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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 262664, October 03, 2023 ]
MANUEL LOPEZ BASON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
INTING, J.:
The Antecedents
Bason was charged with violation of Sections 5[7] and 11,[8] Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165.[9] The accusatory portions of the Informations[10] read:
[Criminal Case No. C-288-16]
That on or about the 22nd day of July 2016, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable [c]ourt, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, deliver, and/or transport to PO1 JIOME CASABON a "poseur buyer", one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, with a weight of 0.0769 grams (sic), without authority to sell, deliver and/or transport the same, in consideration of the agreed sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
[Criminal Case No. C-289-16]
That on or about the 22nd day of July, 2016, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable [c]ourt, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession and control:
without being authorized by law to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Upon arraignment, Bason entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.[13] Trial ensued.
On June 5, 2018, Bason instead proposed to plead guilty to two (2) counts of violation of Section 12,[14] Article II of the same law.[15]
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City (OCP-Roxas City) filed its Opposition[16] on the following grounds: (1) it has already rested its case and it has a strong evidence against Bason; (2) under Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 027,[17] Bason can only be allowed to enter a plea of guilty from Section 5 to Section 11, Article II of RA 9165; (3) the proposed plea bargain will render insignificant the investigation and resolution of the case in court; and (4) there is probable cause for the filing of two or three charges for violation of RA 9165 against Bason.[18]
The RTC Rulings
On November 29, 2018, the RTC issued the Order[19] granting Bason's plea bargaining proposal against the consent of the prosecution. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Plea Bargaining Proposal of MANUEL BASON y LOPEZ is GRANTED over the objection of the Prosecution and the Court will allow the accused to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty to the offenses charged and substitute the same to a plea of guilty to offenses mentioned in the Plea Bargaining Proposal.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On Bason's re-arraignment on December 3, 2018, the RTC issued an Order[21] charging Bason with two (2) counts of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Manuel Bason y Lopez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the following:
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[22]
The OCP-Roxas City filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the Orders of the RTC dated November 29, 2018, and December 3, 2018. It argued that the prosecution's consent or conformity was mandatory in the approval of a plea bargaining proposal.[24] It argued that if the RTC's findings support a conclusion that the guilt of Bason cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, then the RTC should have dismissed the case instead of granting the plea bargaining proposal.[25]
On January 23, 2019, the RTC issued an Order[26] denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On behalf of the State, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for issuing the assailed Orders.
The CA Rulings
On April 13, 2021, the CA issued the Decision[27] granting the petition for certiorari. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Order dated November 29, 2018, the Order dated December 3, 2018, and the Order dated January 23, 2019, issued by respondent Judge Ignacio I. Alajar, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, in Criminal Cases Nos. C-288-16, and C-289-16, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, is ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. C-288-16, and C-289-16, with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration[29] of Bason, the CA denied[30] it for lack of any strong and compelling argument to warrant a modification of its previous decision.[31]
Hence the instant petition where Bason argues that: (1) the CA erred when it ruled that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when the latter granted Bason's plea bargaining proposal despite the prosecution's objection; (2) the CA erred when it ruled that a plea bargaining without the consent of the prosecution is void, in contravention of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC; and (3) with the advent of DOJ Department Circular No. 018,[32] the issue on the lack of consent in plea bargaining cases is now cured.[33]
Issues
The issues raised before the Court are as follows:
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases takes precedence over any DOJ Department Circular or other similar issuances regarding plea bargaining in drugs cases. |
In the recent case of People v. Montierro[34] (Montierro), the Court took judicial notice of DOJ Department Circular No. 018. It recognized that the amendments introduced in DOJ Department Circular No. 018 reconciled the inconsistencies regarding the acceptable plea in DOJ Department Circular No. 27 and the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. As it now stands, under the DOJ Circular and the Court-issued framework, the acceptable plea for a violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 is Section 12, under the same Article. As such, the objection of the prosecution on the ground that the proposed plea bargain is not allowed or goes beyond the guidelines provided under DOJ Department Circular No. 27 is rendered moot.[35]
Moreover, in Montierro, the Court emphasized that its Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases takes precedence over DOJ Department Circular No. 27, or any other similar issuance. It clarified that any plea bargaining framework it promulgates is accorded primacy over any internal guideline on the same matter that the DOJ may issue.[36]
Plea bargaining requires the consent of the parties, but the approval thereof is subject to the sound discretion of the court. |
In Montierro, the Court simplified that, as a rule, plea bargaining in drugs cases requires the mutual agreement of the parties. If a plea bargaining proposal is objected to by the prosecution based solely on the ground that the accused's proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargaining proposal under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, the trial court may overrule the objection after determining that the plea bargaining proposal circumscribes to the Court-issued framework on the acceptable plea bargains and by the evidence and circumstances of each case.[37]
However, when the objection of the prosecution to the plea bargaining proposal is valid and supported by evidence—to the effect that (1) the accused is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times, or (2) the evidence of guilt is strong—the trial court is mandated to hear the prosecution's objection and rule on the merits thereof.[38]
In summary, the approval of the accused's plea of guilty to a lesser offense is ultimately subject to the sound discretion of the court as its discretion to act on a plea bargaining proposal is independent from the requirement of mutual agreement of the parties.[39]
Approval of the plea bargaining proposal requires an evaluation of the character of the accused and the weight of the prosecution's evidence. |
In Montierro, the Court emphasized that the trial court should ensure that any plea bargaining proposal is based on the Court-issued framework and the evidence presented.[40] It is also necessary that the trial courts particularly ascertain if the accused is qualified to a plea bargain taking into consideration the latter's character or if the evidence of guilt is strong.[41] Concurrence of these conditions is not necessary as they pertain to the accused's eligibility to plea bargain. The presence of any of these conditions already disqualifies the accused from entering a plea of guilty to a lesser offense.[42]
Further, in cases where the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution rested its case, the trial court can rule on its propriety after assiduously studying the prosecution's evidence on record. The trial court's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea only becomes proper and regular if its ruling discloses the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.[43]
In the case, the RTC in its Order[44] dated November 29, 2018, adjudged the weight of the evidence presented and ruled that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized items as the police officers committed procedural lapses, which cast doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the offense.[45]
The RTC detailed the procedural lapses in the following excerpts from its Order:
In the cases at hand, the [court] notes of the procedural lapses committed by the Police Officers. As revealed by the Affidavit of Arrest of PO1 Jiome Casabon, PO3 John Aleligay, Police Blotter Report Excerpt, and Investigation Report, PO1 Jiome Casabon brought the seized drug related items to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City after the conclusion of the inventory, and after the accused was physically examined and detained at the Roxas City Police Station. Contrary to this sequence of events is the testimony of PO1 Jiome Casabon [which] x x x stated that after the accused was brought to the Police Station, he took some rest at the safe house of his team bringing with him the recovered items from Manuel Bason. It was also revealed during his testimony that x x x he did not proceed to the Crime Laboratory in Iloilo City and instead, he went to their safe house at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of July 22, 2016 and left the premises only after more than four (4) hours to bring the items to the Crime Laboratory.
The inconsistency x x x created not only a missing link in the chain of custody but also, when coupled with the lack of specifics on how the seized drug related items were stored and preserved from the time of its seizure until its delivery to the Crime Laboratory, created doubts on the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items thereby creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.
Finally, the [c]ourt also notes that despite the missing link in the chain of custody, there is also nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that shows the precautions undertaken to ensure that the condition of the seized items was not altered and the lack of opportunity for anyone not in the chain of custody to take possession of the same. x x x.[46]
Clearly, the RTC made an evaluation of the evidence. As a result of this evaluation, it approved the plea bargaining proposal of Bason.
However, as discussed above, Montierro also requires that the trial court make an evaluation of the character of the accused before it approves the plea bargaining proposal. Particularly, the trial court shall ensure that the accused is not (1) a recidivist, (2) a habitual offender, (3) known in the community as a drug addict and troublemaker, (4) one who has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, and (5) one who has been charged many times.[47]
Here, the records do not show that the RTC made an evaluation of Bason's character. Hence, it should not have approved Bason's plea bargaining proposal without this evaluation. As such, it is proper that the case be remanded to the court of origin to make a determination on whether Bason is qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining based on his character.
A drug dependency test is not a pre-requisite for granting a plea bargain. |
An essential issue was raised before the Court in Montierro on the matter of whether a drug dependency test is a pre-requisite for the approval of a plea bargaining proposal. This issue proceeded from the argument of petitioner Cypher Baldadera y Pelagio (Baldadera) in G.R. No. 254974 that the Plea bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases neither required a drug dependency test for plea bargaining nor made it a condition sine qua non before the prosecution gives consent to a plea bargain.[48]
To address the issue, the Court in Montierro particularly issued the following guidelines:
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the following guidelines shall be observed in plea bargaining in drugs cases:
x x x x
x x x x[49] (Italics supplied)
As a result, the Court in Montierro directed the RTC therein to order petitioners Baldadera and Erick Montierro y Ventocilla to undergo drug dependency test pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.[50]
As Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa noted, Montierro essentially considers the conduct of a drug dependency test as a condition precedent for an accused to avail himself of the plea bargaining mechanism. However, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa pointed out that a closer reading of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC suggests that a drug dependency test is not a pre-requisite for plea bargaining; in fact, it is to be conducted only after the approval of the plea bargaining proposal.
To be clear, a drug dependency test is not a requirement for the approval of a plea bargaining proposal. Based on the guidelines in Montierro, the approval or denial of a plea bargaining proposal is dependent primarily on the trial courts' exercise of its sound discretion taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused as well the evidence present.[51] The requirement for a drug dependency test becomes relevant as the trial courts are required to ensure that, after the approval of the plea bargaining proposal, the applicant is subjected to a drug dependency test to determine if treatment and rehabilitation or counselling, as the case may be, is required as aptly provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Moreover, to make a drug dependency test a requisite for the approval of a plea bargaining runs counter with the purpose for which plea bargaining was adopted in our jurisdiction.[52] As emphasized in Montierro, the plea bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure is geared towards achieving an efficient, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of a case.[53] As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier in her Opinion in Montierro, requiring a drug dependency assessment early on in the process will unnecessarily delay the disposition of the criminal case, precisely as there is no available data on the waiting and processing period for a drug dependency assessment.[54] As such, a prompt disposal of the plea bargaining proposal is necessarily important to ensure that the benefits of the mechanism as to the accused, insofar as early rehabilitation, redemption, and reintegration to society is concerned, and to the State, insofar as to the minimal use of resources, are achieved.[55]
Clarificatory guidelines regarding drug dependency test |
Taking into consideration the foregoing discussion, the Court issues the following clarificatory guidelines to guide trial courts in the implementation of the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.
Summary
To reiterate, in approving or denying plea bargaining proposals, trial courts have the solemn duty and ultimate responsibility to determine the applicant's entitlement thereto based on an evaluation of the latter's character or an assessment of the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. The Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC to provide trial courts with the framework to ascertain whether the proposal to a lesser offense is aligned therein.
After approval of a plea bargaining proposal, trial courts shall then require the conduct of a drug dependency assessment of the accused, not as a condition sine qua non for the plea bargaining but instead to ensure that the applicant undergoes treatment and rehabilitation or counselling, if needed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 13, 2021, and the Resolution dated May 26, 2022, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12682 are SET ASIDE.
The case of petitioner Manuel Lopez Bason is REMANDED to the court of origin to determine whether petitioner is a recidivist, a habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times.
In case the trial court finds petitioner Manuel Lopez Bason qualified to avail himself of the benefits of plea bargaining, a drug dependency assessment shall be conducted pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and the guidelines set forth herein.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, and Singh, JJ., concur.
Lazaro-Javier* and Dimaampao,** JJ., on official business.
Kho, Jr., J., please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
* On official business.
** On official business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4–25.
[2] Id. at 31–42. Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Lorenza Redulla Bordios and Bautista G. Corpin, Jr.
[3] Id. at 45–49. Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Bautista G. Corpin, Jr. and Jacinto G. Fajardo, Jr.
[4] Id. at 58–61, 62–63, and 69. Penned by Presiding Judge Ignacio I. Alajar.
[5] See Proposal for Plea Bargaining dated June 5, 2018, id. at 51–54.
[6] Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, approved on April 10, 2018.
[7] Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
[8] Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
[9] Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, approved on June 7, 2002.
[10] Rollo, pp. 32–33, CA Decision.
[11] Id. at 32.
[12] Id. at 32–33.
[13] Id. at 33.
[14] Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs.
[15] Rollo, p. 34.
[16] Id. at 55–57. Signed by Associate City Prosecutor Ronald G. Asong and approved by City Prosecutor Erwin D. Ignacio.
[17] Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165 Otherwise Known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," DOJ Department Circular No. 27, Series of 2018.
[18] Rollo, pp. 55–56.
[19] Id. at 58–61.
[20] Id. at 61.
[21] Id. at 62–63.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 64–68.
[24] To bolster this argument, the OCP-Roxas City cited the case of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo (816 Phil. 789 [2017]), Section 2 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, approved on April 25, 2017, and took effect on September 1, 2017).
[25] Rollo, pp. 66–67.
[26] Id. at 69.
[27] Id. at 31–42.
[28] Id. at 41.
[29] Id. at 76–80.
[30] Id. at 45–49.
[31] Id. at 49.
[32] Revised Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165 Otherwise Known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", DOJ Department Circular No. 018, Series of 2022.
[33] Rollo, pp. 11–12.
[34] G.R. No. 254564, July 26, 2022. This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 254974 (Baldadera v. People) and A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC (In Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing Its Concern Over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295).
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id.
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] Id.
[43] Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789, 817 (2017), citing People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 731 (1992).
[44] Rollo, pp. 58–61.
[45] Id. at 38 and 60–61.
[46] Id. at 60–61.
[47] People v. Montierro, supra note 34.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id.
[51] Id.
[52] People v. Montierro, supra note 34, citing Estipona v. Lobrigo, supra note 43, at 813.
[53] People v. Montierro, supra note 34.
[54] See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier in People v. Montierro.
[55] People v. Montierro, supra note 34, citing Estipona v. Lobrigo, supra note 43, at 812–813, further citing the cases of Brady v. Unites States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); and Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
KHO, JR. J.:
I concur in the result.
I.
As a brief background, this case stemmed from two Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Capiz, Branch 18 (RTC) respectively charging petitioner Manuel Lopez Bason (petitioner) with violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"[1] as amended.[2] During trial, petitioner made a plea bargaining proposal wherein he offered to plead guilty to two counts of violation of Article II, Section 12 of RA 9165 instead. The prosecution opposed said proposal, on the ground that, inter alia: (a) it had already rested its case and it has strong evidence against petitioner; and (b) Department of Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 027[3] disallows plea bargaining for Section 5 of RA 9165.[4]
The RTC approved petitioner's plea bargaining proposal over the objection of the prosecution, and accordingly, promulgated a ruling finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Article II, Section 12 of RA 9165.[5] Aggrieved, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).[6] After due proceedings, the CA rendered a ruling reversing and setting aside the assailed RTC ruling, and accordingly, ordering the latter court to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases against petitioner, with reasonable dispatch.[7]
The ponencia, mainly citing People v. Montierro,[8] set aside the CA ruling, and accordingly ordered the remand of the criminal cases "to the court of origin to determine whether petitioner is a recidivist, a habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times."[9] Furthermore, the ponencia clarified the guidelines laid down in Montierro, insofar as it held that the conduct of drug dependency test is NOT a condition sine qua non for plea bargaining in drugs cases. Pertinent portions of the ponencia read:
To be clear, a drug dependency test is not a requirement for the approval of a plea-bargaining proposal. Based on the guidelines in Montierro, the approval or denial of a plea-bargaining proposal is dependent primarily on the trial courts' exercise of its sound discretion taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused[,] as well as the evidence present[ed]. The requirement for a drug dependency test becomes relevant as the trial courts are required to ensure that, after the approval of the plea-bargaining proposal, the applicant is subjected to a drug dependency test to determine if treatment and rehabilitation is required as aptly provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
Even so, trial courts may still determine the propriety of a drug dependency test[,] especially considering that the prolonged period counted from the time of the arrest may render the test impractical, as in the present case. To recall, the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. C-288-16 and C-289-16 stated that the offenses were committed on July 22, 2016. On June 5, 2018, after arraignment, [petitioner] filed his proposal for plea bargaining. From July 22, [2016 until] present, a period of more than seven years has already expired. Certainly, subjecting him to a drug dependency test may no longer serve the purpose for which such test was predicated upon.
Moreover, to make a drug dependency test a requisite for the approval of a plea bargaining runs counter with the purpose for which plea bargaining was adopted in our jurisdiction. As emphasized in Montierro, the plea-bargaining mechanism in criminal procedure is geared towards achieving an efficient, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of a case. As pointed out by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier in her Opinion in Montierro, requiring a drug dependency assessment early on in the process will unnecessarily delay the disposition of the criminal case, precisely as there is no available data on the waiting and processing period for a drug dependency assessment. As such, a prompt disposal of the plea-bargaining proposal is necessarily important to ensure that the benefits of the mechanism as to the accused, insofar as early rehabilitation, redemption, and reintegration to society is concerned, and to the State, insofar as to the minimal use of resources, are achieved.
To reiterate, in approving or denying plea-bargaining proposals, trial courts have the solemn duty and ultimate responsibility to determine the applicant's entitlement thereto based on an evaluation of the latter's character or an assessment of the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. The Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC to provide trial courts with the framework to ascertain whether the proposal to a lesser offense is aligned therein. Trial courts, if minded may resort to a drug dependency assessment of the accused, not as [a] condition sine qua non for the plea bargaining but instead, after the approval of the proposal to ensure that the applicant undergoes treatment or rehabilitation if needed.[10]
As adverted to, I concur in the result arrived at by the ponencia. Nonetheless, I respectfully write this Opinion to offer my reasons behind such concurrence; and more significantly, to reiterate the points of dissent I made in my Opinion in Montierro.
II.
With respect to my point of concurrence with the ponencia, it is pointed out that during the pendency of this case, or on May 10, 2022, the DOJ issued DOJ Circular No. 018,[11] which explicitly revoked the earlier-issued DOJ Circular No. 27. A salient feature of DOJ Circular No. 18 is that the DOJ aligned its plea-bargaining framework with that of the Court, i.e., A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.[12]
In Montierro, the Court En Banc, speaking through Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, ruled that "[w]ith the amendments introduced in DOJ Circular No. 18, the prosecution's objection to [therein accused's] plea bargaining proposals, which was based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27, can now be considered as effectively withdrawn."[13] This notwithstanding, the Court En Banc ruled that the trial courts should not have hastily approved therein accused's plea bargaining proposals over the objection of the prosecution. Rather, the trial courts should have first resolved the objection of the prosecution before approving such proposals, which resolution includes a determination of: (a) whether the evidence of guilt against therein accused is strong; and (b) whether therein accused are recidivists, habitual offenders, are known in the community as drug addicts and troublemakers, have undergone rehabilitation but suffered relapses, or have been charged many times. The Court En Banc further instructed that the presence of any of these circumstances would bar therein accused from availing of the benefits of entering into a plea bargain with the State. Given the foregoing, the Court En Banc concluded that the criminal cases against therein accused should be remanded to the court of origin to afford the latter an opportunity to determine whether or not therein accused are qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining.[14]
It is opined that the factual milieu of the instant case is very much similar to that in Montierro. Given this circumstance, the Court En Banc's disquisition in Montierro is equally applicable herein. Thus, pursuant to Montierro, I agree with the ponencia insofar as it held that: first, the prosecution's objection to petitioner's plea bargaining proposal, which is, in part, grounded on the contention that DOJ Circular No. 27 disallows plea bargaining for violations of Section 5 of RA 9165, had already been rendered moot by DOJ Circular No. 18; and second, the criminal cases against petitioner should be remanded to the RTC in order for the latter court the opportunity to ascertain whether petitioner is qualified to avail of the benefits of plea bargaining. This ascertainment will necessarily include not only a determination of whether petitioner is a recidivist, habitual offender, is known in the community as a drug addict and/or a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but suffered relapses, or has been charged many times — as stated in the ponencia, but also a determination of whether the evidence of guilt against petitioner is strong.
III.
Notwithstanding my concurrence as above-described, I respectfully tender my dissent to the ponencia's statement that the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases takes precedence over any DOJ Department Circular or other similar issuances regarding plea-bargaining in drugs cases."[15]
In this regard, I find it fitting to restate the points of dissent I made in my Opinion in Montierro, the pertinent portions of which read:
It is respectfully submitted that the fact that there is no substantive law that relates to plea bargaining and that the same is found in prevailing rules of procedure does not necessarily mean that all aspects of plea bargaining are purely procedural in nature, as what the Majority posits. In fact, the process of plea bargaining is where the two (2) great branches of government – the Executive Department and the Judicial Department – converge, where each has a significant, but separate, role to play to advance the administration of justice.
As may be seen in the requisites of plea bargaining, aside from the accused and the private offended party in applicable instances (as there are crimes which have no private offended party) there are two (2) branches of government that are involved in a plea bargaining process, namely: (a) the Executive Department, represented by the prosecutor who is an agent of the DOJ, which in turn, acts as an alter-ego of the President – that consents to a guilty plea to a lesser offense by the accused; and (b) the Judicial Department, as represented by the trial court handling the criminal case – that approves or disapproves a plea bargaining arrangement agreed upon by the parties-litigants in a criminal case.
That said, and to further understand the interplay of Executive and Judicial powers insofar as plea bargaining is concerned, there is a need to delineate the powers of these great departments in relation to the prosecution of criminal cases in general.
....
Pursuant to Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the President – the bearer of Executive power – to "ensure that the laws [shall] be faithfully executed," it is the Executive Department that is tasked to uphold and enforce the law, and to ensure that all violators are brought to justice in order to uphold public order.
Necessarily, "the prosecution of crimes appertains to the [E]xecutive [D]epartment of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.''
It is thus elementary that "in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and 'the purpose of the criminal action is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the State with his crime . . . In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state."'
In recognition of this exercise of power by the Executive Department, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, explicitly provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor" – who as explained above, is an agent of the DOJ, and who, in turn, is considered an alter-ego of the ultimate wielder of Executive power, the President. Thus, the right to prosecute offenses properly belongs to the Executive Department. This "right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors."
On the other hand, the courts exercise Judicial power which includes the power "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" and to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]"In criminal cases, Judicial power is exercised by the courts by directing the orderly conduct of proceedings, and in the process, ultimately resolving the case and all incidents pertaining thereto, such as but not limited to, the main task of determining whether or not the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. At all times, the courts should act as an impartial tribunal that sees to it that all rules and procedures pertaining to the proper conduct of a trial are faithfully complied with, due process is accorded with both the prosecution and defense and that any judgment rendered in connection with the criminal case is in accordance with prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
Since the conduct of plea bargaining is but a mere component of a criminal case, its substantive aspects, particularly, the determination of which offenses may be plea bargained and what may constitute as proper "lesser offenses" to which a plea bargain may be made in each particular case, as well as the prosecution's giving of consent to a plea bargaining proposal, which is an essential requisite to plea bargaining, are part and parcel of the prosecutorial power which rightfully belongs to the prosecutors of the Executive Department.
Plainly, these substantive matters are matters of policy which should not be touched by the courts. After all, it is the prosecutors and the DOJ in general, as agents of the State who expend State resources in prosecuting violations of the duly enacted penal laws of the country. Thus, the prosecutors must be given the discretion to determine whether or not they will continue to pursue the prosecution of an offense as charged; or if they will just save on the State's resources by agreeing to a plea bargaining deal which will ensure a conviction, albeit for a lesser offense than what was charged. On the other hand, the courts, which stand as the representatives of the Judicial Department, are tasked to ensure that all the requisites of plea bargaining are dutifully complied with.
....
Contrary to what the guideline states, the approval to plea bargain is not entirely dependent to the sound discretion of the court. To reiterate, plea bargaining involves an interplay of the great powers of the Executive and Judicial Departments. It is essentially a two (2)-step process:
First, once the accused submits a plea bargaining proposal, it is up to the Executive Department, through the DOJ and its prosecutors, that wields prosecutorial power, to determine whether it should give its consent to the same; and
Second, once the Executive Department (and the private offended party, in proper cases) gives its consent, it is now up to the Judicial Department to ensure and verify that all requisites for a valid plea bargaining agreement are present. If in the affirmative, then the courts should approve the plea bargaining agreement; otherwise, it should be rejected.
Thus, the first step involves the discretion of the Executive Department, whose discretion in giving or not giving its consent, should be respected by the court as a co-equal body. As already adverted to, the involvement of the Judicial Department in the plea bargaining process is only when the accused, the handling prosecutor, and the private offended party in proper cases, have mutually agreed on a plea bargaining agreement and the same is submitted to the court where the criminal case is pending for its approval or disapproval – which is encapsulated in the second step as above-described. Thus the plea bargaining process is a shared responsibility of the Executive and Judicial Departments.
....
As also discussed above, the determination of which offenses may be plea bargained and what may constitute as "lesser offenses" to which a plea bargain may be made, as well as the giving of consent to a plea bargaining on the part of the prosecutor, are substantive aspects of plea bargaining. These are necessarily part and parcel of the prosecutorial power which rightfully belongs to the prosecutors of the Executive Department, which in turn represents the State – and the People of the Philippines for that matter. Thus, the courts should not be allowed to overrule the objections or the prosecution to any plea bargaining proposal of the accused or to disapprove any plea bargaining agreement if all the requisites of plea bargaining under the Rules are present, including in drugs cases. For the Court to allow this to happen is tantamount to the authorization of an undue and dangerous intrusion into the powers of the Executive Department.
It bears reiterating that the role of the Judicial Department in a criminal case is not to champion the cause of the State and the People of the Philippines – its critical role is justly limited to being an impartial tribunal that ensures the orderly conduct of proceedings and to adjudicate in accordance with prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
Thus, the Judicial Department should not arrogate upon itself the substantive power to determine what is an acceptable "lesser offense" to which the accused may plead guilty to in lieu of the original charge against him/her, and to approve the plea bargaining proposal over the objections of the prosecutors or to disapprove the plea bargaining agreement notwithstanding the presence of all the requisites of plea bargaining as contained in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. If allowed to do so, the trial courts will effectively supplant the wisdom of the Executive Department in the prosecution of criminal cases, a responsibility imposed upon it by no less than the Constitution, thereby resulting in an impermissible overreach into the realm of the Executive Department.
For these reasons, and after a circumspect reflection, I respectfully submit that it now appears that the Court's very own plea bargaining framework for drugs cases, i.e., A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, may have unduly overstepped into the boundaries of Executive power insofar as it provided, among others, a determination as to which violations of RA 9165 may be subject to plea bargaining, including the corresponding lesser offense to which the accused may plead guilty to.
At this juncture, it is acknowledged that the guidelines provided in this case were explicitly made applicable only to plea bargaining in drugs cases. However, I respectfully opine that the Majority's resolution of this case might present a dangerous precedent for the court to intrude into substantive matters of plea bargaining of other crimes, which to again reiterate, are purely within the domain of the Executive Department – under the mistaken notion that all aspects of plea bargaining are purely procedural in nature, particularly in the light of the explicit pronouncement in the ponencia that any plea bargaining framework that the Court may promulgate should be accorded primacy. With all due respect, this should not be countenanced as it is unconstitutional.[16] (Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)
Verily, my views in my Montierro Opinion, which I reiterate herein, may be synthesized as follows:
First, the process of plea bargaining involves the interplay of the powers of the Executive and Judicial Departments;
Second, the substantive aspects of plea bargaining, which include the determination of the "lesser offenses" which an accused may plead guilty to, belongs to the Executive Department; whereas the procedural aspects of plea bargaining, which includes the determination of whether all the requisites of plea bargaining are complied with, belongs to the Judicial Department; and
Third, for the Judicial Department to: (a) insist that its plea bargaining framework takes precedence over that issued by the Executive Department; (b) overrule the objections of the prosecution to any plea bargaining proposal of the accused; and/or (c) disapprove any plea bargaining agreement if all the requisites of plea bargaining are present, is tantamount to an undue and dangerous intrusion into the powers of the Executive Department.
ACCORDINGLY, I VOTE to REMAND the criminal cases against petitioner Manuel Lopez Bason to the court of origin to ascertain his eligibility for plea bargaining, which includes the determination of whether: (a) the evidence of guilt against him is strong: and (b) he is a recidivist, habitual offender, is known in the community as a drug addict and/or a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but suffered relapses, or has been charged many times.
[1] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (2002).
[2] RA 10640, entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002'" (2014).
[3] RE: AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002" (2018).
[4] Ponencia, pp. 2–3.
[5] Id. at 3-4.
[6] Id. at 4.
[7] Id. at 5.
[8] See G.R. No. 254564 (consolidated with Baldadera v. People, G.R. No. 254974; and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC), July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[9] Ponencia, p. 12.
[10] Id. at 10–11.
[11] RE: REVISED AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002" (2022).
[12] "ADOPTION OF THE PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" (A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018).
[13] See G.R. No. 254564 (consolidated with Baldadera v. People, G.R. No. 254974; and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC), July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[14] See id.
[15] See ponencia, p. 6.
[16] J. Kho, Jr., Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Montierro, G.R. No. 254564, (consolidated with Baldadera v. People, G.R. No. 254974; and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC) July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc] citations omitted.