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EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 13674 [Formerly CBD Case No. 16-5221], August 01, 2023 ]
MONETTE MANAUIS-TAGGUEG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VINCENZO NONATO M. TAGGUEG, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Once again, the Court is confronted with a charge of gross immorality leveled against a lawyer for turning his back on his legitimate wife and family in order to cohabit with another woman.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Monette Manauis-Taggueg with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) against her husband Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg.
The precursor facts are synthesized as follows:
On June 6, 2002, complainant Monette Manauis-Taggueg and respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg got married in Quezon City.[2] Thereafter, their union bore a child named Vincent Nayyef M. Taggueg.[3]
On December 13, 2016, complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] with the IBP-CBD, seeking the disbarment of respondent for abandoning his legitimate family and cohabiting with a woman named Cindy Villajuan, whom respondent purportedly married despite the subsistence of his marriage with complainant.
To bolster her imputations, complainant narrated that sometime in March 2015, she went to the law office of respondent to talk to him regarding their personal issues. Upon seeing her, however, respondent got mad, went home to their residence to pack his things, and left without any explanation. Complainant texted respondent the following day, and the latter replied that he is no longer returning to her because he cannot tolerate her attitude. Subsequently, complainants' parents tried to intervene and talk to respondent, but the latter shut down any hope of reconciliation with complainant.[5]
A few months thereafter, complainant sought the help of her friend at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to determine the whereabouts of respondent. The investigation revealed that respondent is now living in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and is cohabiting with his mistress, Cindy Villajuan. This impelled complainant to search for Cindy Villajuan's social media account, where complainant discovered that she now bore the last name of complainant's husband, i.e., "Taggueg." Complainant also saw pictures of Cindy and respondent's wedding, together with other photos of their amorous relationship, posted on said account. Complainant then went to the alleged wedding venue of respondent and Cindy, and the owner thereof purportedly confirmed their wedding ceremony held on February 20, 2015.[6]
Acting on the complaint, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[7] dated May 22, 2017, directing respondent to file his duly verified answer. Respondent, however, turned a deaf ear to such directive.
In a Notice of Mandatory Conference,[8] the IBP-CBD directed both parties to appear before it on October 23, 2017, with a warning that non appearance shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings. Both parties were likewise required to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs at least three days prior to the mandatory conference.
On the scheduled mandatory conference on October 23, 2017, complainant appeared and submitted her Pre-Trial Brief.[9] She likewise submitted the following as supporting evidence: a) Certificate of Marriage between her and respondent;[10] b) Certificate of Live Birth of their son Vincent Nayyef M. Taggueg;[11] c) print-out of pictures from the Facebook account of Cindy;[12] d) Reservation Slip for respondent and Cindy's wedding ceremony on February 20, 2015;[13] and e) Customer Inquiry Form stating the details of respondent and Cindy's wedding.[14]
Respondent, on the other hand, failed to comply with both directives to appear before the IBP-CBD at the scheduled mandatory conference and submit a mandatory conference brief.[15]
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD issued its Report and Recommendation[16] on August 3, 2020, recommending the disbarment of respondent for Gross Immorality under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[17] and Canon 1, Rule 1.01[18] and Canon 7, Rule 7.03[19] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for abandoning his legitimate family, contracting a bigamous marriage with another woman, and flagrantly displaying such illicit relationship. The IBP-CBD likewise noted respondent's previous suspension for three months in the Resolution issued by this Court on July 17, 2019 in a case entitled, "Roberto J. Delloro v. Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg, "and docketed as A.C. No. 12422.[20]
In the Resolution dated June 25, 2022,[21] the IBP Board of Governors modified the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, lowering the penalty to an indefinite suspension from the practice of law, and further imposing a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for disobeying the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD, thus—
THE COURT'S RULING
The Court adopts the IBP Board of Governors' findings, albeit with modification as to the imposable penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to possess good moral character at the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and requires them to maintain such character until their retirement from the practice of law.[23]
Complainant asseverates that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Jurisprudence abounds with iterations that a married lawyer's abandonment of his spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes gross immorality. The offense may even be criminal, amounting to concubinage or adultery.[36] The Court has consistently lent zero tolerance to lawyers who openly engaged in illicit affairs during the subsistence of their marriages. In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza,[37] Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty. Alejandro,[38] Panagsagan v. Atty. Panagsagan,[39] and Villarente v. Atty. Villarente,[40] this Court imposed the supreme penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyers for being guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct in abandoning the legal spouse in order to cohabit with another woman.
Here, respondent's transgression is even worse as he flaunted his illicit relationship with his mistress on social media, thereby manifesting his insouciance towards the harsh effects of his immorality on his wife and their child. Plain as day, respondent did not live up to the stringent standards required of him by the law profession.
It cannot be stressed enough that respondent failed to debunk the evidence adduced by complainant showing his extramarital affair with Cindy. Quite tellingly, rather than controverting complainant's averments, respondent neither appeared before the IBP to submit his answer nor present any counter evidence, leaving complainants' allegations undisputed.
It bears accentuating that every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times. This must be so, because any lawyer who cannot abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.[41] By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the respondent committed grossly immoral conduct, and violated the fundamental canons of ethics expected to be obeyed by the members of the legal profession. Ineluctably, the Court imposes the penalty of disbarment upon respondent,[42] consistent with the provisions of Section 33, in relation to Section 37, Canon VI of the CPRA, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and ordains respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg GUILTY of Gross Immorality in violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon II, and Canon VI of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, for which he is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision. His name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see dissenting opinion.
Lazaro-Javier,* J., on official business.
* On Official Business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[2] Id. at 13.
[3] Id. at 14.
[4] Id. at 1-3.
[5] Id. at 1.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 7.
[8] Id. at 9.
[9] Id. at 11-12.
[10] Id. at 13.
[11] Id. at 14.
[12] Id. at 15-34.
[13] Id. at 35.
[14] Id. at 36.
[15] Id. at 10; See IBP-CBD Order dated October 23, 2017 issued by IBP-CBD Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
[16] Id. at 45-49. The Report and Recommendation was signed by IBP-CBD Commissioner Victor Emmanuel M. Pangilinan.
[17] Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[18] Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
[19] Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
[20] Rollo, p. 49.
[21] Id. at 43-44, see Notice of Resolution signed by IBP National Secretary Doroteo Lorenzo B. Aguila.
[22] Id. at 43.
[23] See Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 111-112 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[24] A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC.
[25] GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Transitory Provision. — The CPRA shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that in the opinion of the Supreme Court, its retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.
[26] SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. — The Code of Professional Responsibility of 1988, Sections 20 to 37 of Rule 138 and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are repealed.
The Lawyer's Oath, as found in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is amended and superseded.
Any resolution, circular, bar matter, or administrative order issued by or principles established in the decisions of the Supreme Court inconsistent with the CPRA are deemed modified or repealed.
[27] 884 Phil. 1 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[28] Id. at 9.
[29] 755 Phil. 297 (2015) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[30] Id. at 307-308.
[31] Rollo, p. 13.
[32] Id. at 14.
[33] Id. at 15-34.
[34] Id. at 15-17.
[35] Id. at 35.
[36] Villarente v. Atty. Villarente, supra note 27 at 11.
[37] 851 Phil. 372 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[38] 467 Phil. 139 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[39] 864 Phil. 19 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[40] Supra note 27.
[41] See Hosoya v. Atty. Contado, A.C. No. 0731, October 5, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[42] See Atty. Saludares v. Atty. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Hosoya v. Contado, supra note 38.
[43] SECTION 38. Modifying circumstances. — In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
....
(b) Aggravating Circumstances:
....
(7) Failure to comply with the orders of the Court and the IBP in relation to an administrative case; ...
[44] See Pontiano v. Atty. Gappi, A.C. No. 13118, June 28, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc] and Jacolbia v. Atty. Panganiban, 871 Phil. 33, 41-42 (2020) [J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I disagree with the majority's ruling that respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg should be disbarred for gross immorality. While his engagement in an extramarital affair is deplorable conduct, suspending him from the practice of law is sufficient to impress upon him the gravity of his actions. "The highest penalty [of disbarment] should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law."[1]
This Court has consistently emphasized that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis in that they seek to determine whether the lawyer in question is still fit to be a member of the legal profession:
This principle applies in disciplinary cases involving all manner of alleged transgressions—including the conduct of extramarital affairs. "As its primary purpose is to protect public interest, disbarment cases should not be allowed by this Court to become the vehicle for asserting private rights."[3]
Being officers of the court, lawyers must possess the highest degree of morality[4] and "comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession."[5] They should refrain from engaging in grossly immoral acts, which refer to acts "the extent of which is so corrupt to constitute a criminal act, or grossly unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under circumstances so scandalous and revolting as to shock the common sense of decency."[6]
Yet, the determination of whether an act is grossly immoral in the context of a disciplinary case is not so clear-cut. Nonetheless, this Court must refrain from applying a religion's definition of morality in a nonreligious proceeding. In Perfecto v. Esidera:[7]
I have consistently urged this Court to observe a clear, objective, and secular standard in handling disciplinary cases that involve imputations of gross immorality, so as to avoid imposing arbitrary standards of morality.[10] "Secular standards, independent of religious beliefs, must be the basis for determining immorality. After all, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to weigh in on religious doctrine."[11]
Thus, in Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala,[12] I advanced three circumstances where a lawyer's indiscretions would merit disbarment:
I disagree as to the penalty imposed. Suspension from the practice of law would have been sufficient.
Respondent's actions do not fall under any of the three circumstances I laid down in Judge Dagala. First, respondent was not shown to have repeatedly entered extramarital affairs. Second, the facts do not show that his acts resulted in a permanent rearrangement causing extraordinary difficulty on existing relationships. Private complainant did not allege that respondent refused to provide support for her and their son, nor did she allege that respondent completely abdicated his role as a father. Lastly, respondent did not commit any act that prima facie violates the law.
Similarly, it has not been shown that respondent's transgressions impacted or related to his duties as a lawyer, or that maintaining his license to practice law will reduce the public's confidence in the legal profession and the rule of law.
As such, respondent has not breached the threshold that will merit his disbarment. "The penalty of disbarment must be a last resort. Where a lesser penalty may accomplish the goal of discipline[in]g the erring lawyer, disbarment should not be imposed."[16] Suspension from the practice of law for three years is commensurate to the gravity of respondent's transgressions.
In the recent cases of Juni v. Juni[17] and Saludares v. Saludares,[18] this Court En Banc sagely traversed the many nuances of gross immorality to arrive at the just penalty.
In Juni, Atty. Mario Juni (Atty. Juni) left his wife and two children to cohabit with another woman, Ruth Vaguchay (Ruth). Despite the subsistence of his first marriage, Atty. Juni sired two children with Ruth and even contracted his second marriage with her.[19] This Court merely suspended him from the practice of law for five years, as his actions did not show that he was unfit to remain a member of the legal profession:
With the majority's ruling in this case, this Court seemed to have backslid to an antiquated overinvolvement in primarily private affairs. Lawyers are called to account for how their behavior affects the legal profession, without more. Disciplinary cases should never be used as a forum for individuals to vindicate private rights that are beyond the lawyer's professional dealings.
As I stated in my opinion in Hierro v. Nava II:[23]
[1] J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 155 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[2] In re Almacen, 142 Phil. 353, 390 (1970) [Per J. Castro, First Division].
[3] J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Villarente v. Villarente, Jr., 884 Phil. 1, 14 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
[4] Gonzaga v. Abad, A.C. No. 13163, March 15, 2022 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[5] Batangueño Human Resources, Inc. v. De Jesus, A.C. No. 13443, December 7, 2022 [Per J. Kho, Second Division], at 6. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6] Saludares v. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[7] 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[8] Id. at 398-400.
[9] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 120 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[10] J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Zerna v. Zerna, 882 Phil. 19 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[11] J. Leonen, Separate Concurring Opinion in Hierro v. Nava II, 868 Phil. 56, 69 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[12] 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[13] Id. at 155.
[14] Ponencia, p. 6.
[15] Id. at 8.
[16] Juni v. Juni, A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[17] A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[18] A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[19] Juni v. Juni, A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 2.
[20] Id.
[21] Saludares v. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 4.
[22] Id. at 8.
[23] 868 Phil. 56 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[24] Id. at 70.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Monette Manauis-Taggueg with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) against her husband Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg.
The precursor facts are synthesized as follows:
On June 6, 2002, complainant Monette Manauis-Taggueg and respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg got married in Quezon City.[2] Thereafter, their union bore a child named Vincent Nayyef M. Taggueg.[3]
On December 13, 2016, complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] with the IBP-CBD, seeking the disbarment of respondent for abandoning his legitimate family and cohabiting with a woman named Cindy Villajuan, whom respondent purportedly married despite the subsistence of his marriage with complainant.
To bolster her imputations, complainant narrated that sometime in March 2015, she went to the law office of respondent to talk to him regarding their personal issues. Upon seeing her, however, respondent got mad, went home to their residence to pack his things, and left without any explanation. Complainant texted respondent the following day, and the latter replied that he is no longer returning to her because he cannot tolerate her attitude. Subsequently, complainants' parents tried to intervene and talk to respondent, but the latter shut down any hope of reconciliation with complainant.[5]
A few months thereafter, complainant sought the help of her friend at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) to determine the whereabouts of respondent. The investigation revealed that respondent is now living in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and is cohabiting with his mistress, Cindy Villajuan. This impelled complainant to search for Cindy Villajuan's social media account, where complainant discovered that she now bore the last name of complainant's husband, i.e., "Taggueg." Complainant also saw pictures of Cindy and respondent's wedding, together with other photos of their amorous relationship, posted on said account. Complainant then went to the alleged wedding venue of respondent and Cindy, and the owner thereof purportedly confirmed their wedding ceremony held on February 20, 2015.[6]
Acting on the complaint, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[7] dated May 22, 2017, directing respondent to file his duly verified answer. Respondent, however, turned a deaf ear to such directive.
In a Notice of Mandatory Conference,[8] the IBP-CBD directed both parties to appear before it on October 23, 2017, with a warning that non appearance shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings. Both parties were likewise required to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs at least three days prior to the mandatory conference.
On the scheduled mandatory conference on October 23, 2017, complainant appeared and submitted her Pre-Trial Brief.[9] She likewise submitted the following as supporting evidence: a) Certificate of Marriage between her and respondent;[10] b) Certificate of Live Birth of their son Vincent Nayyef M. Taggueg;[11] c) print-out of pictures from the Facebook account of Cindy;[12] d) Reservation Slip for respondent and Cindy's wedding ceremony on February 20, 2015;[13] and e) Customer Inquiry Form stating the details of respondent and Cindy's wedding.[14]
Respondent, on the other hand, failed to comply with both directives to appear before the IBP-CBD at the scheduled mandatory conference and submit a mandatory conference brief.[15]
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD issued its Report and Recommendation[16] on August 3, 2020, recommending the disbarment of respondent for Gross Immorality under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[17] and Canon 1, Rule 1.01[18] and Canon 7, Rule 7.03[19] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for abandoning his legitimate family, contracting a bigamous marriage with another woman, and flagrantly displaying such illicit relationship. The IBP-CBD likewise noted respondent's previous suspension for three months in the Resolution issued by this Court on July 17, 2019 in a case entitled, "Roberto J. Delloro v. Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg, "and docketed as A.C. No. 12422.[20]
In the Resolution dated June 25, 2022,[21] the IBP Board of Governors modified the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, lowering the penalty to an indefinite suspension from the practice of law, and further imposing a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 for disobeying the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD, thus—
RESOLVED, to MODIFY, as it is hereby MODIFIED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner (IC) in the instant case, and to recommend instead the imposition upon Respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg (of) the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law; andPerceivably, the pivotal issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for Gross Immorality.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to recommend that the Respondent be meted out a FINE of Php5,000. 00 each for disobeying the directives of the IC, i.e., i) for failure to file an answer to the complaint, ii) failure to file a mandatory conference brief, iii) failure to attend the mandatory conference, and iv) failure to file his position paper, or a total of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00).[22]
The Court adopts the IBP Board of Governors' findings, albeit with modification as to the imposable penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to possess good moral character at the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and requires them to maintain such character until their retirement from the practice of law.[23]
Complainant asseverates that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The new Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA),[24] which was approved on April 11, 2023 and made applicable to pending cases,[25] repealed[26] the foregoing provisions and incorporated these Canons:CANON 1
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.CANON 7
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Villarente v. Atty. Villarente,[27] the Court elucidated:CANON II
PROPRIETY
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.
SECTION 1. Proper conduct. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
SECTION 2. Dignified conduct. – ...
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession.CANON VI
ACCOUNTABILITY
By taking the Lawyer's Oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an administrator of justice. As such, the lawyer shall observe the highest degree of morality, adhere to rigid standards of mental fitness, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession.
Failure to honor this covenant makes the lawyer unfit to continue in the practice of law and accountable to society, the courts, the legal profession, and the client.
It is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses, but also to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is a member of its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles, but must also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[28]Along this grain, the pronouncement of the Court in Perez v. Atty. Catindig[29] as to what constitutes grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment is quite illuminating, to wit:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[30]In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by complainant indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral – one which is not only corrupt or unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree. Complainant and respondent contracted marriage on June 6, 2002,[31] and their union eventually bore a child.[32] As it happened, respondent subsequently abandoned his family, cohabited with another woman, and even flaunted his illicit relationship to the public.[33] True it is that the photos[34] and Reservation Slip[35] of the alleged wedding ceremony presented by complainant fall short of the required evidence to prove that respondent indeed entered into a bigamous marriage with Cindy. However, it is equally true that respondent exhibited a highly reproachable conduct by engaging in an extramarital affair with a woman and therewithal, flaunting their illicit relationship to the public. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values and constitutes a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
Jurisprudence abounds with iterations that a married lawyer's abandonment of his spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes gross immorality. The offense may even be criminal, amounting to concubinage or adultery.[36] The Court has consistently lent zero tolerance to lawyers who openly engaged in illicit affairs during the subsistence of their marriages. In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza,[37] Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty. Alejandro,[38] Panagsagan v. Atty. Panagsagan,[39] and Villarente v. Atty. Villarente,[40] this Court imposed the supreme penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyers for being guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct in abandoning the legal spouse in order to cohabit with another woman.
Here, respondent's transgression is even worse as he flaunted his illicit relationship with his mistress on social media, thereby manifesting his insouciance towards the harsh effects of his immorality on his wife and their child. Plain as day, respondent did not live up to the stringent standards required of him by the law profession.
It cannot be stressed enough that respondent failed to debunk the evidence adduced by complainant showing his extramarital affair with Cindy. Quite tellingly, rather than controverting complainant's averments, respondent neither appeared before the IBP to submit his answer nor present any counter evidence, leaving complainants' allegations undisputed.
It bears accentuating that every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times. This must be so, because any lawyer who cannot abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.[41] By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the respondent committed grossly immoral conduct, and violated the fundamental canons of ethics expected to be obeyed by the members of the legal profession. Ineluctably, the Court imposes the penalty of disbarment upon respondent,[42] consistent with the provisions of Section 33, in relation to Section 37, Canon VI of the CPRA, viz.:
SECTION 33. Serious offenses. – Serious offenses include:Appositely, the Court notes respondent's repeated disregard of the IBP-CBD's orders and disrespect of the board proceedings. Records evince that despite being required to do so, respondent failed to file his answer, mandatory conference brief, and position paper. He likewise failed to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference despite due notice. Section 38, paragraph (b)(7) of the CPRA[43] considers the failure to comply with the orders of the IBP in relation to an administrative case as an aggravating circumstance.[44] However, considering that respondent is hereby meted with the supreme penalty of disbarment, the aggravating circumstance becomes non momentum est.
....
....
SECTION 37. Sanctions. –
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and ordains respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg GUILTY of Gross Immorality in violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon II, and Canon VI of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, for which he is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision. His name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see dissenting opinion.
Lazaro-Javier,* J., on official business.
* On Official Business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[2] Id. at 13.
[3] Id. at 14.
[4] Id. at 1-3.
[5] Id. at 1.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 7.
[8] Id. at 9.
[9] Id. at 11-12.
[10] Id. at 13.
[11] Id. at 14.
[12] Id. at 15-34.
[13] Id. at 35.
[14] Id. at 36.
[15] Id. at 10; See IBP-CBD Order dated October 23, 2017 issued by IBP-CBD Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
[16] Id. at 45-49. The Report and Recommendation was signed by IBP-CBD Commissioner Victor Emmanuel M. Pangilinan.
[17] Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[18] Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
[19] Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
[20] Rollo, p. 49.
[21] Id. at 43-44, see Notice of Resolution signed by IBP National Secretary Doroteo Lorenzo B. Aguila.
[22] Id. at 43.
[23] See Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 111-112 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[24] A.M. No. 22-09-01-SC.
[25] GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Transitory Provision. — The CPRA shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that in the opinion of the Supreme Court, its retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.
[26] SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. — The Code of Professional Responsibility of 1988, Sections 20 to 37 of Rule 138 and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are repealed.
The Lawyer's Oath, as found in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is amended and superseded.
Any resolution, circular, bar matter, or administrative order issued by or principles established in the decisions of the Supreme Court inconsistent with the CPRA are deemed modified or repealed.
[27] 884 Phil. 1 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[28] Id. at 9.
[29] 755 Phil. 297 (2015) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[30] Id. at 307-308.
[31] Rollo, p. 13.
[32] Id. at 14.
[33] Id. at 15-34.
[34] Id. at 15-17.
[35] Id. at 35.
[36] Villarente v. Atty. Villarente, supra note 27 at 11.
[37] 851 Phil. 372 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[38] 467 Phil. 139 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[39] 864 Phil. 19 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[40] Supra note 27.
[41] See Hosoya v. Atty. Contado, A.C. No. 0731, October 5, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[42] See Atty. Saludares v. Atty. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Hosoya v. Contado, supra note 38.
[43] SECTION 38. Modifying circumstances. — In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
....
(b) Aggravating Circumstances:
....
(7) Failure to comply with the orders of the Court and the IBP in relation to an administrative case; ...
[44] See Pontiano v. Atty. Gappi, A.C. No. 13118, June 28, 2022 [Per J. Rosario, En Banc] and Jacolbia v. Atty. Panganiban, 871 Phil. 33, 41-42 (2020) [J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I disagree with the majority's ruling that respondent Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg should be disbarred for gross immorality. While his engagement in an extramarital affair is deplorable conduct, suspending him from the practice of law is sufficient to impress upon him the gravity of his actions. "The highest penalty [of disbarment] should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law."[1]
This Court has consistently emphasized that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis in that they seek to determine whether the lawyer in question is still fit to be a member of the legal profession:
[I]n the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[2] (Citation omitted)Thus, the specific actions for which the lawyer is made to account, as well as the penalty to be imposed, should always be commensurate to how the lawyer's conduct erodes the public's confidence in the legal profession and the rule of law.
This principle applies in disciplinary cases involving all manner of alleged transgressions—including the conduct of extramarital affairs. "As its primary purpose is to protect public interest, disbarment cases should not be allowed by this Court to become the vehicle for asserting private rights."[3]
Being officers of the court, lawyers must possess the highest degree of morality[4] and "comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession."[5] They should refrain from engaging in grossly immoral acts, which refer to acts "the extent of which is so corrupt to constitute a criminal act, or grossly unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under circumstances so scandalous and revolting as to shock the common sense of decency."[6]
Yet, the determination of whether an act is grossly immoral in the context of a disciplinary case is not so clear-cut. Nonetheless, this Court must refrain from applying a religion's definition of morality in a nonreligious proceeding. In Perfecto v. Esidera:[7]
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose.To protect public interest and, therefore, serve the purpose of disciplinary cases, this Court must ensure that a lawyer's proven infraction is only measured against secular moral standards. To merit administrative sanction, such infraction must relate to one's functions as a lawyer and must erode the public's confidence in the rule of law.[9]
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights.
....
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court's supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.[8] (Citations omitted)
I have consistently urged this Court to observe a clear, objective, and secular standard in handling disciplinary cases that involve imputations of gross immorality, so as to avoid imposing arbitrary standards of morality.[10] "Secular standards, independent of religious beliefs, must be the basis for determining immorality. After all, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to weigh in on religious doctrine."[11]
Thus, in Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala,[12] I advanced three circumstances where a lawyer's indiscretions would merit disbarment:
The highest penalty should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law. The negligence or utter lack of callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their inability to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate relationships, or their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock should be aggravating and considered for the penalty to be imposed.[13]In this case, the majority narrowed down respondent's transgressions to his entering an extramarital affair, living with a woman not his wife, and flaunting his affair to the public. It did rule that the evidence presented by the private complainant, respondent's wife, failed to prove that respondent contracted a bigamous marriage.[14] Nonetheless, for the majority, the proven acts have already warranted his disbarment.[15]
I disagree as to the penalty imposed. Suspension from the practice of law would have been sufficient.
Respondent's actions do not fall under any of the three circumstances I laid down in Judge Dagala. First, respondent was not shown to have repeatedly entered extramarital affairs. Second, the facts do not show that his acts resulted in a permanent rearrangement causing extraordinary difficulty on existing relationships. Private complainant did not allege that respondent refused to provide support for her and their son, nor did she allege that respondent completely abdicated his role as a father. Lastly, respondent did not commit any act that prima facie violates the law.
Similarly, it has not been shown that respondent's transgressions impacted or related to his duties as a lawyer, or that maintaining his license to practice law will reduce the public's confidence in the legal profession and the rule of law.
As such, respondent has not breached the threshold that will merit his disbarment. "The penalty of disbarment must be a last resort. Where a lesser penalty may accomplish the goal of discipline[in]g the erring lawyer, disbarment should not be imposed."[16] Suspension from the practice of law for three years is commensurate to the gravity of respondent's transgressions.
In the recent cases of Juni v. Juni[17] and Saludares v. Saludares,[18] this Court En Banc sagely traversed the many nuances of gross immorality to arrive at the just penalty.
In Juni, Atty. Mario Juni (Atty. Juni) left his wife and two children to cohabit with another woman, Ruth Vaguchay (Ruth). Despite the subsistence of his first marriage, Atty. Juni sired two children with Ruth and even contracted his second marriage with her.[19] This Court merely suspended him from the practice of law for five years, as his actions did not show that he was unfit to remain a member of the legal profession:
The penalty of disbarment must be a last resort. Where a lesser penalty may accomplish the goal of discipline[in]g the erring lawyer, disbarment should not be imposed. While Atty. Juni left complainant to cohabit with Ruth and sired two children with her, the same standing alone does not show Atty. Juni's unfitness to remain a member of the Bar. Atty. Juni did not deny his circumstances, instead he exhibited candor due to his religious belief that he is now a converted [M]uslim. Thus, without any evidence showing that his transgression seriously affected his standing and character as an officer of the court, a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for five years is proper.[20] (Citation omitted)In Saludares, Atty. Reynaldo Saludares (Atty. Saludares) not only engaged in an extramarital affair, but he showed no qualms or remorse to the extent that he unabashedly admitted to his wife and children that he was having an illicit affair. Worse, he boasted to his children that his paramour was "disente" and "maraming pera[.]"[21] For these acts, Atty. Saludares undeniably caused extraordinary difficulty on his relationship with his children. For a child to hear their father proudly proclaim such traits of a paramour will naturally skew that child's views on relationships. This Court, therefore, justifiably disbarred Atty. Saludares.[22]
With the majority's ruling in this case, this Court seemed to have backslid to an antiquated overinvolvement in primarily private affairs. Lawyers are called to account for how their behavior affects the legal profession, without more. Disciplinary cases should never be used as a forum for individuals to vindicate private rights that are beyond the lawyer's professional dealings.
As I stated in my opinion in Hierro v. Nava II:[23]
The State must not excessively intrude into the personal relationships of lawyers to the extent that it unduly affects their professional standing. Marital indiscretion by itself is insufficient to strip one's license to practice law. To sensibly implement our notion of secular morality is to reckon with the prevailing realities of how marriage works, and not dwell on its idealized versions.[24]ACCORDINGLY, I vote to SUSPEND Atty. Vincenzo Nonato M. Taggueg from the practice of law for three years.
[1] J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 155 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[2] In re Almacen, 142 Phil. 353, 390 (1970) [Per J. Castro, First Division].
[3] J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Villarente v. Villarente, Jr., 884 Phil. 1, 14 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
[4] Gonzaga v. Abad, A.C. No. 13163, March 15, 2022 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[5] Batangueño Human Resources, Inc. v. De Jesus, A.C. No. 13443, December 7, 2022 [Per J. Kho, Second Division], at 6. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6] Saludares v. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[7] 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[8] Id. at 398-400.
[9] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 120 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[10] J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Zerna v. Zerna, 882 Phil. 19 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[11] J. Leonen, Separate Concurring Opinion in Hierro v. Nava II, 868 Phil. 56, 69 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[12] 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[13] Id. at 155.
[14] Ponencia, p. 6.
[15] Id. at 8.
[16] Juni v. Juni, A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 7. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[17] A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[18] A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[19] Juni v. Juni, A.C. No. 11599, August 3, 2021 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 2.
[20] Id.
[21] Saludares v. Saludares, A.C. No. 10612, January 31, 2023 [Per Curiam, En Banc], at 4.
[22] Id. at 8.
[23] 868 Phil. 56 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[24] Id. at 70.