CONTACT: |
Supreme Court of the Philippines Library Services, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, Philippines 1000 |
(632) 8524-2706 |
libraryservices.sc@judiciary.gov.ph |
350 Phil. 129; 95 OG No. 20, 3284 (May 17, 1999)
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 122478, February 24, 1998 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. RUSTUM LUZORATA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RUSTUM LUZORATA
was charged with rape in the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City. He was convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He was also ordered to
indemnify his victim P30,000.00.
We now review
his conviction.
Maritess
Cutamora and Rustum Luzorata were neighbors in Pusok, Lapu-Lapu City, their
houses being only about 30 to 40 meters apart. Maritess was a helper in the household of Ceferina Ibio.
The nightmare of
Maritess began at dawn of 10 December 1990. At around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning, Maritess who was sleeping with her face downwards suddenly felt a
heavy weight on her back. When she
turned around she saw a man naked holding a pair of scissors. It was the accused Rustum Luzorata. She recognized him immediately as she had
known him for quite sometime before then and his face was illuminated by the
night light on the left side of her bed.[1] Ceferina, Maritess' employer, was
out of town.
Maritess'
familiarity with Rustum did not deter him from pursuing his evil design. He lost no time in lifting her t-shirt,
raised her skirt and took off her panties. She tried to resist him by crossing her legs but to no avail. She told him, "kalain gud nimo Noy
Rustum,"[2] but the accused warned her instead
to keep quiet or he would kill her. He
then placed himself on top of her, parted her legs and the inevitable had to
come. He forcibly inserted his penis
into her vagina with a "push-and-pull" movement while alternately
nibbling and sucking her nipples. After
having satisfied his lust he hurriedly put on his shorts and exited through the
same window he destroyed when he entered the house early that morning.
Her vagina bled,
ached. She wept incessantly through the
night, heavy perhaps with the thought of her experience with the accused. She was so disturbed that it took her a long
while to open the door when her employer arrived that morning from Bohol. Obviously, Maritess appeared weak, weary and
exhausted, and her employer later noticed her
condition. After narrating to Ceferina
what happen to her, her employer accompanied her to the Lapu-Lapu District
Hospital where she underwent physical examination. The result showed that she suffered fresh lacerations with bleeding
and congested edges at 5:00 o'clock position. She had abrasions on her fourchette with white vaginal discharge
indicating the presence of spermatozoa in her organ.[3]
On 14 December
1990 Maritess Cutamora lodged her complaint agaisnt the accused Rustum Luzorata
for rape in the court a quo which
on 29 October 1991 found him guilty as charged.[4]
The accused now
comes to us on appeal contending that -
First. There is no any physical evidence showing
the use of force. Dr. Araceli P. Yap,
the medico-legal officer of Lapu-Lapu District Hospital, Lapu-Lapu City,
admitted that she found no injuries on the victim's person when she was
examined and that, furthermore, the victim had old lacerations which she could
have obtained through previous sexual encounters.[5]
But in rape,
force need not always produce physical injuries.[6] The absence of external signs of
physical injuries and the failure of the victim to shout for help do not negate
rape.[7] It is not necessary that force be
employed. Intimidation is sufficient,
and this includes threatening the victim with a knife.[8] In this case, the accused used a
pair of scissors to compel his victim to submit to his evil scheme. In People v. Oarga we held
that intimidation was addressed to the mind of the victim and therefore subjective, and its presence could not be tested by any
hard-and-fast rule but must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the crime.[9]
Second. The behavior of the complainant,
particularly her conduct immediately
after the incident, negated her claim that she was raped.
This Court
indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave
immediately after she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the
victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Different people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and
there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange or startling or frightful experience.[10] In one case[11] the Court held that in a
prosecution for rape the complainant's
credibility becomes the single most
important issue. If her testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof. Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify falsely. Considering the inbred modesty and the
consequent revulsion of a Filipina
against airing in public matters that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive
that complainant would reveal and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true.[12]
Third. The
complainant's delay in reporting the alleged rape to the authorities created
serious doubts.
We do not
agree. In People v. Faigano this Court held that it was
understandable for the victim not to
immediately report the rape as Filipino women are known to be affectedly shy
and coy, and rape stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator.[13]
Fourth. The complainant did not know the identity of
the man who allegedly raped her.
This is
puerile. While it is true that the
complainant was lying down in a prone position and could not have seen the face
of the accused at the first instance, Maritess was able to positively identify
the accused when she turned her head to find out what it was or who he
was. Besides, in consummating the act,
they had to assume a missionary position which enabled the accused to
consummate the rape. The contention of
the defense that it was improbable, if not highly impossible, for the victim to
recognize a man in darkness when both her eyes were covered with tears, cannot
be given credence. The
crime scene was not exactly in pitch darkness since there was a tiny bulb which illuminated the room sufficient enough
for Maritess to see and recognize the accused.
Fifth. The defense would also fault the complaining
witness for not confronting the accused about the incident when they saw each
other after the incident.
We must consider
that the victim was a 15-year old barrio lass who only finished grade six and worked only as a househelp, obviously
too naive in the ways of the world. One
cannot expect a girl with her status in life to cry out in public her personal
anguish, humiliation and pain. Surely,
she should be looked upon with pity for the bestiality she went through. Her courage failed her when she came face to
face with the accused who was threatening to snuff off her life should she
resist.
As the trial
court observed, Maritess' innocent, straightforward and unflinching narration
of how she was molested was not at all tainted by any semblance of
untruthfulness that may open a possible avenue for suspicion that what she was
telling the court may have been coached or fabricated.[14]
We have oftentimes
taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly inconceivable for a young
barrio girl to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination
of her private parts, subject herself
to public trial and tarnish her own and her family's honor and reputation
unless she was motivated by a potent
desire to seek justice for the wrong
done to her.[15]
As regards the
testimony of Azucena Luzorata wife of the accused, suffice it to say that her
effort at an alibi for her husband merits no credence at all. She testified that her husband Rustum was
with her when the rape was committed. She tried to bolster this allegation with the fact that they had sex
around 1:00 a.m. and again at 3:00 a.m. For someone who has been so physically busy the whole day, it is most
unlikely that she could still muster the strength to indulge in sexual
interlude, twice at that in a span of two hours, when she had to report for
work early the following morning. Alibi
as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by the testimony of a
credible witness. Courts have always
looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. Alibi as basis for acquittal must be
established with clear and convincing evidence. The accused must convincingly demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. And, where accused was positively identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill motive against the rapist, as in this
case, the defense of alibi must fail.[16]
Finally, the
feigned revenge plot against the accused said to be at the machinations of the
complainant's employer is preposterous being irrelevant and immaterial. We
should accord great weight and respect to the findings of fact of the trial court as it is in a better position to determine questions involving credibility
having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment at the witness
stand. We do not see in this case any reason to overturn the findings of the trial court.[17]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant RUSTUM LUZORATA guilty
of rape and imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that the indemnity of P30,000.00 awarded by the trial court
is increased to P50,000.00 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
TSN, 3 April 1991, p. 23.
[2]
Translated into English means, "You are really bad, Noy
Rustum." Records, 13 December
1990, p. 3.
[3]
Id., 14 December 1990, p. 30.
[4]
Rollo, 29 October 1991, p. 75.
[5]
TSN., 5 March 1991.
[6]
People v. Bacalzo, G.R. No. 89811, 22 May 1991, 195 SCRA 557.
[7]
People v. Alegado G.R. Nos. 93030-31, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA
37.
[8]
People v. Salarza, G.R. Nos. 98121-22, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 55.
[9]
G.R. Nos. 109396-97, 17 July 1991, 259 SCRA 90.
[10]
People v. Talaboc, G.R. No. 103290, 23 April 1996, 256 SCRA 441.
[11]
People v. Cagto, G.R. No. 113345, 9 February 1996, 253 SCRA 455.
[12]
People v. Gecomo, G.R. Nos. 115035-36, 23 February 1996, 254 SCRA
82.
[13]
G.R. No. 113483, 22 February 1996, 10 SCRA 254.
[14]
Decision penned by Judge Teodoro K. Risos, RTC - Br. 27, Lapu-Lapu City, 29 October 1991.
[15]
People v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 117482, 8 May 1996, 256 SCRA 657.
[16]
People v. Canada, G.R. No. 112176, 6 February 1996, 253 SCRA 277.
[17]
People v. Salazar, G.R. Nos. 98121-22, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 55.