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Court of Appeals
In this appeal, appellant seeks to set aside the Decision^[1] dated 07 May 2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila, Branch 74 (trial court) in L.R.C Case No. 212; L.R.A. Rec. No. N-71532 entitled "In Re: Petition for Decree of Registration, Heirs of Virginia Eustaquio-Dimaguila, namely: Virma, Rustico, Ronald,

Roel, Lorna, all surnamed Dimaguila, Gina Dimaguila-Reodique, and Elsie Dimaguila-Marinas, represented by Virma E. Dimaguila, Petitioners."

The history of the case may be traced as follows:

On 25 August 1999, the heirs of Virginia Eustaquio Dimaguila, namely, Virma, Rustico, Ronald, Roel, and Lorna, all surnamed Dimaguila, Gina Dimaguila Reodique, and Elsie Dimaguila Marinas, represented by Virma Dimaguila ("appellees"), filed with the trial court a petition for registration^[2] of a piece of land designated as Lot 2696-A of Subdivision Plan Csd-007607-000166-D (being a portion of Lot 2696), MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, situated in Barangay Ibayo-Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila, consisting of 291 square meters.

In their petition, appellees alleged that they were the owners of the land having acquired it by right of representation as the compulsory heirs of Virginia Eustaquio Dimaguila, daughter of Anselmo Eustaquio. They further alleged that during his lifetime, and even earlier than 12 June 1945, Anselmo was in open, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner, and that their mother, Virginia, predeceased their grandfather, Anselmo. Appellees likewise asserted that they were in possession of the land having declared it for taxation purposes, and that there was no mortgage or encumbrance on it.

Thereupon, the trial court set the case for hearing on 10 January 2000.^[3] On 15 September 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the State.^[4]

On 17 November 1999, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) submitted a report^[5] recommending to the trial court that an order be issued to appellees directing them to: 1) amend their petition so as to include the names of the respective spouses of Ronald E. Dimaguila, Roel E. Dimaguila, Gina D. Reodique, and Elsie D. Marinas; 2) submit the duplicate original and/or certified xerox copy of the technical description of Lot 2696-A as well as the original and/or certified true copy of plan Csd-007607-000166-D in tracing cloth or diazo polyester film; and 3) pay the publication fee.

On 10 January 2000, the trial court issued an order^[6] resetting the hearing of the case to 25 May 2000 considering that the Notice of Initial Hearing had not yet been published in the Official Gazette by the LRA for appellees' failure to comply with the LRA report dated 17 November 1999.

To establish the jurisdictional facts of the case, appellees, on 25 May 2000, offered in evidence the following documents, to wit: 1) Notice of Initial Hearing issued by the LRA;^[7] 2) Certificate of Publication in the Official Gazette issued by the LRA;^[8] 3) Certificate of Notification issued by the LRA;^[9] 4) copy of the Official Gazette;^[10] 5) Certificate of Publication in the Official Gazette issued by the National Printing Office;^[11] 6) Affidavit of Publication issued by the Advertising Manager of The Challenger News;^[12] 7) copy of the newspaper The Challenger News;^[13] and 8) Certificate of Posting issued by the Branch Sheriff.^[14]

Having ascertained that the jurisdictional requirements for the application had been done in accordance with the law, the trial court, on 25 May 2000, issued an order^[15] of general default against the whole world with the exception of the government. The trial court likewise set the case for the reception of appellees' evidence.

On 21 June 2000, the trial court issued an order^[16] directing the LRA to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land subject of the application. In its letter^[17] dated 21 August 2000, the LRA informed the trial court that only a print copy of the subject plan was attached to the record on file in its office. The LRA explained that it had already called the attention of appellees thereto in its report dated 17 November 1999, but appellees never heeded the directive. The LRA requested the trial court to direct the appellees to comply with LRA Circular No. 06-2000.^[18]

On 31 August 2000, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) filed a Motion to Lift Order of General Default and Opposition.^[19] The LLDA alleged, inter alia, that the land in question was located below "the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water." Claiming that the lot was part of the bed of the Laguna Lake which was considered public land, the LLDA implored the trial court to render judgment dismissing the present petition.

On 11 September 2000, the trial court issued an order^[20] directing appellees to comply with LRA Circular No. 06-2000 by submitting the original tracing cloth plan or sepia copy of plan Csd-007607-000166-D at the next scheduled hearing on 20 September 2000. However, appellees failed again to present the original tracing cloth plan at the hearing on 20 September 2000. Whereupon, the trial court reset anew the presentation of appellees' evidence to 25 October 2000.^[21]

On 22 September 2000, the trial court received a letter^[22] dated 21 September 2000 from the LRA. In its letter, the LRA stated that it was "returning herewith the original/ true copy of plan Csd-007607-000166-D in tracing cloth/diazo polyester film." The LRA asserted that pursuant to LRA Circular No. 06-2000, " the original/true copy of said plan in tracing cloth/diazo polyester film should now be filed in the Court's record of the case." The LRA, moreover, stated that the Branch Clerk of Court should furnish its Office with a certified true copy of the said tracing cloth plan.

On 06 December 2000, the trial court issued an order^[23] granting the LLDA's Motion to Lift Order of Default and admitting its Opposition to the application for registration.

Thereafter, the trial court received a report^[24] dated 25 July 2001 from LRA. The report stated, inter alia, the after plotting the conversion plan of the subject land in the Municipal Index Sheet through its tie line, the LRA noted a discrepancy on the bearing and distance of the property as indicated on the plan.  Thus, the LRA recommended that the trial court direct the Lands Management Bureau (DENR) and the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office to submit a report on the status of the land applied for registration to determine whether the property or any portion thereof was already covered by land patent.  The LRA also recommended that the trial court direct the DENR Lands Management Services to verify the discrepancy pointed and to make the necessary correction thereof, and then, to submit the  result of its findings.

On 28 November 2001, on LLDA's Manifestation^[25] that it was withdrawing its Opposition in light of its finding that the disputed land was situated above the 12.5 meter reglementary elevation, and therefore, not part of its jurisdiction, the trial court issued an order^[26] declaring the LLDA's Opposition withdrawn.

Appellees presented the following documents to support their application: 1) conversion plan of the subject land;^[27] 2) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan;^[28] 3) technical description;^[29] 4) tax declarations for the years 1994, 1993, 1991, 1985, 1983, 1979, 1974, 1966, and 1949;^[30] 5) Confirmation Receipt and Official Receipts showing appellees' payment of realty taxes on the land for the years 1992, 1995 up to 1999.^[31] On 07 May 2002, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, premises considered and finding that the allegations in the petition had been sufficiently established by the applicants' evidence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicants Virma E. Dimaguila, single; Rustico E. Dimaguila, married to Flora Anonuevo; Gina E. Dimaguila-Reodique, married to Jersom E. Reodique; Roel E. Dimaguila, married to Emelita Dollente; and Elsie E. Dimaguila-Marinas, married to Ramon Marinas and all residents of Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila over the subject parcel of lot known as Lot 2696-A, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping under Conversion Subdivision Plan Csd-007607-000166-D situated at Barangay Ibayo-Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila, consisting of Two Hundred Ninety One (291) square meters and hereby order the registration thereof in their names.

After finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on the said lot, let an Order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED."^[32]

Hence, this recourse by appellant Republic.

Before this Court, appellant submits that the trial court committed the following reversible errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SUFFERS FROM JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS.

1. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT REGARDING THE  PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING;

2. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF MAILING AND POSTING OF SAID NOTICE;

3. THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS NOT SUBMITTED.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES BY THEMSELVES AND THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST, HAS (sic) BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LAND AND, THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO A DECREE OF REGISTRATION.^[33]

According to appellant, the challenged decision suffers from jurisdictional defect because the initial hearing was set more than ninety (90) days from the date of the trial court's order dated 10 January 2000, in violation of Section 23 of P.D. 1529 which requires that the initial hearing be set not earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the order.

This argument is specious. The pertinent portion of Section 23 reads:

SEC. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc.—The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.   Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

By mailing.

Mailing of notice to persons named in the application.—The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also, within seven days after publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as herein before provided, cause a copy of the notice of initial hearing to be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is known.

*   *   *

By posting.

The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be posted by the sheriff of the province or city, as the case may be, or by his deputy, in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land included in the application and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion thereof is situated, fourteen days at least before the date of initial hearing.

*   *   *

As shown by the records, the trial court set the case for initial hearing on 10 January 2000. However, since the notice of initial hearing had not yet been published in the Official Gazette at that time due to appellees' failure to comply with LRA report dated 17 November 1999, the court moved the hearing date to 25 May 2000.

Needless to say, the duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court.^[34] Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the LRA shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.  If the LRA finds a mistake committed in the application or that certain documents required were not submitted, as what happened in the case at bar, the LRA reports the same to the court which issues an order requiring the applicant to make the necessary corrections and to submit the documents required. The applicant must comply with all these requirements before the publication of the notice of hearing.^[35] Section 23 of PD 1529 does not provide a period within which the notice should be published in the Official Gazette, but for reasons already obvious, the publication should precede the date of initial hearing. Simply put, what is more important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration proceedings via publication.^[36]

Appellant also contends that the court below did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the application for registration because appellees failed to comply with the requirements of mailing and posting prescribed under Section 23 of PD 1529. Appellant faults the trial court for giving due course to the application even if there was no proof that all interested parties namely, the adjoining lot owners, were duly served with the notice of initial hearing. Appellant further maintains that "the lack of proof can be traced to the fact that the notice which was published in the Official Gazette failed to indicate the respective names of the supposed adjoining owners and interested parties."

We are not impressed. Upon close scrutiny of the records, this Court found that the names of "the supposed adjoining owners" were indicated not only in the notice published in the Official Gazette, but also in the notice published in the newspaper The Challenger News.^[37] Also extant in the records of this case are the Certificate of Notification issued by the LRA and the Certificate of Posting prepared by the Branch Sheriff to the effect that the notice of initial hearing as required by law has been complied with.^[38] Hence, on the issue of jurisdiction, We submit that appellees' application for registration was rightfully given due course by the trial court.

Just as untenable is appellant's claim that the original tracing cloth plan of the disputed land was not submitted in evidence before the trial court and that appellees did not include the same in their Formal Offer of Evidence.^[39] It must be recalled that it was the LRA, in compliance with the court's order of 09 August 2000, which submitted "the original/true copy of plan Csd-007607-000166-D in tracing cloth/diazo polyester film."^[40] In view thereof, appellees could not be expected to include the tracing cloth plan in their formal offer of exhibits.

However, on the more important issue of lack of evidence of possession on the part of appellees for the period and in the manner required by law, We find for appellant.

Section 14 of PD 1529 specifically provides:

Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives.

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove that: 1) he, by himself or his predecessor-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and 2) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable.^[41]

While the appellees asserted in their Application for Registration of Title^[42] that their grandfather-predecessor-in-interest, Anselmo Eustaquio, "during his lifetime had open, uninterrupted and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the said land even earlier than June 12, 1945," the evidence that they presented is not sufficient to prove that, indeed, their possession started since 12 June 1945 or earlier and that it was made in the manner required by law. In an unbroken line of cases, the Supreme Court held that in land registration cases, it is incumbent on the applicant to show by'clear, positive, and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were of the nature and duration required by law.^[43] He may not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.^[44] By possession is meant actual possession of land which consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.^[45] It is not enough for an applicant to declare himself or his predecessor-in-interest the possessor and owner of the land for which registration is sought. Possession, under the law, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate his claim.^[46]

In the present case, the record shows that appellees did not fare any better with the documentary evidence they adduced before the trial court. They failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession of their predecessor-in-interest. No single instance of the exercise by the appellees and their predecessor-in-interest of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over the disputed lot was established. While appellees asserted that the subject land was previously owned by their grandfather and that they inherited the property from him, no evidence was presented to show that, indeed, their grandfather had been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Appellees relied merely on the tax declarations and tax receipts in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, the earliest of which was issued in 1949.^[47] At best, appellees can only prove possession of the lot in question since said date. Though We emphasize, at this point, that tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership only when coupled with proof of actual possession which must be clear, complete and conclusive.^[48] To be sure, tax declarations in themselves do not vest absolute ownership of the property upon the declarant nor do declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty.^[49]

In fine, the trial court's finding that appellees had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land in question in the concept of owner fails. Clearly, the court below gravely erred in granting appellees' application for registration of the land in question. While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the national patrimony.^[50] The Court must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards relative to the registration of imperfect titles.^[51]

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of title over Lot 2696-A. MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

De Guia-Salvador and De Leon, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Records, pp. 392-403.

^[2] Id. at 1-9.

^[3] Id. at 42.

^[4] Id. at 43.

^[5] Id. at 47.

^[6] Id. at 55.

^[7] Id. at 273-274.

^[8] Id. at 58.

^[9] Id. at 59.

^[10] Id. at 61-248.

^[11] Id. at 60.

^[12] Id. at 249.

^[13] Id. at 250-259.

^[14] Id. at 266.

^[15] Id. at 268-269.

^[16] Id. at 279.

^[17] Id. at 298.

^[18] Id. at 299-300.

^[19] Id. at 285-292.

^[20] Id. at 307.

^[21] Id. at 311.

^[22] Id. at 312.

^[23] Id. at 324.

^[24] Id. at 345.

^[25] Id. at 351-352.

^[26] Id. at 355.

^[27] Id. at 313.

^[28] Id. at 12.

^[29] Id. at 11.

^[30] Id. at 373-390.

^[31] Id. at 32, 38-41.

^[32] Id. at 402-403.

^[33] Rollo, pp. 25-26.

^[34] Republic vs. Manna Properties,  Inc.,  31 January 2005.

^[35] Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, by Antonio H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, p. 101, 1992 Rev. Ed. Citing Section 20, Act 2347 and Republic Act No. 96.

^[36] Republic vs. San Lorenzo Development Corp., G. R. No. 170724, 29 January 2007; Republic vs. Manna Properties, Inc., supra note 34.

^[37] Records, pp. 218 and 257.

^[38] Id. at 59 and 60.

^[39] Id. at 356-360.

^[40] Id. at 312.

^[41] Republic vs. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, 06 December 2006. Republic vs. Enriquez, G. R. No. 160990, 11 September 2006; Recto vs. Republic, 440 SCRA 79.

^[42] Records, p. 7.

^[43] Diaz-Enriquez vs. Republic, 437 SCRA 311.

^[44] Martinez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 160895, 30 October 2006.

^[45] Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 693; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 626.

^[46] Martinez vs. Republic, supra note 44.

^[47] Records, pp. 32, 38-41, 373-390.

^[48] Gesmundo vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 487.

^[49] Gapacan vs. Omipet, 387 SCRA 383.

^[50] Republic vs. Kalaw, 431 SCRA 401.

^[51] Republic vs. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, 26 September 2006.