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559 Phil. 20
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 146212, September 05, 2007 ]
FRED N. BELLO, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CORPUZ MOYA SECURITY AND SERVICES, INC. AND/OR REMEDIOS MOYA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
[6]
In a Letter[7] dated August 28, 1997, the respondent CMSSI informed the petitioner that he was being dismissed:
In view of the termination of our contract with the ROBINSONS ANTIPOLO HOMES and the need to adapt a policy of strict etrenchment due to loss of a substantial amount of a revenue by our company we are obliged much to our regret to inform you that we are dispensing with your services effective August 31, 1997 until such time as we shall be in a financial position to avail once more of your assistance.[8]The petitioner received the letter on September 1, 1997. On September 15, 1997, the petitioner filed a Complaint[9] against CMSSI for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, nightshift differential, overtime pay and other money claims. In his Affidavit, the complainant admitted that the agency could hardly cope with its financial obligations, for which reason he has not yet requested for the reimbursement of his transportation expenses. For their part, the respondents explained that in the months of August and September 1997, Robinsons’s Land Corporation cancelled its contracts with CMSSI. In order to cope with the huge loss of revenue, CMSSI was forced to adopt strict austerity measures. These measures included the retrenchment of employees, particularly the petitioner, whose services had become unnecessary.; Moreover, based on the evaluation of the petitioner’s performance, they found that he was incapable of discharging his duties and responsibilities, and that he was frequently absent for several days.[10]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant as illegally and unjustly dismissed and respondents are jointly and severally ordered to pay complainant ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P108,000.00) representing his full backwages including 13th month pay and ordering respondents to reinstate complainant Fred N. Bello to his former position without loss of seniority rights. However, in case reinstatement is no longer practicable, complainant shall be paid separation pay of one-month pay for every year of service in addition to his full backwages. The reinstatement aspect is immediately executory even pending appeal.SO ORDERED.[12]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 15 September 1998 is hereby REVERSED.
Respondent CORPUZ MOYA SECURITY & SERVICES, INC. is however ordered to indemnify complainant FRED N. BELLO the amount of P1,000.00. SO ORDERED.[14]
The case of PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation vs. NLRC cited by petitioner enunciated that "in labor cases, both the party and its counsel must be duly served their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution; unlike in ordinary judicial proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to the party.” Reference was made therein to Article 224 of the Labor Code. But, as correctly pointed out by private respondent in its Comment to the petition, Article 224 of the Labor Code does not govern the procedure for filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the decision of the NLRC but rather, it refers to the execution of "final decisions, orders or awards" and requires the sheriff or a duly deputized officer to furnish both the parties and their counsel with copies of the decision or award for that purpose; There is no reference, express or implied, to the period to appeal or to file a petition for certiorari as indeed the caption is “execution of decisions, orders or awards.” Taken in proper context, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of “final decisions, orders or awards” and could not have been intended to refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or order. The period or manner of "appeal" from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65 pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, states that the "petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed." Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly mandates that "(F)or the purpose(s) of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record." Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why the same rule should not apply to petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC.This procedure is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that "(A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure”’ a provision which is similar to Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel.[23]
We are mindful of the Court’s rulings that, as much as possible, appeals should not be dismissed on a mere technicality in order to afford the litigants the maximum opportunity for the adjudication of their cases on the merits.[25] However, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[26] After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision in the case.[27]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated July 5, 2000 and November 24, 2000, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
[2] Rollo, pp. 98-99.
[3] Id. at 42.
[4] Id. at 43.
[5] Id. at 50.
[6] Id. at 44.
[7] Id. at 45.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 47-48.
[10] Id. at 61.
[11] Id. at 66-72.
[12] Id. at 71-72.
[13] Id. at 74-81.
[14] Id. at 80-81.
[15] Id. at 86.
[16] Id. at 83.
[17] Id. at 89-91.
[18] Id. at 98-99.
[19] Id. at 136.
[20] 353 Phil. 431, 445-446 (1998).
[21] Allied Banking Corporation v. Eserjose, G.R. No. 161776, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 199, 208.
[22] 411 Phil. 953 (2001).
[23] Id. at 957-958.
[24] At that time, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, read:
SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. –
x x x x
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[25] Mendoza v. David, G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 172, 181.
[26] Zaragoza v. Nobleza, G.R. No. 144560, May 13, 2004, 428 SCRA 410, 419.
[27] Allied Banking Corporation v. Eserjose, supra note 21, at 208.