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351 Phil. 569
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998 ]
PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO
C. SANTIAGO AND WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, PETITIONERS VS. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, C.J.:
The special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar seeks nullification of two
(2) Resolutions of the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan issued in Criminal
Case No. 21711 -- in which petitioners are prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act : Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
The resolution assailed are:
1) that dated February 1, 1996, which ordered petitioners ‘ preventive suspension for ninety (90) days in accordance with Section 13 of said R.A 3019; and
2) that dated February 23, 1996, which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
The primary
issue raised is whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the
Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand
accused before it, pursuant to said Section 13 of the law. Section 13 reads:
Sec. 13 Suspension and Loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or propertty, whether as a simple or as a complex offense in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. ** **”
It is
petitioners' submission that preventive suspension under this section “rest
in the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan despite the ostensibly mandatory
language” of the statute, and that that discretion was gravely abused by
the Sandiganbayan, or it exceeded its jurisdiction, when it decreed their
suspension.
Petitioners --
Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan -- all hold
regular executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They --
together with two other officers who have since resigned from the NPC, namely:
Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales -- were designated by the NPC Board
to compose the Contracts Committee for said NPC’s “Mindanao Grid LDC & SCADA/EMS
System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project.”
The Contracts
Committee thus constituted conducted the prequalification and bidding
procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the Joint
Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc.,
respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC reviewed
all the bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The contracts
Committee, however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disqualified
after verification from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that
group, as well as the second lowest bidder (Urban) had been
“downgraded,” thereby rending both ineligible as bidders.
The Contracts
Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors disclosed that
the other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and the Allowable
Government Estimates for Options A and B of the Project, it was was needful for
the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. The
recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for reasons not
appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the
project was eventually cancelled.
Obviously
feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban filed a complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of
Directors of NPC; the Chairman (Gilberto Pascual) and Members of the NPC
Contracts Awards Committee; the Chairman (Perla Segovia) of the Pre-Qualification
Bids & Awards Committee; the Manager (Cecilia D. Vales) of the Contracts
Management Office, and two others.[1] Urban alleged that before
the bidding, Joint Venture had been disqualified, but the Contracts
Committee, without basis and in order to favor it, reconsidered its
disqualification and thus enabled it to take part in the bidding and in fact to submit the lowest bid; that the NPC
was “already poised to award the contract to Joint Venture” but because Urban
protested, it was compelled to "post-disqualify" the former;
however, intead of awarding the contract for the project to Urban as the
second lowest bidder, the Committee and the NPC Board declared a failure of
bidding and ultimately cancelled the
project. These acts, it is claimed,
constituted a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
A preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Ombudsman’s Office after which Graft
Investigation Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 1994[2]recommending, among others, that:
1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto Pastoral and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 of having in “one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence;” and
2) the NPC President, NPC charman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the ** complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is supported by factual and legal basis.”
Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., favorably endorsed the recommendation
which was eventually approved on December 6, 1994 by Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez,
then the Ombudsman.[3]
An information
was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia,
Santiago, and Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 21711. They were charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019: i,e., “causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial function through manifest
partiality, evident bad faithy or gross inexcusable negligence.”
Petioners sought
and obtained a reinvestigation of their case but gained no benefit
thereby. For although the
reinvestigating officer made a recommendation on March 7, 1995 that the
information against petitioners be withdrawn -- because the “prima facie case had already been overthrown,
considering that, as it now stands, the evidence at hand cannot stand judicial
scrunity”[4] -- and that recommendation met with
the aprroval of the Special Prosecutor, it was ultimately turned down by the
chief Special Prosecutor[5] on April 18, 1995, and on April 20,
1995, by the Ombudsman himself.[6]
The case thus
proceeded in the Sandiganbayan. The
accused were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty; and a pre-trial was
held which resulted in stipulation of facts embodied in an order dated January
11, 1996.[7]
Earlier, the
People had filed a “Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite” dated
October 24, 1995, invoking Section 13 of RA 3019., as amended, and relevant
jurisprudence, and alleging that the “information/s is /are valid.”[8]
Petitioner
opposed the motion.[9] In their pleading dated November 28, 1995, the theorized that the explicit
terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the
premises. They claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the
transactions in question resulted in no
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two
of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that two of the five
accused were no longer employees of the NPC; that the positions that Segovia,
Pangilinan and Santiago continued to occupy in the NPC were quite sentitive and
had no relation to prequalification of contractors, biddings or awards -- which
was an additional function temporarily assigned to them and for which the
received no compensation at all -- and their suspension might cause delay of
vital projects of the NPC; and that under the circumstances obtaining, they
were in no position to tamper with any evidence.
Petitioners’
opposition was overruled. On January
31, 1996 the Sandiganbayan[10] handed down its Resolution
suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days.[11] The Sandiganbayan held that the
suspension was mandated under the law
upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been conducted , the
information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes
specified in the law; and stressed that its “authority and power to suspend the
accused had been repeatedly upheld” in several precedents. It subsequently
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration dated February 14, 1996,
“(c)onsidering the paucity of the(ir) arguments ** and in the light of the mass
of jurisprudence involving the power and authority of this Court to issue
orders for preventive suspension of the accused **.”[12]
Petitioners
would now have this Court strike down these resolution because supposedly
rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The court will not do so. In no sense may the challeged resolutions be
stigmatized as so clearly capricious, whimsical, oppressive, egregiously
erroneous or wanting in logic as to call for invalidation by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. On the
contrary, in promulgating those resolution, the Sandiganbayan did but adhere to
the clear command of the law and what it calls a “mass of jurispudence”
emanating from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree suspension of
public officials and employees indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory of
“discretionary suspension” should still be advocated to this late date, despite
the “mass of jurisprudence” relevant to
the issue, it little short of amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of
the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the Highest court of the land.
Republic Act no.
3019 was enacted by Congress more than 37 years ago, on August 17, 1960,
becoming effective on the same date. The law was later amended by Republic Act No. 3047, Presidential Decree
677 and Presidential Decree No. 1288. The last amendment -- to Section 13 thereof -- was introduced by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 195, approved on March 16, 1972.
The validity of
Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- treating of the suspension pendente
lite of an accused public officer -- may no longer be put at issue, having
been repeatedly upheld by this Court. As early as 1984, in Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the Court held by this Court. As suspension was not penal in character but
merely a preventive measure before final judgement; hence, the suspension of a
public officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment, does
not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto
law. The purpose of suspension is to
prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his
prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with
documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.[14] Substantially to the same effect
was the Court’s holding in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan,[15] that preventive suspension is not
violative suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence since his culpability must still be established.
The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive
suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case
is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court
functions -- including preventive suspension -- should be aknowledged as within
the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.[16]
The provision of
suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicated upon a valid
information under Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or
permenent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career
service.[17] It appears to a Public High School
Principal;[18] a Municipal Mayor;[19] a Governor;[20] a Congressman;[21] a Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager;[22] a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[23] The term “office” in Section 13 of
the law applies to any office in relation to which he is charged.[24]
It is mandatory
for the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused
before it.[25] Imposition of suspension, however,
is not automatic or self-operative. A precondition therefor is the existence of
a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is
in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching
consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction,
and the demands of public interest for speedy determination of the issues
involved in the case.[26] The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to detrmine the
validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any
part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.27 The accused should be given
adequate oppurtunity to challege the validity or regularity of the criminal
proceedings against him; e.g. that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation; that he has
not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the Revised Penal Code) warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court.28 But once a proper determination of the validity of
the Information has been made, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension of the accused official on
the pretext that the order denying the latter’s motion to quash is pending
review before the appellate courts.29
However, the
preventive suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for an unreasonable
length of time; it would be constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises,
at the very least, questions of denial of due process and equal protection of
the laws.30
The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed
the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential Decree No.
807 (the Civil Service Decree), noew Section 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987.31
While
petitioners concede that this Court has “almost consistently ruled that the
preventive suspension contemplated in Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandantory in
character,” they nonetheless urge the Court to consider their case an exception
because of the “peculiar circumstances” thereof. They assert that the evils
sought to be avoidedby “seperating a public official from the scene of his
alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated”32 -- e.g., “to preclude the abuse of
the prerogative of ** (his) office, such as through intimidation of witnesses,”33 or the tampering with documentary
evidence -- will not occur in the present situation where:
“1. The Project
has been cancelled.
2. (Their) **
official duties no longer pertain, in any manner, to the prequalification of
contractors dealing with the NPC. Neither are they now involved in any bidding
for or awarding of contracts, ** it (being) emphasized (in this connection)
that they were merely designated as ad hoc members of the Committee without
additional compensation for their additional duties.
3. All the
relevant documentary evidence had been submitted either to the Ombudsman or the
Honorable Sandiganbayan.”
They conclude
that their preventive suspension “at this point would actually be purposeless,
as there is no more need for precautionary measures against their abuse of the
prerogatives of their office.”
The arguments
are not new. They have been advanced and rejected in earlier cases. They will
again be so rejected in this case.
The Court’s
pronouncements in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, supra.,34 are germane:
“Our holding
that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act
No. 30 19, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government
or public property, it is the duty of the court to place the accused under
preventive suspension disposes of petitioner’s other contention that since the
trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner
would intimidate prosecution’s witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that
the accused would intimidate witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is
just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other one is, ** to
prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in
office.”
Bolastig also
disposes of the other contention that vital projects of NPC may be delayed by
their preventive suspension, viz.:35
“Finally, the
fact that petitioner’s preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of
the services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a
sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period
prescribed by law. The vice governor,
who has likewise been elected by them, will act as governor. (The Local
Government Code of 1991, sec. 46[a]) Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes
the suspension for not more than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty
of disorderly behavior, (Art. VI, sec. 16[3]) thus rejecting the view expressed
in one case (Alejandrino v. Quezon. 46 Phil. 83, 96 [1924]) that members of the
legislature could not be suspended because in the case of suspension, unlike in
the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constitutents are deprived
of reprensation.”
The firmly
entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity
of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.
In Socrates v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,36 decided fairly recently, the Court again expatiated
on the mandatory character of suspension pendente lite under Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019 and the nature of the pre-suspension hearing.
“This Court has
ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a public
officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing
is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which
the Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and
dismissed the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its
validity. That hearing may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Albano,
etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)
“In the leading
case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. (L-32950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA
187), we have set out the guidelines to
be followed by the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension
under Section 13 of the law, to wit:
‘(c) By way of
broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of
suspension from office of public officers charged under a valid information
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act, it may be
briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should
issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause
at a specific date of hearing why he shoud not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused
in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity
thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary.
What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter
hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or withhold such suspension in the
contrary case.
‘(d) No specific
rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he has not
been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, the act for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of the Act, or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory suspension decreed by the act
upon determination of the pendency in court or crimianl prosecution for
violation of the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information
requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act.
Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be indubitable, then
it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon its upholding the
validity of the information and setting the same for trial on the merits.’
“With the
aforequoted jurisrudential authority as the basis, it is evident that upon a
proper determination of the validity of the information, it bacomes mandatory
for the court to immmediately issue the
suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves
no room for interpretation. It is not within the court’s discretion to hold in
abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order
denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its
discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the
accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filling of
the information against him, (2) the
acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act. No. 3019 or of the provisions of title 7, Book II of the revised
Penal Code, or (3) the information against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rules
117 of the Rules of Court. (People vs. Albana, etc., at al. Supra, fn. 26)
“Once the
information is found to be sufficient
in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a
matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a
preventive suspension is not penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension. In view of this latter provisions, the accused elective public officer does not stand to
be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event
that the information is subsequently
declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking
into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a
public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public
interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the
accused. (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 61776-61861, March 23,
1984, 128 SCRA 383)
“To further
emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019, it is said that the court trying the case has neither discretion nor
duty to determine whether or not a preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue commiting malfeasance in office. The presumption is
that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in same way that upon a finding
that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does not require the
court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court.”
The Court is
satisfied that the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, after upholding the
validity of the information against petitioners, correctly ordered their
preventive suspension from any public office for period of ninety (90) days.
As was stressed
in Libanan v. Sandiganbayan 37
“ ** When the
statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution
against him. This Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is
mandatory **, and there are no ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ about it.”
WHEREFORE, the
petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Docketed
as OMB-0-94-0735
[2] Rollo,
pp 51-63.
[3] Id.,
p.62
[4] Annex E,
petition
[5] Hon.
Aniano Desierto, now the incumbent Ombudsman
[6] Rollo,
p.11
[7] Annex J,
petion
[8] Rollo,
p.135-136.
[9] Id., pp.
137 et seq
[10] Second
Division: Per Escareal, J., Chairman, with whom concurred Lagman and
Demetriou, JJ.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 26-30
[12] Id.,
p.31
[13] 128 SCRA
383 [1984]
[14] Bolastig v.
Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103 [2994]
[15] 201 SCRA
417 [1991]; SEE also
[16] Luciano v.
Provincial Governor, et al., 28 SCRA 517 [1969]; per Sanchez, J.
[17] Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
[1995]; Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 201 SCRA 417 [1991]
[18] Gonzaga v Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417 [1991]
[19] See Layno, Sr. v Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536
[1985]
[20] See Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409
[1985]
[21] Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364,
August 8, 1995, En Banc Resolution
[22] Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
[1995]
[23] Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 [1989]
[24] Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163
[1994]; SEE Bayot v Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383 [1984] -- auditor,
charged with a crime committed while a municipal mayor; Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,
173 SCRA 409 [1989] -- privincial governor, charged with crime committed while
a municipal mayor; Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163 [1994] --
Vice-Governor, charged with a crime committed while a Snguniang Bayan Member,
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 118364. August 8, 1995, En
Banc Minute Resolution, MR denied with finality on January 28 1997 --
Congressman, charged with a crime committed while provincial governor.
[25] Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan, 265 SCRA
121 [1996] citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 [1996];
Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103 [1994]; Libanan v. Sandiganbayan,
233 SCRA 163 [1994] citing Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417 [1991]
Bunye v. Escareal, 226 SCRA 332 [1993], People v. Albano, 163
SCRA 511 [1988], and People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 [1988, People v.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 372 [1985]; Luciano v. Provincial Governor,
28 SCRA 517 [1969]; See Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 [1971]
[26] People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 [1988 citing Luciano
v. Wilson, 34 SCRA 638 [1970]
27 People v.
Albano, supra, p. 517
28 Id.,citing Luciano v. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187 [1971].
29 Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773
[1996]
30 Gonzaga
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, citing Layno v. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536 [1985];
Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 [1989}; Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177
SCRA 354 [1989].
31 Bolastig
v. Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103 [1994]; Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201, SCRA 417
[1991] citing Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 [1989] and Doromal v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 354 [1991]
32 Citing
Bautista v. Peralta, 207 SCRA 689
33 Citing Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA
409, at pp. 420-421
34 235
SCRA 103, 109 emphasis supplied
35 235 SCRA
103, 110, emphasis supplied
36 253
SCRA 773, 794-797 (1996), per Regalado,
J., emphasis supplied
37 163 SCRA
163, at p. 167.