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351 Phil. 1013
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 119205, April 15, 1998 ]
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC., PETITIONER,
VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) AND SIME DARBY
SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-TUCP), RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Is the act of
management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their
paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice?
Sime Darby
Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires,
tubes and other rubber products. Sime
Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an
association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina
factory. Prior to the present
controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina including members of
private respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30
minute paid “on call” lunch break.
On 14 August
1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all
its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the
Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work
schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus –
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE
Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule factory office will be as follows:
7:45 A.M. – 4:45 P.M. (Monday to
Friday)
7:45 A.M. – 11:45 P.M. (Saturday).
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:
9:30 A.M. –10:30 A.M. and
2:30 P.M. –3:30 P.M.
Lunch break will be between:
12:00 NN –1:00 P.M. (Monday to
Friday).
Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA employees who are on shifting. Their work and break time schedules will be maintained as it is now.[1]
Since private
respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and
discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call” lunch break, it filed on behalf
of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this
Court in Sime Darby International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.[2] However, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and
the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted
a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule,
break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the effect of diminishing the
benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight
(8) hours.
The Labor
Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be justly enriched if they
continued to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer “on
call” or required to work during the break. He also ruled that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case[3] was not applicable to the instant
case because the former involved discrimination of certain employees who were
not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory workers
were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the discriminated employees be
similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch break.
Private
respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal.[4] However, upon motion for
reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with two (2) new
commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its arlier decision
of 20 April 1994 as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[5] The NLRC considered the decision of
this Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein
petitioner was ordered to pay “the money value of these covered employees
deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks.” The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the
employees of the benefits of time-honored company practice of providing its
employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of
company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction: (a) in ruling that
petitioner committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the change in
the work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. – 3:45 p.m. to 7:45 a.m. –
4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in holding
that there was diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch break was
eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby
case affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to
discontinue the practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it
decide to do so; and (d) in ignoring petitioner’s inherent management
prerogative of determining and fixing the work schedule of its employees which
is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement between
petitioner and private respondent.
The Office of
the Solicitor General filed in lieu of comment a manifestation and motion
recommending that the petition be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992
memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the
union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of
petitioner.
We agree, hence,
we sustain petitioner. The right to fix
the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the
employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its
business operations and its improved production.[6] It rationalizes that while the old
work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be
called upon to do jobs during that period as they were “on call.” Even if denominated as lunch break, this
period could very well be considered as working time because the factory
employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for
working. With the new work schedule,
the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption
from their employer. For a full
one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use
this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are
conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer required
to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be
compensated for this period. We agree
with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily
work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code.[7] Besides, the new schedule applies
to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union
members or not.[8]
Consequently, it
was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the earlier Sime
Darby case[9] with the facts obtaining in this
case. That ruling in the former case is
not applicable here. The issue in that
case involved the matter of granting lunch breaks to certain employees while
depriving the other employees of such breaks. This Court affirmed in that case the NLRC’s finding that such act of
management was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.
The case before
us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees
but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule, which management
deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor practice. As shown by the records, the change effected
by management with regard to working
time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work
whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it cannot be said that the new scheme
adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to
self-organization.
Every business
enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare
of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise
what are clearly management prerogatives.[10] Thus, management is free to
regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place
and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.[11] Further, management retains the
prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the
working hours of its employees. So long
as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this
Court will uphold such exercise.[12]
While the
Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has right which, as such, are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Although this Court has inclined more often than not toward the
worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such as
favoritism has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine.[13]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 29 November 1994 is SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Labor Arbiter dated 26 November 1993 dismissing the complaint against
petitioner for unfair labor practice is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Rollo, p. 34.
[2]
G.R. No. 87838, 26 February 1990.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Rollo, p. 70.
[5]
Rollo, p. 26.
[6]
Rollo, p. 11.
[7]
Rollo, p. 36.
[8]
Rollo, p. 42.
[9]
See Note 2.
[10]
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force v. Ople, G.R. No. 53515. 8 February
1989, 170 SCRA 25; Abbot Laboratories v. NLRC, 154 S 713.
[11]
NLU v. Insular Yebana Co., L-15363, 31 July 1961, 2 SCRA 924.
[12]
Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
41314, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 554.
[13]
Cruz v. Medina, G.R. No. 73053, 15 September 1989, 177 SCRA 565.