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419 Phil. 937
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133002, October 19, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
INTOY GALLO @ PALALAM, A.K.A. ANICETO
GALLO, ANTONIO PESEDAS, AND JOHN DOE, ACCUSED.
INTOY GALLO @
PALALAM, A.K.A. ANICETO GALLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated October 1, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City, Branch 7, finding appellant, Intoy Gallo, guilty of murder. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P31,000
as moral damages and P50,000 as death indemnity, and to pay the costs.
Appellant was originally charged
with Antonio Pesedas and one John Doe for murder. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of May, 1990, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other and with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, armed with armalite (M16) rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one RONALD QUILLOPE, thereby inflicting upon said Ronald Quillope gunshot wounds, which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Antonio Pesedas was arrested
earlier. He pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide and was duly sentenced. Intoy Gallo was arrested after six years in hiding. One John Doe, their co-accused, has remained
at large.
After the arrest of appellant, he
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. The basic facts of the case are as follows:
On May 28, 1990, at about 4:00
A.M., while prosecution witness BENITO TEJANO was tending his coffee shop
located at Burgos St., Tacloban City, he saw Intoy[3] Gallo and Antonio Pesedas[4] approaching. They had arrived with a certain Marcial in a motorcycle parked at the
other side of the street where Marcial waited. After a while, Intoy and Antonio crossed the street to conduct a search
aboard a passenger bus bound for Borongan, Samar. Then the two went down and proceeded to a Toyota vehicle parked
nearby. Asleep inside the Toyota was
Ronald Quillope, a security guard of the Caltex gasoline station. Upon reaching the Toyota, Intoy and Antonio
identified themselves as “PC Soscia”, a group of PC soldiers who
inspected security guards at nighttime. Ronald Quillope immediately got up and out of the Toyota vehicle. Intoy hit him with the butt of an M16 rifle
and took Ronald’s service pistol. Intoy
then pushed Ronald towards the waiting motorcycle and told him to board
it. They drove towards Rizal
Avenue. After a few hours, Benito
Tejano said he learned that a security guard was found dead and the body was
brought to the Gomez Funeral Parlor. Benito immediately went to the parlor and discovered the dead was Ronald
Quillope.[5]
SPO1 JAMES QUILLOPE, the brother
of the victim, testified that they spent about P8,000, covering the expenses in
Gomez Funeral Parlor and the amount spent in transporting the body of Ronald
from Tacloban City to Tomas Opus, Southern Leyte. The family also spent P16,000 for the embalming and wake.[6]
The defense waived the
presentation of any evidence.
On October 1, 1997, the trial
court rendered a decision finding Intoy Gallo guilty of murder. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused, INTOY GALLO @ Palalam; a.k.a. Aniceto Gallo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, as charged, and he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amounts of P31,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 for the death of Ronald Quillope; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Intoy Gallo interposed this
appeal, alleging that the trial court erred:
I. IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF BENITO TEJANO ALTHOUGH THE VERACITY ON MATERIAL POINTS (AS TO THE PARTICIPATION AND PRESENCE OF ACCUSED ENTOY GALLO DURING THE MAULING INCIDENT IS CONCERNED) IS CONFLICTING AND SERIOUSLY DOUBTFUL;
II. THAT NOT MORE THAN ONE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENT IN THE CASE;
III. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EXISTENCE OF SERIOUS DOUBTS ATTENDANT IN THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED
The issues raised in this case
are: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
Benito Tejano; and (2) whether the evidence for the prosecution established the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that the
testimony of Benito Tejano should not have been given credence by the trial
court because it was inconsistent with his sworn statement before the
provincial prosecutor. Appellant points
out that Benito, in his testimony, declared that Ronald was sleeping in the
Toyota. In contrast, Benito’s sworn
statement stated that it was Ronald who approached Intoy and Antonio. Appellant also claims that Benito’s
testimony was inconsistent with his sworn statement as to who was wearing the
fatigue shirt, whether it was Intoy Gallo a.k.a. Palalam or someone else,
namely Antonio Pesedas. Lastly, appellant
argues that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt because
no one actually saw him kill the victim and that the prosecution was able to
prove only one circumstance[8] and not a chain of circumstances that could link
appellant to the killing.
For the State, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of Benito are more apparent than real. The witness was consistent in explaining that Ronald was the one
sleeping in the Toyota, said the OSG, while appellant was the one in fatigue
shirt. Further, OSG argues these are
insignificant details which do not form part of the essential elements of the
crime.
The OSG also avers that more than
one circumstance were established by the prosecution. These are: (1) Appellant with Antonio Pesedas came to the area
near the corner of Burgos and Rizal Avenues armed with an armalite rifle
apparently in search for somebody;[9] (2) Finding Quillope inside the parked Toyota,
appellant disarmed him of his service pistol and struck his right face with the
butt of his armalite;[10] (3) Appellant forcibly took Quillope by pushing him
into a waiting tricycle and sped away towards Rizal Avenue;[11] (4) Quillope died of gunshot wounds;[12] (5) Appellant was in hiding for six long years; (6)
Appellant’s companion Antonio Pesedas, already pleaded guilty;[13] (7) Appellant chose not to present any evidence to
controvert that of the prosecution. These, according to the OSG, are more than enough circumstances to
sustain the conviction of the appellant.[14]
On the issue of credibility of
witnesses, settled is the rule that in the absence of any fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misconstrued to impeach the findings of the trial court, the appellate
courts will not interfere with the trial court’s findings on the credibility of
the witnesses or set aside its judgment considering that the trial court is in
a better position to decide the question for it had heard the witnesses
themselves during the trial.[15] The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a
matter that particularly falls within the authority of the trial court.[16]
The trial court appreciated
favorably the testimony of Benito Tejano as witness for the prosecution. His testimony was straightforward and
spontaneous. He had no reason to
perjure himself. He placed his own life
and his family in danger when he decided to testify in court. The trial court was not unaware of this, as
it even ordered that said witness be placed under the government’s witness
protection program.[17]
On the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimony and sworn statement of Benito, we agree with the OSG that these
refer to immaterial and insignificant details. They do not change the fact that Benito was present at the time Ronald
was accosted and taken away by Intoy and Antonio. Further, we have ruled in the past that discrepancies between a
sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal
of an accused. Such discrepancies do
not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are
often incomplete. They do not purport
to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant, and have been taken as inferior to court testimony.[18] In this case, Benito categorically stated on the
witness stand that Ronald was sleeping in the Toyota vehicle, apparently making
his sworn statement inaccurate. In
fact, however, he testified that he did not say that Ronald approached Intoy
and Antonio, to wit:
Q: Now, you must understand now that what you told the investigator Luna and what you told the court this morning at least on the fact of from where you came from are diametrically opposed to each other, do you understand that?
A: I recall he was asleep at that time.
Q: So when you told the investigator Luna “Then came the security guard Ronald Quillope from nowhere”, that fact is false?
A: I did not state that, it was only that he was asleep that I told.[19]
There also was no inconsistency on
who wore the fatigue shirt. Benito
categorically stated:
Upon the arrival of security guard Quillope he was also accosted by the companion of Intoy Palalam, the one who was wearing a fatigue shirt.[20]
It was not
Benito but apparently appellant’s counsel who misappreciated the statement to
mean that it was Intoy’s companion who was wearing the fatigue shirt.
Likewise, appellant failed to show
any improper motive for Benito to testify falsely on a grave felony. Human experience tells us that a person, in
the absence of a showing of any ill-motive, would not impute a grave crime upon
another unless the same is true.[21] Absent such showing, we are constrained to uphold the
trial court’s favorable ruling on the credibility of Benito’s testimony.
But was Benito Tejano’s testimony
sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt? The testimony of a single witness, if found
to be convincing and trustworthy is enough to sustain a conviction.[22] Testimonies of witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered.
Benito’s testimony established a
logical chain of circumstances which point to Intoy as one of Ronald’s
killers. First, Intoy was one of
those who accosted Ronald and was the one who hit him with the butt of an M16
Rifle. Second, Intoy was among
those who forced Ronald into the motorcycle and even rode with him towards
Rizal Avenue. Third, Intoy had a
gun and Ronald was found dead with gunshot wounds. Fourth, Intoy and his
companions were the last persons seen with Ronald while the latter was still
alive. Fifth, Intoy chose to
flee and hide for six years, rather than voluntarily surrender. As repeatedly held, flight is a strong
indication of guilt.[23] Appellant’s act of not confronting his accuser right
away goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent man when
accused with wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune
time.[24]
While it is true that no witness
who saw the actual killing was presented, the above enumerated circumstances
are enough to prove Intoy’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Direct evidence of the commission of the
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would
result in setting felons free. As above
discussed the following are present in the instant case such that conviction is
justified on circumstantial evidence: (1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[25]
However, we are not in agreement
with the trial court that the killing should be considered as murder. The records reveal no proven circumstance to
qualify the crime as murder. The trial court’s decision is unclear on why it
considered the killing as murder. While
nighttime, superior strength, evident premeditation, and treachery were all
alleged in the information, the prosecution did not prove each of them
specifically and convincingly. This
being so, the crime proved can only be homicide.[26]
On the civil aspect, no evidence
was presented to support an award of moral damages. The amount of P31,000 might refer to the actual expenses incurred
by the family of the victim,[27] but no receipts and other documentary evidence
therefor were presented. However, in
lieu of actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code[28] may be recovered since it has been shown by testimonial
evidence that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss, the amount of
which cannot be proved with certainty.[29] For this purpose an award of P24,000 is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City, Branch 7, is MODIFIED. Appellant Intoy Gallo @ Palalam a.k.a. Aniceto Gallo is declared
GUILTY of homicide for the death of Ronald Quillope. In the absence of any aggravating and/or
mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
victim P24,000 as temperate damages and P50,000 as death indemnity, and the
costs. The award of moral damages is
deleted.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, pp.
16-18.
[2] Id. at 9.
[3] Referred to as
“Entoy” in appellant’s brief.
[4] Referred to as
“Posedas” in appellant’s brief.
[5] TSN, Benito Tejano, August
20, 1996, pp. 3-13.
[6] TSN, SPO1 James
Quillope, June 25, 1996, pp. 14-15.
[7] Rollo, p. 18.
[8] Id. at 33-36.
[9] TSN, Benito Tejano,
August 20, 1996, pp. 4-6.
[10] Id. at 6-7
and 10.
[11] Id. at 7-8.
[12] Exhs. “A” and “B”, Records,
pp. 25 and 27; TSN, Benito Tejano, August 20, 1996, pp. 10-11.
[13] Exh. “C”, Records,
p. 40; TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5.
[14] Rollo, pp.
58-66.
[15] People vs.
Hernandez, G.R. No. 130809, 328 SCRA 201, 210 (2000).
[16] People vs. Baygar,
G.R. No. 132238, 318 SCRA 358, 365 (1999); People vs. Venerable, G.R. No.
110110, 290 SCRA 15, 25 (1998).
[17] TSN, Benito Tejano,
July 26, 1996, p. 3.
[18] People vs. Minangga,
G.R. No. 130670, 332 SCRA 558, 565-566 (2000).
[19] TSN, Benito Tejano,
August 20, 1996, p. 27.
[20] Id. at 27-28.
[21] People vs. Geguira,
G.R. No. 130769, 328 SCRA 11, 31 (2000).
[22] People vs. Bundang,
G.R. No. 101830, 272 SCRA 641, 651 (1997) citing People vs. Camat, G.R.
No. 112262, 256 SCRA 52, 63 (1996); People vs. Galano, G.R. No. 111806, 327
SCRA 462, 472-473 (2000).
[23] People vs. Fabon,
G.R. No. 133226, 328 SCRA 302, 317 (2000).
[24] People vs. Antonio,
et.al., G.R. No. 128149, July 24, 2000, p. 9.
[25] People vs. Santos,
G.R. No. 122935, 332 SCRA 394, 398-399 (2000).
[26] People vs. Araneta,
G.R. No. 137604, 335 SCRA 1, 11 (2000).
[27] People vs. Cual,
G.R. No. 131925, 327 SCRA 623, 648 (2000).
[28] Art. 2224. Temperate
or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty.
[29] People vs. Suplito,
G.R. No. 104944, 314 SCRA 493, 504 (1999).