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The RTC stated that issuing a Temporary Environmental Protection Order was appropriate given that the case was instituted for the protection and preservation of the environment and the rights of the parties.^[24] It also gave credence to the certification of the DENR that the area where earth-moving and bulldozing activities of Spouses Maliones et al. are was outside the alienable and disposable zone.^[25] Since there was no showing that the subject land was converted into an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain by a positive act of the government, the RTC ruled that it remained beyond the commerce of man.^[26]

The RTC also declared that the writ of continuing mandamus was proper because of the insufficient action undertaken by the DENR and the other concerned agencies on the purported violations of Spouses Maliones et al., and the possible harmful effects of these activities on the environment and health of the people.^[27] For the RTC, these gave rise to an actionable neglect that justified the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus.^[28]

Aggrieved, Spouses Maliones et al. appealed to the CA.

In a Decision,^[29] the CA denied the appeal of Spouses Maliones et al., the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province in Civil Case No. 2015-10-30-68 dated October 10, 2016 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.^[30]

In denying their appeal, the CA held that Timario, et al. have legal standing to file an environmental case because of their personal and substantial interest in the protection and preservation of the Batacang and Am-amoting areas which they claim are public or communal land.^[31] It emphasized that the Regalian Doctrine leads to the presumption that the land subject of the case is considered a public forest.^[32] The CA ruled that the tax declarations presented do not prove actual ownership and that a mere claim of private ownership does not convert public property into private property. Because Timario, et al. failed to offer any evidence that the State has performed a positive act declaring the subject land to be alienable and disposable, the CA concluded that the presumption of ownership by the State remained unrebutted.^[33]

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC ordering Spouses Maliones et al. to cease and desist from occupying or converting the public forest.^[34] It also clarified that the RTC did not order the cancellation of the tax declarations. The RTC merely ordered for the conduct of an investigation as to the propriety of the issuance of the tax declarations in favor of the respective holders and to cause their cancellation if determined to have been issued in contravention of law.^[35]

In a Resolution,^[36] the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Spouses Maliones et al. for lack of merit.^[37]

In the Petition^[38] docketed as UDK-16868, Spouses Maliones argue that the Regalian Doctrine is not applicable to the subject parcels of land because they did not fall under the category of public domain.^[39] They claim that the subject parcels of land were their ancestral lands under native title from their predecessors-in-interest.^[40] Thus, they maintain that there was no basis to cause the cancellation of their respective tax declarations.^[41]

Meanwhile, in the Petition^[42] filed by Spouses Quiño, Sawate, and Bati-­el, represented by his wife Lilia Bati-el, they point out that the Petition arose from a civil case for the enforcement of environmental laws and not an action for registration of the subject parcels of land.^[43] They highlight that Timario, et al. merely alleged that the subject land was classified as outside the alienable and disposable zone based on the Land Classification Map No. 2017, certified on July 30, 1956, by the Director of Forestry.^[44] They insist that the identity of the subject land was not established as the metes and bounds were not proven by preponderance of evidence.^[45]

On the other hand, in the Joint Comment and Notice^[46] filed by Timario, et al., they insist that they did not claim the subject land as their ancestral land or individual private land.^[47] They clarify that the subject land was communal public land for all Datanians to use including the community people from the nearby barangays of different municipalities in the Mountain Province. They aver that the subject land was part of the public domain and classified as timber or forest land. They contend that it was never classified nor delineated as ancestral domain or ancestral land by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in accordance with Republic Act No. 8371.^[48]

In a Resolution,^[49] this Court ordered that the Petitions for Review on Certiorari docketed as UDK-16868 and G.R. No. 252834 be consolidated.

Issues
I.
Whether Spouses Maliones et al. may invoke their claim of ownership over the property allegedly obtained by native title to deter this Court from granting the protection order, writ of continuing mandamus, and other reliefs prayed for by Timario, et al.;and

II.
Whether the reliefs awarded are proper.

This Court's Ruling
The Petition must be denied.
 

Spouses Maliones et al. cannot invoke their claim of ownership over the property allegedly obtained by native title to deter this Court from granting the protection order, writ of continuing mandamus, and other reliefs prayed for by Timario, et al.

Spouses Maliones claim that the subject land should be considered their ancestral land, claiming that they have native title derived from their predecessors-in-interest. Particularly, they argue that the portion of the subject land declared under their names is an ancestral land of the late John Miguel that was first declared for tax purposes in 1970. Upon his death, his heirs allegedly took over and eventually sold the ancestral land to Spouses Maliones in 2012.^[50] As such, they posit that the Regalian doctrine should not be applied in justifying the reliefs awarded in favor of Timario, et al.

In the prevailing 1987 Constitution, the Regalian doctrine is found in Section 2, Article XII, which states that:

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development[,] and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant[.]^[51] (Emphasis supplied)

Spouses Maliones maintain that they derived their ownership over the subject land from their predecessor-in-interest, the late John Miguel, who allegedly acquired the same through native title. The concept of native title refers to:

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title. — refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.^[52] (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)

In determining whether this Court may resolve the argument raised by Spouses Maliones, this Court must necessarily discuss the nature of a citizen suit and the reliefs that may be awarded within the context of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

Citizen suit is one of the features introduced in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases that seeks to liberalize the traditional rule on standing by relaxing the requirement of personal and direct interest for all cases filed to enforce environmental laws. This is intended to further encourage the protection of the environment as stewards of nature.^[53] Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states:

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis in the original)

The reliefs that may be granted in a citizen suit are explicitly enumerated in Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, to wit:

SECTION 1. Relief in a citizen suit. If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. (Emphasis in the original)

The quoted provision enumerated broad reliefs that are primarily intended for the protection, preservation, and rehabilitation of the environment. This is consistent with the policy that a citizen suit is pursued in the interest of the public. A careful study of the quoted provision reveals that the authority to resolve an issue of ownership is not among the reliefs that may be awarded in a citizen suit involving an environmental case.

Furthermore, to resolve the ownership controversy raised by Spouses Maliones et al., it will necessarily entail identifying and recognizing individuals claiming to be indigenous peoples or indigenous cultural communities who claim ownership under a native title. This Court cannot simply accept and declare the parties as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples without violating the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine provides that "if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction."^[54]

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples is the primary government agency mandated by Republic Act No. 8371 to "protect and promote the interest and well-being of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions."^[55] In The City Government of Baguio City v. Atty. Brain Masweng,^[56] this Court declared that:

The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans[,] and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIP's assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.^[57] (Citations omitted)

The foregoing mandate is consistent with the framework observed by the State in favor of the protection of the rights of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples, as found in Section 22, Article 11,^[58] Section 5, Article XII,^[59] and Section 6, Article XIII^[60] of the Constitution.^[61]

Moreover, in carrying out the functions of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371 outlined its jurisdiction as follows:

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

The jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples is also delineated in Section 5, Rule III of the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003, or the Rules on Pleadings, Practice, and Procedure Before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure), which states:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/ IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation enforcement and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1)	Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the RHO:
	a.	Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
	b.	Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
	c.	Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
	d.	Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
	e.	Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2)	Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office:
	a.	Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
	b.	Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371
(3)	Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
	a.	Petition for cancellation of Certificate or Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R. A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the elate of registration.[62]

As clarified in the recent case of Santos v. Gabaen,^[63] the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples does not automatically have jurisdiction over all disputes involving indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. Citing the case of Unduran v. Aberasturi,^[64] this Court explained in Santos that:

Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371 does not confer on the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/ IPs. This Court emphasized that the proper construction of the provision, particularly its qualifying proviso, is that "the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and disputes occur only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.^[65]

The recognition of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples as the primary agency tasked to carry out the provisions in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) was also reiterated in Sama v. People,^[66] where this Court declared that:

Under the IPRA, the NCIP is the lead government agency for the protection, promotion, and preservation of IP/ICC identities and rights in the context of national unity. As a result of its expertise, it has the primary jurisdiction to identify ICCs and IPs[.]^[67] (Citations omitted)

In the present case, this Court cannot rule on the underlying claims of ownership and recognition as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. These are issues beyond the expertise of this Court and are best left to the judgment of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, the primary government agency presumed to be equipped with the technical knowledge and expertise in this specialized field. These issues cannot be resolved in the present Petition assailing the ruling of the lower courts in a citizen suit involving an environmental dispute.

Furthermore, this Court cannot simply accept the claims of Spouses Maliones et al. without validating them. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the IPRA, states:

Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. — The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.

Admittedly, it is settled that:

The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The indigenous peoples' ownership over their ancestral domain even precedes the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act. Thus, a State-issued title to the land is not a condition precedent to recognize their ownership over the land. It is simply a symbol of ownership. What the law offers is merely a formal recognition of their titles over the territories identified and delineated under the law.^[68] (Citations omitted)

It would be premature to make a final determination on the rights and obligations of the parties based on Spouses Maliones et al.'s claim of ownership when the identity of the subject property has not yet been settled. To resolve this issue, a full-blown trial on the merits must be conducted and evidence must be adduced to properly identify, delineate, and recognize the purported ancestral land, and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

As regards the claim of Spouses Maliones et al. that their respective tax declarations have been cancelled by the assailed Decision, the same is incorrect. The pertinent portion of the RTC Decision states:

D. The Public respondents Offices of the Provincial Assessor and Municipal Assesor [sic] of Sabangan, Mountain Province are ordered to desist from issuing tax declarations without compliance with the provisions of Sec. 84 of P.D. 705 and other related laws, rules, and regulations; and where appropriate to cause the cancellation of the tax declarations of the herein private respondents over the subject area at Batacang, Am-amoting, Ambango, Obua, Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province.^[69]

A careful study of the quoted portion of the Decision would reveal that there is no instruction from the court to cancel the tax declarations held by Spouses Maliones et al. Instead, the RTC merely ordered the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Mountain Province and the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Sabangan to stop issuing tax declarations without complying with Presidential Decree No. 705 and other related issuances. The second instruction of the court is to cause the cancellation of the tax declarations of Spouses Maliones et al. "where appropriate." This instruction must be understood as contemplating a scenario wherein an investigation will be conducted and the parties will be given an opportunity to be heard before determining whether the tax declarations held by Spouses Maliones et al. should be cancelled. It is not an order from the court that gives rise to an outright cancellation of the subject tax declarations that were not even submitted to the court.
 

The reliefs the CA awarded are in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

To reiterate, the present Petition under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is not the proper remedy to assail the validity of the tax declarations purportedly issued in favor of Spouses Maliones et al. nor to seek the recognition of the native title they claim to have inherited from their predecessors. Accordingly, this Court shall refrain from resolving the underlying issues on the ownership of the subject land and the recognition of the parties as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples in the present environmental case which must be addressed in the proper case and in the correct forum. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from granting reliefs available to Timario, et al., in accordance with Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

Further, the remaining arguments raised in the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 to challenge the grant of reliefs in favor of Timario, et al. do not warrant a review of the facts. Here, the arguments of Spouses Maliones et al. assailing the conclusion of the CA that there exists an actual or imminent threat that can be attributed to Spouses Maliones et al. and the activities they are conducting on the subject area, and that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the residents of Barangay Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province are being prejudiced entail a review of the factual findings of the RTC and the CA.

As a rule, issues dealing with the sufficiency of evidence and the relative weight accorded by the lower court cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is limited only to questions of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze nor weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below.^[70] While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, there is no showing that a departure from this rule is warranted. This Court finds no error in the uniform factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC and the CA to warrant their reversal or modification. The factual findings of the trial court are binding upon this Court especially when the same carry the full concurrence of the appellate court, as in this case.

In the present case, the factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, declared the existence of an actual or imminent threat can be attributed to Spouses Maliones et al. and the activities they are conducting on the subject area that violate environmental statutes and cause prejudice the life, health, or property of residents of Barangay Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province.

The reliefs awarded by the RTC and the CA are within the limits provided by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Apart from Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the court is authorized to grant reliefs such as permanent environmental protection order and writ of continuing mandamus in a citizen suit. Section 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states:

Section 3. Permanent EPO; writ of continuing mandamus. — In the judgment, the court may covert the TEPO to a permanent EPO or issue a writ of continuing mandamus directing the performance of acts which shall be effective until the judgment is fully satisfied.

The court may, by itself or through the appropriate government agency, monitor the execution of the judgment and require the party concerned to submit written reports on a quarterly basis or sooner as may be necessary, detailing the progress of the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. The other party may, at its option, submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment. (Emphasis in the original)

Here, both the RTC and the CA determined that since the subject land is presumptively part of the public forest, the acts of Spouses Maliones et al. of occupying, fencing of clearing, planting on, sowing on, and building on the disputed land are contrary to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, particularly, Sections 51,^[71] 52,^[72] 53,^[73] and 78.^[74] There is no evidence on record that Spouses Maliones et al. obtained or possessed the requisite permits or authorization to enter, occupy, and clear the forest land they claim.^[75] In addition, as aptly pointed out by the CA, with respect to Spouses Maliones, the CENRO expressly declared that their earth-moving activities were being done on a portion of the public forest.^[76] These facts remain unrebutted. As such, this Court does not find any compelling reason to reverse the reliefs awarded by the RTC and CA.

ACCORDINGLY, the consolidated Petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 1, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 108423, which denied the appeal of Spouses Maliones et al., are AFFIRMED.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region, represented by the Office of the Regional Director-CAR Engineer Ralph C. Pablo, and the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Sabangan, Mountain Province are ORDERED to:

1.	Stop and prevent Spouses Maliones et al. and anybody acting on their behalf from converting the portion of the forest zone covered by their tax declarations at Am-amoting/ Ambango, and Batacang/Obua into vegetable farms, from engaging in any other illegal activities therein including cutting of trees, kaingin, earth-moving and land conversion activities, from using chemical fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, and other substances that pollute the soil, water, and air;
2.	Cause the planting of trees in the denuded portions or the rehabilitation of the areas damaged by the earth-moving and bulldozing activities;
3.	Guard and patrol the subject area to prevent the repetition of illegal and destructive activities therein and cause the apprehension and prosecution of all violators; and
4.	Perform all needed measures to ensure the protection and preservation of the environment.

The Punong Barangay of Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province, is ORDERED to perform his/her mandated obligation to actively participate in the environmental management and protection programs of the government, to render assistance in the enforcement of environmental laws and in the apprehension of the violators thereof.

The Temporary Environmental Protection Order earlier issued is hereby made PERMANENT and an Environmental Protection Order is hereby issued and Spouses Maliones et al. are ORDERED to cease and desist from bulldozing, cultivating, and introducing improvements, from other earth­-moving activities that cause irreparable damage to the forest zone, from cutting trees, engaging in kaingin and other illegal activities, from causing pollution in any way of the soil, water, and the environment, and from claiming private owner hip over the communal forest of Batacang and Am-amoting covered by their tax declaration. Spouses Maliones et al. are ORDERED to remove their barbed wire fences that restrict the community from the use and enjoyment of the communal forest zone.

The Offices of the Provincial Assessor and Municipal Assessor of Sabangan, Mountain Province are ORDERED to desist from issuing tax declarations without compliance with the provisions of Section 84 of Presidential Decree No. 705 and other related laws, rules, and regulations; and where appropriate to cause the cancellation of the tax declarations of Spouses Maliones et al. over the subject area at Batacang, Am-amoting, Ambango, Obua, Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province.

From the finality of this Decision, the foregoing government officials and agencies are DIRECTED to submit to this Court a quarterly report of actions and measures undertaken by their respective agencies/offices in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.


Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), see concurring opinion

---

^* Also spelled as Camilla in some parts of the rollo.

^* Also spelled as Feliciana in some parts of the rollo.

^* Also spelled as Lunesa in some parts of the rollo.

^* Also spelled as Baoidang in some parts of the rollo.

^[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 258836), pp. 7-20; Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), pp. 12-37.

^[2] Rollo (G.R. 252834), pp. 44-63. The October 18, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 108423 was penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas of the Sixteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[3] Id. at 65-70. Dated July 1, 2020.

^[4] Id. at 73.

^[5] Id. at 73-91.

^[6] Id. at 73.

^[7] Id. at 74.

^[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 258836), pp. 34-35.

^[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), pp. 79-81.

^[10] Id. at 81-82.

^[11] Id. at 82-83.

^[12] Id. at 84-85.

^[13] Id. at 86-87.

^[14] Id. at 88.

^[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 258836), p, 10.

^[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), pp. 163-168.

^[17] Id. at 163-165 and 356-357.

^[18] Id. at 169-174.

^* Sawati in some parts of the rollo.

^[19] Id. at 170.

^[20] Id. at 175-187.

^[21] Id. at 176-177.

^[22] Id. at 376-394.

^[23] Id. at 391-393.

^[24] Id. at 386.

^[25] Id. at 387.

^[26] Id.

^[27] Id. at 390-391.

^[28] Id. at 390.

^[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 258836), pp. 24-42. Dated October 18, 2019.

^[30] Id. at 42.

^[31] Id. at 34-36.

^[32] Id. at 37-38.

^[33] Id. at 39.

^[34] Id. at 39-41.

^[35] Id. at 41-42.

^[36] Id. at 44-49. Dated July 1, 2020.

^[37] Id. at 48.

^[38] Id. at 7-20.

^[39] Id. at 13-14 & 16.

^[40] Id. at 14-16.

^[41] Id. at 16-17.

^[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), pp. 12-37.

^[43] Id. at 30-31.

^[44] Id. at 31.

^[45] Id.

^[46] Id. at 438-446.

^[47] Id. at 443.

^[48] Id. at 444.

^[49] Id. at 435-437. Dated April 28, 2021.

^[50] Id. at 163-165 and 356-357.

^[51] CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.

^[52] Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 970 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

^[53] A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, April 13, 2010, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES.

^[54] Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 527 Phil. 623, 626 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)

^[55] Republic Act No. 8371, sec. 3(k) and 39.

^[56] 597 Phil. 668 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[57] Id. at 674.

^[58] CONST., art. II, sec. 22 states: Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

^[59] CONST., art. XII, sec. 5 states: Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

^[60] CONST., art. XIII, sec. 6 states: Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights or indigenous communities lo their ancestral lands. The Stale may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

^[61] Santos v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 195638, March 22, 2022 [Per J. Lopez, J., En Banc] at 11. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[62] Section 5, Rule III of the NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003.

^[63] Supra note 60, at 12. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy or this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[64] 771 Phil. 536 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[65] Supra note 60, at 12-13. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[66] G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, En Banc].

^[67] Id. at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[68] Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority, G.R. Nos. 198688 & 208282, November 24, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc] at 38. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[69] Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), p. 392.

^[70] Heirs of Racaza v. Spouses Abay-abay, 687 Phil 584, 590 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

^[71] Presidential Decree No. 705, sec. 51 of, as amended, states:

Sec. 51. Management of Occupancy in Forest Lands. — Forest occupancy shall henceforth be managed. The Bureau shall study, determine and define which lands may be the subject of occupancy and prescribed therein, an agro-forestry development program.

Occupants shall undertake measures to prevent and protect forest resources.
Any occupancy in forest land which will result in sedimentation, erosion, reduction in water yield and impairment of other resources to the detriment or community and public interest shall not be allowed. In areas above 50% in slope, occupation shall be conditioned upon the planting of desirable trees thereon and/or adoption of other conservation measures.

^[72] Presidential Decree No. 705, sec. 52, as amended, states:
Sec. 52. Census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands. Henceforth, no person shall enter into forest lands and cultivate the same without lease or permit.

A complete census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants and residents in forest lands with or without authority or permits from the government, showing the extent of their respective occupation and resulting damage, or impairment of forest resources, shall be conducted. The Bureau may call upon other agencies of the government and holders of license agreement, license, lease and permits over forest lands to participate in the census.

^[73] Presidential Decree No. 705, sec. 53, as amended, states:

Sec. 53. Criminal Prosecution. Kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants who entered into forest lands before the effectivity of this Code, without permits or authority, shall not be prosecuted: Provided, that they do not increase their clearings: Provided, further, That they undertake, within two (2) months from the notice thereof, the activities which will be imposed upon them by the Bureau in accordance with a management plan calculated to conserve and protect forest resources.

^[74] Presidential Decree No. 705, sec. 78, as amended, states:

Sec. 78. Unlawful occupation or destruction of forest lands. Any person who enters and occupies or possesses, or makes kaingin for his own private use or for others any forest land without authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, or in any manner destroys such forest land or part thereof, or causes any damage to the timber stand and other products and forest growths found therein, or who assists, aids or abets any other person to do so, or sets a fire, or negligently permits a fire to be set in any forest land shall, upon conviction, be fined in an amount of not less than five hundred pesos ([PHP] 500.00) nor more than twenty thousand pesos ([PHP] 20,000.00) and imprisoned for not less than six (6) months nor more than two (2) years for each such offense, and be liable to the payment of ten (10) times the rental fees and other charges which would have been accrued had the occupation and use of the land been authorized under a license agreement, lease, license or permit: Provided, That in the case of an offender found guilty of making kaingin, the penalty shall be imprisoned for not less than two (2) nor more than (4) years and a fine equal to eight (8) times the regular forest charges due on the forest products destroyed, without prejudice to the payment of the full cost of restoration of the occupied area as determined by the Bureau.

The Court shall further order the eviction of the offender from the land and the forfeiture to the Government of all improvements made and all vehicles, domestic animals and equipment of any kind used in the commission of the offense. If not suitable for use by the Bureau, said vehicles shall be sold at public auction, the proceeds of which shall accrue to the Development Fund of the Bureau. In case the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in addition to the above penalties, be deemed automatically dismissed from office and permanently disqualified from holding any elective or appointive position.

^[75] Rollo (G.R. No. 252834), p. 61.

^[76] Id. at 59.

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CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur. The Petition for enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws which includes the prayer for the issuance of the environmental protection order and writ of continuing mandamus, should be granted.

I
Pursuant to the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology and to ensure the effective enforcement of environmental laws,^[1] the Court adopted the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases providing for the remedies of continuing mandamus and environmental protection order.

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases define a continuing mandamus as a "writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied."^[2] Meanwhile, it defines an environmental protection order (EPO) as "an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the environment."^[3]

Prior to the enactment of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, this Court, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,^[4] first introduced and applied the principle of continuing mandamus and held that under extraordinary circumstances, the Court may issue directives to ensure that "its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference." Thus, this Court ordered the petitioners government agencies to submit a progressive report of the activities undertaken pursuant to the decision.

Thereafter, the rationale for the writ of continuing mandamus has been explained by this Court in Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan:^[5]

The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law" and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO "as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.'' The Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this wise:

Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal­-point from the initiation of regulation by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate government agencies.

Thus, a government agency's inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely on such agencies to take the initial incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly, questions regarding the propriety of an agency's action or inaction will need to be analyzed.

This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the performance of a legal duty.

The writ of continuing mandamus "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision" and, in order to do this, "the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision."^[6] (Emphasis in the original)

Although similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases on the writ of continuing mandamus provides a distinct procedure as it is specifically intended for the enforcement or violation of environmental laws.^[7]

Rule 8, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides:

When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

Rule 8, Section 4 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases requires the petition to be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action. Thus, in Dolot v. Paje:^[8]

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forums hopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality or government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course or law.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein.^[9] (Emphasis in the original)

Upon a finding of the sufficiency of the petition, the Court may then issue its judgment pursuant to Rule 5, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases:

SECTION 1. Reliefs in a Citizen Suit. — If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
. . . .

SECTION 3. Permanent EPO; Writ of Continuing Mandamus. — In the judgment, the court may convert the TEPO to a permanent EPO or issue a writ or continuing mandamus directing the performance of acts which shall be effective until the judgment is fully satisfied.

The court may, by itself or through the appropriate government agency, monitor the execution of the judgment and require the party concerned to submit written reports on a quarterly basis or sooner as may be necessary, detailing the progress of the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. The other party may, at its option, submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.

Thus, in Boracay Foundation, Inc., this Court ordered the temporary environmental protection order to be converted into a writ of continuing mandamus, in effect granting petitioner's prayer to compel respondents' compliance with environmental laws, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing mandamus specifically as follows:

1.	Respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources Environmental Management Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and review the following matters:
	a.	its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
	b.	its approval of respondent Province's classification of the project as a mere expansion of the existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead or classifying it as a new project; and
	c.	the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated, and comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be ordered by respondent DENR-­EMB RVI.
2.	Respondent Province of Aklan shall perform the following:
	a.	fully cooperate with respondent DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation project proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
	b.	secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as required by Section 27 in relation to Section 26 of the Local Government Code.
3.	Respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the submission by respondent Province of the requirements to be issued by respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the environmental concerns raised by petitioner, and shall coordinate with respondent Province in modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of respondent DENR­-EMB RVI.
4.	The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the respondents The Province of Aklan, represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to submit their respective reports to this Court regarding their compliance with the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than three (3) months from the date of promulgation of this Decision.
5.	In the meantime, the respondents, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents, representatives or persons acting in their place or stead, shall immediately cease and desist from continuing the implementation of the project covered by ECC­ R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders from this Court. For this purpose, the respondents shall report within five (5) days to this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy furnished the petitioner.[10]

. . . .

According to petitioner, respondent Province acted pursuant to a MOA with respondent PRA that was conditioned upon, among others, a properly-secured ECC from respondent DENR-EMB RVI. For this reason, petitioner seeks to compel respondent Province to comply with certain environmental laws, rules, and procedures that it claims were either circumvented or ignored. Hence, we find that the petition was appropriately filed with this Court under Rule 8, Section 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC ... ^[11]

Still, in Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,^[12] this Court emphasized the necessity for every petition praying for the issuance of a writ of continuing to mandamus to be clear on the guidelines sought for its implementation and its termination point:

However, requiring the periodic submission of compliance reports does not mean that the court acquires supervisory powers over administrative agencies. This interpretation would violate the principle of the separation of powers since courts do not have the power to enforce laws, create laws, or revise legislative actions. The writ should not be used to supplant executive or legislative privileges. Neither should it be used where the remedies required are clearly political or administrative in nature.

For this reason, every petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus must be clear on the guidelines sought for its implementation and its termination point. Petitioners cannot merely request the writ's issuance without specifically outlining the reliefs sought to be implemented and the period when the submission of compliance reports may cease.^[13]

In this case, respondents Mario Somebang Timario, Jr., Gabriel B. Lantec, Janice A. Biag, Feliciana^[14] C. Laus, Oplen Saga-oc, Narcisa Vicente, Gloria G. Polon, Lunesa^[15] V. Tany, Evelio Andy S. Timario, Octavio A. Lesking, Roel Ngoloban, Nestor Buteng, Cynthia G. Polon, William Sad-ang, Cerilo Baoidang, Jr.,^[16] Adam Sirnultog, Elena Atolba, Dux Allen P. Annaguey, Rydel Lantec, Mario Pagtan, Suani M. Copicop, Carnille^[17] Cayabas, Jun M. Witawit, George Daday, Criselda Bimoyag, John It-itan, Tomas O. Bangsoy, Crispin B. Mangangey, Thelma L. Lacyod, Eva Tongtongdan, Mathew W. Kiyawan, Miranda L. Bingcola, Ferdinand Sudicalan, Ian C. Dameg, Domingo Montes, Benjamin Malona, Davyne Art Kidit, Jessamine Timario, Helen T. Ngiteyeb, Laurence M. Viernes, and Caesar Lapicto Balacwid (respondents Timario et al.) filed a Petition for enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws, which includes a prayer for the issuance of temporary or permanent environmental protection order and a writ of continuing mandamus.^[18]

They alleged that petitioners Spouses Robles and Rose Maliones, Spouses Eduardo and Rosita Quiño, George Bati-el, and Eugenio Sawate (petitioners Maliones et al.) declared for tax purposes portions of a parcel of land situated in Am-amoting/Batacang in Barangay Data, Sabangan, Mountain Province, which are classified as "outside the Alienable and Disposable Zone" by the Director of Forestry. This supposedly enabled petitioners Maliones et al. to introduce improvements to the area; exclude the public from its use and enjoyment; do "earth moving and bulldozing activities that have destroyed the natural view and beauty of nature"; use fertilizers and pesticides contributing to soil, water, and air pollution; cut and/or threaten to cut alnus trees and pine trees; and engage in kaingin activities that contributed to the destruction of the environment.^[19]

Thus, respondents Timario et al. pray that: (a) the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-City Environment and Natural Resources Office be compelled to zealously enforce and implement the environmental laws; (b) the Provincial and Municipal Assessors of Mountain Province be compelled to release certified true copies of the tax declarations in the name of the tax declaration holders; and (c) the Punong Barangay of Data to actively participate in the environmental management and protection programs of the government.^[20]

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals determined that the subject land is presumptively part of the public forest, and that the acts of petitioners Maliones et al. in occupying, fencing off, clearing, planting on, sowing on, and building on the land are contrary to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, particularly Sections 51, 52, 53, and 78,^[21] to wit:

SECTION 51. Management of Occupancy in Forest Lands. — Forest occupancy shall henceforth be managed. The Bureau shall study, determine and define which lands may be the subject of occupancy and prescribed therein, an agro-forestry development program.

Occupants shall undertake measures to prevent and protect forest resources.

Any occupancy in forest land which will result in sedimentation, erosion, reduction in water yield and impairment of other resources to the detriment of community and public interest shall not be allowed.

In areas above 50% in slope, occupation shall be conditioned upon the planting or desirable trees thereon and/or adoption of other conservation measures.

SECTION 52. Census of Kaingineros, Squatters, Cultural Minorities and other Occupants and Residents in Forest Lands. — Henceforth, no person shall enter into forest lands and cultivate the same without lease or permit.

SECTION 53. Criminal Prosecution. — Kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occupants who entered into forest lands and grazing lands before May 19, 1975, without permit or authority, shall not be prosecuted:...

SECTION 78. Unlawful Occupation or Destruction of Forest Lands and Grazing Lands. — Any person who enters and occupies or possesses, or makes kaingin for his own private use or for others, any forest land or grazing land without authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, or in any manner destroys such forest land or grazing land or part thereof, or causes any damage to the timber stand and other products and forest growth found therein, or who assists, aids or abets any other person to do so, or sets a fire, or negligently permits a fire to be set in any forest land or grazing land, or refuses to vacate the area when ordered to do so, pursuant to the provisions or Section 53 hereof shall, upon conviction, be lined in an amount or not less than five hundred pesos (P500.00), nor more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisoned for not less than six (6) months nor more than two (2) years for each such offense, and be liable to the payment to ten (10) times the rental lees and other charges which would have accrued has the occupational and use of the land been authorized under a license agreement, lease, license or permit:"

Thus, in an October 10, 2016 Judgment, the trial court granted the following reliefs to respondents Timario et al., which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered issuing the writ prayed for and ordering the public respondent DENR-CAR represented by the Office of the Regional Director-CAR Engr. Ralph C. Pablo and the DENR­-CENRO-Sabangan, Mountain Province to:

A. 1. Stop and prevent the herein private respondents and anybody acting in their behalf from converting the portion or the Forest Zone covered by their Tax Declarations at Am­-amoting/Ambango, and Batacang/Obua into vegetable forms, from engaging in any other illegal activities therein including cutting of trees, kaingin, earth moving and land conversion activities, from using chemical fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides, and other substances that pollute the soil, water, and air;

2. cause the planting of trees in the denuded portions or the rehabilitation of the areas damaged by the earth moving and bulldozing activities;

3. guard and patrol subject area to prevent repetition of illegal and destructive activities therein and cause the apprehension and prosecution of all violators; and

4. perform all needed measures to ensure the protection and preservation of the environment.

B. Likewise ordering the Punong Barangay of Data, Sabangan. Mountain Province, to perform his mandated obligation to actively participate in the environmental management and protection programs of the government, to render assistance in the enforcement of environmental laws and in the apprehension of the violators thereof;

C. The Temporary Environmental Protection Order earlier issued is hereby made PERMANENT and an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) is hereby issued and the private respondents arc ordered to cease and desist from bulldozing, cultivating, and introducting improvements, from other earth moving activities that cause irreparable damage to the forest zone, from cutting trees, engaging in kaingin and other illegal activities, from causing pollution in any way of the soil, water, and the environment, and from claiming private ownership over the communal forest of Batacang and Am­-amoting covered by their tax declarations. The private respondents are ordered to remove their barbed wire fences that restrict the community from the use and enjoyment of the communal forest zone.

D. The Public respondents Offices of the Provincial Assessor and Municipal Assesor of Sabangan, Mountain Province are ordered to desist from issuing tax declarations without compliance with the provisions of Sec. 84 of P.D. 705 and other related laws, rules, and regulations; and where appropriate to cause the cancellation of the tax declarations of the herein private respondents over the subject area at Batacang, Am-amoting, Ambango, Obua, Data, Sabangan. Mountain Province.

E. From the finality of this Judgment, the public respondents are directed to submit to the court quarterly report of actions and measures undertaken by their respective agencies/offices in accordance with this Judgment.

F. No award of damages for lack of basis. No costs.

SO ORDERED.^[22]

In granting respondents' Petition, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, established that the Petition is sufficient both in form and substance. The Court of Appeals found:

As summarized by the RTC, the petitioners' causes of action against the respondents is the latter's alleged acts which violate P.D. No. 705, as amended, or the Revised Forestry Code. The petitioners accuse private respondents of illegally occupying and destroying parts of the public forest. They also bring action to compel public respondents to perform their duty to protect the public forests by enforcing environmental laws. In relation to such causes of action, petitioners' legal standing is based on their personal and substantial interest in the protection and preservation of the Batacang and Am-amoting areas which they claim are public or communal lands. Petitioners are not asserting private ownership over said areas. Instead, the allegations of their petition seek to enjoin activities which threaten to irreversibly damage and destroy a part of the public forest to which every Filipino citizen, and more specifically the residents or the Municipality of Sabangan, Mountain Province, have a right to enjoy as part of their enforceable environmental rights.^[23]

However, petitioners insist that they possess native title over the subject parcels of land, as those were ancestral lands from their predecessors-in-­interest.

In Federation of Coron, Busuanga, Palawan Farmer's Association, Inc. v. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,^[24] this Court has already clarified that native title is an exception to the concept of Regalian doctrine:

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws or the [ndies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

To further understand the Regalian Doctrine, a review of the previous Constitutions and laws is warranted. The Regalian Doctrine was embodied as early as in the Philippine Bill of 1902. Under Section 12 thereof, it was stated that all properties of the Philippine Islands that were acquired by the United States through the treaty with Spain shall be under the control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, to wit:

SECTION 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine islands by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as provided in this Act.

The only exception in the Regalian Doctrine is native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown. In Cariño v. Insular Government, the United States Supreme Court at that time held that:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, which institutionalized the concept of native title. Thus:

Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

From the foregoing, it appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership or land.^[25] (Emphasis supplied)

However, in Federation of Coron, despite the recognition of the validity of native title, this Court held that petitioners therein still failed to prove actual possession and ownership of the land, and that the subject forest land has been classified to alienable and disposable land, thus:

In this case, aside from their bare assertion that they are recipients of the distribution of the lands in Sitio Dipangan and Langka, Brgy. Bintuan, Coron, and Brgy. Sto. Nino, Busuanga, Palawan under the CARP, petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of mvncrship and possession over the same. As properly pointed out by respondents, petitioners have not presented any evidence to prove that they actually occupy the lands much less that the lands are alienable and disposable. Further, petitioners have not even alleged that they attempted to file an application to have the subjects lands re-classified from forest lands to alienable and disposable lands of public domain with the proper government agency and that their application was denied.^[26]

This Court emphasized that unclassified lands are not subject to private ownership because they belong to the State and are not alienable and disposable lands of public domain:

However, it must be emphasized that even without Sec. 3 (a), which declared that unclassified lands are considered as forest lands, the exact same result shall apply — unclassified lands are still not subject to private ownership because they belong to the State and are not alienable and disposable lands or public domain.

In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court explained that when a land or public domain is unclassified, it cannot be released and rendered open for private disposition pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine and that the private applicant in a land registration case has the burden of proof to overcome State ownership of the lands of public domain, to wit:

Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for under [C.A.] Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Courts have no authority to do so.

This is in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The burden or proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Similarly, in Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was held that when the land is unclassified, it shall not be subject to disposition pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of public domain belong to the State, viz:

In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification or public lands is an exclusive prerogative or the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, [C.A.] No. 141 as amended: Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources 123 SCRA 441 [1983]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10. Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).

Indeed, under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.^[27] (Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, here, petitioners failed to prove that the parcel of land classified as "outside the Alienable and Disposable Zone" by the Director of Forestry, being forest lands, has been reclassified to alienable and disposable lands of public domain.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision dated October 18, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 1, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108423 should be AFFIRMED.

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^[1] Rules or Procedure for Environmental Cases, sec. 3(a) and (c).

^[2] Rules or Prncedure for Environmental Cases, sec. 4(c).

^[3] Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, sec. 4(d).

^[4] 595 Phil. 305 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

^[5] 689 Phil. 218 (2012) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

^[6] Id. at 271-272.

^[7] Dolot v. Paje, 716 Phil. 458, 471 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, En Banc].

^[8] Id.

^[9] Id. at 471-472.

^[10] 689 Phil. 218, 186-288 (2012) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

^[11] Id. at 272.

^[12] G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019 [Per J. Leonen. En Banc].

^[13] Id.

^[14] Also spelled as "Feleciana" in some parts of the rollo.

^[15] Also spelled as "Lumesa" in some parts of the rollo.

^[16] Also spelled as "Bao-idang" in some parts of the rollo.

^[17] Also spelled as "Camilla" in some parts of the rollo.

^[18] Ponencia, p. 1

^[19] Id. at 4-5.

^[20] Id. at 5-6.

^[21] Id. at 19.

^[22] Rollo, pp. 30-31.

^[23] Id. at 34-35.

^[24] G.R. No. 247866, September 15, 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].

^[25] Id.

^[26] Id.