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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 209479, July 11, 2023 ]
FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP), ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TRANSPORT OPERATORS (ACTO), ALLIANCE OF TRANSPORT OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (ALTODAP), PANGKALAHATANG SANGGUNIANG MANILA AND SUBURBS DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (PASANG-MASDA), METRO MANILA BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (MMBOA), PAGKAKAISA NG MGA SAMAHAN NG TSUPER AND OPERATOR NATIONWIDE (PISTON), MAKATI JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ALLIANCE, INC. (MJODA), INTEGRATED METRO BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (IMBOA), NORTHEAST MANILA BUS OPERATORS GROUP (NEMBOG), NATIONAL TRANS-WORKERS UNION (NTU), AND PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP), PETITIONERS, VS. GOVERNMENT OF MANILA CITY, QUEZON CITY, VALENZUELA CITY, CALOOCAN CITY, SAN JUAN, NAVOTAS, LAS PIÑAS, TAGUIG, PASAY CITY, PARAÑAQUE CITY, MUNTINLUPA CITY, MANDALUYONG CITY, MAKATI CITY, PASIG CITY, PATEROS, METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO) AND THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Facts
On June 20, 1964, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the "Land Transportation and Traffic Code," (LTO Law) which created the Land Transportation Commission (LTC), later renamed as Land Transportation Office (LTO). Pursuant to its creation, Congress vested on the LTC, now LTO, several powers and functions, pertinent of which are as follows:
SECTION 4. Creation of Commission. — . . .
. . . .
The Commissioner shall be responsible for the administration of this Act and shall have, in connection therewith, the following powers and duties, in addition to those mentioned elsewhere in this Act:
. . . .
. . . .
CHAPTER III
Operation of Motor Vehicle
ARTICLE I
License to Drive Motor Vehicles
. . . .
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's Licenses. — Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his [or her] case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his [or her] license.
In addition to the foregoing provisions which petitioners invoke, they reference as well Section 62 of the same law, which provides:
ARTICLE III
Final Provisions
SECTION 62. No provincial board, city or municipal board or council shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act, or prohibiting any deputy or agent of the Commission to enforce this Act within their respective territorial jurisdiction and the provisions of any charter to the contrary notwithstanding.
On July 23, 1979, through Executive Order No. 546, the LTC was renamed Bureau of Land Transportation, and was placed under the then Ministry of Transportation and Communications.[4]
On March 20, 1985, Executive Order No. 1011 was issued, abolishing in the process the then Bureau of Land Transportation. A new LTC was created and absorbed the powers and functions of the Bureau of Land Transportation and the then Bureau of Transportation which was similarly abolished. Executive Order No. 1011 did not specifically provide for the LTC's power to confiscate licenses and issue receipts for violations, although it granted the same a general power to "implement and enforce laws and policies on land transportation."[5]
Subsequently, on January 30, 1987, the LTC was again abolished through EO 125,[6] and its functions were transferred to the Bureau of Land Transportation. Similar to Executive Order No. 1011, and Executive Order No. 125 did not specifically grant the Bureau of Land Transportation the power to confiscate licenses and issue receipts. However, it granted the said bureau the general power to"[e]stablish and prescribe the corresponding rules and regulations for the enforcement of laws governing land transportation, including the penalties for violation thereof, and for the deputation of appropriate law enforcement agencies in pursuance thereof."[7] The Bureau of Land Transportation was later on renamed as Land Transportation Office or LTO.
On October 10, 1991, RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) was approved, and took effect on January 1, 1992. The LGC defined and enumerated the powers, duties, and functions common to legislative bodies of the various local government units, to wit:
SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The [sangguniang bayan], as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . . .
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
. . . .
Subsequently, or on March 1, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7924, "An Act Creating The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and Other Purposes" (MMDA Law); Section 5(f) of said law places upon the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) the duty to:
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:
. . . .
In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the legislative bodies of the respondent local government units (LGUs) of Metro Manila, acting separately, passed the following Ordinances:
Ordinance No. 2003-89 series of 2003 of Makati City titled "AN ORDINANCE ENACTING THE MAKATI CITY TRAFFIC CODE SUBJECT TO ALL LAWS AND EXISTING LEGAL RULES AND REGULATIONS."
Ordinance No. 103 series of 2003 of Taguig titled "AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG."
Ordinance No. 05-04 series of 2004 of Parañaque City titled "AN ORDINANCE ENACTING THE PARANAQUE CITY TRAFFIC CODE SUBJECT TO EXISTING LAWS AND APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS."
Ordinance No. 2916 series of 2004 of Pasay City titled "AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING A TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF PASAY CITY."
Ordinance No. SP-1444 series of 2004 of Quezon City titled "AN ORDINANCE CREATING THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF QUEZON CITY."
Ordinance No. 37 series of 2004 of San Juan titled "MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE KNOWN AND CITED AS THE MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA."
Ordinance No. 2004-14 series of 2004 of Navotas titled "TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAVOTAS, METRO MANILA."
Ordinance No. 652-04 series of 2004 of Las Piñas titled "LAS PIÑAS TRAFFIC CODE."
Ordinance No. 01 series of 2004 of Pasig City titled "AN ORDINANCE ENACTING THE 2004 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE CITY OF PASIG."
Ordinance No. 04-022 series of 2005 of Muntinlupa City titled "AN ORDINANCE ENACTING THE MUNTINLUPA CITY TRAFFIC CODE, SUBJECT TO ALL LAWS AND EXISTING LEGAL RULES AND REGULATIONS."
Ordinance No. 358 series of 2005 of the City of Mandaluyong titled "THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE CITY OF MANDALUYONG."
Ordinance No. 019 series of 2005 of Valenzuela City titled "AN ORDINANCE ENACTING THE LAND TRANSPORTATION CODE OF THE CITY OF VALENZUELA."
Ordinance No. 0391 series of 2005 of Caloocan City titled "AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE NEW TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF CALOOCAN CITY."
Ordinance No. 8092 series of 2005 of the City of Manila titled "AN ORDINANCE REVISING THE TRAFFIC CODE OF THE CITY OF MANILA BY AMENDING CHAPTER 121 OF THE COMPILATION OF THE ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF MANILA AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
Ordinance No. 2005-19 series of 2005 of Pateros titled "ORDINANCE APPROVING THE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CODE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATORS AND FOR OTHER LEGAL PURPOSES."
Each of the foregoing Ordinances provides for the issuance of a traffic violation ticket to erring drivers denominated as "Ordinance Violation Receipt" (OVR). The Ordinances have a common provision, which reads:
Procedure in the Issuance of Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) – Any person violating any provision of this Ordinance or any Ordinance of the City shall be issued an Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR). In case of violation of the Traffic Management Code, a duly deputized traffic enforcement officer shall confiscate the driver's license and the issued receipt shall serve as Temporary Driver's License for five (5) working days from elate of issuance. Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) issued by the local government [Unit] in Metropolitan Manila shall be honored or respected by the apprehending traffic enforcer.[8] (Italics supplied)
On December 21, 2006, the Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines (FEJODAP), Alliance of Concerned Transport Operators (ACTO), Alliance of Transport Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines (ALTODAP), with Pangkalahatang Sangguniang Manila and Suburbs Drivers Association, Inc. (PASANG-MASDA), Metro Manila Bus Operators Association (MMBOA), Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide (PISTON), Makati Jeepney Operators and Drivers Alliance, Inc. (MJODA), Integrated Metro Bus Operators Association (IMBOA), Northeast Manila Bus Operators Group (NEMBOG), National Transworkers Union (NTU), and Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP) (collectively, petitioners), all of them transport organizations duly registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and which members are either public utility transport operators and/or drivers of public utility vehicles duly authorized by the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, filed before the CA a Petition for Injunction and Mandamus against respondents LGUs, and the MMDA, the LTO, and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), seeking the nullification of the OVR provision in the aforementioned Ordinances.
Petitioners claimed that the OVR provision, which authorizes respondent LGUs to confiscate licenses and issue OVRs to erring drivers, violates Sections 29 and 62 of the LTO Law which grants the LTO authority to confiscate driver's licenses and issue a prescribed receipt for violations of said law or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto or of local traffic rules and regulations, and Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law, authorizing the MMDA to "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations . . . and confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations."[9]
Petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the MMDA to immediately draw up, install, and administer a single ticketing system for all traffic violations in Metro Manila in compliance with Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law.[10]
Meanwhile, on January 26, 2012, during the pendency of the case before the CA, respondent MMDA, through the Metro Manila Council (MMC), issued Resolution No. 12-02, series of 2012[11] (MMDA Resolution No. 12-02) adopting a uniform ticketing system and establishing a system of interconnectivity among government instrumentalities involved in the transport and traffic management in Metro Manila.
Ruling of the CA
On December 17, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,[12] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Injunction and Mandamus is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed subject Ordinances of the different Local Government comprising the Metropolitan Manila are declared LEGAL and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA ruled that there is no conflict between the MMDA Law and the LGC because each of the said laws has their specific boundaries — the MMDA Law governs the delivery of metro-wide services whereas the LGC embodies the authority of respondent LGUs to enact the assailed ordinances as a necessary effect of the delegation by Congress of its lawmaking power. The CA further held that, since the Court in MMDA v. Garin[14] (Garin) did not declare Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law unconstitutional, it is very much still a good law waiting to be enforced and utilized for the benefit of the general public. The CA, however, did not rule on the issue of whether the OVR being issued by respondent LGUs was in violation of the single ticketing system because, as admitted by the parties, no single ticketing system had at that time been drawn.
The CA also rejected petitioners' contention that the assailed Ordinances conflict with Sections 29 and 62 of the LTO Law. According to the CA, the LGC did not expressly repeal Sections 29 and 62 of the LTO Law because only the aspect of traffic management was transferred to the LGUs and not the entire powers of the LTO.
As regards the prayer for mandamus, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to provide strong evidence of neglect on the part of the MMDA in the enforcement of its duty to draw up a single ticketing system. They failed to show that MMDA absolutely abdicated its duty to install a single ticketing system as provided under Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution[15] dated October 3, 2013.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners argue that Section 29 of the LTO Law is explicit as to the power of the LTO to confiscate licenses and issue traffic violation receipts; and while, admittedly, LGUs were authorized by the LGC to regulate traffic within their respective territorial jurisdictions, they cannot usurp the power that is legislatively vested in the LTO. Petitioners insist that the assailed Ordinances must yield to the LTO Law.
Petitioners further contend that the issuance of Executive Order No. 712, series of 2008[16] and MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 show the clear legislative intent to have a single ticketing system installed by the MMDA. According to petitioners, the implementation of a single ticketing system by the MMDA will address the confusion, disorder, and prejudice to motorists caused by the variance of traffic tickets and corresponding fines and penalties separately imposed by respondents LGUs, the LTO, and the MMDA.
Moreover, petitioners assert that while MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 intends to implement a Uniform Ordinance Violation Receipt (UOVR), it did not invalidate the OVRs issued by respondent LGUs, which practically defeats the objective of a single ticketing system. In other words, allowing respondent LGUs to continue issuing OVRs renders nugatory MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 and undermines the single ticketing system implemented by the MMDA.
Accordingly, petitioners pray that the Court: (1) annul and set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA; (2) declare unconstitutional, null and void the OVR provision of the assailed Ordinances, or, in the alternative, striking down said provision from the subject Ordinances; and (3) issue a permanent injunction against respondent LGUs enjoining them from implementing the OVR.
Respondent LGUs, on the other hand, argue that: (1) they are vested by law with the power to regulate traffic within their respective territorial jurisdictions and legislate ordinances pertinent thereto; (2) the MMDA has no authority to impose upon respondent LGUs a single ticketing system because, as enunciated by the Court in the cases of Garin and MMDA v. Bel-Air[17] (Bel-Air), the MMDA is clothed only with administrative powers and not police power, nor legislative power; and (3) consequently, petitioners are not entitled to the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction against the implementation of the OVR provision.[18]
However, respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC do not share the views of respondent LGUs. They maintain that: (1) by the express mandate of the MMDA Law, the authority to set traffic policies and to install a single ticketing system in Metro Manila is vested with the MMDA;[19] (2) the MMDA Law, a later and special enactment of Congress, prevails over the LGC in regard to the formulation of traffic policies and installation of a single ticketing system;[20] and (3) respondent LGUs, in the exercise of their delegated powers, cannot pass ordinances that would contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.[21]
Issues
The Court's Ruling
The Court holds that the CA erred in declaring as valid the common provision in the questioned Ordinances, and in ruling that the respondent LGUs have the right to issue OVRs.
| The present petition has actual case or controversy |
At the outset, it is worth pointing out that the case presents an actual case or controversy. "An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution."[22] The requirement of actual case or controversy necessitates that:
[t]he controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.[23]
In this case, there is a clear assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, shown primarily by the antagonistic assertions of power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila by respondent LGUs, on the one hand, and by respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC on the other.
The conflict of legal rights is also susceptible of judicial resolution, as the controversy could be terminated through a "specific relief that courts can grant."[24] The reason for this is that "[i]n cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments [of the government] and among the integral or constituent units thereof."[25] The Court, therefore, not only has the power, but it has, in fact, the duty to decide the case at bar.
The assailed Ordinances were not enacted in violation of the LTO Law |
As previously mentioned, petitioners assail the validity of the Ordinances for allegedly being contrary to existing statutes. Specifically, petitioners contend that the Ordinances are invalid for running afoul of Sections 29 and 62 of the LTO Law and Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law.
To reiterate Sections 29 and 62 of the LTO Law:
CHAPTER III
Operation of Motor Vehicle
ARTICLE I
License to Drive Motor Vehicles
. . . .
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's Licenses. — Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his [or her] case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his [or her] license.
. . . .
ARTICLE III
Final Provisions
SECTION 62. No provincial board, city or municipal board or council shall enact or enforce any ordinance or resolution in conflict with the provisions of this Act, or prohibiting any deputy or agent of the Commission to enforce this Act within their respective territorial jurisdiction and the provisions of any charter to the contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law provides:
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:
. . . .
According to petitioners' theory, Section 29 of the LTO Law explicitly vests on the LTO the power to confiscate licenses and to issue receipts for traffic violations.[26] In addition, they assert that the assailed Ordinances render nugatory the mandate of the MMDA to install and administer a single ticketing system. Thus, in accordance with the principle that a valid ordinance must not contravene a statute,[27] the assailed Ordinances are invalid as the LGUs arrogated upon themselves the said power through the issuance of the OVRs.
Petitioners also add that the "variance of traffic tickets issued by the LTO, the MMDA, and the LGUs causes confusion and conflict among the three bodies. The traffic tickets issued by the LTO and the MMDA are not recognized by the LGUs, and vice versa."[28] They further point out that to allow the LGUs to still have powers to confiscate licenses would be arbitrary and unduly oppressive to them, as they would be subjected to "double penalty."[29] This is due to the fact that the MMDA does not recognize the OVRs issued by the LGUs as a temporary ticket, and hence, if they get apprehended by the MMDA after their licenses were already confiscated by the traffic enforcers of the LGUs, they would likewise be found guilty of "driving without license" on top of the violation they committed.
The argument is unmeritorious.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the assailed Ordinances were not enacted in violation of the LTO Law. As previously mentioned, the LTO Law has undergone numerous amendments through the years via the enactment of Executive Order Nos. 546, 1011, and 125. Executive Order Nos. 546 and 1011 were issued under the authority given the President by Presidential Decree No. 1416[30] — a law — to reorganize the national government,[31] while Executive Order No. 125 itself is considered law as it was issued under the auspices of the Freedom Constitution when the President exercised legislative powers.
These subsequent enactments, as discussed, did not specifically grant the LTO the power to confiscate licenses and issue receipts. This, along with the fact that the LGC, a subsequent law, granted cities and municipalities the power to enact ordinances which regulate traffic and the use of streets,[32] leads the Court to rule that the assailed Ordinances were not invalidly enacted as they were issued under the authority of a valid delegation of legislative power through the LGC. Between the LTO and respondent LGUs, therefore, it is the latter who have the power to enact ordinances relating to traffic — and to enforce the same — in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, as respondents pointed out, the assailed Ordinances are valid as respondent LGUs were explicitly granted by the LGC, a statute duly enacted by the Legislature, the said power to approve the same. Respondents thus correctly argued, and the CA consequently correctly held, that the assailed Ordinances and the common provision therein cannot be struck down for being in violation of the LTO Law.
But while it is untenable to hold that the assailed Ordinances are invalid for violating the LTO Law, they are nonetheless invalid for being in violation of the MMDA Law.
History and powers of the MMDA
Recognizing the need to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative region, Republic Act No. 7924, or the MMDA Law, was enacted and the MMDA was accordingly created to provide metro-wide services to the area, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGUs.[33] The MMDA Law provided that the MMDA should provide "those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metropolitan Manila."[34] The services to be offered by the MMDA include:
As can be gleaned from the above, one of the functions assigned to the MMDA is "transport and traffic management" which includes the "administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations ... including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila." In this connection, the MMDA was granted the following powers:
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:
. . . .
Thus, the enactment of the MMDA Law shows a clear legislative intent to bestow upon the MMDA both the power to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and the duty to coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management.[36] Specifically, the MMDA was given the task of installing and administering a "single ticketing system" and to fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations.[37] Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law specifically mentions that it applies, "the provisions of RA 4136 ... to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus, as between the MMDA and the LTO, it is the MMDA which can exercise these powers.
In response to the said mandate, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 12-02 on January 26, 2012 where it created a Technical Working Group that was tasked to study the uniform ticketing system and which would submit a corresponding recommendation to the Metro Manila Council. This led to the signing of the Joint Metro Traffic Circular No. 12-01 titled "Guidelines on the Implementation of the Uniform Ticketing System in Metro Manila" (Joint Circular). The Joint Circular provides:
JOINT METRO TRAFFIC CIRCULAR NO. 12-01
1.0 Rationale
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) issues Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority issues Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR), and LGUs issue their respective Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) for traffic violations. Moreover, the TOP, TVR, and OVRs are being issued with varying fines and penalties for the same traffic violation, and under different procedure in apprehension, payment of fine, and redemption of license/plate. This multiple-ticketing system and uncoordinated implementation of traffic laws result to confusion of the driving public and loss of money and productive hours, and if left unattended may create chaos to the detriment of the public in general.
To address this predicament, the Metro Manila Council, by virtue of Section 5 (f) of Republic Act No. 7924, enacted MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 on January 26, 2012, adopting a Uniform Ticketing System within the Metro Manila using a uniform ticket and ticketing system, aimed at harmonizing the existing national and local laws on traffic enforcement and for the prevention of confusion among private and public motorists.
2.0 Purpose
To prescribe the guidelines for the implementation of the Uniform Ticketing System adopted by the Metro Manila Council under MMDA Resolution No. 12-02, "Adopting a Uniform Ticketing System and the Establishment of a System of Interconnectivity among Government Instrumentalities involved in the Transport and Traffic Management in Metro Manila".
3.0 Coverage
This Joint Circular shall cover the implementation of the Uniform Ticketing System within the jurisdiction of the sixteen (16) cities and one (1) municipality in Metro Manila and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Land Transportation Office (LTO).
4.0 Guidelines
5.0 Validity of Existing OVR and TVR Inventories
All existing OVR and TVR inventories shall be deemed null and void. All traffic operatives in Metro Manila shall hereafter use the UOVR.
6.0 Oversight Committee
7.0 Separability Clause
If any of the provisions of this Joint Circular is declared unconstitutional or invalid for whatever reason, the same shall not affect the validity of other provisions not declared unconstitutional or invalid.
8.0 Repealing Clause
The provisions of any Circular, Order, local ordinances and other issuances, which are inconsistent with this Circular, are hereby rescinded, repealed and/or modified accordingly.
9.0 Miscellaneous
In order to effectively carry out and achieve the goals of the Uniform Ticketing System, the MMDA Chairman is hereby authorized to issue further Guidelines as may be necessary in its implementation.
10.0 Effectivity
This Circular shall take effect immediately upon signing.
Under the Joint Circular, the Uniform Ticketing System shall be implemented within the 16 cities and one municipality in Metro Manila. Through the Uniform Ticketing System, traffic violators shall be issued a UOVR which shall be recognized by the MMDA, the LTO and all LGU traffic operatives as a valid traffic citation receipt and temporary driver's license.[38]
Respondents Cities of Caloocan,[39] Mandaluyong,[40] Navotas,[41] Parañaque,[42] Quezon,[43] and Valenzuela[44] question the validity of the Joint Circular because the MMDA supposedly does not have legislative power, as held in the cases of Bel-Air and Garin. Respondent City of Manila adds that "the MMDA cannot legally enact an ordinance imposing a single ticketing system within Metro Manila for its function according to the Supreme Court is only [a]dministrative in nature."[45] Respondents Cities of Caloocan[46] and Taguig[47] further argue that the implementation of the single ticketing system subject of MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 and the Joint Circular "must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source" for it to be valid. Respondent Parañaque City additionally avers that the MMDA was not created as a political unit — and was instead created as a mere development authority — hence it does not possess the power to enact an "ordinance" to provide for a single ticketing system.[48]
It should be noted that on June 15, 2021, the Court asked the parties in this case to manifest any supervening events or any changes in positions they may have taken in this case. In response, all of the parties which responded expressed that there have been no changes in the positions they have taken in this case, although some of the LGUs which responded, namely the cities of Mandaluyong,[49] San Juan,[50] Manila,[51] Taguig,[52] Pasig,[53] and Parañaque[54] confirmed that they have been implementing the single ticketing system since 2012 in accordance with Resolution No. 12-02 and the Joint Circular. The cities of San Juan, Pasig, Parañaque, and Taguig noted, however, that while they have been implementing the single ticketing system, the fines, penalties, and surcharges continuously differ because the LGUs are still implementing their local ordinances in the exercise of their local autonomy.
Meanwhile, Caloocan City[55] manifested that it still follows its own traffic ordinance and that it issues its own OVR to persons or entities found to have violated any provision of the ordinance.[56] Caloocan City also reiterated its positions that:
On the other hand, respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC, through the OSG, merely manifested that the single ticketing system had been in place since 2012.[58]
The Court now rules on the issue of the validity of the local ordinances vis-à-vis the MMDA Law.
Respondent LGUs' reliance on Bel-Air is misplaced, as the facts and issues presented therein do not fall squarely with the case at bar. In Bel-Air, the MMDA sought to open Neptune Street, a private road inside Bel-Air Village, to public vehicular traffic believing that it had the authority to do so under the MMDA Law. The MMDA believed that it had the power to open Neptune Street because the MMDA Law granted it the authority to "rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons."[59]
The Court held that the MMDA did not have the power to open Neptune street to the public as it did not possess police power nor legislative powers. Without an enabling ordinance enacted by Makati City, the Court held that the MMDA's attempt to open Neptune Street to the public was invalid. The Court opined that "[t]here is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power."[60]
It must be pointed out, however, that it was necessary for the Court in Bel-Air to delve into whether the MMDA possesses police power or legislative power as the MMDA attempted to impose burdens on private property in the said case. It bears stressing that police power is the "power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."[61] Stated differently, "in the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare."[62] Involving as it did the imposition of burdens or limitations on the use of private property, the Court in Bel-Air needed to answer — and it did, in the negative — the question of whether the MMDA had police power, in light of the absence of a law or ordinance authorizing it to open a private road to the public.
The same factual circumstances, however, do not apply in the present case.
The question involved in this case is merely who between the MMDA and the LGUs has the right (1) to issue receipts for traffic violations and (2) to confiscate the licenses of the erring drivers. Unlike in the case of Bel-Air, there is no potential burden or limitation to be imposed on any private property. As held in the case of Garin, a case cited by respondent LGUs themselves, "a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power."[63] If at all, the "burden" is imposed on the licensees themselves like herein petitioners — who are at risk of having their licenses confiscated — who filed this case not to question the basis for confiscating their licenses per se, but only sought to clarify which government entity is empowered under the law to do so.
Respondents LGUs' reliance on the Court's pronouncement in Garin that the MMDA's exercise of "the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses without need of any other legislative enactment . . . is an unauthorized exercise of police power"[64] is also untenable as a closer reading of the ruling in Garin reveals that this pronouncement was merely obiter dictum. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay,[65] the Court explained an obiter dictum in this wise:
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law that is not necessary in the determination of the case before the court. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his [or her] decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him [or her], or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata.[66] (Italics in the original)
In Garin, a traffic violation receipt was issued by the MMDA to Dante O. Garin (Garin), and his driver's license was confiscated, for illegally parking at a street in the City of Manila. Garin wrote a letter to the MMDA requesting the return of his license, but his request went unheeded. Garin thus filed a complaint "contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution."[67] Garin further contended that "the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists."[68] Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Parañaque ruled that "[t]he summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without [due process] cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional."[69]
Thus, the issue presented before the Court in Garin was a question of due process: that is, at a time when there were as yet no implementing rules and regulations issued by the MMDA, whether a driver's license may be summarily confiscated without a judicial proceeding instituted for the purpose. In this regard, it is significant to note that the Court in Garin recognized that subsequent events had already made the issue moot and academic:
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers' licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court's need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.[70] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Despite this recognition, the Court unfortunately still went on to rule that the MMDA possesses neither police power nor legislative power. Relying on the case of Bel-Air, the Court in Garin ruled that the MMDA may only enforce traffic laws or ordinances passed by LGUs, but may not itself enact such rules:
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound — to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.[71] (Italics in the original)
The pronouncement of the Court relied upon by respondent LGUs is, therefore, obiter dictum as the Court decided the case (1) when the issue was not presented by the parties, as shown above, and (2) the issue, if at all raised, had become functus officio and therefore moot, in violation of the rule that courts should decide actual cases and controversies, and not to render advisory opinions.[72]
The above interpretation of the import of the cases of Bel-Air and Garin is consistent with the Court En Banc's recent ruling in Pantaleon v. MMDA[73] (Pantaleon), which dealt with the MMDA's implementation of the number coding scheme. According to Pantaleon:
Bel Air, Viron and Trackworks involved the outright deprivation of private property under the pretext of traffic regulation and promotion of safe and convenient movement of motorists. On the other hand, Garin was mooted by supervening events.
In the present case, there is no outright deprivation of property but merely a restriction [– through the number coding scheme] in the operation of public utility buses along the major roads of Metro Manila through the number coding scheme.[74]
In any event, even if the pronouncements in Garin are to be considered binding — and hence, that the principle of stare decisis applies — the Court now holds that the same are nevertheless incorrect and must perforce be abandoned.
It is well-settled that the principle of stare decisis is not absolute. It is likewise not a principle that mandates blind adherence to precedents.[75] A doctrine or rule laid down, which has been followed for years, no matter how sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned.[76] In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,[77] for instance, the Court did not hesitate to abandon the "condonation doctrine" despite its applicability having been reaffirmed by the Court numerous times in the five decades prior to its abandonment, especially after finding that the doctrine had no statutory anchor. In the said case, the Court explained:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, a temporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."[78] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Further, the principle of stare decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law.[79] The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.[80]
Thus, assuming that Garin is a valid precedent, the same must now be abandoned for it was error to apply the principles enunciated in Bel-Air therein when, as illustrated, the factual circumstances were different. To reiterate, Bel-Air dealt with the imposition of burdens and limitations on private property — which concededly the MMDA could not do — whereas Garin dealt with the general power of the MMDA regarding traffic management in Metro Manila. The actions of the MMDA subject of Garin were different from that in Bel-Air, in that traffic management and enforcement of traffic rules are explicitly within the domain of the MMDA's powers as laid down in the MMDA Law.
That the MMDA has the power to set policies, fix, and impose penalties, and to enforce the same is fully supported by the text of the MMDA Law, which is quoted anew for emphasis:
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. — Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metro wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
. . . .
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:
. . . .
From the letter of the statute alone, the legislative intent is already clear that the MMDA should be the central policymaking body in Metro Manila on matters relating to traffic management, and the entity charged with the enforcement of the same policies. The law is replete with provisions granting the MMDA rule-making powers, such as the power to "formulate policies, standards, and programs" and "fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations." The law is thus clear and unambiguous. As the Court held in Pantaleon, "Republic Act No. 7924 clearly confers upon the MMDA, through the Metro Manila Council, the power to issue regulations that provide for a system to regulate traffic in the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila for the safety and convenience of the public."[81]
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.[82] Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[83] The rule is derived from the maxim index animo sermo est — meaning, speech is the index of intention — which rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.[84] Bearing in mind that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law,[85] then the Court must thus see to it that the mandate of the clear letter of the law is obeyed.[86]
Beyond the letter of the MMDA Law, the legislative deliberations also reveal the intent to lodge in the MMDA all the rule-making powers relative to traffic management in Metro Manila. The deliberations of the Committee on Local Government on House Bill No. 14170/11116, the progenitor of the MMDA Law, reveal that indeed the intent of the legislature was for the MMDA to have rule-making powers in relation to traffic management in Metro Manila:
COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(October 27, 1994)
THE CHAIRMAN (Feliciano M. Belmonte, Jr.)[:] Ang point kasi ni Mayor Mathay is that, the number one problem of Metro Manila that is toothless to address the number one problem of the metropolis, then it might be perceived as being toothless in other areas as well. I think that is what the Mayor is saying here, because he was quite adamant about this single ticketing system eh. So we see that it is not just a single ticketing system, but just a whole lot of other provisions here.[87]
. . . .
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Mayor Mathay has recommended the addition of two sub-sections here – 5-e and 5-f. 5-e – do you have a copy there? Pakibasa mo nga iyong tungkol sa traffic.
MR. CAYTON[:] Ito ba iyong "install and administer"?
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Yes. Yes, oo.
MR. CAYTON[:] Have you read that?
THE CHAIRMAN[:] What do you think of that? What is the rationale for that?
MR. CAYTON: I think he just simply wants to make it clear that it will be the MMDA that will issue the laws, rules, and regulations throughout Metro Manila as a change from today's situation that...
THE CHAIRMAN: Which is... ?
MR. CAYTON[:] ... Well, it is not coordinated in the sense that rules and regulations and ordinances come in different forms. There is no one body that will adopt a singular system of...
THE CHAIRMAN[:] So, you are in fact in favor of that?
MR. CAYTON[:] Sir – I am.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] You're in favor?
MR. CAYTON[:] Yes, sir.
. . . .
HON. BUNYE[:] Mr. Chairman, actually most of the amendments are clarificatory in nature. They did not change the sense of the provisions to which they relate. They nearly clarified and made very clear exactly what the MMDA can do because there were some vagueness in the original text. The new provisions that is placed here is on page 4, "d) coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plan,["] "e) with respect to traffic.["] Traffic is the number 1 problem in MMDA, in the Metro Manila region today, Your Honor, and one of the reasons is everybody is a driver here and nobody is really calling the shots. So, here we have this new provisions (sic) "e" with respect to the power of the MMDA concerning traffic, and secondly, the installation and administration of a single ticketing system. You will find, Your Honor, that the different component LGUs have their own rules and respective penalties with respect to ticketing and it creates havoc among those who are subject to these rules. So these are the two new items that have been placed. All the others are really by way of clarifying the authority of the MMA. For instance, where the MMA originally, where the original text merely says to set down policies, we have made it clear here that it can also lay down rules and regulations to implement those policies. I think that is necessary, otherwise, we are going to perpetuate the ambiguities that exist now with respect to the powers of the present MMA. So those are the provisions, Your Honor. This is not yet a perfect document, but if we ever wanted to come out in this session, it should come out of this committee already.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Okay, on this particular paragraph, letter "f", on "confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations ...", I think, Mr. Cayton, you had a Supreme Court case where a case was filed against the MMA, where questioning the powers, for the MMA to confiscate licenses.
HON. BELMONTE[:] Well, that may very well be so, Your Honor, because it's not clear in the present laws. We want to clarify it now, it will be put in a law, and the Supreme Court will have to yield to this law. Right now[,] we don't know what the powers of the MMA are, and that's a source of our problems.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Okay, I think this was already studied by the technical group. There would be no legal impediment, Mr. Cayton, in case we give the MMDA the power to confiscate, revoke licenses of drivers.
MR. CAYTON[:] We don't foresee any such problem, Mr. Chairman. In fact, this will only give life to what has already been implied under P.D. 1605, where even the Justice Department opined that in the Metro Manila Authority, it would be the MMC then who should implement such laws within this region. And under that same P.D. delineated the powers of the MMC then and the LTO, LTO being on the national level and as on the... only on the Metropolitan region.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Because it says here, "shall set up rules and regulations on fines and penalties".
MR. CAYTON[:] Mr. Chairman, because of the ambiguity as the Chairman of this committee said, it was unclear whether the MMA, then MMC could really undertake such rules and regulations. This became more apparent after 1986 when there was more power given to the local units, and because of the ambiguity, there was no such central system of coordination then existing. It was rather difficult to impose a uniform system throughout the region, this bill is trying to correct.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Okay, is there objection on this amendment?
HON. LOPEZ[:] Mr. Chairman, I don't think there's an objection. In fact[,] I ask that we now go to the previous question. There is a pending motion for approving this bill which I seconded.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think that this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view that there are proposals, setup, to make the MMA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection on paragraph "f"... And then next is paragraph "b", under Section 6. It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances or resolutions deem (sic) by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this act. Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA ... because that takes to form a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. BELMONTE[:] Yes, I believe so, Your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, it's very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies maybe in the form of a resolution or it maybe in the form of an ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, Your Honor. Otherwise we are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that is, the case now. You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] That's very nice, I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment. You are making MMDA as a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution, it states "if it is a political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE[:] All right, Mr. Chairman, okay what you are saying there is...
THE CHAIRMAN[:] In setting up ordinances, is a political exercise. Believe me.
HON. LOPEZ[:] Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations. That would be... its shall also be enforced ...
HON. BELMONTE[:] Okay, I will ...
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE[:] All right, I defer to that opinion, Your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN[:] So, instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE[:] Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN[: ] Rules and resolution.
HON. BELMONTE[:] Rules and regulations and resolutions.[88] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it is indisputable that the legislative intent was to lodge in the MMDA all the rule-making powers relative to traffic management in Metro Manila.
This grant of rule-making powers to administrative agencies is not novel. The Court has long recognized that due to the growing complexity of human activities, some delegation of legislative power in the form of administrative rule-making is not just allowable, but is even necessary. As early as 1988, in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,[89] the Court already made the following observations:
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.[90] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For the grant of rule-making powers to be constitutional, jurisprudence provides that the delegation must be complete, and there is a standard laid down by which the administrative agency concerned determines the metes and bounds of it powers. In Edu v. Ericta,[91] the Court said:
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.[92]
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule-making authority by an administrative agency are necessarily broad and highly abstract.[93]
A review of jurisprudence reveals that the Court has found the following, despite being broad principles, to be sufficient standards to constitute a valid delegation of legislative power: "the standardization and regulation of medical education,"[94] "safe transit upon the roads,"[95] "public welfare,"[96] "interest of law and order,"[97] "public interest,"[98] "public convenience and welfare,"[99] and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency."[100]
In the present case, the Court finds the standard of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of metro-wide services found in Section 1[101] of the MMDA Law as a sufficient standard to constitute a valid delegation.
Thus, despite the power granted by Sections 447(5)(v-vi) and 458(5)(v vi) of the LGC to the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the cities, respectively, to "[a]pprove ordinances . . . to . . . (v) [r]egulate the use of streets . . . [and] (vi) [r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges," this power does not exist for the cities and the lone municipality in Metro Manila because of Sections 5(e) and (f) of the MMDA Law.
The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that Sections 5(e) and 5(f) of the MMDA Law have primacy over Sections 447(5)(v-vi) and 458(5)(v-vi) of the LGC in that the latter provisions empower the cities and the lone municipality in Metro Manila to regulate traffic only to the extent that they do not conflict with the regulations issued by the MMDA. From the foregoing, the Court thus construes Sections 5(e) and 5(f) of the MMDA Law, being the later expression of legislative will, as partially impliedly modifying the aforementioned sections of the LGC.
Invalidity of the common provision in the assailed Ordinances for being contrary to existing law |
The Court does not lose sight of the fact that the MMDA Law created the MMDA "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units."[102] It is clear from the same law, however, that the MMDA shall perform its functions "without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters."[103] And, in this regard, the Court observes that the legislature, in the exercise of its wisdom, deemed traffic management as a matter that transcends local political boundaries,[104] thereby taking the same out of the matters over which the LGUs in Metro Manila have exclusive authority.
All things considered, the Court hereby abandons the pronouncements in Garin, and so holds that the MMDA possesses rule-making powers with regard specifically to traffic management in Metro Manila. To be clear, the Court maintains that Bel-Air was correct, in that the MMDA does not exercise police power or legislative power, unlike LGUs which are given ordinance powers by the LGC under its relevant sections. The Court only clarifies in this case that, as an exception therein, the MMDA has the primary rule-making powers relating to traffic management in Metro Manila because Sections 5(e) and (f) of the MMDA Law specifically grant it such powers. The power of the LGUs to regulate the streets are valid only insofar as they pertain to "purely local matters" such as, but are not limited to, determination of one-way streets, regulation of alleys and inner streets, prohibiting the putting up of encroachments and obstacles, and authorizing the removal of such encroachments, etc. And even as that power continues to inhere in the LGUs, that power is circumscribed and limited by the regulations that may be issued by the MMDA.
Furthermore, the Court holds that the MMDA has exclusive authority to enforce traffic laws, rules and regulations, and declares that the LGUs in Metro Manila may participate in such functions only when their traffic enforcers are deputized by the MMDA, in consonance with Section 5(f) of the MMDA Law. That this should be the relationship between the MMDA and the LGUs is further confirmed by the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the MMDA Law.[105] Section 20 of which provides:
SECTION 20. Linkage with DOTC and DPWH on Transport and Traffic. — The Authority shall undertake transport and traffic management and enforcement operation in Metropolitan Manila in coordination with the Department of Transportation and Communications. It shall formulate a uniform set of rules and regulations for traffic in Metropolitan [M]anila and establish any regulation thereof, in coordination with DOTC and DPWH and in consultation with all other agencies concerned.
It shall deputize LGU traffic enforcers, duly licensed security guards, members of the Philippine National Police and non-governmental organizations and personnel of national agencies concerned to implement a single ticketing system.
The Authority shall likewise formulate standards for route capacity and volume of motor vehicles for main thoroughfares.
The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board of the DOTC shall evaluate, approve and [issue] franchise applications using the standards on route measured capacity, and prescribe and regulate transportation routes and areas of operation of public land transportation of public land transportation services, pursuant to the Metro Manila transport plan.
The Land Transportation Office of the DOTC shall be responsible for the registration of motor vehicles and licensing of drivers, conductors and dealers.
The DPWH may effect the gradual transfer of the operation, maintenance and improvement of the Traffic Engineering Center facilities to the Authority, subject to mutual agreement of the parties concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Well-established is the rule that for an ordinance to be valid, the following requisites must be met: the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.[106]
Having established that the common provision of the assailed Ordinances is inconsistent with the MMDA Law, the said provision accordingly fails to hurdle the test as laid down above. Consequently, the common provision found in each of the Ordinances of the LGUs in Metro Manila shall unavoidably be considered stricken off and deemed inoperative.
While the Court recognizes that LGUs possess delegated legislative powers, and thus may enact regulations to promote the general welfare of the people,[107] the fact remains that as agents of the State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal.[108] Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause of the LGC may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes.[109] As held by the Court in the case of Magtajas v. Pryce Properties:[110]
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.[111] (Citations omitted)
It bears stressing that the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions independent of the sovereign state.[112] As agents of the State, LGUs should bear in mind that the police power devolved to them by law must be, at all times, exercised in a manner consistent with the will of their principal.[113]
Enforcement of the Single Ticketing System |
Finally, considering that the MMDA Law lodged in the MMDA both the duty and the power to install and administer a single ticketing system,[114] the Court hereby directs respondent LGUs, particularly those who have not manifested that they have been complying with the Joint Circular, (1) to desist from continuing to implement the common provision in the Ordinances in their respective territorial jurisdictions, and (2) to bar their respective traffic enforcers from issuing OVRs and from confiscating the driver's licenses of erring motorists, unless they have been deputized by the MMDA.
It bears emphasis that the MMDA has already issued the Joint Circular implementing the single ticketing system in Metro Manila. It was issued bearing in mind precisely the predicament that petitioners faced in this case. As the Joint Circular itself states:
1.0 Rationale
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) issues Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority issues Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR), and LGUs issue their respective Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) for traffic violations. Moreover, the TOP, TVR, and OVRs are being issued with varying fines and penalties for the same traffic violation, and under different procedure in apprehension, payment of fine, and redemption of license/plate. This multiple-ticketing system and uncoordinated implementation of traffic laws result to confusion of the driving public and loss of money and productive hours, and if left unattended may create chaos to the detriment of the public in general.
To address this predicament, the Metro Manila Council, by virtue of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924, enacted MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 on January 26, 2012, adopting a Uniform Ticketing System within the Metro Manila using a uniform ticket and ticketing system, aimed at harmonizing the existing national and local laws on traffic enforcement and for the prevention of confusion among private and public motorists.
As a necessary consequence of the foregoing discussion on the MMDA possessing the necessary powers to implement the single ticketing system as provided for by the MMDA Law, the Court so holds that the Joint Circular is valid and must thus be implemented with full force and effect so as to accomplish the intent of the legislature in enacting the MMDA Law. As the CA held in its Decision, which was made prior to the issuance of the Joint Circular, "Section 5(f) of RA [7924] is very much still a good law waiting to be enforced and utilized."[115] The Joint Circular was precisely enacted to enforce the MMDA Law, and must accordingly be fully implemented.
At this juncture, the Court takes judicial notice[116] as well that the MMC has recently adopted MMDA Resolution No. 23-02, or the "Metro Manila Traffic Code" (Code), which not only reiterated the implementation of the single ticketing system through the use of the UOVRs[117] but also explicitly provided for the interoperability of citation tickets issued within Metro Manila.[118] Notably, apart from providing for the single ticketing system, the Code also provided standard penalties for most traffic violations, such as disregarding traffic signs,[119] illegal parking,[120] violation of the number coding scheme,[121] reckless driving,[122] illegal counterflow,[123] and overspeeding,[124] to name a few. The adoption of the Code confirms that the Court's disquisition in this Decision is the correct interpretation of the MMDA Law's provisions.
While it was argued during the deliberations of this case that the adoption of the Code has rendered the issue in this case moot due to this supervening event,[125] this is not so. The adoption of the Code does not render the issue academic as the Code did not repeal the provisions in the respective ordinances of the LGUs pertaining to the issuance of OVRs.[126] In fact, the Code merely "encouraged" the LGUs to adopt "this Code through a legislation by their respective Sanggunian and ensure that all traffic laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with this Code are amended in accordance herewith."[127] It is thus clear that even with the passage of the Code, and following its language in the final provisions, the MMDA and the LGUs still operate on the understanding that the LGUs' ordinances remain supreme even in matters pertaining to traffic which, as discussed, is not the intent of the MMDA Law.
All told, the Court thus declares as invalid the common provision in the said traffic codes or ordinances of the LGUs in Metro Manila empowering each of them to issue OVRs to erring drivers and motorists. The other provisions of the traffic codes or ordinances remain valid and unaffected by this Decision.
Final Word
The Court is not unmindful of the mandate of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments.[128] While the Court acknowledges the importance of local autonomy, the Court similarly recognizes that its primordial duty is to apply the law as it is written. To do otherwise — even if another interpretation is more logical or wise — would be an encroachment upon legislative prerogatives to define the wisdom of the laws.[129] Such would be a case of judicial legislation — an act which the Court could not, and must not, do.
In this connection, the Court also finds that the autonomy of the LGUs will not be unduly undermined by the ruling in this case, as their interests are amply protected by the very structure of the MMDA as established by the MMDA Law. With the exception of the MMDA Chairperson who is appointed by the President, the membership of the MMC — which is the. governing board and policy making body of the MMDA — is composed of all the mayors of the 16 cities and the lone municipality in Metro Manila, as well as the Presidents of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League and the Metro Manila Councilors League. While the national government has representatives in the MMC, these representatives sit as non-voting members.
This structure breathes life to the avowed objectives of the MMDA Law which is to promote efficiency, cohesion, harmony, and order, in the delivery of metro-wide services such as traffic management in Metro Manila — without undermining local autonomy, as its decisions are reached through a governing body composed primarily of the local chief executives themselves.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 7, 2012 and Resolution dated October 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97308 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The following provisions — and only the following — are henceforth declared NULL and VOID:
A permanent injunction is hereby issued to enjoin respondent local government units from: (1) further issuing Ordinance Violation Receipts; and (2) confiscating licenses through their own traffic enforcers, unless they are deputized by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see separate concurring.
Lazaro-Javier, J., please see dissent.
J. Lopez,* J., no part.
* No part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3–29.
[2] Id. at 1023–1038. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, Sixth Division, Court of Appeals.
[3] Id. at 32–35.
[4] Executive Order No. 546 (1979), sec. 10.
[5] Executive Order No. 1011 (1985), sec. 5(b)(3).
[6] Executive Order No. 125 (1987), sec. 17.
[7] Id. at sec. 13(e).
[8] Rollo, p. 10, Petition.
[9] Id. at 1025.
[10] Id.
[11] Titled "Adopting A Uniform Ticketing System And The Establishment Of A System of Interconnectivity Among Government Instrumentalities Involved In The Transport And Traffic Management In Metro Manila."
[12] Supra note 2.
[13] Id. at 1038.
[14] 496 Phil. 82 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
[15] Supra note 3.
[16] Titled "Directing The Immediate Review Of Existing Orders, Rules And Regulations Issued By Local Government Units Concerning Public Transportation, Including The Grant Of Franchises To Tricycles, Establishment And Operation Of Transport Terminals, Authority To Issue Traffic Citation Tickets, And Unilateral Rerouting Schemes Of Public Utility Vehicles, And For Other Purposes," March 11, 2008.
[17] 385 Phil. 586 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[18] See Rollo pp. 1107–1120 (Comment of respondent Caloocan City); 1130–1138 (Comment of respondent Las Piñas City); 1140–1145 (Comment of respondent City of Manila); 1149–1161 (Comment of respondent Taguig City); 1173–1178 (Comment of respondent Parañaque City); 1181–1191 (Comment of respondent San Juan City); 1198–1208 (Comment of respondent Quezon City); 1210–1215 (Comment of respondent Makati City).
[19] Id. at 1229–1238, Comment of respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC filed through the OSG.
[20] Id. at 1238–1239.
[21] Id. at 1239–1241.
[22] Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 74 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[23] Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 499 Phil. 281, 304–305 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[24] Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, 850 Phil. 1168, 1188 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[25] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
[26] Rollo, p. 13, Petition.
[27] See Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta, 182 Phil. 42, 46 (1979) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc].
[28] Rollo, p. 11, Petition.
[29] Id. at 19.
[30] Titled "Granting Continuing Authority of the President of the Philippines to Reorganize the National Government," June 9, 1978.
[31] Specifically, it gave the President the power to: a) group, coordinate, consolidate, or integrate departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, instrumentalities, and functions of the government; b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient conduct of government functions services, and activities; c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records, and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality to another; d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions; and e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment.
[32] See LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, secs. 447(5)(v-vi) and 458(5)(v-vi).
[33] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 1.
[34] Id. at sec. 3.
[35] Id. at sec. 3.
[36] Id. at sec. 5(e).
[37] Id. at sec. 5(f).
[38] Joint Metro Traffic Circular No. 12-01, sec. 4.1
[39] Rollo, pp. 1110–1113, Comment of respondent Caloocan City.
[40] Id. at 1301, Comment of respondent City of Mandaluyong.
[41] Id. at 1332, Compliance and Comment of respondent Navotas City.
[42] Id. at 1175–1176, Comment of respondent Parañaque City.
[43] Id. at 1203, Comment of respondent Quezon City.
[44] Id. at 1351, Comment and/or Opposition of respondent Valenzuela City.
[45] Id. at 1141, Comment of respondent City of Manila.
[46] Id. at 1110, Comment of respondent Caloocan City.
[47] Id. at 1151–153, Comment of respondent Taguig City.
[48] Id. at 1175, Comment of respondent Parañaque City.
[49] Id. at 1503–1510, Manifestation and Compliance of respondent City of Mandaluyong.
[50] Id. at 1515–1524, Manifestation and Compliance of respondent San Juan City.
[51] Id. at 1526–1530, Compliance of respondent City of Manila.
[52] Id. at 1567–1576, Manifestation and Compliance of respondent Taguig City.
[53] Id. at 1671–1675, Manifestation and Compliance of respondent Pasig City.
[54] Id. at 1682–1690, Compliance of respondent Parañaque City.
[55] Id. at 1577–1588, Compliance of respondent Caloocan City.
[56] Id. at 1578.
[57] Id. at 1579–1580.
[58] Id. at 1692–1696, Compliance of respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC, filed through the OSG.
[59] MMDA v. Bel-Air, supra note 17, at 610. See also Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 3(b).
[60] MMDA v. Bel-Air, id. at 607.
[61] Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 476 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
[62] Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 722 Phil. 538, 576 (2013) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
[63] MMDA v. Garin, supra note 14, at 89.
[64] Id. at 94. Italics supplied.
[65] 678 Phil. 879 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[66] Id. at 913–914.
[67] MMDA v. Garin, supra note 14, at 86.
[68] Id.
[69] Id. at 88.
[70] Id. at 88–89.
[71] Id. at 95.
[72] See Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, 389 Phil. 20, 23 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[73] 890 Phil. 453 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[74] Id. at 484.
[75] Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249, 257 (1947) [Per J. Padilla, First Division].
[76] Id.
[77] 772 Phil. 672 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[78] Id. at 759–760.
[79] Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, supra note 75.
[80] Id.
[81] Pantaleon v. MMDA, supra note 73, at 485.
[82] Baranda v. Gustilo, 248 Phil. 205, 219 (1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
[83] Social Security Commission v. Favila, 662 Phil. 25, 39 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
[84] Id.
[85] See Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 378 Phil. 10, 22 (1999) [Per J. Melo, En Banc].
[86] Id., citing Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 222 Phil. 570 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].
[87] Rollo, p. 1232, Comment of respondents MMDA, LTO, and DOTC, filed through the OSG, citing Deliberations of the Committee on Local Government, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, November 10, 1993.
[88] Id. at 1233–1237.
[89] 248 Phil. 762 (1988) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
[90] Id. at 772–773.
[91] 146 Phil. 469 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[92] Id. at 486.
[93] See Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 236 Phil. 768, 780 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
[94] Id. at 781.
[95] Edu v. Ericta, supra note 91, at 486.
[96] Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547, 548 (1917) [Per J. Moreland, En Banc].
[97] Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 702 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[98] People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328, 341–342 (1939) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
[99] Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
[100] Cervantes v. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359, 364 (1952) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].
[101] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to treat Metropolitan Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro-wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. Pursuant to this policy, Metropolitan Manila, as a public corporation created under Presidential Decree No. 824, embracing the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, and Muntinlupa, and the municipalities of Las Piñas, Malabon, Marikina, Navotas, Parañaque, Pateros, San Juan, [Taguig], and Valenzuela, is hereby constituted into a special development and administrative region subject to direct supervision of the President of the Philippines.
[102] Id.
[103] Id. at sec. 2. Emphasis supplied.
[104] Id. at sec. 3, in relation to sec. 3(b).
[105] Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7924, The Law Creating The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, May 9, 1996.
[106] See Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 699–700 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
[107] See LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, sec. 16.
[108] City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, 810 Phil. 566, 584 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
[109] Id.
[110] 304 Phil. 428 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
[111] Id. at 446–447.
[112] City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra note 108, at 569.
[113] Id.
[114] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 5(f).
[115] Rollo, p. 1035.
[116] RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 129, sec. 1, provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, When Mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
[117] See METRO MANILA TRAFFIC CODE, sec. 31, which provides:
. . . Unified Ordinance Violation Receipt (UOVR) — The Uniform Ticketing System shall be implemented using a Uniform Ticket called Uniform Ordinance Violation Receipt (UOVR) for physical apprehension. The UOVR contains the following features: the MMDA, LTO and 17 LGU logos, MMDA and LGUs specific and distinctive serial numbers; and common security features to avoid the use or proliferation of fake tickets, commonly termed as "palipad" or "talahib". The UOVR shall be recognized by MMDA, LTO and all LGUs' deputized or authorized traffic personnel as a valid traffic citation receipt and temporary driver' license within Metro Manila pursuant to Section 34 of this Code.
[118] See id. at sec. 34, which provides:
. . . Interoperability of Citation Tickets within Metro Manila — The operability of the citation ticket, as a temporary license, within the jurisdictional bounds of Metro Manila while operating a motor vehicle in cases the Driver's License is confiscated, or upon citation of continuing traffic violations; or violations that transcend the territorial jurisdictions shall be recognized and acknowledged by the MMDA, LGUs in Metro Manila and LTO notwithstanding who effected the apprehension or issued the citation ticket within ten (10) working days from the issuance thereof.
[119] Id. at sec. 10.
[120] Id. at sec. 11.
[121] Id. at sec. 12.
[122] Id. at sec. 15.
[123] Id. at sec. 24.
[124] Id. at sec. 25.
[125] Dissent of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, p. 2.
[126] METRO MANILA TRAFFIC CODE, sec. 55. Repealing Clause — All rules, issuances and regulations or parts thereof promulgated through the Metro Manila Council that are inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
[127] Id. at sec. 54.
[128] CONST., art. II, sec. 25 and art. X, sec. 2.
[129] Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 85.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
Petitioners are a group of transport organizations with public utility transport operators and/or drivers of public utility vehicles for their members.[1] They filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Injunction and Mandamus seeking to: (1) enjoin respondent local government units from implementing their ordinance violation receipt system, and (2) compel respondent Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to enforce the single ticketing system[2] under Republic Act No. 7924.[3]
While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, the MMDA "issued Resolution No. 12-02, Series of 2012 (MMDA Resolution No. 12-02) adopting a uniform ticketing system and establishing a system of interconnectivity among government instrumentalities involved in the transport and traffic management in Metro Manila."[4]
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision dismissing the Petition for Injunction and Mandamus. It rejected petitioners' stance as to the conflict between the Local Government Code and Republic Act No. 4136.[5] It further decreed that there is no clash between the Local Government Code and Republic Act No. 7924 as their provisions contain specific boundaries of their powers. No pronouncement was, however made concerning the issue of whether the local government units' ordinance violation receipt violated the single ticketing system under the Republic Act No. 7924.[6]
Petitioners then filed the present Petition for Review before this Court.
Essentially, the parties argue on the validity of the ordinance violation receipt provisions in the various ordinances[7] issued by respondent local government units. These provisions authorize local government traffic enforcers to issue traffic violation receipts and confiscate driver's licenses within their territorial jurisdictions. They read:
Procedure in the issuance of Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) - Any person violating any provision of this Ordinance or any Ordinance of the City shall be issued an Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR). In case of violation of the Traffic Management Code, a duly deputized traffic enforcement officer shall confiscate the driver's license and the issued receipt shall serve as Temporary Driver's License for five (5) working days from date of issuance. Ordinance Violation Receipt (OVR) issued by the local government Unit in Metropolitan Manila shall be honored or respected by the apprehending traffic enforcer.[8]
The parties also question the MMDA issuances adopting a single ticketing system for Metro Manila.[9]
This case thus invites this Court to rule on the respective powers of the MMDA and local government units to regulate traffic and set traffic policies within their jurisdictions.
I concur with the ponencia's resolution of the issues in this case. Nonetheless, I take this opportunity to raise a few points on the requirement of an actual case or controversy for judicial review, and the power of the MMDA in relation to local government units.
I
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides for this Court's power of judicial review. It states:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As most powers conferred by the 1987 Constitution, this Court's power of judicial review is not without limitation.[10] Its exercise necessitates the existence of four exacting requisites:
. . . first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.[11] (Citation omitted)
The Constitution demands the presence of an actual case or controversy. It means "a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute."[12]
By reason of this requirement, the party bringing the case must not only establish an act by another that opposes or conflicts with their legally demandable and enforceable right but should also show that the relief they seek is a matter that courts may address.[13]
In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment,[14] this Court further elaborated on the requirement of an actual case or controversy:
An actual case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented are "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action. In the classic words of Angara v. Electoral Commission:
[T]his power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments.
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text.[15] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III[16] explained the significance of this requisite:
This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers, and will not rule on any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if there is no actual or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the ambiguities may only be clarified in the existence of an actual situation.[17]
In my concurring opinion in Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education,[18] I explained that:
The other rationale for requiring an actual case or controversy is to avoid rendering merely advisory opinions on legislative or executive acts. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that judicial decisions interpreting the laws and the Constitution are part of the legal system. It is the courts' duty "to make a final and binding construction of law." Absent an actual case or controversy, courts merely answer legal questions with no actual effect on any person, place, or thing affecting the import of its issuances.[19] (Citation omitted)
I (A)
The recent case of Universal Robina Corporation v. Department of Trade and Industry[20] further clarified the concept of actual case or controversy.
In Universal, this Court decreed that aside from proof of actual facts, a case also presents an actual controversy "when there is a clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of legal rights":[21]
An actual case or controversy exists when there are actual facts to enable courts to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
There is also an actual case and controversy when there is a clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of legal rights. In Belgica v. Ochoa, this Court explained:
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute." In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."
In Calleja v. Executive Secretary, this Court explained that a contrariety of legal rights is one:
. . . that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. All these are in line with the well-settled rule that this Court does not issue advisory opinions, nor does it resolve mere academic questions, abstract quandaries, hypothetical or feigned problems, or mental exercises, no matter how challenging or interesting they may be. Instead, case law requires that there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts.[22] (Citations omitted)
Executive Secretary v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.[23] echoed this pronouncement and further provided guidelines on how clear and convincing contrariety of rights may be established:
Thus, in asserting a contrariety of legal rights, merely alleging an incongruence of rights between the parties is not enough. The party availing of the remedy must demonstrate that the law is so contrary to their rights that there is no interpretation other than that there is a factual breach of rights. No demonstrable contrariety of legal rights exists when there are possible ways to interpret the provision of a statute, regulation, or ordinance that will save its constitutionality. In other words, the party must show that the only possible way to interpret the provision is one that is unconstitutional. Moreover, the party must show that the case cannot be legally settled until the constitutional issue is resolved, that is, that it is the very lis mota of the case, and therefore, ripe for adjudication.[24] (Citation omitted)
In this case, I find the facts presented by the parties to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners insist that while local government units are authorized to issue ordinances to regulate traffic, this power does not include confiscating driver's licenses or issuing ordinance violation receipts. They claim that the authority to issue traffic tickets falls on the Land Transportation Office as stated under Republic Act No. 4136. They then assert that allowing respondent local government units to continue issuing ordinance violation receipts would constitute a direct contravention of an act of Congress, particularly Republic Act No. 4136.[25]
Evidently, petitioners' assertions clearly and convincingly establish a contrariety of rights. Their allegations demonstrate that there can be no other interpretation of the assailed ordinances that will save their constitutionality.
II
As to the merits, the ponencia ruled that the MMDA's issuances providing for the single ticketing system prevail over the local government ordinances.[26]
The ponencia discussed that Republic Act No. 7924 authorizes the MMDA to create and enforce all policies relating to traffic management in Metro Manila.[27] This power is expressly provided in the law, and the intent to delegate it to the MMDA is further revealed in legislative deliberations.[28] As the later expression of legislative will,[29] the ponencia held that Republic Act No. 7924 partly modified the provisions of the Local Government Code on the local government units' power to regulate traffic.[30]
In addition, the ponencia deemed traffic management as a matter that transcends local political boundaries and, therefore outside the exclusive authority of local government units.[31]
I agree with the ponencia's disposition.
As a recognition of the State's declared policy of treating "Metropolitan Manila as a special development and administrative region[,]" Republic Act No. 7924 created the MMDA to administer effective and efficient delivery of basic metro-wide services in Metro Manila.[32]
Under the law, the MMDA is tasked to "perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila[.]"[33] However, this power of the MMDA is subject to the condition that its exercise shall be without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.[34]
I concur with the ponencia that traffic management is a matter that cannot be categorized as purely local. It is a concern that "transcends local political boundaries"[35] and is within the jurisdiction of the MMDA.
To be sure, this interpretation is recognized by the definition of metro-wide services as defined under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7924:
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. — Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metro wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
. . . .
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila.
This is further reinforced by the functions and powers of the MMDA, which include the authority to set policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, to install and administer a single ticketing system, and to fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties for traffic violations. Section 5 of the Republic Act No. 7924 provides:
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — The MMDA shall:
. . . .
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose[.]
Considering that traffic management is not classified as a purely local matter, but is a metro-wide concern, it is the MMDA who has jurisdiction over it. Furthermore; Republic Act No. 7924 is a special law and a later enactment than the Local Government Code. Thus, in case of conflict between its provisions, Republic Act No. 7924 prevails.[36]
This Court has recognized the MMDA's regulatory powers over traffic in Metro Manila in Pantaleon v. Metro Manila Development Authority.[37] Local government units do not necessarily lose their jurisdiction but must nonetheless align their ordinances with the MMDA's policies:
The jurisdiction of the Metro Manila Development Authority was conferred by law to address common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. Particularly, it was tasked to coordinate these basic services so that their flow and distribution will be continuous. Pursuant to this function the Metro Manila Development Authority through its Council is expressly authorized to issue binding rules and regulations pertaining to traffic management.
However, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7924 provides that the Metro Manila Development Authority's exercise of its powers is "without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters." This means that the Metro Manila Development Authority has the right to regulate traffic in Metro Manila, subject to the jurisdiction of local government units to enact ordinances aligned with the Metro Manila Development Authority's general policies.
Petitioners' contention that a legislative enactment from the respective local government units is necessary to uphold the implementation of the Metro Manila Development Authority issuances is untenable. Metro Manila Development Authority Resolution No. 10-16 was approved by the Metro Manila Council, which is composed of the heads of the local government units comprising Metro Manila. Hence, the local government units are presumed to support and adopt the reimplementation of the number coding scheme to public utility buses plying their respective territorial jurisdictions, unless they release an issuance to the contrary.[38]
III
The ponencia also addressed the cited cases of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.[39] and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin.[40]
It held that Bel-Air does not apply because the facts and issues differ from this case.[41] In Bel-Air, this Court ruled that the MMDA was not delegated police or legislative power to impose burdens or limitations on the use of private property. Thus, it had no authority to open a private road to public vehicular traffic.[42] This case does not involve the exercise of this power.[43]
As to Garin, the ponencia ruled as obiter dictum this Court's pronouncement that "the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses without [the] need of any other legislative enactment. . . is an unauthorized exercise of police power."[44] It further discussed that the issue raised in Garin pertains to the lack of due process in confiscating licenses from motorists.[45] Even assuming Garin is binding, the ponencia opines that the doctrine ought to be abandoned, considering there is a conflict between Garin and the express authority in Republic Act No. 7924 of the MMDA to set and enforce traffic policies and penalties.[46]
I agree.
In Pantaleon, this Court explained that these cases do not limit the MMDA's power to issue resolutions or circulars to regulate traffic in Metro Manila where there is no outright deprivation of private property:
Petitioners invoke the cases of MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., MMDA v. Garin and MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., to support its position that the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority has no authority to issue the resolution and circular.
These are not squarely on point with the present case.
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the Metro Manila Development Authority claimed that it had the authority to open to public traffic a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and to cause the demolition of the village's perimeter wall because it is an agent of the State endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this, the Metro Manila Development Authority argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Republic Act No. 7924, this Court concluded that the Metro Manila Development Authority is neither a local government unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it had no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid. It is in the sense that this Court stated that Republic Act No. 7924 did not grant the Metro Manila Development Authority with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
In MMDA v. Garin, respondent was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver's license was confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. Garin questioned the validity of Section 5 (f) of Republic Act No. 7924. He contended that the provision violated the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, because it allowed the Metro Manila Development Authority to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
While the case was pending in this Court, the Metro Manila Development Authority implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004 proscribing traffic enforcers from confiscating licenses in traffic violations. Consequently, this Court held that, insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers' licenses is concerned, the case was mooted by the implementation of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. 04, series of 2004.
However, citing Bel-Air, this Court further stated in Garin that the Metro Manila Development Authority has no legislative power and that Section 5 (f) merely grants it the duty to enforce existing traffic laws, rules and regulations enacted by the legislature or those agencies with delegated legislative powers. This obiter dictum in Garin is erroneous. It contravenes Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7924, which expressly grants the Metro Manila Development Authority or its Council the power to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of its functions, which include traffic management and instituting a system for road users. Even Bel-Air recognizes the delegated rule-making power of the Metro Manila Council.
MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., arose from the issuance of Executive Order No. 179 by former President Arroyo, declaring as operational the Greater Manila Transport System Project and designating the Metro Manila Development Authority as the implementing agency. The Project aimed to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing common mass transport terminal facilities. Pursuant to the Executive Order, the Metro Manila Development Authority issued Resolution No. 03-07 expressing full support for the immediate implementation of the Project.
This Court held that although the President had the authority to order the implementation of the Project, the designation of the Metro Manila Development Authority as the implementing agency for the Project was ultra vires for lack of legal basis. This Court held that the Department of Transportation and Communication is, by law, the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. Hence, it is the Department of Transportation and Communication, not the Metro Manila Development Authority, which had the power to administer the transportation project. This Court further ruled that the elimination of bus terminals did not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure and was contrary to the provisions of the Public Service Act.
In MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., this Court held that MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks in the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3. Citing Bel-Air, Garin and Viron, this Court reiterated that the Metro Manila Development Authority's powers were limited to formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted it police power, let alone legislative power.
Bel-Air, Viron and Trackworks involved the outright deprivation of private property under the pretext of traffic regulation and promotion of safe and convenient movement of motorists. On the other hand, Garin was mooted by supervening events.
In the present case, there is no outright deprivation of property but merely a restriction in the operation of public utility buses along the major roads of Metro Manila through the number coding scheme.
Furthermore, Republic Act No. 7924 clearly confers upon the Metro Manila Development Authority, through the Metro Manila Council, the power to issue regulations that provide for a system to regulate traffic in the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila for the safety and convenience of the public.[47] (Citations omitted)
There is no outright deprivation of private property in this case. The issue here involves determining whether the imposition of traffic violation receipts should be integrated under the single ticketing system formulated by the MMDA or under the power of the local government units if committed within their respective jurisdictions.
In the absence of an outright deprivation of private property thus, this Court should hesitate to restrict the power of the MMDA to perform its mandates provided under Republic Act No. 7924.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
[1] Ponencia, pp 7–8.
[2] Rollo, p. 12.
[3] An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funding therefor and for other Purposes.
[4] Ponencia, p. 8.
[5] An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a Land Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes.
[6] Ponencia, pp. 8–9.
[7] Makati City Ordinance No. 2003-89, Series of 2003, An Ordinance Enacting the Makati City Traffic Code, Subject to all Laws and Existing Legal Rules and Regulations; Taguig Ordinance No. 103, Series of 2003, An Ordinance Establishing the Traffic Management Code of the Municipality of Taguig; Parañaque Ordinance No. 2916, Series of 2004, An Ordinance Enacting the Parañaque City Traffic Code Subject to Existing Laws and Applicable Rules and Regulations; Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-1444, Series of 2004, An Ordinance Creating the Traffic Management Code of Quezon City; San Juan Ordinance No. 37, Series of 2004, Municipal Ordinance Known and Cited as the Management Code of the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila; Navotas Ordinance No. 2004-14, Series of 2004, Traffic Management Code of the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila; Las Piñas Ordinance No. 652-04 Series of 2004, Las Piñas Traffic Code; Pasig City Ordinance No. 01, Series of 2004, An Ordinance Enacting the 2004 Traffic Management Code of the City of Pasig; Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 04-022, Series of 2005, An Ordinance Enacting the Muntinlupa City Traffic Code, Subject to All Laws and Existing Legal Rules and Regulations; Mandaluyong City Ordinance No. 358, Series of 2005, The Traffic Management Code of the City of Mandaluyong; Valenzuela Ordinance No. 019, Series of 2005, An Ordinance Enacting the Land Transportation Code of the City of Valenzuela; Caloocan City Ordinance No. 0391, Series of 2005, An Ordinance Providing for the Adoption of the New Traffic Management Code of Caloocan City; City of Manila Ordinance No. 8092, Series of 2005; Pateros Ordinance No. 2005-19, Series of 2005, Ordinance Revising the Traffic Code of the City of Manila by Amending Chapter 121 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila and for Other Purposes: Pateros Ordinance No. 2005-13, Series of 2005, Traffic Management Code of the Municipality of Pateros.
[8] Ponencia, p. 7.
[9] MMDA Resolution No. 12-02, Series of 2012, Establishing A Motorcycle Lane Along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue (EDSA); Joint Metro Traffic Circular No. 01-12, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Uniform Ticketing System in Metro Manila.
[10] Senate of the Phils. v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
[11] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 244 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[12] Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, 801 Phil. 472, 485–486 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
[13] Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III, 850 Phil. 1168, 1191 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[14] 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[15] Id. at 244–246.
[16] 850 Phil. 1168 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[17] Id. at 1188.
[18] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, 841 Phil. 724 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[19] Id. at 864.
[20] G.R. No. 203353, February 14, 2023 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[21] Id., citing Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
[22] Id.
[23] G.R. No. 209216 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[24] Id.
[25] Rollo, pp. 14–16.
[26] Ponencia, p. 36.
[27] Id. at 26.
[28] Id. at 32.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 33.
[32] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), secs. 1, 2 provides:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to treat Metropolitan Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro-wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units.
. . . .
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — The affairs of Metropolitan Manila shall be administered by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, hereinafter referred to as the MMDA, to replace the Metro Manila Authority (MMA) organized under Executive Order No. 392 series of 1990.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.
[33] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 2.
[34] Republic Act No. 7924 (1995), sec. 2.
[35] Ponencia, p. 33.
[36] Pantaleon v. Metro Manila Development Authority, 890 Phil. 453, 489 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[37] Id.
[38] Id. at 489–490.
[39] 385 Phil. 586 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[40] 496 Phil. 82 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
[41] Ponencia, p. 21.
[42] Id.
[43] Id. at 22.
[44] Id.
[45] Id. at 23.
[46] Id. at 25.
[47] Pantaleon v. Metro Manila Development Authority, 890 Phil. 453, 481–485 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
DISSENT
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Majority Decision, penned by my highly esteemed senior colleague, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, struck down the assailed common provisions of the respective ordinances of the respondent local government units (LGUs) as void for allegedly contravening Republic Act No. 7924 or the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Law. It ordained that the MMDA Law clearly bestowed upon the MMDA rule-making power with respect to the regulation of traffic in Metro Manila, citing as basis Sections 3(b), 5(e) and (f), and the deliberations of the Committee on Local Government on House Bill No. 14170/11116. Accordingly, the MMDA Law, being the later enactment, impliedly modified Sections 447(5)(v-vi) and 458(5)(v-vi) of the Local Government Code (LGC). Consequently, the common provisions of the assailed ordinances are void for being inconsistent with the MMDA Law.
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions drawn by the Majority Decision vis-à-vis the nature of the powers lodged with the MMDA as regards traffic regulation in Metro Manila. For it is my humble view that the MMDA is, and has always been, a mere administrative coordinating body sans any ordinance-making power. Notably, this view is strongly supported, reiterated, and espoused by a handful of landmark jurisprudence[1] on the matter.
I elucidate.
First. The Majority Decision itself took judicial notice that the Metro Manila Council (MMC) has already adopted MMDA Resolution No. 23-02 or the "Metro Manila Traffic Code," which provided for the unified ticketing system throughout Metro Manila. Too, it now standardized the penalties for most traffic violations in the area.
To recall, petitioners themselves admitted that "the implementation of a single ticketing system by the MMDA will address the confusion, disorder, and prejudice to motorists caused by the variance of traffic tickets and corresponding fines and penalties separately imposed by respondents LGUs, LTO, and MMDA."[2]
Too, their allegation that "allowing respondent LGUs to continue issuing OVRs renders nugatory MMDA Resolution No. 12-02 and undermines the single ticketing system implemented by MMDA,"[3] has been duly addressed by the Metro Manila Traffic Code which explicitly provides for the inter-operability of citation tickets issued within Metro Manila.
It is all clear, therefore, that the present controversy, as well as the dilemma of confusion bewailed by petitioners, has already become moot due to this supervening event. A case is moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties such that the Court is left with nothing more to resolve. It can no longer grant any relief or enforce any right and anything it says on the matter will have no practical use or value.[4]
Accordingly, the Petition may already be dismissed on this score alone. Even so, my view remains the same even considering the merits of the case. Consider the following points:
Second. The delineation between the roles and powers of respondent LGUs and the MMDA has always been clear. There was never any confusion nor is there any confusion now. This is glaringly apparent from the face of the relevant statutes and even the deliberations of the Congress. Allow me to demonstrate:
LGUs are explicitly and directly empowered to enact ordinances on traffic rules and regulations and impose penalties for traffic violations |
It is a settled principle in political law that LGUs possess quasi legislative power for, by immemorial practice, they have always been allowed to legislate on purely local matters.[5] Relevantly, Sections 447(5)(v-vi) and 458(5)(v-vi) of the LGC state:[6]
SECTION 447. – Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolution and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: x x x
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall: x x x
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges, prohibit the putting up of encroachments or obstacles thereon, and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places; x x x (Emphases supplied)
The law is unequivocal: respondent LGUs are empowered to enact ordinances to regulate traffic on all streets and avenues within their respective territories. We cannot say the same for MMDA, with due respect, contrary to what the Majority Decision endorsed.
The MMDA is only empowered to enact rules and regulations to coordinate, implement, and enforce already existing traffic laws and regulations |
The Majority Decision cited Section 3(b) and Section 5(e) and (f) of the MMDA Law as well as pertinent Congressional deliberations to justify that "the legislative intent was to lodge in the MMDA the entire rule-making power relative to traffic management in Metro Manila", seemingly to the exclusion of LGUs.
With due respect, I beg to differ.
The cited authorities in the Majority Decision in truth only affirm the MMDA's functions as purely coordinative. Meaning, any rule-making power lodged upon it, if any, is limited solely to harmonize, coordinate, and unify the implementation of any traffic law, ordinance, or regulation already existing and in place. They do not, in any explicit or implied terms, deprive the LGUs of their quasi-legislative power vis-à-vis traffic regulation and transfer the same to the MMDA.
I examine the Majority Decision's cited authorities in seriatim. In doing so, I am guided by the rule in statutory construction that "[t]he statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole."[7]
One. Section 3(b) of the MMDA Law states:
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. – Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include: x x x
(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The Majority Decision construed the meaning of this provision as one granting the MMDA with rule-making powers, such as the power to "formulate policies, standards, and programs."[8] With due respect, however, "policies, standards, and programs" are not "rules and regulations." They are not self-executing but are mere aids or guides to legislative bodies, like the local legislative councils of the LGUs, in enacting traffic ordinances, much like the nature of Article II of the Constitution.[9]
More, reading the provision as a whole, MMDA's "traffic management" function appears to be purely administrative. If the entire phrase is to be read completely, it states that "the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects" is for the purpose of rationalizing existing transport operations, among others. "To rationalize" means to "make (a company, process, or industry) more efficient, especially by dispensing with superfluous personnel or equipment."[10] It includes "administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations...including the institution of a single ticketing system in the Metropolitan Area." To be sure, this interpretation is consistent with the very purpose of the MMDA, which is, to repeat, coordinative and policy-making.
Two. Section 5(e) and (f) of the MMDA Law reads:
SECTION 5. Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority. – The MMDA shall: x x x(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall extend assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and many deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
I adopt my earlier stance with respect to this provision. The Majority Decision particularly anchored its argument on the phrase in Section 5(f), which states, "fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations" as to mean that MMDA has rule making power akin to the LGUs' traffic ordinance-making power because it can, by itself, impose sanctions for violation of traffic rules.
The provision, however, must be read as a whole. Remarkably, it starts with "install and administer a single ticketing system." Notably, under Section 3(b), the installation of a single ticketing system is part of the MMDA's services to administer and implement all traffic enforcement operations m Metro Manila. Simply put, it is also purely administrative in nature.
As for the phrase used by the Majority Decision, i.e., "fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations," there can be no reason why it was attached and lumped with the power to install a single ticketing system other than that MMDA is empowered to "fix, impose, and collect fines and penalties" for all kinds of traffic violations precisely to, again, coordinate, harmonize, and unify different existing traffic rules by replacing the varying fines and penalties under different traffic laws, ordinances, and regulations with a uniform set of fines and penalties under the single ticketing system.
Last. In fact, this interpretation is affirmed by the very portion of the deliberations of the Committee on Local Government on House Bill No. 14170/11116, quoted by the Majority Decision itself, viz.:
HON. BUNYE: Mr. Chairman, actually most of the amendments are clarificatory in nature. They did not change the sense of the provisions to which they relate. They nearly clarified and made very clear exactly what the MMDA can do because there were some vagueness in the original text. The new provisions that is placed here is on page 4, "d) coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plan,["] "e) with respect to traffic.["] Traffic is the number 1 problem in MMDA, in the Metro Manila region today, Your Honor, and one of the reasons is everybody is a driver here and nobody is really calling the shots. So, here we have this new provisions (sic) "e" with respect to the power of the MMDA concerning traffic, and secondly, the installation and administration of a single ticketing system. You will find, Your Honor, that the different component LGUs have their own rules and respective penalties with respect to ticketing and it creates havoc among those who are subject to these rules. So these are the two new items that have been placed. All the others are really by way of clarifying the authority of the MMA. For instance, where the MMA originally, where the original text merely says to set down policies, we have made it clear here that it can also lay down rules and regulations to implement those policies. I think that is necessary, otherwise we are going to perpetuate the ambiguities that exist now with respect to the powers of the present MMA. So those are the provisions, Your Honor. This is not yet a perfect document, but if we ever wanted to come out in this session, it should come out of this committee already.
x x x
MR. CAYTON: We don't foresee any such problem, Mr. Chairman. In fact, this will only give life to what has already been implied under P.D. 1605, where even the Justice Department opined that in the Metro Manila Authority, it would be the MMC then who should implement such laws within this region. And under that same P.D. delineated the powers of the MMC then and the LTO, LTO being on the national level and as on the... only on the Metropolitan region.
THE CHAIRMAN: Because it says here, "shall set up rules and regulations on fines and penalties."
MR. CAYTON: Mr. Chairman, because of the ambiguity as the Chairman of this committee said, it was unclear whether the MMA, then MMC could really undertake such rules and regulations. This became more apparent after 1986 when there was more power given to the local units, and because of the ambiguity, there was no such central system of coordination then existing. It was rather difficult to impose a uniform system throughout the region, this bill is trying to correct. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As shown, Section 5(e) and (f) were inserted to make clear that MMDA's purpose is to quell the havoc wreaked by the different rules and penalties sanctioned by the respondent LGUs, through a central system of coordination under a single ticketing system.
Third. I humbly opine that the legislative intent from the onset was clear: MMDA was never intended to wield legislative powers in the same way LGUs do. Rather, any rule-making powers that were granted to it is limited in scope for purposes only of implementing the policy of the MMDA Law. This much can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Congress, viz.:
THE CHAIRMAN: That's correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own government, it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all governmental powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different; because it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued with any political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here that the council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have to be delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective ... as a political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will be members and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political power. We do not elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny that. It's before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. It's right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, it's alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management agency.
x x x
THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f'... And then next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA ... because that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the policies, it's very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, what's the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of a resolution or it may be in the form of an ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now. You've got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let's call it an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That's very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I'm trying to avoid. I've been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I'm trying to make this as administrative. That's why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is ....
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and regulations. That would be ... it shall also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will ....
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The clear import of the deliberations is that MMDA was expressly never intended to be a political subdivision much less exercise any power of a political subdivision, including usurping the traffic rule-making power of respondent LGUs; otherwise, the Congress could have simply created an autonomous region, with its corresponding local government, to govern Metro Manila. In fact, this legislative intent, as shown by the afore-quoted deliberations, is obvious in the MMDA Law itself.
I focus on Section 6(b) referred in the deliberations, m relation to Sections 1 and 2 of the MMDA Law, to wit:
SECTION 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. – x x x
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act. x x x
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to treat Metropolitan Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro-wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. x x x
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. – The affairs of Metropolitan Manila shall be administered by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, herein after referred to as the MMDA, to replace the Metro Manila Authority (MMA) organized under Executive Order No. 392, series of 1990.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In fine, while the MMC is empowered to issue rules and regulations and resolutions, the same must only be to carry out the purposes of the MMDA Law, which, according to Sections 1 and 2, are to develop a more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised, and coordinated delivery of basic services within Metro Manila. In other words, the MMDA may issue rules, regulations, and resolutions but only to allow it to be able to enforce the coordination policies and programs it prepared.
Fourth. The key word here is coordination. "Coordination" means the process of organizing people or groups so that they work together properly and well: the harmonious functioning of parts for effective results.[11] If the MMDA Law is to be construed the way the Majority Decision espoused, i.e., all rule-making power is now lodged in the MMDA to the exclusion of the component LGUs, what else is left for MMDA to coordinate?
Lastly. Implied repeal is frowned upon in this jurisdiction. It is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislative authority so intended or unless it convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is because the legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal is intended, the proper step is to express it.[12]
This is precisely why when faced with two seemingly inconsistent pieces of legislation, the first step is to harmonize their provisions, not to immediately strike down one or the other as repealed. Here, there is room for harmony. The two pieces of legislation at hand are not repugnant nor patently inconsistent. In fact, they have been co-existing for more than two decades now under the aegis of the present interpretation of the MMDA Law. Besides, we need not go to extreme lengths to settle a dispute that has, anyway, become moot.
More important, to declare that the MMDA Law has impliedly modified the LGC with respect to the component LGUs is absolutely contrary to the unequivocal intent of the law. Repeatedly, our quotations of the Congressional deliberations emphasized how the legislators took pains to protect the autonomy of the LGUs. The Court is in no position, pursuant to the primordial doctrine of separation of powers, to ordain otherwise. Our function is merely to apply the law and interpret it in accordance, not contrary to, the clear legislative intent.
ALL TOLD, I respectfully reiterate my dissent. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the Petition on the ground of mootness. Alternatively, I vote to uphold the power of the component LGUs to issue ordinances regulating traffic within their respective territorial jurisdictions subject only to the coordinative functions, authority, and policies of the MMDA.
[1] See Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, 385 Phil. 586 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division], Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, 496 Phil. 82 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., 623 Phil. 236 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 674 Phil. 637 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc], Francisco, Jr. v. Hon. Fernando, 537 Phil. 391 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], Picardal v. People, 854 Phil. 575 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], and Pantaleon v. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, G.R. No. 194335, November 17, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[2] Majority Decision, pp. 9–10.
[3] Id. at 10.
[4] See Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 196902, July 13, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[5] See Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 546 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[6] Except for their respective reference to municipality and city, the wording of the provisions are identical. We thus cite only Section 447(5)(v-vi) for brevity.
[7] See Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
[8] Majority Decision, p. 26.
[9] See Tondo Medical Center v. CA, 554 Phil. 609 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
[10] Oxford Languages.
[11] Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
[12] See United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., 440 Phil. 188 (2002) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].