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351 Phil. 944
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 107799, April 15, 1998 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. PABLITO NANG ALIAS “BATUTTO,” (AT LARGE) SUMINA GAMO AND LUMUNSOG
GABASAN ALIAS “DODONG,” ACCUSED, SUMINA GAMO AND LUMUNSOG GABASAN ALIAS
“DODONG,” ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Pablito Nang
alias “Batutto” (Batuto) and accused-appellants Sumina[1] Gamo and Lumonsog[2] Gabasan alias “Dodong” were charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City, Branch 19. The
information reads:
“That on the 16th day of May, 1990 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio San Pedro, Barangay Lubusan, Municipality of Lapuyan, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Phlilippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, the two of said accused being armed with a pistol and a knife respectively, with intent to gain and by means of violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and rob (sic) the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Nicanor Gonzales of the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos and pursuant to said conspiracy and by reason and on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and inflict injuries upon Nicanor Gonzales which caused the latter’s death immediately thereafter.
Act contrary to Article (sic) 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code.”[3]
Of the three
accused, only herein accused-appellants Gamo and Gabasan, were apprehended,
while Pablito Nang remains at large to this day. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of “not
guilty.”
The
prosecution’s version of the crime, as testified to by the deceased victim’s
wife, Epifania Gonzales, and daughter, Elizabeth, is as follows:
At around 7:00
o’clock p.m. on May 16, 1990, farmer Nicanor Gonzales, his wife Epifania and
six of their eleven children, namely: Monina, Celso, Elizabeth, Basilio,
Ambrosio and Ronnie were in their house at Sitio San Pedro, Lubosan, Lapuyan,
Zamboanga del Sur. Feeling the urge to
relieve himself before going to bed, Nicanor proceeded downstairs to the
comfort room adjacent to the house. Since it was already dark, Epifania placed a lighted gas lamp on the
windowsill overlooking the toilet to illuminate the place.[4] After a while, Nicanor called for
his daughter Elizabeth to take her turn in using the toilet. Forthwith, Elizabeth went downstairs and
walked towards the direction of the toilet.[5]
To her surprise,
she saw her father being attacked by three masked men. As Nicanor struggled with the assailants,
their T-shirt masks dropped, enabling Elizabeth to recognize them with the aid
of the light emanating from the gas lamp on the window overlooking the toilet
and the scene of the crime. She
recognized the two culprits who held her father’s hands as accused-appellants
Sumiba Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan, and the third who stabbed her father, as
accused Pablito Nang. Elizabeth
positively identified the three assailants because she was familiar with their
faces since they used to pass by their place.[6]
After stabbing
Nicanor, the three malefactors rushed inside the house. Out of fear, Elizabeth
followed them, only to be hit on the head by Gabasan who then stood as lookout
beside the stairs.[7] Having subsequently eluded Gabasan,
Elizabeth managed to reach the upper floor of the house where she saw her
mother Epifania struggling against Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo.[8]
Earlier Epifania
Gonzales, having heard the commotion coming from the direction of the comfort
room, decided to investigate. Before
she could even step out of the door, two masked men she met immediately grabbed
her by the hands and poked knives at her. In the ensuing scuffle, she was able to pry loose their masks. Aided by the light coming from the gas lamp
on the window, Epifania recognized the two who gripped her hands as Pablito
Nang and Sumiba Gamo, both of whom were then armed with hunting knives. She also saw Lumonsog Gabasan standing by
the stairs. The three intruders were
familiar to her as Lumonsog Gabasan used to sell copra to them and buy on
credit from her store. Nang was known
as “bugoy,” being notorious in their community.[9]
Gabasan demanded
money from Epifania who replied that they had no money. She pleaded with them to spare her
life. The two men warned her, instead,
to keep quiet. But as Epifania
continued to struggle with the two, she sustained wounds on her left wrist and
neck. While Pablito Nang was
restraining her, Sumiba Gamo searched their trunk, took the money in it, and
told Nang about it.[10] As the three intruders fled, one of
them shouted threateningly that they would come back. After the three had left,
Epifania immediately shouted for help crying out, “Tabang mo kay gitulis
me!” (Help us, we were robbed!)
There being no
immediate response to her cries for assistance, Epifania, hurriedly scampered
downstairs. As she left the house, she saw her husband Nicanor seriously
wounded beside the mango tree. When she
asked him to identify his assailants, he named Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo and
could make no more utterance as he was choking in his own blood due to his
grave condition.[11] When the neighbors arrived, they
placed the wounded Nicanor on a bench which they carried towards the road to
bring him to a doctor. Unfortunately, however, Nicanor expired after only a few
minutes.[12]
When Epifania
inspected the family trunk that was ransacked by the intruders, she found out
that the money consisting of paper bills and coins totalling some P500.00
were taken by the three men.[13]
The following
day, Patrolman Alfren Humpa and Pfc. Ansaling Lingating conducted an
investigation and drew a sketch of the crime scene[14] which indicated the window of the
Gonzales house overlooking the toilet, the one meter distance of the toilet
from the house, the four-meter distance of the toilet from the mango tree where
bloodstains were found and the distance of the house from the road where the
victim died.
The post
mortem examination prepared by Rural Sanitation Inspector George Bayamban
revealed that Nicanor Gonzales sustained the following injuries:
1. One stab wound at the middle of the chest measuring 1 ¾ inch in length and 1 inch wide and 4 inches deep;
2. One stab wound at the middle of his back measuring 1 ¾ inch in length and ½ inch wide and 4 inches deep.[15]
Hemorrage due to stab wounds at middle back and chest was the cause of Nicanor’s death.[16]
The defense had
an altogether different version of the occurrence. Accused-appellants Sumiba Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan interposed
the defense of denial and alibi. In the
morning of May 16, 1990, they were hired by Lamberto Lingating Lusay to make
copra at Guili-an, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. They started making copra after
breakfast at about 7:00 o’clock a.m. After they had finished their work at about 4:00 o’clock p.m., they
decided to go to the house of Lumonsog Gabasan in order to rest. While there,
Ernie Gandamon arrived and summoned Temie Gabasan, the brother of
accused-appellant Lumonsog Gabasan, to discuss the impending marriage between
Temie and Ernie’s cousin Myrna. The
father of Lumonsog Gabasan agreed to go to the house of Myrna in Sitio Guili-an,
Poblacion, Lapuyan. He was accompanied
by accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo, Dugang, Temie and
Mamerto Masulog. The group brought two chickens to symbolize the plighted troth
between Temie and Myrna.
Upon arrival at
their destination, accused-appellants cooked and prepared the chickens for
supper, after which a wedding covenant was forged between the father of the
prospective groom and Mamerto Masulog, the guardian of the bride-to-be. While
having dinner, they heard gunshots coming from the neighboring barangay, thereby
prompting the father of accused-appellant Lumonsog and his younger brother to
go home at once out of concern for the rest of the family. Accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and
Sumiba Gamo, together with Temie, stayed behind and slept at the house of Ernie
that evening. Upon waking up at 7:00
o’clock a.m., they then returned to their place of work.[17] The defense presented Ernie
Gandamon, Mamerto Masulog and Pendatun Bandatun to corroborate
accused-appellants’ alibi.[18]
On February 21,
1992, the trial court[19] rendered its judgment of
conviction, disposing thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt accused SUMINA GAMO and LUMONSOG GABASAN of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentences them to RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to return the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS to the heirs of victim Nicanor Gonzales which is the amount taken by them and to pay FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as to compensation for the death of the victim Nicanor Gonzales to the latter’s heirs without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Both accused Sumina Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan having been in prison since June 5, 1990, are hereby credited FOUR-FIFTH (4/5) of such preventive imprisonment in the service of their sentence herein imposed.
SO ORDERED.”[20]
Hence, this
appeal. Appellants insist on their
innocence and contend that the trial court erred:
“I x x x WHEN IT IGNORED MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND MADE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS AND THE EVIDENCE;
II x x x WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE AND FULL WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WIFE AND THE DAUGHTER OF THE DECEASED VICTIM NICANOR GONZALES;
III x x x WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.”[21]
The appeal is
devoid of merit.
Clearly, the
core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of
witnesses. It is doctrinal that this
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon
the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance
of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[22] There is no cogent reason for the
Court to depart from this well-settled rule.
Accused-appellants
point to certain errors committed by the trial court in its “findings of fact x
x x that are not supported by the records x x x (and thus) x x x greatly
prejudiced their constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.” They,
therefore, submit that this case comes within the exception to the rule that
the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of the witnesses
and the findings as to facts are not to be disturbed on appeal.[23] These supposed errors are: (1) that
the daughter of the deceased victim, Elizabeth, was hit on the head with a gun
by one of the three assailants,[24] but the records show that she only
testified that she was hit on the head without mentioning a gun;[25] (2) that Pablito Nang was
identified by Epifania because he removed his mask while ransacking the family
trunk,[26] but witness Epifania said that she
was able to remove the masks of the culprits while she was struggling with
them; (3) that Epifania was grabbed by two masked men and a third masked person
followed and entered the house and then ransacked the trunk,[27] but in the testimony of Epifania,
only two persons entered their house and it was appellant Gamo who opened the
trunk, while the third, appellant Gabasan, was waiting by the stairs;[28] (4) that the victim’s wife,
Epifania, did not identify Lumonsog Gabasan while the victim’s daughter
Elizabeth did not identify Sumina Gamo, because they did not know them, hence
the two told the truth,[29] but in their respective
testimonies, wife and daughter categorically identified all three accused as
the ones who killed Nicanor, attacked them and robbed them of their money.[30] Accused-appellants, therefore,
conclude that because of these errors in its factual findings and appreciation
of the evidence, the lower court failed in its duty to conduct a real
examination as to the credibility of the testimony of the two key witnesses for
the prosecution.
Upon careful
examination of the assailed decision and the evidence on record, this Court
agrees with accused-appellants’ observation that the trial court may indeed
have committed some errors, but these lapses are not so grave as to suffice to
reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants, who, as the
records show, were categorically and positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
More important,
all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are shown to exist. The crime of robbery with homicide is
primarily classified as an offense against property and not against
persons. It is therefore incumbent upon
the prosecution to establish that: (a) the taking of personal property with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on
the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which
is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.[31] This Court is satisfied that all
the elements of the crime attributed to accused-appellants had been adequately
established.
Accused-appellants
attempt to discredit the testimonies of prosecution witnesses by pointing out
certain alleged inconsistencies and contradictions between their affidavits or
sworn statements given to the police investigators vis-à-vis their
testimonies in open court. They allege
that in Epifania’s affidavit, nothing was mentioned about her being stabbed by
her attackers. What she stated was that
Sumiba Gamo pointed a knife at her while Pablito Nang ransacked the trunk. In court, however, she testified that Nang
stabbed her and that Gamo was the one who opened the trunk, and that she
recognized them as she was able to snatch their masks. As regards the affidavit of Elizabeth,
accused-appellants point out that what was stated therein was that Lumonsog
Gabasan whipped her with a pistol but she made no mention about the gun in her
court testimony, only her allegation that she was whipped by Lumonsog Gabasan.
Contrary to what
accused-appellants assert, there is no serious incongruence in the prosecution
eyewitnesses’ sworn declarations and their testimonies. What is material is
that their testimonies agree on the essential fact that the three accused were
present and they participated in the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that ex parte
affidavits are generally incomplete. Hence, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiants in their
sworn statements and those in court do not necessarily discredit them. The infirmity of affidavits as evidence is a
matter of judicial experience.[32]
In People v.
Miranda,[33] this Court observed thus:
“x x x Predictably, testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements. Ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons, at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Witnesses cannot be expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may be inconsequential and what may be mere insignificant details.”
In the same
vein, this Court noted in People v. Reyes,[34] viz.:
“x x x Differences in the narration of an incident between the sworn statements and the testimony of a witness are not unknown. The infirmity of an extrajudicial statement is a matter of judicial experience. An extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement; hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent.”
Thus, as between
sworn statements taken ex parte and testimonies given in open court, the
latter are generally held to be superior. The rationale is that affidavits are oftentimes executed when an
affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident that has transpired.[35] Affidavits are not complete reproductions
of what the declarant has in mind because the administering officer generally
prepares them and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read
to him.[36]
In the case at
bar, the alleged inconsistencies between the affidavits and testimonies of
witnesses are minor and do not affect their credibility as witnesses. They
merely show that their affidavits are incomplete with respect to certain
details that do not in any way detract from the overall veracity of their
testimonies. Minor inconsistencies
serve instead to strengthen their credibility as they are badges of truth
rather than indicia of falsehood. The most candid witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and fall into
confused and inconsistent statements but such honest lapses do not necessarily
affect their credibility. Far from
eroding the effectiveness of the testimonies of the two witnesses, such trivial
differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.[37] What is clear is that their
affidavits and testimonies concur on all material points and establish the
presence of accused-appellants at the scene of the crime and the manner in
which they executed the same.
Accused-appellants
also assail the trial court’s utmost reliance on the testimony of 11-year-old
Elizabeth considering her tender age and alleged low level of understanding,
intelligence and common sense.[38] On this score, it is
well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness
if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and
that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined.[39]
The requirements
of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation (b)
capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. The determination of whether a child is of
sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements is addressed to
the sound judgment of the trial court. In the instant case, this Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s assessment regarding
Elizabeth’s credibility as a witness.
Accused-appellants’
defense of alibi is, as repeatedly pronounced, one of the weakest defenses an
accused can invoke.[40] Accordingly, courts have invariably
looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently
unreliable but because it is rather
easy to fabricate.[41] Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution’s witness who has no
motive to testify falsely against them.[42] For alibi to be believed, credible
and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene
of the crime is indispensable.[43] The accused must show that he was
at such other place for such a period of time that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of
its commission.[44]
Evidence of
physical impossibility had not been adduced in the case at bar. Barangay Guili-an where Lumonsog Gabasan and
Sumiba Gamo claimed to be at the time of the commission of the crime is not far
from Sitio San Pedro, Brgy. Lubosan where the crime was committed. According to
defense witness Ernie Gandamon, the distance between Guili-an and San Pedro
Lubosan, Lapuyan, can be negotiated in 20 minutes by riding a carabao or by
hiking.[45]
Moreover, accused-appellants’
alibi cannot prevail in light of the positive identification of prosecution
eyewitnesses Epifania and Elizabeth Gonzales who have not been proved to harbor
any ill-motives in testifying against the accused-appellants.[46]
Challenge is
also made as to the credibility of the key witnesses being the wife and child
of the deceased victim. Relationship per
se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses. Indeed, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victims who seek justice to commit another injustice by
imputing the crime on innocent persons and not on those who were actually
responsible therefor.[47]
Moreover, the
delay of witnesses in revealing to the authorities the identities of the
accused may be attributable to trauma, confusion, and grief. It is quite understandable when the
witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the offender after a
startling occurrence more specifically when they are related to the victim as
they just had a traumatic experience.[48]
The trial court
correctly found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with homicide as defined in Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution has established
with moral certainty through the eyewitness testimonies of Epifania and
Elizabeth that accused-appellants used violence and intimidation against the
members of the Gonzales family in carrying out their intention to rob
them. They stabbed to death Nicanor
Gonzales to facilitate the commission of the robbery and attacked his wife
Epifania and 11-year-old child Elizabeth causing them injuries, in carrying out
their intention to rob them of their money. It was likewise amply shown through eyewitness testimony that accused-appellants
took away some P500.00 from the Gonzales family trunk. There being proof
of asportation, animus lucrandi is presumed.[49]
In the crime of
robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after
robbery. What is essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection
between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to
the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.[50]
Likewise, the
rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part
in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.[51] Such exception does not apply in
the instant case. By their concerted
action, accused-appellants and Pablito Nang obviously conspired to rob the
Gonzales family, on which occasion they killed Nicanor to facilitate their
criminal intent. It is immaterial,
therefore, that accused-appellants merely held the arms of Nicanor Gonzales
while Pablito Nang stabbed him. In view
of the presence of conspiracy, all the perpetrators of the crime shall bear
equal responsibility.[52]
The special
complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. In the
case at bar, the proper imposable penalty upon accused-appellants is reclusion
perpetua in the absence of proven mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[53] However, the trial court
erroneously imposed on accused-appellants the penalty of “reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment.” Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not
synonymous penalties - these are distinct in nature, in duration and in
accessory penalties.[54] This Court has distinguished
between the two penalties in previous decisions, going as far back as People v.
Mobe[55] and, recently, in People v.
Antonio Magana,[56] thus:
“The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of `life imprisonment’ for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the x x x Code but by the special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as `life imprisonment’ which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration.”
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
convicting accused-appellants Sumina Gamo and Lumunsog Gabasan of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the phrase “or
life imprisonment” in the dispositive portion thereof is DELETED.
Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the National
Bureau of Investigation which shall effect with dispatch the arrest of Pablito
Nang in order that he may be put on trial for the crime charged and duly proved
here.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Gamo’s name is Sumiba not Sumina as corrected by the
trial court (TSN, April 10, 1991, p. 8).
[2] Sometimes spelled as Lomonsog in the records,
this name also appears as Lumonso in the letter addressed to Atty. Jose
Ilustre, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of Judicial Records Office, Lomonso
in the Certificate of Live Birth (Records, p. 23) and Domonso in Form
137 E (Exh. “A”).
[3] Original Record, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[4] TSN, April 10, 1991, pp. 3-5.
[5] Ibid., p.
26.
[6] Id., pp.
24-35.
[7] Id., pp.
26-29.
[8] Id., p.
28.
[9] Id., pp.
12-13.
[10] Id.
[11] Id., pp.
10-11.
[12] Id., p.
11.
[13] Exh. 1.
[14] Exh. B.
[15] Index of Exhibits, p. 5
[16] Exh. “C;” Index of Exhibits, p. 5
[17] TSN, October 16, 1991, pp. 3-34.
[18] TSN, June 11, 1991, pp. 3-21, 22-32; July 9, 1991, pp. 3-21.
[19] Presided by Judge Franklyn A. Villegas.
[20] Rollo, p.
22.
[21] Ibid., p.
54.
[22] People v. Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, July 11,
1994, 234 SCRA 51, 58, citing United States v. Ambrosio and Falsario, 17
Phil. 295 (1910), People v. Kyamko, G.R. No. 103805, May 17, 1993, 22
SCRA 183; People v. Jumamoy, G.R. No. 101584, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA
333; People v. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 148; People
v. Lee, G.R. No. 66848, December 20, 1991, 204 SCRA 900; People v.
Tismo, L-44773, December 4,1991, 204 SCRA 535.
[23] Appellants’ Brief, p. 23.
[24] RTC Decision, p. 4.
[25] TSN, April 10, 1991, p. 26.
[26] RTC Decision, p. 6.
[27] Ibid., p.
4.
[28] TSN, April 10, 1991, pp. 6 and 7.
[29] RTC Decision, pp. 8 and 9.
[30] TSN, April 10, 1991, pp. 7, 24 and 25.
[31] People v. Gavina, G.R. No. 118076, November 20,
1996, 264 SCRA 450, 455 citing People v. Esperraguerra, 318 Phil. 250
(1995).
[32] People
v. Batulan, 323 Phil. 63 (1996); People v. Dumpe, G.R. Nos.
80110-11, March 22, 1990, 183 SCRA 547; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
L-40727, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697.
[33] G.R. No. 92369, August 10, 1994, 235 SCRA 202,
213-214.
[34] 316 Phil. 1, 12 (1995).
[35] People v. Dumpe, supra.
[36] REGALADO, 2 REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 560.
[37] People v. Prado, G.R. No. 112982, December 29,
1995, 251 SCRA 690; People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 109783, September 22,
1994, 236 SCRA 666.
[38] Appellants’ Brief, p. 33; Rollo, p. 54.
[39] People v. Mendoza, 324 Phil. 222, 238 (1996).
[40] People v. Manzano, 318 Phil. 279, 292 (1995).
[41] People v. Esquilona, 318 Phil. 164, 170
(1995).
[42] People v. Pacapac, 318 Phi. 91, 110 (1995).
[43] People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04,
November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 14.
[44] People v. Pacapac, supra.
[45] TSN, June 11, 1991, p. 3.
[46] People v. Jose, G.R. No. 107106, November 24,
1995, 250 SCRA 319.
[47] People v. Estrellanes, Jr., G.R. No. 111003,
December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 235.
[48] People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, February 25,
1991, 194 SCRA 372.
[49] People v. Esparraguerra, 318 Phil. 250, 266
(1995).
[50] People v. Hernandez, 46 Phil. 48, 49 (1924).
[51] People v. Angeles, 315 Phil. 23 (1995); People
v. Calegan, G.R. No. 93846, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 537; People v.
Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247.
[52] People v. Piandiong, G.R. No. 118140, February
19, 1997, 268 SCRA 555, 571.
[53] Art. 63 (2), Revised Penal Code.
[54] People v. Kulais, 313 Phil. 863 (1995); People
v. Magalong, 313 Phil. 823 (1995).
[55] 81Phil. 58 (1948).
[56] G.R. No. 105673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 380, citing
People v. Baguio, G.R. No. 76585, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 459, 469.