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350 Phil. 342
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 107792, March 02, 1998 ]
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA
PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), PETITIONERS,
VS. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER
AND EXPORTER CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and
order dated November 12, 1992, of Undersecretary of Labor and Employment
Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted among
the employees of respondent company.
The facts of the
case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election was
conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter
Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the
elections were as follows:
National Federation of Labor (NFL) - 235
No Union - 466
Spoiled Ballots - 18
Marked Ballots - 9
Challenged Ballots - 7
However, some
employees of Permex Producer formed a
labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later affiliated with the
Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).
On August 16,
1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor
Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex
Producer. On October 19, 1991 Permex
Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank
and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE.
On February 25,
1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was
dismissed by Med-Arbiter Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated August 20, 1992.
Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the
Permex Producer, with the following choices:
1. National Federation of Labor
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex
3. No union
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was
denied in an order dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this petition.
Two arguments
are put forth in support of the petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the
majority of the employees at Permex Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a
group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to
represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain
collectively, the employer may do one of two things. First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees’ claim the
employer may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively
with it. The formal written
confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if on the other hand, the employer
refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor
Relations to conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election,
the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the petition so that
it may be directly certified as the employees’ representative or a
certification election may be held.
The case of Ilaw
at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja,[1] cited by the Solicitor General in
his comment filed in behalf of the NLRC, is particularly apropos. There, the union also requested voluntary recognition
by the company. Instead of granting the
request, the company petitioned for a certification election. The union moved to dismiss on the ground
that it did not ask the company to bargain collectively with it. As its motion was denied, the union brought
the matter to this Court. In sustaining
the company’s stand, this Court ruled:
...Ordinarily,
in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union
that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified
bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily
recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did,
it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative
of the employees — A CERTIFICATION
WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees’
prerogative (not the employer’s) to determine whether they want a union to
represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)
In accordance
with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary
recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as
exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The company did not have the power to
declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose
of collective bargaining.
Indeed,
petitioner’s contention runs counter to the trend towards the holding of certification election. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed
under the Labor Code had been discontinued as a method of selecting the
exclusive bargaining agents of the workers.[2] Certification election is the most
effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization
can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a
company.[3]
Petitioner
argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer, 479 supported its application for registration
with the DOLE and that when petitioner signed the CBA with the company, the CBA
was ratified by 542 employees. Petitioner contends that such support by the majority of the employees
justifies its finding that the CBA made by it is valid and binding.
But it is not
enough that a union has the support of
the majority of the employees. It is
equally important that everyone in the
bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself.[4]
This is
especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came
barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted “no union” in the
certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent
Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining
representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the
certification election.[5] Here the results, which showed that
61% of the employees voted for “no union,” were certified only on February 25,
1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and
entered into a CBA with it.
There is
something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the employees
had voted that they did not want any union to represent them, they would
be expressing support for
petitioner. The doubt is compounded by
the fact that in sworn affidavits some
employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into signing a
document which turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective
bargaining agent. Although there were
retractions, we agree with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements
by employees adverse to a company (or its favored union) are oftentimes tainted
with coercion and intimidation. For how
could one explain the seeming flip-flopping of position taken by the
employees? The figures claimed by
petitioner to have been given to it in support cannot readily be accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts.
253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code and Book V, Rule 5, §3 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for
intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the date of
expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The purpose of the
rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the
management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of
contracts which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the
identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts
must be subordinated to the employees’ freedom of choice because it does not
establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by the law.[6] Such situation obtains in this
case. The petitioner entered into a CBA
with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the
employees had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent
Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] 182 SCRA
561 (1990).
[2] Central
Negros Electric Cooperative v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 201
SCRA 591 (1991).
[3]National
Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Secretary of Labor, 227 SCRA 821
(1993); Associated Trade Unions v. Trajano, 162 SCRA 319 (1988).
[4] Central
Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Secretary of DOLE, 201 SCRA at 592.
[5]
IMPLEMENTING RULES, Bk V, Rule V, §3.
[6] Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company Employees Union v. Estrella, 81 SCRA 49 (1978).