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a)	the Decision[2] dated October 27, 2022, which nullified the dispositions of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay granting petitioner Vicente Suarez Jr. y Banua's motion to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, convicting him for such lesser offense, and denying reconsideration of its decision; and
b)	the Resolution[3] dated July 11, 2023 denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration.

Antecedents

By Information^[4] dated May 27, 2019, petitioner was charged with violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165^[5] which reads:

That, on March 20, 2019, along Ziga Avenue Basud, Tabaco City, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute, or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver to a poseur buyer one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking EBB 3/20/19 1, containing 2.1585 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, against public order and policy.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.^[6]

On September 21, 2019, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On August 3, 2020, petitioner filed a motion to enter a plea of guilty to lesser offense of violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, in lieu of the original charge of violation of Section 5 of the same law. Respondent People of the Philippines (respondent) opposed the motion, asserting that the evidence is sufficient to convict petitioner for illegal sale of dangerous drugs and emphasized that the approval of the public prosecutor and the arresting officers are required in plea bargaining for offenses under Republic Act No. 9165.^[7]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Under Order^[8] dated September 14, 2020, the trial court granted petitioner's motion. Petitioner was rearraigned, and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded guilty to violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. The trial court then ordered that petitioner's plea of guilty be entered into the records of the case.^[9]

Subsequently, by Decision^[10] dated October 1, 2020, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165:^[11]

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused VICENTE SUAREZ y BANUA, JR. guilty for violation of [Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No.] 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Apparatus and other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years to four (4) years and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos ([PHP]10,000.00).

Accordingly also, accused is hereby ordered to: 1) voluntarily submit herself (sic) in (sic) Risk Assessment Program by the concerned Rural Health Office and to undergo appropriate program (sic) such as General intervention, Community Based Rehabilitation, and/or After Care Program of the Government; 2) support and cooperate with the Anti-Illegal Drug Campaign of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Local Government Units (LGU) and other concerned government agencies to suppress and eradicate the proliferation of Illegal Drugs in the community and will also serve as a lecturer/resource speaker during symposia on the ill-effects of illegal drugs to the user as well as in the community; and 3) not engage in any illegal activities particularly illegal drug activities and shall help and support the proper authorities in maintaining the peace and order in the community and in the Barangay where he is residing. The above-stated conditions shall be incorporated in the conditions for his probation and any violation thereof shall be a ground for the cancellation and revocation of his probation.

SO ORDERED.^[12] (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent sought a reconsideration, reiterating that neither the prosecution nor the arresting officers consented to petitioner's plea of guilty to a lesser offense.^[13] It was denied by the trial court per its Order^[14] dated November 17, 2020.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Dissatisfied, respondent went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, faulting the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for allowing petitioner to plead guilty to a lesser offense, sans its concurrence; and even though such lesser offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged. In praying that the case be remanded to the trial court for continuation of the proceedings on the original charge, respondent averred that petitioner's right against double jeopardy will not be violated.^[15]

In his Comment,^[16] petitioner countered that pursuant to Estipona v. Lobrigo,^[17] the approval or denial of the plea bargaining proposal is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court. It is the duty of the trial court to rule against the objection of the prosecution and grant the request for plea bargaining if it is just under the circumstances. Further, a prosecution under the original charge violates petitioner's right against double jeopardy since he has pleaded to a valid information before a competent court that had already convicted him after he was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.^[18]

Under its Decision^[19] dated October 27, 2022, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's petition for certiorari, nullified the assailed dispositions and remanded the case to the trial court, thus:^[20]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 14, 2020 Order, October 1, 2020 Decision, and November 17, 2020 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. T-7583 are NULLIFIED. The case is REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 15 for the continuation of the trial against private respondent. Vicente Suarez y Banua, Jr. on the original charge of violation of [Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.] 9165.

SO ORDERED.^[21] (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the consent of the prosecutor is a condition sine qua non to obtaining a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, the trial court allegedly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it gave due course to petitioner's motion in the absence of the prosecutor's approval and despite his objections. Since petitioner's plea to a lesser offense was invalid, it is not a bar to another prosecution for the same act or omission for which the accused was initially indicted for.^[22]

In its Resolution^[23] dated July 11, 2023, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief and prays that the assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals be reversed and a new one rendered, affirming the trial court's Order dated September 14, 2020, Decision dated October 1, 2020, and Order dated November 17, 2020.^[24]

Petitioner asserts that while the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right, its resolution is ultimately determined by the trial court. Even when both the accused and the prosecution agree to plea bargaining, the request remains subject to the approval of the court. Hence, notwithstanding the prosecution's objection, the trial court may still allow an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Too, petitioner reiterates his argument that a remand of the case will violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy.^[25]

Our Ruling

We reverse. The guidelines in People v. Montierro^[26] are apropos, thus:

1.	Offers for plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by way of a formal written motion filed by the accused in court.
2.	The lesser offense which the accused proposes to plead guilty to must necessarily be included in the offense charged.
3.	Upon receipt of the proposal for plea bargaining that is compliant with the provisions of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the judge shall order that a drug dependency assessment be administered. If the accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after a drug dependency test, then he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the period of his/her after-care and follow-up program if the penalty is still unserved. If the accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, then he/she will be released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his/her sentence in jail minus the counselling period at rehabilitation center.
4.	As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.
	a.	Though the prosecution and the defense may agree to enter into a plea bargain, it does not follow that the courts will automatically approve the proposal. Judges must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea bargaining, taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused.
5.	The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:
	a.	the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse or has been charged many times; or
	b.	when the evidence of guilt is strong.
6.	Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed plea bargain does not conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.
7.	Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court if any.
8.	If the prosecution objects to the accused's plea bargaining proposal due to the circumstances enumerated in item no. 5, the trial court is mandated to hear the prosecution's objection and rule on the merits thereof. If the trial court finds the objection meritorious, it shall order the continuation of the criminal proceedings.
9.	If an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under [Republic Act No.] 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to Section 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

On April 10, 2018, the Court adopted A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, also known as the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases. The same outlines the acceptable plea bargain of an accused, based on the quantity of dangerous drugs involved, depending on the specific violation of Republic Act No. 9165 charged. With respect to violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 involving methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases states:^[28]

As affirmed in Montierro, plea bargaining must conform to the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases. Also, the concurrence of the prosecution is not an indispensable requirement for the trial court's grant of the motion to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Rather, the trial court must exercise its sound discretion in accepting the terms of the plea bargaining.

The Court, nonetheless, finds that the trial court should not have granted the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense in this case for the simple reason that the original charge for which he was indicted (violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165) involved 2.1585 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, in which case, plea bargaining is proscribed. Evidently, therefore, the trial court gravely erred in granting petitioner's motion for plea bargaining and in consequently convicting him of the lesser offense of violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.

The Court notes, however, that although plea bargaining should not have been allowed based on the aforesaid guidelines, this argument was never put to fore by respondent itself in any of its pleadings before the trial court, the appellate court, and now even before the Court. Respondent's opposition was solely anchored on the fact that it did not conform to petitioner's proposed plea bargaining.^[29] In any event, both the trial court and the appellate court themselves overlooked the fact that petitioner's case fell within the excepting clause.

As it was, the trial court approved petitioner's proposed plea bargaining which eventually led to his re-arraignment, his plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165, and finally, the promulgation of a judgment of conviction against him for such lesser offense, which judgment has already become final and executory.

The question now hinges on the validity of the appellate court's order to remand the case for continuation of the proceedings petitioner's arraignment and trial, and the trial court's rendition of judgment on the original charge of violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

On this score, however, the Court sustains petitioner's invocation of double jeopardy. Indeed, all the requisites therefor are present in this case: (1) petitioner was indicted under a valid Information, (2) the trial court possessed jurisdiction over him and the offense charged; (3) following the trial court's approval of his plea bargain, he was arraigned for the lesser offense and entered a valid plea therefor; and (4) there was a termination of the case in view of petitioner's eventual conviction for violation of Article II, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.^[30]

In Villa Gomez v. People,^[31] the Court held that since rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, courts may still brush aside procedural infirmities in favor of resolving the merits of the case. Correlatively, since legal representation before the courts and quasi-judicial bodies is a matter of procedure, any procedural lapse pertaining to such matter may be deemed waived when no timely objections have been raised.^[32] In the same vein, plea bargaining being a rule of procedure,^[33] respondent's failure to invoke petitioner's disqualification from plea bargaining may be deemed waived. That the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their application of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases in favor of petitioner; and respondent was even deemed to have waived the exclusion clause therein should not be blamed on petitioner. His right against double jeopardy should therefore be sustained.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 27, 2022 and Resolution dated July 11, 2023 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 167998 are REVERSED. Criminal Case No. T-7583 is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[2] Id. at 31-40. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Michael P. Ong concurring.

^[3] Id. at 42-44. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Michael P. Ong concurring.

^[4] Id. at 86.

^[5] Otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

^[6] Rollo, p. 86.

^[7] Id. at 32-33.

^[8] Id. at 75-76.

^[9] Id. at 76.

^[10] Id. at 77-78.

^[11] Id. at 78.

^[12] Id.

^[13] Id. at 92.

^[14] Id. at 79-80.

^[15] Id. at 61-69.

^[16] Id. at 102-113.

^[17] 816 Phil. 789 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[18] Id. at 104-109.

^[19] Rollo, pp. 31-40. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Michael P. Ong, concurring.

^[20] Id. at 40.

^[21] Id.

^[22] Id. at 39.

^[23] Id. at 42-44. Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol with Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Michael P. Ong, concurring.

^[24] Id. at 23.

^[25] Id. at 20-22.

^[26] G.R. No. 254564, July 26, 2022 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[27] Id.

^[28] SC Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018, Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases. (Emphasis supplied)

^[29] Rollo, p. 68.

^[30] People v. Nitafan, 362 Phil. 58, 74 (1999) [Per J. Martinez, En Banc].

^[31] 889 Phil. 915, 962 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].

^[32] Id.

^[33] Estipona v. Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789, 796 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].