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351 Phil. 928
SECOND DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-98-1150, April 15, 1998 ]
OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS. JUDGE LILIA C. ESPAÑOL, MTCC, BRANCH 2, DAGUPAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a
complaint charging respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Dagupan City with gross ignorance of law, knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order (Revised Penal Code, Art. 206) and violation of §3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury to a party litigant.
Complainant is
the plaintiff in a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Dagupan City (Branch 2). A decision was rendered in his
favor on January 3, 1996 by Judge Jules A. Mejia. The defendant was ordered to vacate the property and pay rentals,
damages, and attorney’s fees. Defendant
subsequently filed a notice of appeal.
In view of the
failure of the defendant to post a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly
rentals, however, complainant filed a motion for execution. On March 21, 1996,
respondent judge, as acting presiding judge of Branch 2 vice Judge Mejia (who
had retired), issued an order setting the motion for hearing on April 15,
1996. At the hearing, over the
objection of complainant, respondent judge gave the defendant ten (10) days
within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral arguments, and complainant
five (5) days within which to file a reply memorandum from receipt of the said
memorandum. No memorandum was, however,
filed by the defendant within the 10-day period. Complainant, on the other hand, filed a reply memorandum for the
purpose of answering some arguments made by the defendant at the hearing.
On May 15, 1996,
the respondent judge granted the motion of complainant and ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution. But the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that complainant’s brothers, who are co-owners of the property, had
renewed the lease contract of the defendant. The defendant attached an unsworn “Affidavit” where the alleged
co-owners stated that they did not authorize the filing of the complaint and
expressed their consent to the continued stay of defendant on the property.
Complainant filed a motion to expunge the motion for reconsideration from the
record of the case on the ground that the pleading was not authorized under the
Rules on Summary Procedure and that it contained misleading statements.
On June 27,
1996, respondent judge granted the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and gave the defendant’s appeal
due course, at the same time deferring
the issuance of the writ of execution “until the opportune time.” Respondent judge then ordered the records of
the case to be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court for the “assessment of the
fees to be paid by her and the appropriateness thereof.”[1]
Complainant
avers that the appellate docket fee was paid in July, 1996, six (6) months
after the 15-day period within which to appeal had expired.
In her comment,
respondent judge explained that she granted the defendant’s motion for
reconsideration in view of a supervening event, i.e., the renewal of the
lease contract by the co-owners of the complainant, which justified a stay of
execution. She accuses complainant of pressuring her into
resolving the matter in his favor, threatening to file an administrative complaint against her if she did
not do so. She claims that the
complaint in this case is one by a disgruntled litigant. Respondent judge
claims further that complainant would appear in her chambers unannounced and
engage her in lengthy conversation which sometimes strayed into the merits of
the case. Out of courtesy to him, since complainant was a former RTC judge, she
had to entertain him. According to
respondent judge, in order to discredit and embarrass her, complainant has been spreading the news in the court
that he has filed the instant complaint against her.
The Office of
the Court Administrator, to which this complaint was referred for evaluation, report and recommendation,
found the facts alleged in the complaint to be true. In his report dated November 13, 1997, Deputy Court Administrator
Reynaldo Suarez recommends that respondent judge be found administratively
liable and fined P10,000 with a warning that the commission of the crime
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The
recommendation is well-taken.
Complainant
cites the following provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure as having been violated by respondent judge
in resolving his motion for execution:
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions - The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion
to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply
with the preceding section;
(b) Motion
for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion
for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of
trial;
(d) Petition
for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion
for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion
to declare the defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory
motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k)) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
The Rules on
Summary Procedure, however, apply to the proceedings in the main action, i.e.,
from the filing of the complaint to the rendition of the judgment by the
municipal or metropolitan trial court, not to incidents occurring subsequent to
the main action. Nevertheless, respondent judge should have known that
ejectment cases are summary in character and that under §21 of the aforequoted
rules and Rule 70, §8 of the Rules of Court, the judgment in an action for
unlawful detainer is immediately executory, and may be stayed only if the
defendant-appellants (1) perfect their appeal, (2) file a supersedeas bond, and
(3) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.[2] Considering
these principles, respondent judge should simply have ascertained from the
records the allegations in complainant’s motion for execution and, on that
basis, resolved the motion. Had she
done this, she could not have failed to notice that the defendant had not given
a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution of the judgment and had not paid
the current rents as they fell due. The defendant’s failure to comply with
these requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate execution of the
judgment. The court’s duty was simply to order such execution.[3]
Respondent judge herself held so when she finally issued an order on May 15,
1996 granting execution.
Indeed, this
administrative complaint would have been unnecessary had respondent judge
stopped there. After all, not only did
the defendant in the ejectment case fail to post a supersedeas bond and to pay
the current rentals, he failed to pay the docket fee as well (although the fee
was paid belatedly in July 1996). Respondent judge, however, over complainant’s
objection, proceeded to grant defendant’s motion for a reconsideration of her
May 15, 1996 order granting execution. Her claim was that there was a supervening event justifying
reconsideration, namely, the other owners of the property had agreed to extend
the defendant’s right to stay.
The excuse is a
flimsy one. The judge ought to have
known that at least until the filing of the motion for reconsideration,
complainant, as administrator, had the sole authority to extend the defendant’s
stay. As Deputy Court Administrator Suarez observes:[4]
A careful perusal of the records though would indicate that the circumstance of supervening event is wanting in the case at bar. Respondent judge should have studied the case carefully before issuing the questioned order. Had respondent assiduously studied the records, she would have discovered that the plaintiff is the co-owner (1/3 share) and the appointed administrator of the entire intestate estate of their parents, the late Angel and Corazon Fernandez. With respect to his (1/3) share, complainant entered a verbal Lease contract with the defendant. Record shows that plaintiff was appointed administrator of the intestate estate of Sps. Fernandez, on January 6, 1996 in SPL PROC No. 3021. Considering that herein complainant was appointed administrator, there is no doubt that he alone and nobody else could maintain an action to preserve the rights of the decedents during their lifetime (Annex A - Decision, Civil Case No. 10037, rollo, p. 9). The affidavit allegedly executed by the brothers of herein complainant who claim to be co-administrators of the estate to our mind cannot overcome this established fact, firstly, because the affidavit is unverified and secondly said affidavit is being assailed. It is evident that respondent Judge merely relied on the assailed affidavit in issuing the questioned Order of June 27, 1996 and disregarded the entire records of the case.
There may be
truth to the contents of the affidavit, as in fact complainant admits that his
coheirs had contested his right to administer the property and that as a result thereof, they now administer the
property of his late mother jointly. However, there was no joint administration of the estate at the time the
motion for reconsideration of the defendant was granted. Respondent judge could
not recognize any other administrator but complainant at that time.
Respondent judge
has shown ignorance of law, considering that the special cases under the Rules
on Summary Procedure, especially ejectment cases, are staples of the municipal
and metropolitan courts which have exclusive jurisdiction over them. However,
to justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the
error or mistake of the judge must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or
in bad faith.[5] These are
not present in the instant case. There
is no evidence that respondent acted with malice in issuing her order of June
27, 1996 granting reconsideration of
her earlier order of execution to sustain or support the other charges against
respondent judge. For this reason, a lower penalty than would be appropriate
had there been gross ignorance of law would suffice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby imposes upon
respondent judge a FINE of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) with the
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, p.
37.
[2] Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation vs.
Katalbas-Moscardon, 247 SCRA 145, 173 (1995).
[3] Puncia v. Gerona, 252 SCRA 425, 430 (1996).
[4] Memorandum for the Chief Justice, p. 5.
[5] Roa, Sr. v. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57, 61 (1994);
Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 240 SCRA 154, 161 (1995); Alvarado v.
Laquindanum, 245 SCRA 501, 504 (1995); Bengzon v. Adaoag, 250 SCRA 344,
348 (1995).