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Court of Appeals
This is an appeal from the Order dated February 24, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 59, the dispositive portions of which states:

"Finding the petition to be well-taken, the same is granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds for the City of Baguio is hereby directed to cancel, upon payment of the prescribed fees therefor, the aforequoted encumbrances annoted on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-68562 of her Registry.

SO ORDERED."^[1]

The Facts

Appellee Jenia Land Ventures Inc. is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-68562 in the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, with an area of 617 sqaure meters.^[2] Appellee filed a petition in the court a quo for the cancellation of the following annotations/encumbrances in the title:

"1.	That the tract shall not be subdivided, nor shall more than one residence be erected thereon, without the written approval of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands.
2.	That the said tract shall not be used for any purpose other than that of residence without the written approval of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands.
3.	That no building shall be erected upon said tract until the plan thereof and the location of the building have been approved in writing by the Consulting Architect to the Philippine Commission."[3]

The petition alleged that "the said annotations/encumbrances have been terminated by the enactment of new provisions of laws which need not appear in the aforecited certificate of title."^[4] It added that "such annotations/encumbrance in the certificate of title are by law not required to appear in the certificate of title and therefore may be cancelled in conformity with Sec. 108 in relation to Sec. 44 of P.D. No. 1529."^[5]

The RTC gave due course to the petition and set the case for hearing, with notice to the following: the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, the Office of the City Prosecutor, the Register of Deeds and the petitioner.^[6]

As cited by the court in its order which is now the subject of the instant appeal, appellee also claimed that:

"1. As to encumbrance no. 1, it may be cancelled since it is now P.D. No. 1529 that governs the subdivision and consolidation of parcels of land.  The office of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands also no longer exists.

2. As to encumbrance no. 2, it may be cancelled since the present law governing all buildings and structures, as well as their location, site design, materials, use, occupancy and maintenance is P.D. No. 1096. Again, the office of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands also no longer exists.  The building official of each  city or municipality has taken over these functions of the Secretary.

3. As to encumbrance no. 3, it may also be cancelled since the office of the Consulting Architect of the Philippine Commission no longer exists; its functions are now being performed by the local building official."^[7]

Without much extrapolation, the court noted its agreement with all of appellee's and issued the appealed order.

Aggrieved by the order, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 12, 1999, which was denied by the court on May 10, 1999.

The Republic filed the instant appeal, arguing that the annotations/encumbrances should remain. In its brief, appellant maintains that the transfer of functions from the Secretary of the Interior (of the Philippine Islands) and the Consulting Architect (of the Philippine Commission) to the municipal or city building official did not obliterate the requirement for a written approval of such official before the acts described in the encumbrances may be performed.^[8] Thus, the abolition of the offices of Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands and the Consulting Architect of the Philippine Commission alone should not result in the cancellation of the encumbrances, especially since no law or jurisprudence authorizes such.^[9]

Further, the government argues that appellee failed to notify the Secretary of the Interior (now the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government) and the Consulting Architect (now the municipal or city building official) who are parties-in-interest to the cancellation, as mandated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.^[10] Appellant argues that this omission is fatal to the petition and should have resulted in its dismissal.^[11]

Appellee, in its brief, responds by stating that under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, when the registered interests of any description appearing in the certificate have terminated and ceased to exist, such certificate may be amended or altered via a verified petition in court.^[12] It is also the appellee's position that under Section 44 of the law, liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and the Constitution need not be annotated in the title.^[13]

As to the allegation that there was a failure to notify the building official or the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, appellee maintains that "notice to the Solicitor General is sufficient notice since said departments are alter egos of the President and the Office of the Solicitor General is Counsel of the Office of the President and its department heads."

The issue

For our resolution is the sole issue of whether or not the annotations/ encumbrances in the appellee's title may be cancelled.

The Court's Ruling

We find the appeal impressed with merit. It was error for the trial court to grant appellee's prayer cancelling the annotations/ encumbrances in the latter's title.

First, it was error for the trial court to rule that the abolition of the offices of Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands and the Consulting Architect of the Philippine Commission should necessarily result in the cancellation of the encumbrances.

There is a need to separate the public officials mentioned in the encumbrances, and the encumbrances or impositions on the property themselves. Though the public office concerned may have been abolished or replaced by another, it is highly likely that the encumbrance itself and the conditions which gave rise to it remains. The encumbrance does not necessarily disappear with the dissolution of a public office charged to regulate the property, because of the high probability that the public interest being served by the restrictions remain.

In the present case, the restrictions that the land remain a residential land or that it not be subdivided, unless permitted by the proper authority, or that its buildings be pre-approved by certain officials, exist independently of which public officials are charged with their enforcement. They are impositions on the land itself. Although none of the parties allege the reasons behind these restrictions, it may be judicially taken notice of that they could be in keeping with Baguio City's character as a tourist destination and designation as the country's summer capital.

An encumbrance has been defined as "anything that impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property."^[14] It may be a "legal claim on an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; an embarrassment of the estate or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an estate, interest, or right in lands, diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an estate."^[15]

Being such a burden/claim/lien/charge on the property, the existence or non-existence of an encumbrance could not be made to depend on whatever realignments, restructuring, or reorganizations happen in the bureaucracy, especially since the latter are done for obviously different reasons from that of the encumbrance's imposition. The encumbrance is a limitation placed on the property by the State. And when there is doubt on whether such an encumbrance should remain on the title or not, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State which placed it there, for as held in Commissioner of internal Revenue v. Marubeni Corp.^[16]:

He who claims an exemption (or an amnesty) from the common burden must justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or state law. It cannot be allowed to exist upon a vague implication. If a doubt arises as to the intent of the legislature, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the state.

In addition, as admitted by appellee itself, the functions of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands and the Consulting Architect of the Philippine Commission as specified in the encumbrances have not been entirely abolished, but were merely assumed by other offices in the government, such as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and local officials.^[17] Therefore, it is with more reason that the subject property's current encumbrances remain, since subdividing or altering the use of the property, or building structures on it, may still be done by merely securing the prior written permission of these officials.

Further, in the hearing of appellee's petition, we sustain the Solicitor General's view that not all parties-in-interest were notified of the initial hearing, a clear violation of Sec. 108 of P.D. No. 1529.^[18] Only the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, the Office of the City Prosecutor and the Register of Deeds were notified, but not the Secretary of the interior (now the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government) and the Consulting Architect (now the municipal or city building official), who have a clear interest in the case. The law clearly requires that all parties-in-interest must be notified, not just a handful of parties and not just their counsel.^[19] Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,^[20] and in the present case, the appellee clearly violated the said provision.

Wherefore, considering the foregoing, the appealed Order dated February 24, 1999 is reversed and set aside and a new one entered denying the petition filed by petitioner-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

Villon and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, p. 12.

^[2] Exhibit "E," RTC records, pp.5-6

^[3] Id. at 2.

^[4] Id. at 2-3.

^[5] Id. at 3.

^[6] Id. at 7-8.

^[7] Id. at 11-12.

^[8] Rollo, pp. 25-26.

^[9] Id.

^[10] Id. at 26-27.

^[11] Id. at 27.

^[12] Id. at 41.

^[13] Id. at 42.

^[14] Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997.

^[15] Id.

^[16] G.R. No. 137377, December 18, 2001;

^[17] Rollo, p. 42; Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, Art. 99(2)(x); E.O. No. 648, s. 1981, sec. 5; E.O. No. 71, s. 1993; Executive Order No. 72, s. 1993.

^[18] Sec. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates.—No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of  a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other person having   an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to open the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section. All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered.  (Emphasis supplied.)

^[19] Id.

^[20] Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. No. L-24116-17, August 22, 1968.