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350 Phil. 499
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 123293, March 05, 1998 ]
ELISA C. FELICIANO, PETITIONER,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ERNESTO BARON, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO , J.:
This petition
for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 9
October 1995 as well as its Resolution of 12 December 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No.
37450 [1] which reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, in Civil Case
No. Q-94-22391.
On 6 February
1978 Eleuterio Cosme obtained a loan of P50,000.00 from the Insular Bank
of Asia and America. To secure the loan, he mortgaged a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 198745 registered in his name “married to Asuncion Obando.” The loan
however was not paid upon maturity, thus the mortgage was foreclosed
extrajudicially and sold at public auction with the bank as the highest bidder.
After the lapse of the redemption period, ownership over the land was
consolidated in the bank and TCT No. 283860 was issued in its name.
Later, Eleuterio
Cosme and his wife Asuncion Obando died. Their daughters, Elisa C. Feliciano
and Arsenia C. Buendia, took possession of the property and exercised their
rights of ownership thereof as compulsory heirs of their deceased parents. In
1985 Elisa instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City an action
against the bank of the Annulment of Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Deed of
Absolute Sale and TCT No. 283860, Reconveyance with Petition for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injuction and Damages. [2] During the pendency of the case,
specifically on 15 February 1991, private respondent herein Ernesto Baron
bought the subject property from the bank and the corresponding Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed in his favor. On the basis of the sale, Baron
demanded from Elisa and Arsenia to pay rents and vacate the premises. Elisa
refused insisting that she was owner of the property and that it was currently
the subject of a pending litigation in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
[3] Hence, Baron filed a complaint for
ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City which, after due
consideration, dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia.
On appeal by
Baron, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC holding that litis
pendentia existed and that, in addition, the MeTC did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the case since there was no sufficient averment in the
complaint which would bring the case within the purview of either forcible
entry or unlawful detainer.
Undaunted by the
adverse decisions of the lower courts, Baron elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals,which subsequently reversed the Regional Trial Court and remanded the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held
that litis pendentia was not present in this case as there was no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the Regional Trial Court
and in the Metropolitan Trial Court. That, further, the allegations in the
complaint for ejectment adequately and sufficiently established a cause for
unlawful detainer by virtue of which the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court was properly laid.
Petitioner Elisa
C. Feliciano now insists that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted and
misapplied the laws and jurisprudence on litis pendentia [4] and on the acquisition or absence
of jurisdiction. Specifically, she maintains that there is identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for in both the pending RTC case for annulment and
reconveyance with damages, and the MeTC case for ejectment, i.e., ownership and
possession of the subject property and that, additionally, a judgment in the
pending RTC case, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res
judicata in the ejectment case. Consequently, there is litis pendentia,
and the pending RTC case may be pleaded in abatement of the pending MeTC case
for ejectment.
On the question
of jurisdiction, petitioner asserts that the allegations in the complaint for
ejectment do not show nor imply that there is unlawful withholding of material
possession by herein petitioner from respondent. Hence, the complaint is
insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the municipal trial court to entertain the
ejectment suit.
Litis
pendentia is a
Latin term which literally means “a pending suit.” [5] It is variously referred to in some
decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. [6] While it is normally connected with
the control which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the
continuance proceedings, [7] it is more interposed as a ground
for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. [8]
Litis
pendentia as a
ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
actions [9] and that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. Therefore, for litis pendentia to be invoked
the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of
parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded
on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. [10] Applying the foregoing criteria in
the instant case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that litis pendentia
does not obtain in this case because of the absence of the second and third
requisites.
The fact that
herein petitioner instituted a prior action for the annulment of the mortgage
contract, certificate of sale, deed of absolute sale, reconveyance and damages,
is not a valid reason for defeating the action for ejectment. While there may
be identity of parties and subject matter in the two (2) actions, the issues
involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment and
reconveyance suit, the issue is the validity of the mortgage and the subsequent
foreclosure sale, whereas the issue in the ejectment case is whether, assuming
the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, private respondent has the right
to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for
is recovery of ownership of the subject land, while the latter, it is the
restoration of possession thereof to private respondent. Hence, the
Metropolitan Trial Court can validly try the ejectment case even while the
annulment suit is being litigated in the Regional Trial Court. [11]
Consequently,
there being different causes of action in the RTC and MeTC cases, a decision in
one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Concededly, a
decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case since they
involve the same parcel of land. But the test to determine identity of causes
of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to
sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the
first. [12] It is true that some items or
pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions, as for instance, the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by and between the bank and herein respondent Baron.
It cannot be said, however, that exactly the same set of evidence presented to
sustain the first action for annulment, reconveyance and damages, can likewise
defeat the second action for ejectment. [13]
Moreover,
well-settled is the rule that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale
and reconveyance may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. The judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the
facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon the different cause
of action involving possession. [14] This rule is not without good
reason. If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated
by the defendant through the simple expedient of filing an action in the RTC
contesting the plaintiff’s ownership over the property from which the defendant
is sought to be evicted. This would render nugatory the underlying philosophy
of the summary remedy of ejectment which is to prevent criminal disorder and
breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves
entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some
appropriate action in court to assert their claims. [15]
On the alleged
insufficiency of the complaint for ejectment, this Court has repeatedly
emphasized that in determining the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, the test is whether admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
plaintiff. [16] The subject complaint for ejectment
stated, among others, that (a) the plaintiff bought the premises occupied by
the defendants as shown by the deed of absolute sale (Annex “A”); and, (b)
defendant Elisa C. Feliciano was requested to vacate the premises for lack of
lawful possession and non-payment of rentals (Annex “B”) but her lawyer
informed the plaintiff that she was the owner of the premises. [17] Clearly, these allegations
adequately established a cause of action for unlawful detainer on the basis of
which the MeTC could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of
the plaintiff. As succinctly observed by the Court of Appeals-
As can be gleaned from the complaint itself, it was alleged that defendant Elisa Feliciano was requested to vacate the premises for lack of lawful possession and non-payment of rentals (Annex “A” of complaint, Rollo, p. 8) considering that said premises has been sold to herein petitioner by Philippine Commercial International Bank.
Notwithstanding such allegations, the Regional Trial Court failed to consider the complaint sufficient to constitute a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. (Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372).
Finally, we are
not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that will be suffered by petitioner
if her ejectment is ordered by the MeTC, only to be reinstated later if she
eventually wins the nullification of the mortgage case in the RTC. However,
respondent will also suffer an injustice if denied of the remedy of ejectment,
resort to which is not only allowed but in fact encouraged by law. Further, the
tide of jurisprudence – which declared in no uncertain terms that an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance may proceed independently of an action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry involving the same parties and the same
parcel of land – is clearly on the side of the respondent herein.
More
importantly, petitioner is not being ejected yet. The Court of Appeals, and now
this Court, is simply ordering the MeTC to reinstate the ejectment case and
proceed with it. Private respondent Baron has not prevailed yet as he must
still prove his right to the possession of the litigated property. By the same
token, all is not lost for petitioner as she still has equal chances of winning
in both the ejectment and annulment cases. At any rate, questions concerning
the propriety of petitioner’s ejectment are premature. We refrain from
expressing any opinion on the merits of the ejectment case as the same will
have to be threshed out in the proper forum after a full consideration of the
evidence that will be presented by the parties and the law upon which it may be
based. Our decision herein is limited to the reinstitution of the ejectment
case which has been improvidently dismissed by the trial court on a flawed
basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals of 9 October 1995 and its Resolution of 12
December 1995 are AFFIRMED, and the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings and proper disposition in light of our pronouncement
herein. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Decision
penned by Justice Jose De la Rama, concurred in by Justices Jorge S. Imperial
and Eduardo G. Montenegro; see Rollo, pp. 25-31, Annex “A,” Rollo,
p. 33, Annex “B.”
[2] Docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-37870, “Elisa C. Feliciano and Arsenia C. Buendia v.
Insular Bank of Asia and America and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;” see
Rollo, p. 62.
[3] Ernesto
Baron was one of the intervenors in Civil Case No. 37870 of the RTC, Quezon
City, being the purchaser of the property and claiming a legal right thereto.
[4] Sec. 1,
par. (e), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
[5] Black’s
Law Dictionary 1081 (4TH Ed., 1957).
[6] See Buan v.
Lopez, Jr., G.R. No. 75349, 13 October 1986, 145 SCRA 34, 37.
[7] Bouvier’s
Law Dictionary & Concise Encyclopedia (8TH Ed.,
1914), p. 2032.
[8] Sec. 1,
par. (e), Rule 16, Rules of Court.
[9] Ibid..
[10] Ramos v.
Ebarle, No. L-49833, 15 February 1990, 182 SCRA 245, 249 citing Marapao v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 61468, 8 December 1982, 119 SCRA 97; Lopez v.
Villaruel, G.R. No. 54323, 19 August 1988, 164 SCRA 616.
[11] Joven v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, 20 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700, 712.
[12] Vda. de
Cruz v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. Nos. 75109-10, 28 June 1989, 174 SCRA 330.
[13] See
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909, 5 September 1991, 201 SCRA
343, 353.
[14] Sy v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95818, 2 August 1991, 200 SCRA 117.
[15] See
Drilon v. Gaurana, No. L-35482, 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 342, 348.
[16] Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87678, 16 June 1992, 210
SCRA 33, 38.
[17] Rollo,
p. 40; Annex “A.”