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Court of Appeals
Before Us is a Petition for Review with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/ or Writ of Preliminary Injuction^[1] under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision^[2] dated December 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 161, Pasig City in SCA Case No. 3349 which affirmed the Decision^[3] dated June 30, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 68, Pasig City, directing herein petitioners Gregorio Santos and Manuel Santos to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property in favor of respondent Luisa Santos, pay the attorney's fees and costs of suit.

THE FACTS

On August 24, 2007, respondent Luisa Santos filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City a complaint^[4] for unlawful detainer against petitioners Gregorio Santos and Manuel Santos. It was alleged that respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 278 square meters, more or less, situated in Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 894^[5] issued on September 30, 1999. Petitioners who are the nephews of respondent occupied a portion of her land by mere tolerance. Prior to the filing of the suit, respondent pleaded for petitioners to voluntarily vacate the subject property but the latter vehemently refused to leave. Respondent had exerted all efforts to settle the case with petitioners since they are close relatives. However, petitioners merely insisted to stay on the land in dispute. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation and mediation. Petitioners failed to appear and participate in the barangay proceedings. Thus, a Certificate to File Action^[6] was issued in favor of respondent. A demand letter^[7] dated July 25, 2007 was then sent by respondent to petitioners reminding them of the nature of their occupation and demanding them to immediately vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof. The demand was not heeded by petitioners.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon petitioners.^[8] In an Ex-Parte Motion for Additional Time to File Answer^[9], petitioners asked for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their answer. Respondent filed an Opposition with Motion to Render Judgment as may be Warranted by the Complaint^[10] contending that petitioners' motion was not allowed under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

On September 24, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaims^[11] arguing that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners further alleged that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, in the concept of an owner, of the subject property. Petitioners never knew that respondent applied for a land title over the said property. The issuance of OCT No. 894 in the name of respondent was also questionable. Respondent falsified the deed of self-adjudication claiming that she was the sole heir of the late Catalino Santos, the original owner of the disputed land.

On March 3, 2008, the MeTC denied petitioners' Ex-Parte Motion for Additional Time to File Answer and granted respondent's motion to render judgment.^[12]

In a Decision^[13] dated June 30, 2008, the MeTC directed petitioners to vacate the subject property and surrender the possession thereof to respondent. It ratiocinated that respondent merely tolerated petitioners to occupy the land. While petitioners' possession thereof was lawful in the beginning, the same became unlawful when demands were made upon petitioners to vacate the land but refused to do so. Consequently, respondent was entitled to the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of suit. The pertinent portions of the Decision read:

Plaintiff tolerated defendants' occupation of the premises, which at its inception was lawful. However, when plaintiff demanded from the defendants to vacate the premises and the latter refused to do so, it was at that point that defendants' occupation was deemed unlawful, and as such, they must turn over lawful possession of the premises to plaintiff.

Considering the fact that plaintiff was forced to litigate to advance her cause of action, the court finds merit in the award of attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Luisa Santos and against the defendants Gregorio Santos and Manuel Santos as follows:

1. ordering the defendant[s] and  all  persons claiming  rights  under them to vacate and peacefully surrender the premises subject of this case which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 894 (Decree No. N-827924) to the plaintiff;
   
   
2. ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum often thousand pesos (Php 10,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees;
   
   
3. ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
   

SO ORDERED."^[14]

Aggrieved by the adverse decision, petitioners appealed to the RTC.

In the assailed Decision^[15] dated December 28, 2009, the RTC held that the MeTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint for unlawful detainer. The said complaint sufficiently alleged the jurisdictional facts that petitioners' possession of the disputed property was by mere tolerance of respondent; that such possession became illegal when petitioners refused to vacate the same despite notice from respondent; and, that the complaint filed on August 24, 2007 was well within the one (1) year period from the date of last demand, or on July 25, 2007. Further, there was no grave error on the part of the MeTC in not admitting the answer belatedly filed by petitioners. Petitioners failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason that would warrant the relaxation of the mandatory rule. Hence, the MeTC's ruling was sustained. The pertinent portions of the Decision are quoted:

The appeal is not meritorious.

Firstly, Defendants-Appellants argue that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as plaintiff-appellee failed to state the necessary allegations for unlawful detainer case or that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

The defendants are incorrect.

In the case of Valentin Cabrera et al, vs. Elizabeth Getaruela et al. G.R. No. 164213 April 21, 2009, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that:

It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

*       *       *

In this case, all of the above-mentioned requisites in sufficiently alleging or stating a cause of action for unlawful detainer are present in this case. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the complaint that the possession of the Defendant of the property is by mere tolerance of the Plaintiff,* * *

*       *       *

Paragraph 8 and 9 of the complaint sufficiently recite the requisite demand to vacate and failure to vacate after such demand* * *

*       *       *

The requisite that the complaint for unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year from the date of last demand to vacate was also complied with, considering that the last demand to vacate was made on July 25, 2007 and the complaint of unlawful detainer was filed on August 24, 2007.

Hence, the court a quo correctly assumed jurisdiction.

Secondly, defendants alleged as an error the lower court's act of denying admission of their belated answer, relying on the principle of liberal interpretation.

Defendants are incorrect.

*       *       *

In the same vein, the defendants also failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason to warrant relaxation of the mandatory rule.

Defendants did not provide any exceptionally meritorious instances which warrant the liberal interpretation of the Rules. Their lone argument was that liberal interpretation on the Rules of Court is allowed, nothing more.

*       *       *

Lastly, defendants argue that plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees.

The defendants are incorrect.

In this case, the defendants' act of not leaving the premises, upon demand, compelled the plaintiff to litigate to protect her interest.^[16]

Hence, the instant petition for review in which petitioners raised the following Assignment of Errors^[17], to wit:

I.

THE RTC PALPABLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE METC HAS CORRECTLY ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT.

II.

THE RTC PALPABLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE METC CORRECTLY DENIED ADMISSION OF THE BELATED ANSWER.

III.

THE RTC PALPABLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE METC CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENT.

THE ISSUE

The pivotal issue to be resolved is whether or not the RTC gravely erred in affirming the Decision dated June 30, 2008 of the MeTC.

THE RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners contend that the MeTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. The complaint for unlawful detainer failed to allege respondent's prior physical possession  of the disputed property.  It likewise did not specifically state the time when petitioners entered and started to occupy the same. There is thus no reckoning point for the one-year period within which to file the subject complaint. There was also no showing as to how respondent tolerated petitioners' possession of the land in question.

We are not persuaded.

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for.^[18] In Barbosa, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al.^[19], the Supreme Court held that to make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the complaint must set forth allegations to the effect that the defendant is unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of certain real property after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied and that the action is being brought within one year from the time the defendant's possession became unlawful. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff   to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.^[20]

As long as the aforementioned allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter.^[21] In the case at bench, a perusal of the allegations in respondent's complaint clearly shows the jurisdictional facts to make a case for unlawful detainer. The complaint sufficiently averred that respondent was the registered owner of the land covered by Oct No. 894; that petitioners' stay at the questioned property was by mere tolerance the former being respondent's relatives; that oral demands were made upon petitioners asking them to voluntarily leave the premises; that on July 25, 2007, respondent sent a letter to petitioners demanding them to vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so; and that on August 24, 2007, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was made, the complaint for unlawful detainer was filed with the MeTC. As such, MeTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the instant complaint.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa Big. 129, explicitly provides that "Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer".^[22]

It may also be well to state that from the time the title over the subject land was issued in favor of respondent on September 30, 1999 as the registered owner, she is duly entitled to its possession. Well-entrenched is the principle that the person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.^[23] In Malabanan vs. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.^[24], the Supreme Court held that from the time title to the property was transferred in the name of the plaintiff, defendant's possession was converted into one by mere tolerance of the owner. The forbearance ceased when plaintiff made a demand on defendant to vacate the lot. Thenceforth, defendant's occupancy has become unlawful. Here, petitioners' possession of the disputed land was merely by tolerance of their aunt, herein respondent. When respondent demanded for petitioners to vacate the property, the latter's possession thereof became unlawful. The action for ejectment was thus respondent's legitimate remedy.

We likewise sustain the RTC's fiinding that the MeTC did not err in denying petitioners' Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer and in not admitting the answer belatedly filed by them. As aptly stated by the RTC, petitioners failed to establish any sufficient and satisfactory reason to warrant the relaxation of the mandatory rule in the filing of answer. It is also worthy to note that the motion filed by petitioners was a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Petitioners' contention that the award of attorney's fees was not proper also deserves scant consideration. The trial court may, whenever it deems just.and equitable, allow the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party.^[25] Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that attorney's fees can be recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Considering that petitioners refused to vacate the subject property despite demands by the respondent, the latter was compelled to file the complaint for unlawful Petition denied.   Decision of the RTC detainer.  Thus, the award of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees is justified.

All told, this Court finds to compelling reason to veer from the assailed ruling of  the court a quo.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby denied, The assailed Decision dated December 28,  2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch Court 161, Pasig City is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Bruselas, Jr.^* and Barrios, JJ., concur

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 3-30.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 31-35.

^[3] Rollo, p. 36.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 68-71.

^[5] Rollo, p. 72.

^[6] Rollo, p. 73.

^[7] Rollo, p. 74.

^[8] Vide: MeTC Decision dated June 30, 2008, Rollo, p. 36.

^[9] Rollo, pp. 37-38.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 87-90.

^[11] Rollo, pp. 43-52.

^[12] Vide: Respondent's Memorandum dated September 30, 2009, Rollo, p. 119.

^[13] Supra, see note 3.

^[14] Rollo, p. 36.

^[15] Supra, see note 2.

^[16] Rollo, pp. 32-35.

^[17] Rollo, p. 11.

^[18] Dela Ross, et al. vs. Roldan, et al., G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006; Heirs of Julian dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005; Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc., et al. vs. Spouses Ong. G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005, citing Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997); Hilario, et al. vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005; Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 410 SCRA 484, 10 September 2003.

^[19] G.R. No. 133564, July 10, 2007.

^[20] Canlas, et al. vs.  Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, citing Cabrera, et al.  vs. Getaruela, et al., G.R. No. 164213, April 21, 2009.

^[21] Canlas, et al. vs. Tubil, G.R. No.  184285, September 25, 2009.

^[22] Dela Rosa, et al. vs. Roldan, et al., G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006.

^[23] Dela Rosa, et al. vs. Roldan, et al., G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006.

^[24] G.R. No. 163495, May 8, 2009.

^[25] Dela Rosa, et al. vs. Roldan, et al., G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006.

^* Vice Justice Rosmari D. Carandang who is on leave of absence per Office Order No. 357-10-ABR dated November 18, 2010.