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SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 13219 (Formerly CBD Case No. 18-5598), March 27, 2023 ]
IN RE: G.R. NOS. 226935, 228238, AND 228325, VS. ATTY. RICHARD R. ENOJO,* RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
KHO, JR., J.:
Respondent was appointed provincial legal officer of Negros Oriental sometime in January 2011.[2] On October 29, 2013, June Vincent Manuel S. Gaudan (Gaudan) filed criminal and administrative cases before the Ombudsman against then-Governor of Negros Oriental, Roel R. Degamo (Degamo). In these cases, respondent appeared as counsel for Degamo. When the cases reached the Sandiganbayan upon the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause to charge Degamo and other public officials with malversation of public funds, respondent also entered his appearance as counsel for Degamo.[3] The prosecution then opposed respondent's appearance, arguing that it is not among respondent's duties as provincial legal officer to represent the province's public officials who are charged with criminal cases. The Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the prosecution and ordered respondent to desist from appearing as counsel for Degamo. Respondent was then replaced as counsel for Degamo.[4]
At the same time, the Ombudsman’s finding of administrative liability was assailed before the Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually reached the Court through the cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 226935, 228325, and 228238. Respondent represented Degamo before the Court as well.[5] It was in these proceedings where the Petition to Disbar Atty. Richard Enojo was filed.
On June 4, 2018, the Director for Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission, on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to file his answer to the complaint.[6] On August 14, 2018, respondent filed his answer,[7] arguing that under the Local Government Code,[8] the prohibition from appearing as counsel in criminal cases against an officer or employee of the national and local government for offenses committed in relation to their office is imposed, not on appointive legal officers, but on Sanggunian members, who are elective public officials. He claimed that his functions as provincial legal officer, the Local Government Code[9] purportedly authorize him to "defend the LGU's [local government unit] officers and employees who are sued in relation to or affecting the discharge of their official functions."[10] Finally, he argues that the Court En Banc's ruling in Urbano v. Chavez,[11] through Associate Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, does not apply to him since he is not part of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In Urbano, the Court held that the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case.[12]
On November 15, 2019, the case was set for mandatory conference,[13] where only respondent appeared and filed a Conference Brief.[14] Thereafter, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to file their verified position papers.[15] The records show that both parties did not file their position papers.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[16] dated June 4, 2020, the IBP-CBD recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In so recommending, the IBP-CBD noted that at most, respondent was guilty of an erroneous interpretation of the law. It found that contrary to respondent's argument, the Sandiganbayan had already ruled that it was in fact not part of respondent's duties to appear as counsel for public officials who are accused in criminal cases.[17] The IBP-CBD also noted that at present “there is no law that positively prohibits the respondent from handling the case of his Governor. I[n] fact, it even took the case of Urbano to finally settle the issue of the appearance of the Solicitor General. Such Decision of the Supreme Court does not specifically refer to [a] provincial legal officer. In fact, in the Resolution of the Honorable Sandiganbayan, the said case was only applied by inference."[18]
In its Resolution[19] dated March 13, 2021, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue before the Court is whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful study and review of the records, the Court overturns the findings and recommendations of the IBP. As will be explained hereunder, respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law and must be held administratively liable therefor.
I.
At the time the Petition to Disbar was filed, respondent was a government lawyer, employed as provincial legal officer of Negros Oriental. However, the fact that he is in government service will not preclude the Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar, should circumstances so warrant. It bears emphasizing that "[t]he Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers 'shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.' Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds."[20]
Notably, in Vitriolo v. Dasig,[21] the Court instructed that when the misconduct of government official also constitutes as a violation of one's oath as a lawyer, such lawyer may be disciplined by the Court as a member of the Bar. The Court reasoned that "a member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. [The] Code of Professional Responsibility was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service."[22]
At this juncture, it is well to point out that the Court's power to discipline erring lawyers stems from none other than its exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law under Article VIII, Section 5(5),[23] of the 1987 Constitution. In the case of In re: Cunanan,[24] it was held that "[i]t is ... the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules."[25] It was further declared that "[i]n the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility."[26]
The fact that a lawyer is a public official does not in any way, diminish or modify the Supreme Court's constitutionally vested authority to regulate the practice of law, which necessarily includes the power to discipline erring lawyers. It must be borne in mind that there is a clear substantive bifurcation between the legal profession and public service. Each is governed by different standards and bodies of rules whose regulation and administration fall under separate entities of government. Accordingly, the personality of one being sued for ethical violations as a lawyer should be treated separately and distinctly from the personality of one being sued for administrative violations as a public servant. By constitutional force, cases concerning the former is within the exclusive realm of the Supreme Court. To make any qualification on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in this respect is to diminish its constitutionally vested powers.
Cognizant of the foregoing, the Court En Banc recently promulgated Guevarra-Castil v. Atty. Trinidad[27] wherein it provided the following guidelines in the filing and handling of complaints against government lawyers:
1. All complaints against and which seek to discipline government lawyers in their respective capacities as members of the Bar must be filed directly before this Court. Conversely, complaints which do not seek to discipline them as members of the Bar shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and referred to the Ombudsman or concerned government agency for appropriate action.
2. In connection with paragraph 1, upon filing, the Court must determine whether the concerned agency, the Ombudsman, or the Court has jurisdiction over the complaint against the government lawyer. In making such determination, the following must be considered: did the allegations of malfeasance touch upon the errant lawyer's continuing obligations under the CPR and/or the Lawyer's Oath? To put it more simply, the primordial question to be asked in making this determination is this: do the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, make the lawyer unfit to practice the profession?
2a. If the question in paragraph 2 yields a positive answer, the case properly lies before the Court, which shall retain jurisdiction. This is so because again, the power to regulate the practice of law, and discipline members of the bar, belongs to Us. Necessarily, proceedings to be had before this Court should concern these and only these matters. This rule shall hold, even if the complaint also contains allegations of administrative and/or civil service rules infractions. In such situation however, the Court shall limit its ruling only to the matter of the respondent's fitness as a lawyer.
2b. On the other hand, if the question in paragraph 2 yields a negative answer, the Court, for lack of jurisdiction, shall dismiss the case and refer the same to the appropriate government office or the Ombudsman.
3. If multiple complaints have been filed, the process shall be the same.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, a circumspect reading of the instant administrative disciplinary complaint readily shows that it seeks to discipline, i.e., disbar, respondent for acts committed in his capacity as a member of the Bar, particularly for his purported unauthorized practice of law. Following the Guevarra-Castil guidelines, it is only proper that the Court assume its jurisdiction over this case to determine whether respondent should indeed be held administratively liable for the aforesaid act.
II.
Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," particularly Section 7(b)(2), reads:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
. . . .
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
. . . .
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions[.]
Here suffice it to say that since the records are bereft of proof that respondent possessed an authority to practice law outside of his duties as provincial legal officer, then his act of representing Degamo in the criminal and administrative cases against the latter constitute unauthorized practice of law.
However, and in an attempt to exculpate himself from administrative liability, he contended in his answer[29] that he believed his act of representing Degamo to be a performance of his official duties as provincial legal officer; and hence, not constituting private practice of law.
Such contention is untenable.
First, jurisprudence holds that a basic conflict of interest exists when a government lawyer representing another public official before the Ombudsman. In Fajardo v. Atty. Alvarez,[30] the respondent-lawyer, a Legal Officer III for the National Center for Mental Health, was charged, among others, with unauthorized practice of law when he represented a municipal treasurer in several cases before the Ombudsman. The respondent-lawyer therein argued that he had a valid authority to engage in private practice of the profession. Notwithstanding such authority, however, the Court, speaking through Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, found that he engaged in illicit practice of law, in violation of the Code, viz.:
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public trust." The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople," is mandated to "investigate and prosecute ...any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government's mandate under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Furthermore, this is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the Court in Fajardo held the respondent-lawyer administratively liable for violating the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
RULE 1.01. A lawyer, shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
. . . .
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Second, respondent's insistence that it was part of his duties as provincial legal officer to represent the governor is patently erroneous. Section 481 (b) of the Local Government Code[32] provides the following duties of the legal officer:
Section 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties. – . . .
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the office of legal services and shall:
(1) Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian and provide legal assistance and support to the governor or mayor, as the case may be in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code;
(2) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement the same, particularly those which have to do with programs and projects related to legal services which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code.
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local 249 government unit or any official thereof in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;
(ii) When required by the governor, mayor or sanggunian, draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and other instruments, involving any interest of the local government unit and provide comments and recommendations on any instruments already drawn;
(iii) Render his opinion in writing on any question of law when requested to do so by the governor, mayor, or sanggunian;
(iv) Investigate or cause to be investigated any local official or employee for administrative neglect or misconduct in office, and recommend appropriate action to the governor, mayor or sanggunian, as the case may be;
(v) Investigate or cause to be investigated any person, firm or corporation holding any franchise or exercising any public privilege for failure to comply with any term or condition in the grant of such franchise or privilege, and recommending appropriate action to the governor, mayor or sanggunian, as the case may be;
(vi) When directed by the governor, mayor, or sanggunian, initiate and prosecute in the interest of the local government unit concerned any civil action on any bond, lease or other contract upon any breach or violation thereof; and
(vii) Review and submit recommendations on ordinances approved and executive orders issued by component units(4) Recommend measures to the sanggunian and advise the governor or mayor as the case may be on all other matters related to upholding the rule of law;
(5) Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and prosecuting any violations thereof particularly those which occur during and in the aftermath or man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and
(6) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
A reading of the foregoing provision shows that the functions of a legal officer relate to the official duties of officials of a local government unit, which are considered acts of the local government unit itself—an offshoot of the State agency doctrine which is a core concept in the law of public officers. From an administrative law perspective, "public officers are considered as agents of the State and as such, acts done in the performance of their official functions are considered as acts of the State. In contrast, when a public officer acts negligently, or worse, in bad faith, the protective mantle of State immunity is lost as the officer is deemed to have acted outside the scope of his official functions; hence, be is treated to have acted in his personal capacity and necessarily, subject to liability on his own."[33] In this regard, case law further instructs that the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Hence, acts by such officers which constitute a crime, or that are unauthorized and in excess of the powers given to them are not acts of the State;[34] and consequently, the cloak of protection afforded to them is removed.[35]
Here, it is worthy to reiterate that respondent represented Degamo in a mix of administrative and criminal cases. In G.R. Nos. 226395, 228238, and 228325, Degamo was charged with several administrative offenses. In the cases that reached the Sandiganbayan, Degamo was criminally charged with, among others, Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Respondent withdrew his appearance in the criminal case once he was directed to do so by the Sandiganbayan. This is similar, albeit not identical, to the facts in Fajardo,[36] which also involved the representation by the errant lawyer of a public official in several administrative and criminal cases before the Ombudsman. As stated earlier, the Court noted that in cases before the Ombudsman, public officials are charged with "acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." Verily, Degamo's alleged acts constituting those administrative offenses and crimes are no longer deemed as official acts of the local government unit which he serves; and as such, falls beyond the ambit of respondent's functions as provincial legal officer. Thus, respondent's act of representing Degamo in these cases constitutes unauthorized practice of law for which he should be held administratively liable, and accordingly sanctioned.
Notably, a review of related jurisprudence shows that this is a case of first impression. In Urbano, the Court ruled that by virtue of an inherent conflict of interest, the Office of the Solicitor General may not represent an accused public official in any stage of a criminal case. In Fajardo, the errant lawyer is found liable for unauthorized practice of law when, as a legal officer for the National Center for Mental Health, he represented a public officer from another government agency in the latter's administrative and criminal cases before the Ombudsman.
In Cabalida v. Attys. Lobrido, Jr. and Pondevilla,[37] the Court, through Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, averred that it was a city legal officer who was found liable for unauthorized practice of law when he, without proper authorization from his superior, represented a client in a civil case and acted as a partner in a law firm. Meanwhile, in Lorenzana v. Atty. Fajardo,[38] the Court, through Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, stated that the lawyer maintained an extensive private legal practice without the permission of the Urban Resettlement Office in Manila, where he was employed at the time as its legal officer. Finally, in Catu v. Atty. Rellosa,[39] the Court, through the late Chief Justice Renato Corona, declared that the lawyer, who concurrently served as punong barangay, was found guilty of unauthorized practice of law when he represented a client in an ejectment case without first securing the authorization of the Department of the Interior and Local Government.
Here, the Court is presented with a situation where the legal officer of a LGU represented the chief executive of such unit in administrative and criminal cases before the Ombudsman, ostensibly in the performance of his duties as legal officer. The records do not indicate, and no allegation is made, that respondent engaged in private practice of law or that he failed to secure an authorization for private practice. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the conflict of interest discussed exhaustively in Fajardo is still present in this situation. A legal officer for an LGU encounters the same conflict of interest in representing the LGU's chief executive or any of its public officers in cases—administrative or criminal—filed before the Ombudsman. Thus, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the Court emphasizes that legal officers of LGUs may not represent the public officials of the LGUs where they are serving in cases filed against such officials before the Ombudsman; it is a conflict of interest and amounts to unauthorized practice of law.
III.
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now goes to the imposable penalty on him.
Prevailing case law, specifically the cases earlier cited, instructs that the penalty imposed by the Court for similar transgressions is suspension from the practice of law ranging from six months to one year. In Fajardo, the Court suspended the respondent-lawyer for one year for appearing as defense counsel before the Ombudsman and for influence peddling. In Cabalida, the Court imposed an additional penalty of suspension for six months on Atty. Pondevilla in addition to his other offenses. The same penalty was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in the case of Lorenzana. Finally, in Catu, the Court imposed the same penalty on the respondent-lawyer. As in this case, the Court in Catu found that the lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the CPR. Hence, the Court deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months is proper.
However, the Court sees the need for leniency in this case in light of respondent's honest belief that his acts were part of his duties and responsibilities as provincial legal officer. Instead, the Court finds that respondent must be reprimanded for his act of representing the Provincial Governor, which gave rise to a conflict of interest. The Court, however, stresses that the leniency of this penalty extends only to the present case and not to subsequent cases of legal officers representing their LGU's public officials when they are charged in their private capacities.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Richard R. Enojo is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby REPRIMANDED, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier*** (Acting Chairperson), M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Leonen,** SAJ., on official leave.
* Referred to as "Atty. Richard G. Enojo" in some parts of the rollo. Lawlist Entry: Enojo, Richard R., Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, July 3, 1995, Roll No. 40385.
** On official leave.
*** Per Special Order No. 2950 dated March 23, 2023.
[1] Not attached to the rollo.
[2] Rollo, p. 50.
[3] Id. at 51.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 2. See in particular the reverse of page 2 denoting Atty. Richard R. Enojo as counsel for the respondent.
[6] Id. at 5.
[7] Id. at 17-24.
[8] Republic Act No. 7160 (1991). Section 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) x x x
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That Sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) x x x x
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.
[9] Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
[10] Rollo, p. 21.
[11] 262 Phil. 374 (1990) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
[12] Id.
[13] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[14] Id. at 50-53.
[15] Id. at 54-55.
[16] Id. at 59-65. Penned by Commissioner Vicente C. Andiano.
[17] Id. at 61-64.
[18] Id. at 64.
[19] Id. at 57-58.
[20] Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr., 682 Phil. 1, 9 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
[21] 448 Phil. 199 (2003) [Per Curium, En Banc], citing Dinsay v. Cioco, 332 Phil. 740 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division] and Collantes v. Renomeron, 277 Phil. 668 (1991) [Per Curium, En Banc]. See also Fuji v. Dela Cruz, 807 Phil. 1 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Facturan v. Barcelona, 786 Phil. 493 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
[22] Id.
[23] Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution reads.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition or cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[24] 94 Phil. 534 (1954) [Per J. Diokno, En Banc].
[25] Id.
[26] Id. See also Tabuzo v. Gomos, 836 Phil. 297 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
[27] A.C. No. 10294, July 12, 2022 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[28] Id.
[29] Rollo, p. 21.
[30] 785 Phil. 103 (2016).
[31] Id. at 320-322.
[32] Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
[33] Abellanosa v. COA, 890 Phil. 413, 428 (2020) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[34] United States of America v. Reyes, 292 Phil. 200 (1993) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], citing Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 269 Phil. 750 (1990) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
[35] Id.
[36] 785 Phil. 303 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[37] 841 Phil. 1 (2018) [Per C.J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
[38] 500 Phil. 382 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
[39] 569 Phil. 539 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].