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868 Phil. 56
EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 9459, January 07, 2020 ]
RENE J. HIERRO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Antecedents
Hierro filed a letter-complaint for disbarment with the Supreme Court on May 9, 2012, which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) through a Resolution[7] dated February 13, 2013 charging Atty. Nava of violating Canons 7.03, 15.03, 17, 21.01 and 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through the following acts:
1. Conflict of interest on the part of Atty. Nava for acting as counsel for Annalyn Hierro (Annalyn), Hierro's spouse, in her petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO)[8] against Hierro before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City when Hierro used to be a client of Atty. Nava;
2. Grossly immoral conduct for engaging in adulterous relations with Annalyn and fathering a child with her; and
3. Dereliction of duty for abandoning Hierro as the latter's counsel in a case for Grave Threats with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, docketed as Criminal Case No. S-799-09 after the filing of the petition which resulted to Hierro's conviction.
Respondents Position
Atty. Nava vehemently denied the allegations against him. On the allegation of conflict of interest, Atty. Nava contends that he was compelled to sign the petition with prayer for the issuance of a TPO[9] out of exigency and for humanitarian consideration since prompt and responsive action is needed to preserve the life of Annalyn and her three young daughters: Moreover, Atty. Nava claims that his engagement was limited only to the filing of the petition and securing a TPO from the court. As soon as the TPO was issued, he withdrew as counsel for Annalyn. Furthermore, there was no confidential information in the filing of the civil action because although the narration of all criminal cases involving Hierro was included in the petition for the issuance of a TPO, it is nonetheless based on public records and was not revealed by Hierro to Atty. Nava in confidence. Additionally, Atty. Nava avers that such disclosure is not prejudicial to the case of Hierro and is therefore not covered by the prohibition of Canon 21.01 on conflict of interest.[10]
As to the allegation of grossly immoral conduct, Atty. Nava said that such allegation is a mere afterthought and has no factual basis. As a matter of fact, the complaint for adultery filed against him was dismissed by the investigating prosecutor as the latter found the case to be without merit.[11]
Regarding the allegation of abandonment of Hierro in his Grave Threats case which led to his conviction, Atty. Nava vehemently denied such allegation saying it was Hierro who terminated his services. He also pointed out that the said case was promulgated on September 2, 2011, way before the filing of the civil case of Annalyn on October 21, 2011. This belies the claim of Hierro that Atty. Nava abandoned him after the filing of the petition against him. Besides, to negate the allegation of abandonment, Atty. Nava claims that he was the one who presented Hierro to the witness stand and was the one who conducted the direct examination until his full testimony was terminated.[12]
Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,[13] Investigating Commissioner Rommel V. Cuison (Commissioner Cuison) recommended that Atty. Nava be disbarred and his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On November 28, 2015, a Resolution[14] was passed by the IBP Board of Governors which adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cuison, to quote:
CIBD Case No. 13-3823
A.C. No. 9459
Rene Hierro vs. Atty. Plaridel Nava II
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommended penalty of DISBARMENT on Atty. Plaridel Nava II by the Investigating Commissioner, considering the gravity of his offenses.
Hence, the case was transmitted to this court for review.
The Court's Ruling
After reviewing the records of the case, the Court finds that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors regarding CIBD Case No. 13-3823 is in accord with the pertinent rules and jurisprudence on bar discipline. Hence, we are inclined to adopt the said recommendation.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Particularly, Canon 15.03 demands that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against the latter.[15] The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and confidence.[16] Its purpose is to ensure absolute freedom of communication between the lawyer and the client in order to enable the former to suitably represent and serve the latter's interests. Notably, it is both unethical and unacceptable for a lawyer to use any information he gains during the lawyer-client relationship against his client.[17]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Nava became the retained counsel of Hierro in the latter's cases and also as counsel for Annalyn in the petition for the issuance of a TPO against Hierro. It must be highlighted that the petition for the issuance of a TPO contains reference to the criminal cases that were handled by Atty. Nava to demonstrate Hierro's propensity for violence in order to show supposed maltreatment of Hierro to Annalyn, to wit:
x x x x
14. [Hierro's] history of violence can be gleaned from the following criminal cases he is presently facing in court which were filed by persons, thus:
Case No. S-799-09
S-211-10
R189-10
S-477-10
444-08/445-08
446-08
09-67704-67711
08-65985
GRAVE THREATS
GRAVE THREATS
GRAVE COERCION
RESISTANCE
FALSIFICATION
PERJURY
ESTAFA
ESTAFAMTCC Br. 1
MTCC Br. 2
MTCC Br. 4
MTCC Br. 7
MTCC Br. 7
MTCC Br. 7
RTC Br. 33
RTC Br. 26[18]
Atty. Nava was the lawyer of Hierro in seven of the eight aforementioned cases. As defense counsel for Hierro, Atty. Nava advocates the innocence of his client in these cases. However, in citing these as part of the petition for the issuance of a TPO, in effect, he is implying that there is merit in these cases which is diametrically opposed to his position as defense counsel of Hierro. This clearly violates the rule against conflict of interest.
We are not convinced by Atty. Nava's defense that he accepted the engagement by Annalyn because of emergency, exigency and on temporary capacity only. As a lawyer, he should have used better judgment to foresee the possibility of conflict of interest as that is what the society expects of him. Besides, even if the filing of the TPO is an emergency which requires a swift response, he could have easily recommended another competent lawyer in his place.
As for the gross immorality charge against Atty. Nava, a thorough review of the records would show that there is merit to the said charge. In order to exculpate himself from any liability, he highlights the dismissal of the complaint for adultery against him and Annalyn by the Office of the Prosecutor. However, it must be noted that administrative cases are sui generis and are not affected by the result of any civil or criminal case. They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, being neither purely civil nor purely criminal,[19] but rather involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.[20] Therefore, the instant case, being administrative in nature, may proceed independently and is not bound by the outcome of any criminal and civil proceeding.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed to practice law.[21]
Besides, as pointed out by the IBP, the dismissal by the Office of the Prosecutor of the adultery case is not yet final and executory as it is still under appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
On the other hand, to prove the charge of grossly immoral conduct, Annalyn admitted to maintaining adulterous relations with Atty. Nava. It must be emphasized that Annalyn's admission is not the only piece of evidence pointing to such fact. In her judicial affidavit, Atty. Nava's wife, Cecilia Lim-Nava, stated under oath that Atty. Nava admitted having an affair with Annalyn and that he fathered a child with her. Furthermore, the record of the criminal proceedings for the crime of adultery included the affidavits of Mercedes Nava (Mercedes) and Joy Legarda who confirmed the extramarital affair of Atty. Nava and Annalyn. In fact, in Mercedes' affidavit, she categorically stated that she witnessed the affectionate and intimate gestures between Atty. Nava and Annalyn. Aside from that, she testified that she would bring Annalyn to the office of Atty. Nava to make love, to wit:
x x x x
9. After that, Rene Hierro and I went directly to their house in Providence and when we reached there, we had lunch there at the house of the spouses and after that we left, and while on board the vehicle, Atty. Nava texted to bring Annalyn Hierro to his office which was on top of the Supermarket. When we reached his office, Annalyn Hierro and Atty. Plaridel Nava made love.as they missed each other and after that, Atty. Nava gave instruction to Annalyn that she will be the only beneficiary and not to include the children so that there will be no problem.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Immoral conduct, or immorality, is that which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. As a basis of disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[23]
Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or morality of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he/she denies the charge, for he/she must meet the issue and overcome the evidence presented on the charge. He/she must present proof that he/she still maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of him/her at all times.[24] Atty. Nava failed in this regard.
In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every lawyer, Atty. Nava should have desisted from the illicit relationship with Annalyn not only for the reason that she is married, but also because her husband was his client. His act of involving himself in sexual relations with the wife of his client definitely transgressed the clearly-defined bounds of decency and morality. These circumstances were more than sufficient to establish the charge of gross immorality.
"Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings."[25]
In view of the foregoing, Atty. Nava's immoral conduct violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares respondent Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II GUILTY of conflict of interest and gross immorality in violation of Rule 15.03 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively; DISBARS him from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision; and ORDERS his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Nava's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (C.J.), Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, and Lopez, JJ., on official leave.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., on official business.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-3.
[2] Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
[3] Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.
[4] CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
[5] Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law; [and]
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
[6] CANON 22- A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
[7] Rollo, p. 397.
[8] Id. at 1207-1211.
[9] Id. at 1211.
[10] Id. at 873-876.
[11] Id. at 871-872.
[12] Id. at 877-878.
[13] Id. at 1336-1340.
[14] Id. at 1292-1293.
[15] See Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, 111-112 (2003).
[16] Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 578 (1949).
[17] Diongzon v. Atty. Mirano, 793 Phil. 200, 208 (2016).
[18] Rollo, p. 135.
[19] The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche v. Atty. Lazaro, 794 Phil 308, 317 (2016).
[20] Bertol v. Valencia, A.C. No. 10397, April 2, 2018 (Minute Resolution).
[21] Ylaya v. Atty. Gacon, 702 Phil. 390, 407 (2013).
[22] Rollo, p. 333.
[23] Advincula v. Atty Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 112-113 (2016).
[24] Fabie v. Atty. Real, 795 Phil. 488,495-496 (2016).
[25] Ceniza v. Atty Ceniza, Jr., A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I fully agree with the majority that respondent Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II should be disbarred. However, I take this opportunity to reiterate a fine point.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides that grossly immoral conduct may disbar a misbehaving lawyer:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This finds reinforcement in Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As a ground for disbarment, gross immorality requires a nuanced analysis of our collective notions of morality, the prevailing reality of relationships and families, and the particular circumstances of each case.
In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera[1] this Court discussed how morality is understood in our jurisdiction:
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described morality as "how we ought to live and why."
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, is "a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator." A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans.
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose.[2] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Secular standards, independent of religious beliefs, must be the basis for determining immorality. After all, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to weigh in on religious doctrine.[3]
Lawyers are held to exacting standards as court officers. Disciplinary proceedings against them serve to curb misbehavior and promote excellent public service in the Judiciary. Thus, what constitutes gross immorality is conduct that severely erodes public trust in the rule of law.[4] The behavior that is penalized "must be so gross as to be 'willful, flagrant, or shameless,' so much so that it 'shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."'[5] In a previous case, I opined:
Grossly immoral conduct must be an act that is "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."
There is no fixed formula to define what constitutes grossly immoral conduct. The determination depends on the circumstances. In Arciga v. Maniwang:
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
. . . .
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in consonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend on the surrounding circumstances.[6] (Citations omitted)
The State must not excessively intrude into the personal relationships of lawyers to the extent that it unduly affects their professional standing. Marital indiscretion by itself is insufficient to strip one's license to practice law. To sensibly implement our notion of secular morality is to reckon with the prevailing realities of how marriage works, and not dwell on its idealized versions.
In previous cases, I opined that, generally, complaints for immorality should not be entertained unless initiated by the victims in each case.[7] I proposed the following guidelines in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala:[8]
If at all, any complaint for immorality should not be entertained except when it is commenced by its victims. That is, the betrayed spouse, the paramour who has been misled, or the children who have to live with the parent's scandalous indiscretions.
I accept that in some cases, especially where there is some form of violence against women and children within the families affected, it would be difficult for the victims to come forward. It should only be then that a third party's complaint may be entertained. The third party must show that it acts for the benefit of the victims, not as a means to cause more harm on them. Furthermore, the inability of the victims must be pleaded and proven.
. . . .
I appreciate the ponente's acknowledgment that "immorality only becomes a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary when the questioned act challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice." This affirms this Court's principle that our jurisdiction over acts of lawyers and judges is confined to those that may affect the people's confidence in the Rule of Law. There can be no immorality committed when there are no victims who complain. And even when they do, it must be shown that they were directly damaged by the immoral acts and their rights violated. A judge having children with women not his wife, in itself, does not affect his ability to dispense justice. What it does is offend this country's predominantly religious sensibilities.[9] (Citations omitted)
In Dagala, respondent Judge Exequil L. Dagala (Judge Dagala) admitted to fathering children with women other than his wife. However, he and his wife had mutually accepted that they were not meant for each other and amicably parted ways. He sent support to his children. More important, the victim had forgiven and forgotten.
I reiterate that caution must be taken against stereotyping women as victims who "are weak and cannot address patriarchy by themselves."[10] The State's over-patronage may infringe on the agency of a woman who has found her voice and chosen to forgive.[11] Secular standards of morality will not view Judge Dagala's conduct as one of perverse nature, such that it undermined public trust in the legal profession.
Nonetheless, this case is different.
Here, complainant Rene Hierro (Hierro) lodged the Complaint against respondent, who engaged in sexual relations with Hierro's wife. As respondent's client and the husband of respondent's mistress, he was directly affected by respondent's misconduct. Moreover, Hierro's Complaint was backed by respondent's wife, Cecilia Lim-Nava, who also testified against respondent.
As the ponencia narrated, two (2) other witnesses in the criminal case for adultery, one of whom is a relative,[12] attested to respondent's indiscretions. The ponencia underscored how witness Mercedes Nava testified that she would accompany his paramour to his office, where they would make love.[13] She also recounted how respondent had told his paramour that "she [would] be the only beneficiary and not to include the children so that there [would] be no problem."[14] This is not the amicable arrangement outside of marriage that may be deemed acceptable. Respondent exhibited sheer indifference to public opinion and appeared to be callous and lacking circumspection. His conduct was "so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law"[15]—one that this Court penalizes.
In my separate opinion in Dagala, I wrote:
The highest penalty should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law. The negligence or utter lack of callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their inability to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate relationships, or their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock should be aggravating and considered for the penalty to be imposed.[16]
It did not help respondent's case that he represented his paramour in filing a petition against her husband, who was also his client, and in which he cited his client's cases as proof to support his paramour's petition.
All told, respondent is unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. He must be disbarred.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur.
[1] 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[2] Id. at 397-398.
[3] Id. at 399.
[4] Id.
[5] J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Tumbaga v. Teoxon, A. C. No. 5573, November 21, 2017, 845 SCRA 415, 439 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[6] Id. at 439-440.
[7] See J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Sabillo v. Atty. Lorenzo, A.C. No. 9392, December 4, 2018, [Per Curiam, En Banc]; and J . Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019,
[8] 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[9] Id. at 154-155.
[10] Id. at 155.
[11] Id.
[12] Ponencia, p. 6. The ponencia named a certain in Mercedes Nava as witness, but how she and respondent were related was not mentioned.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 154 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[16] Id. at 155.