget Office or] FMBO, and then through the Internal Audit Division. (See Annex W for the Action Flow Slip for Payment.) The offices, which are in charge of ensuring our compliance with all accounting and auditing rules and are better versed with auditing and accounting guidelines compared to [OCAt], did not find any irregularity in Ms. Macasaet's contracts and renewals. No payment[s] were withheld because all required documentation were available to support the payments. All of our financial and auditing units had to do due diligence to ensure that no post-audit findings would be raised by the Commission on Audit. Indeed, [five] years hence since the first contract of Ms. Macasaet was executed, the COA has yet to issue any adverse observation or notice of disallowance against any of the payments made to Ms. Macasaet on the grounds cited by [OCAt].[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Since the law does not require a specific form for the CAF, the certifications by the Chief Accountant (as to the availability of appropriation and funds) contained in the Obligation Requests and Disbursement Vouchers, which were issued before the payments were made to Ms. Macasaet, should be deemed compliant with the CAF requirement under the Administrative Code. Verily, even the auditing bodies within the Court itself, as well as the COA, had not made any adverse findings on the subject contracts, specifically as to the CAF requirement.

These premises considered, it can be said that the concerned officials from the OCJ, the MISO, the OAS, the PPC, and the FMBO all acted within their authority — or at the very least, in the good faith belief that they were doing so.

II.
While the ponencia upholds the assailed Resolution's declaration that the subject contracts are void, it nevertheless orders the OAS to determine, on a quantum meruit basis, the total compensation due to Ms. Macasaet on her consultancy services done for the EISP. This is a welcome departure from the assailed Resolution, for to insist on making Ms. Macasaet reimburse the amounts she received as consultancy fees from the subject contracts — after reaping the benefits of her labor — would be the height of unfairness.

Notably, it cannot be disputed that Ms. Macasaet had no participation in the preparation of the subject contracts. As the only non-lawyer among the key parties to the contracts, she relied heavily and in good faith on the officials she was dealing with, who were from no less than the Supreme Court. After all, as a person who is not knowledgeable of the law, she had no reason to question the subject contracts especially since the other contracting party is none other than the highest court of the land. Thus, Ms. Macasaet's claim of good faith deserves serious consideration.

More importantly, the Court should consider that Ms. Macasaet had accomplished her work under the subject contracts and rendered services to the Court from 2013 to 2017. Her efforts and contributions to the EISP and other ICT projects have not been disputed. Arguably, these projects have benefitted and continue to benefit not just the Court but the entire judiciary, considering that these projects also cover all courts in the country.^[14]

Despite this, the assailed Resolution still ordered Ms. Macasaet to return what she had received for services she had already rendered in the span of four years. There is no other way to describe this situation than an unjust enrichment. Thus, I commiserate with Ms. Macasaet's emphatic plea in her MR:

Her services benefited the Judiciary. The accomplishments of Ms. Macasaet under the EISP project are now operational and being enjoyed by the whole Judiciary nationwide. These can no longer be undone or returned. In the instant case, the Court is not correct to apply the principle of status quo ante when the contract is declared null and void. This is against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience especially since the grounds cited by this Honorable Court for nullifying the Contracts of Services were not her fault. To order the return or refund the consultancy fees without any mention of how to undo the services she delivered and now being enjoyed by the Judiciary is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.^[15] (Emphasis supplied)

To be sure, Ms. Macasaet's position is not novel. The notion that irregularities in the contracts do not preclude the contractor from receiving payment for services rendered to the government is supported by jurisprudence — and is recognized by the ponencia. As summarized in the case of Geronimo v. COA^[16] (Geronimo):

In Dr. Eslao v. The Commission on Audit, the Court ruled that the contractor should be duly compensated notwithstanding the questions which hounded the construction project involved due to the failure to undertake a public bidding. The Court explained that the denial of the contractor's claim would result in the government unjustly enriching itself. The Court further reasoned that justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.

Recovery on the basis of quantum meruit was also allowed despite the invalidity or absence of a written contract between the contractor and the government agency. This has been settled in the same case of Dr. Eslao, citing the unpublished case of Royal Trust Construction v. Commission on Audit, thus:

....

The above disquisitions in Dr. Eslao and Royal Trust have been reiterated in the cases of Melchor v. Commission on Audit, EPG Construction Co. v. Hon. Vigilar, Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects, RG Cabrera Corporation, Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, and other similar cases.^[17]

In this regard, the following pronouncements in EPG Construction Co. v. Hon. Vigilar,^[18] which was cited in Geronimo, is instructive:

To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.

....

To be sure, this Court — as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare — cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project.^[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, I welcome the ponencia's order for the OAS to determine Ms. Macasaet's compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. However, I maintain that Ms. Macasaet should not be made to return the consultancy fees she had received under the subject contracts, which amounts ought to already be considered as reasonable even under the standards of quantum meruit.

At this juncture, I maintain that, contrary to the ruling in the assailed Resolution, the consultancy fees awarded to Ms. Macasaet were not unreasonable.

To recall, the OCAt Report questioned the Memorandum to the Chief Justice dated April 16, 2014 which states that the consultancy fees of Ms. Macasaet were fair and reasonable, considering the scope of her work and comparing it with the cost of similar ICT consultancies that the Court approved in 2012, i.e., consultancy for the review of the terms for Judiciary" Case Management System and Enterprise Information System, which cost P1.8 million per consultancy. The OCAt questioned the validity of this comparison, arguing that firms were hired for the two consultancies and not individual consultants; hence, their rates were incomparable with Ms. Macasaet's.^[20] However, the point of comparison that should be used is the scope of work of the two consultancies (costing P1.8 million) vis-à-vis the scope of Ms. Macasaet's consultancy (costing less, at P1.5 million), and using this correct comparison, the consultancies previously contracted by the Court actually cost approximately 300% more per TOR compared to what was paid to Ms. Macasaet. Moreover:

.... the rate of P250,000.00 per month was also lower than Ms. Macasaet's going rate based on her salary history, which is one of the factors considered in determining the cost of consultancy under the Manual of Procedures. According to Ms. Macasaet, she was paid almost P1 million per month as GSIS-CIO consultant. She received P500,000.00 as consulting center director at James Martin & Co., exclusive of car plan, gas allowance, communication allowance and other allowances. As President and COO of MISNet, she also received a monthly salary of P500,000.00 plus allowances.

In addition, not only did Ms. Macasaet agree to a rate lower than her previous consulting fees and salaries, but she also resigned as President of her company, Pentathlon Systems Resources, Inc., and discontinued providing consultancies to other clients in order to avoid conflict of interest, especially when the projects she helped develop for the Court reached the procurement stage where private IT companies were expected to participate. Based on the records, these factors were among those considered in evaluating Ms. Macasaet's consultancy fees.^[21]

Likewise, I reiterate that there was no violation of the ceiling provided in DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11. To recall, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of said Circular on the subject of Compensation of Contractual Personnel and Individual Professional Consultants, the ceiling for remuneration is fixed at 120% of the minimum basic salary of his or her equivalent position. Upon this premise, the OCAt adopted the basic monthly salary of the MISO Chief (i.e., P73,099.00) in view of the latter's classification as highly technical and policy-determining. After considering the MISO Chief as a comparable position, the OCAt then concluded that the maximum limit of the compensation of the consultant should have been P87,718.80, which was exceeded by the subject contracts covering the period of 2013-2016.

As I had explained in detail in my Dissenting Opinion to the assailed Resolution, what governs the determination of the cost of consultancy are R.A. 9184, its IRR, and the Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Consulting Services, and not DBM Circular Letter No. 2000-11, which was already revoked by DBM Circular Letter No. 2017-9.^[22]

In any case, even if the ceiling were to be applied, I reiterate anew that it was erroneous for the assailed Resolution to rule that the remuneration of Ms. Macasaet should not be more than 120% of the basic minimum monthly salary of the MISO Chief based on its inaccurate conclusion that the position of the MISO Chief is equivalent to the position of Ms. Macasaet under the Contracts of Services. Again, I submit that the position of Ms. Macasaet as an ICT consultant is in no way equivalent to the position of the MISO Chief. The qualifications of Ms. Macasaet as an ICT consultant and that of the MISO Chief, as well as the scope of their work, are entirely different. Stated simply, there exists no equivalent position in the Court for the position of Ms. Macasaet:

In this connection, the work performed by Ms. Macasaet was not merely to oversee or overview the implementation of the Updated EISP. A perusal of her accomplishment reports per contract would reveal that she did not only perform general IT consultancy which could have been done by the MISO Chief.

Hence, the OCAt's conclusion that Ms. Macasaet's compensation is unreasonable based on the assumption that the basic salary of the MISO Chief is the appropriate government sector benchmark as "equivalent position" plainly rests upon wrong premises.

As discussed earlier, the scope of work of the ICT Consultant is sufficiently distinct from the functions of the MISO Chief. The work of the MISO Chief is general in scope, while Ms. Macasaet' s work is specific to the development and implementation of the EISP. Moreover, it bears reiterating anew that the EISP encompasses not merely the ICT system of the Court alone; it involves the development of the complex IT framework and other computerization projects covering the entire judiciary. To illustrate, the integrated automation program under the EISP encompasses more than 3,500 trial court locations and stands to benefit more than 30,000 court employees. This is in stark contrast with the mandate of the MISO which is limited to providing technological services and managing the computerized monitoring system installed in [the] Supreme Court alone. The review of the IT framework of the entire judiciary is clearly beyond the scope of the MISO's functions.

Additionally, it should be stressed once more that since the EISP encompasses the IT initiatives of the entire judiciary, its review necessarily includes an evaluation of the projects and initiatives of the MISO. Thus, the MISO cannot possibly be tasked to assess and evaluate its own IT projects. Indeed, an independent, highly technical consultant is better equipped to ensure the development of an improved IT system for the judiciary.

Finally, it bears reiterating that, along with Atty. Ocampo, it was Mr. Davis, then Acting Chief of the MISO, who recommended Ms. Macasaet to be the consultant for the Updated EISP. Verily, the MISO itself recognized the need to hire a consultant for such undertaking.

Considering the level of expertise and the magnitude and scope of work required for the review and implementation of the EISP, it is clear that the consultancy position of Ms. Macasaet is the first of its kind and has no equivalent post in the Court.

As important, it should be emphasized that R.A. 9184 itself recognizes that the need for consulting services arises precisely from the lack of capacity or capability of the government or its organic personnel to undertake[.]^[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Given the foregoing, while the ponencia maintains that the subject contracts are void, it rightfully held that Ms. Macasaet should still be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. However, as explained above, I submit that the amounts given to Ms. Macasaet under the subject contracts should already be considered as reasonable so as to satisfy the requirements of quantum meruit.

To end, I maintain my position that subject contracts between the Court and Ms. Macasaet are valid. Nevertheless, while I dissent from the majority's ruling that the subject contracts are void, I welcome the ponencia's recognition, as unanimously concurred in by the Court En Banc, that the Court officials involved in this case, as well as Ms. Macasaet, all acted in good faith in the performance of their duties surrounding the subject contracts. Moreover, even as I maintain that the amounts given to Ms. Macasaet under the subject contracts are reasonable, I likewise welcome the ponencia's directive to the OAS to determine Ms. Macasaet's compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.

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^[1] Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, 909 SCRA 74.

^[2] Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, id. at 252-253.

^[3] Ponencia, p. 2.

^[4] Id. at 6.

^[5] Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, supra note 1, at 245-251.

^[6] Id. at 194-195.

^[7] Id. at 164.

^[8] Id. at 189-193.

^[9] Id. at 221-224.

^[10] Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, supra note 1, at 141.

^[11] Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, supra note 1, at 181-183.

^[12] Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, supra note 1, at 142.

^[13] Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, supra note 1, at 237-238.

^[14] See Motion for Reconsideration of Ms. Macasaet, pp. 6-10. N. B. Ms. Macasaet's contributions in the EISP and ICT Projects of the Court have not been disputed by the OCAt Report and the assailed Resolution.

^[15] Motion for Reconsideration of Ms. Macasaet, p. 15.

^[16] 844 Phil. 651 (2018).
 
^[17] Id. at 658-659.

^[18] 407 Phil. 53 (2001).

^[19] Id. at 64-66.

^[20] Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Re: Consultancy Services of Helen P. Macasaet, A.M. No. 17-12-02-SC, July 16, 2019, supra note 1, at 217.

^[21] Id. at 218-219.

^[22] Id. at 219-230.

^[23] Id. at 227-229.