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108 OG No. 13, 1383 (March 26, 2012)
[ CV No. 91635, September 15, 2010 ]
GREGORIO FRANCO & LEONILA APELIT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. MARCELO MACALINO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.[*]
At bench is an appeal from the Decision dated May 16, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 12457, the dispositive portion of which states:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the defendant is hereby ordered to vacate and surrender the possession and occupation of the property in question to the plaintiff; to cause at his expense, the removal of all the structures constructed on the titled property, to pay P20 000 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
The subject matter of the instant suit is a parcel of land ("the property"), measuring 112 square meters, located in the Barrio of Bahay Pare, Municipality of Candaba, Pampanga and registered in the name of plaintiff-appellee Leonila Apelit under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14367 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, where it was entered on January 20, 2000.[1]
Appellee alleges that on June 10, 2000, defendant-appellant Marcelo Macalino, acting with strategy, force and stealth, illegally entered the property and started erecting a house using sturdy materials.[2] Appellee confronted appellant and demanded that he vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do so.[3] The matter was then referred to Barangay Conciliation proceedings, but no settlement was reached.[4]
Hence appellees filed an action for Forcible Entry with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga, where in addition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction, they prayed for a permanent order for appellant to vacate the subject premises, remove the structures he built, and pay damages.[5] As evidence, appellees presented TCT No. 14367,[6] tax declarations, and Leonila Apelit's own testimony in court.[7]
Upon completion of an ex parte hearing on appellee's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibition injunction, the MTC granted the writ, ordering that appellees be restored in possession and ordering appellant to cease and desist fom ousting appellees from their possession of the property while the case is pending.[8]
However, appellee was unable to enforce the writ, so that appellant and parties acting in his behalf have remained in possession up to the present time.[9]
On November 8, 2000, appellant filed his answer, where he claimed that he is not a real party-in-interest in the case as the property belongs to one Wilfredo Macalino, who brought the same on November 14, 1990 from a certain Fermin Carpio, brother of the alleged previous owner Lucila Carpio.[10] Appellant claimed that from November 14, 1990, Wilfredo Macalino had taken possession of the property, and thereafter, allowed his brothers to construct houses on it.[11] To support his claim, appellant submitted the following documentary evidence:
Exhibit "1,"[12] or a "Kasunduan Sa Paglilipat ng Loteng Pamayanan" dated November 14, 1990, Wherein Wilfredo Macalino supposedly bought the property from Fermin Carpio;
Exhibit "2,"[13] or a Tax Declaration dated September 28, 1973, in the name of Lucila Carpio, the sister of Fermin Carpio.
Exhibits "3"[14] and "4,"[15] or a DAR Official Receipt dated April 22, 1974 and a Order of Award dated October 23, 1972, respectively, also in the name of Lucila Carpio;
Exhibits "5"[16] "6,:[17] 7,"[18] and "8,"[19] or the affidavits of Marcelo Macalino, Fermin Carpio, Wilfredo Macalino and Gerardo Macalino which repeat the allegations in the complaint that neither appellant nor appellee were the owners of the property and/or its improvements.
In its Decision dated February 18, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint, stating that there was no allegation by the plaintiffs of prior physical possession, and mainly holding that the central issue in the case is ownership of the property, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to decide. The decision stated, thus:
"In the case at bar, where there is a question of ownership, the first level court loses jurisdiction over the case. Thus, where the allegation of the complaint clearly establish a case for recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of possession as a mere element attribute of such claim for ownership, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for ownership cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. (Bautista vs. Fernandez, 38 SCRA 548).Appellees filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the decision.[21]
On view of the foregoing, the court is constrained to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction earlier issued is dissolved and the counter-claim of defendant is dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED."[20]
On appeal, the RTC ordered a trial on the merits. In an Order dated November 22, 2002.[22] the RTC affirmed the MTC's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the existence of a question of ownership gave the RTC jurisdiction and the duty to try the case on the merits as if it was originally filed with it, following Rule 40, Sec. 8 of the Rules of Court.[23]
During the trial, plaintiffs-appellees presented the following evidence, among others:
Testimony of Leonila Apelit; [24]Defendant-appellant, meanwhile, submitted the same evidence earlier presented to the MTC, and in addition, presented the testimonies in open court of Fermin Carpio,[30] Wilfredo Macalino[31] and Gerardo Macalino.[32]
Exhibit "A,"[25] or TCT No. 14367;
Exhibit "B,"[26] or the Subdivision plan of Lot 41 Blk. 60, PSD-39093;
Exhibit "C,"[27] or a Tax Declaration dated April 11, 2000;
Exhibit "D,"[28] or a Certification from the Municipal Treasurer of Candaba, Pampanga showing that appellee's tax payments were up-to-date;
Exhibit "E and series,"[29] or photographs of house being constructed;
The RTC treated the case as an accion publiciana and rendered its Decision on May 16, 2008.[33] The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, finding that the latter's certificate of title gave them "a superior right to possess the contested property."[34] It also found that appellant's mere tax declaration and order of a wards were "not better proof of ownership than (those presented by) plaintiffs (appelees)."[35] Further, it ruled that appellees, as owners of the property, have the right to eject any person illegally occupying their property.[36] In addition, it declared that the appellant, as a builder in bad faith on appelees' property, is not entitled to indemnification for the improvements made once he is ejected.[37]
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, defendant-appellant perfected the appeal at bench with the filing of their June 10, 2008 Notice of Appeal.[38]
In his appeal brief, appellant faulted the RTC as follows:
"1. The RTC erred in not holding that defendant-appellant Marcelo Macalino is not the party-in-interest in the instant case;
2. The RTC erred in holding in its Order dated November 22, 2002 that the appeal of plaintiffs from the Decision dated February 18, 2002 of the first level Court (MCTC) in Civil Case No. 2000-252 should be tried by it under paragraph one (1) and not paragraph two (2) of Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
3.The RTC erred in its Order dated January 26, 2004 in denying the Motion to Dismiss dated November 6, 2003 filed by the defendant-appellant on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action alleged in the Complaint and the Complaint states no cause of action;
4. Be that as it may, the RTC erred in declaring in its decision that defendant-appellant is a builder in bad faith even though he is not the owner of the houses erected in the lot in question; erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender the possession and occupation of the property in question and to cause at his expense, the removal of all the structures constructed on the titled property; and further erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay the plaintiffs P20.000.00 attorney's fees and to pay the costs; and finally.
5. The RTC erred in not as a whole dismissing the case and in not granting the counterclaim for damages, attorney's fees and costs as contained in the Answer filed by the defendant in Civil Case No. 2000-252, MCTC, Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga."[39]
The issues for our resolution are:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to try and decided the case;
Whether or not plaintiffs-appellees are entitled to judicially eject defendant-appellant and persons acting in his behalf from the subject property.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
First, we discuss appellant's challenge to the RTC's jurisdiction to render the assailed decision.
While it may be true that the RTC erroneously sustained the MTC's ruling dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction, the RTC's ultimate finding ordering the ejectment of defendant-appellant, among other things, must be affirmed.
The MTC erred in dismissing the case for Forcible Entry for alleged lack of jurisdiction. The fact that the defendant raised a question of ownership in the answer is not a ground for dismissing an ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction, for it is a basic rule in such cases before the MTC that jurisdiction of that court is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and not the defenses raised in the answer.[40] In addition, even if an issue as to ownership exists, the MTC is not deprived of jurisdiction, as it may resolve the issue of ownership only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession; the title or ownership itself should still be finally settled in a litigation before the proper court.[41]
However, even if the MTC erred in divesting itself of jurisdiction, and the proper procedure should have been for the RTC to have ordered a remand of the case to the MTC, per Rule 40, Sec. 8, Par. I, we note that appellant's own estoppel and the long period of time that it had already taken the case to reach this stage demand that the case be decided as it now is, i.e., an appeal from a decision of the RTC which treated the case as an accion publiciana under its original jurisdiction. After more than 10 years of litigation, the cause of law and justice will not be served if the case is again ordered remanded and tried anew before the MTC, to the great prejudice of the parties who are entitled to speedy resolution of the case. We are mindful of the injunction that rules of procedure must be liberally construed to speedily and efficiently attain substantial justice.[42]
Appellant's estoppel by laches is apparent in his active participation in the case before the RTC, spurred by its own representations that the MTC had no jurisdiction, since "a question of ownership is involved." Further, appellant at no point had challenged the RTC's jurisdiction, but in fact invoked it when it questioned the MTC's jurisdiction.
In his Position Paper before the MTC, appellant argued that:
From the aforesaid evidence it is also clear that Wilfredo Macaltno asserts ownership over the land in question and so the real issue is ownership over and above the issue of possession, this Honorable Court should dismiss the complaint and let the parties ventilate the matter before the Regional Trial Court, where the question of ownership of the land may be finally settled, thus:It was upon these protestations by appellant that the MTC dismissed the case for Forcible Entry. And it is upon this dismissal that the RTC took jurisdiction and tried the case as it was originally filed before it, following Rule 40, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in this appeal, appellant may not again question the RTC's taking of jurisdiction over the case, for if sustained, not only would it leave appellees with no legal recourse in both the MTC or RTC for their clear cause of action, it would also make appellant benefit from his abuse or procedural rules, an absurdity that the law never intended and our collective sense of justice would not permit."Where it appears during the trial that, by the nature of the evidence presented, the issue of possession can not be decided without deciding the issue of ownership, in such case, the jurisdiction of the municipal court is lost and the action should be dismissed. (Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA412, De los Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 44)."
(Emphasis supplied.)[43]
In an apparent effort to escape the court's inevitable and ultimate finding, appellant contends that the second, not the first, paragraph of Rule 40, Section 8 should have been applied by the RTC.
We do not agree. In receiving evidence and trying the case anew as accion publiciana, the RTC violated neither the first nor second paragraph of the provision, as both paragraphs anyway permit the court to receive evidence in the interest of justice. We reiterate that it was appellant who ardently and with success sought to deprive the MTC of jurisdiction and caused the case to be brought to the RTC. Having failed to obtain favorable results before the RTC, appellant would now have the case remanded back to the MTC. We cannot be a party to this absurdity and it is now time for this Court to put an end appellant's trifling with court processes.
We come to the substantive aspects of the case.
The RTC correctly held that it is plaintiffs-appellees, specifically Leonila Apelit, who is the registered owner of the property under a valid Torrens title, who have the right to possess the subject property.
Appellee's right of possession (jus possidendi) is among the bundle of rights Art. 428 of the New Civil Code guarantees a property owner.[44] Under the same article, appellee also has a right of action to recover the property against any holder or possessor.
Appellant's main defense - that appellees are not the owners of the property, is unavailing. It flies in the face of appellees' clear and indefeasible title.
Issued under the Torrens system, appellees' TCT No. 14367 is a concrete and conclusive evidence of their indefeasible title to the property.[45] it is a conclusive evidence of ownership[46] and is immune to collateral attack.[47] Therfore, appellant's effort at questioning appellees' ownership is futile, as it attacks what is already a conclusive proof of ownership, and collaterally at that, i.e., in an ejectment proceeding instead of a direct action specially filed for such purpose.
Appellees' clear title is what ultimately gave them the cause of action to file an ejectment case (either for forcible entry, unlawful detainer or accion publiciana) against any unlawful occupant or possessor.
And as correctly ruled by the RTC, even appellant's own effort at proving his own or other people's alleged ownership grasps at straws.
Fraught with many infirmities that reduce it into a mere scrap of paper, appellant's Exhibit "1,"[48] or the "Kasunduan Sa Paglilipat ng LotengPamayanan" dated November 14, 1990 was rightly disregarded by the lower court. The document does not clearly identify the property being sold in terms of metes and bounds; thus, it has no object certain or subject matter, making it a void contract.[49] Basic is the rule that a person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership.[50] Moreover, the "kasunduan" is not even in a public document as required by the frauds;[51] its being unnotarized also makes it impossible to ascertain the real date of its actual execution. Lastly, the document itself does not other proof nor documents under which Fermin S. Carpio, the alleged "seller," derives any right to sell the "property."
Also correctly ignored by the trial courts is his Exhibit "2,"[52] or the Tax Declaration dated September 28, 1973, in the name of Lucila Carpio. The rule is that "tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership."[53] They certainly pale in comparison to a valid Torrens title as proof of such ownership.
Likewise correctly disregarded are Exhibits "3"[54] and "4,"[55] or the DAR Official Receipt dated April 22, 1974 and the Order of Award dated October 23, 1972, respectively, since in addition to their being vastly inferior to appellees' certificate of title, these documents are also not in the name of any of the persons claimed by appellant to be the real owners of the property. They are in the name of Lucila Carpio, the deceased alleged sister of Fermin Carpio, who himself has no proof of his being the sole heir of the former nor of the settlement of her estate.
The affidavits and testimonies of Fermin Carpio,[56] Wilfredo Macalino[57] and Gerardo Macalino[58] are of little weight, as they only make the unsubstantiated assertions that they were the successive owners of the property, but with nary a credible proof nor evidence to support such claims.
The other thrust of appellant's defense is that he, Marcelo Macalino, is not the real party-in-interest in the case as he is not the actual possessor nor occupant of the property; instead, the property is allegedly owned by Wilfredo Macalino (the alleged "buyer") and the latter's brother, Gerardo Macalino, who built the house now standing on it.
The Courts rejects this defense or obviously just another clever ploy of appellant Marcelo Macalino to evade the court's jurisdiction and frustrate the execution of the final decision in this case. Suffice it to state that an existing house was demolished and new structures were built on the subject property upon Marcelo's supervision and on his representation that he owned the property.[59] Both Wilfredo Macalino and Gerardo Macalino also testified under oath that Marcelo Macalino is their father.[60] The records bear out that appellant Marcelo Macalino insisted on constructing a house on the property, even while the parties were undergoing Barangay Conciliation proceedings and even when a case was already filed in Court.[61] We also note that the original complaint of plaintiff-appellees, filed with the MTC, in fact names Marcelo Macalino "and all persons acting in his behalf as defendants,[62] hence, there is no reason for him or any of his son to evade whatever orders will emanate from the courts in relation to this case. Note must be taken too of Marcelo Macalino's active participation in the case, even at this stage of the appeal, which is not formal behavior for anymore who claims that "he does not occupy the property" and thus, does not stand to be affected by any ejectment order that may emanate from the case.
Finally, the RTC also correctly ruled that appellant and/or his sons, having built on the land in bad faith, are not entitle to compensation when ordered to return possession of the land and its improvements to appellees, following Art. 449 of the Civil Code.[63] In addition, appellant may be proceeded against as a builder in bad faith under Arts. 20, 21, 450-452 and 2176 of the Code.[64] As earlier stated, and as admitted by his own witness, appellant proceeded with his construction and even destroyed an existing house despite having been notified of the land's ownership by appellee, and despite the filing of a case in court.[65] Such acts of illegality and malice have no room in an orderly society and must not be rewarded nor countenanced.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vilion and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
[*] Court of Appeals Reports Annotated, Vol. 9.
[1] Exhibit "A," MTC records, p. 16.
[2] Complaint for Forcible Entry, id. at 11.
[3] Id. at 12.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 11-15.
[6] Exhibit "A," id. at 16.
[7] Hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, Direct examination of Leonila Apelit, TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 8-10, id. at 64-76.
[8] Id. at 86.
[9] Exhibit "7," id. at 185-186; Direct and cross examination of Wilfredo Macalino, TSN, February 20, 2007; Exhibit "8," id. at "187-188. Direct and cross-examination of Gerardo Macalino, TSN, September 11, 2007.
[10] Answer, id. at 89.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 188.
[13] Id. at 189.
[14] Id. at 190.
[15] Id. at 191.
[16] Id. at 181-182.
[17] Id. at 183-184.
[18] Id. at 185-186.
[19] Id. at 187-188.
[20] Id. at 202.
[21] Id. at 213.
[22] RTC records, pp. 241-243.
[23] Id. at 242.
[24] Direct and cross examination of Leonila Apelit, TSN, October 26, 2004 and March 8, 2005.
[25] RTC records, p. 317.
[26] MTC records, p. 25.
[27] Id. at 26.
[28] Id. at 29.
[29] Id. at 31.
[30] Direct and cross examination of Fermin Carpio, TSN, August 16, 2005.
[31] Direct and cross examination of Wilfredo Macalino, TSN, February 20, 2007.
[32] Direct and cross examination of Gerardo Macalino, TSN, September 11, 2007.
[33] RTC Decision, RTC records, pp. 405-412.
[34] Id. at 409.
[35] Id.
[36] Id. at 411.
[37] Id. at 412.
[38] Id. at 418-419.
[39] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[40] Garcia v. CA, G.R. No. 88632, March 22, 1993; Sarmiento v. CA, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992; Del Rosario v. CA, G.R. No. 109032, February 21, 1995.
[41] RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. 16; Del Mundo v. CA, G.R. No. 108522, January 29, 1996.
[42] Id., Rule 1, Sec. 6; McEntee v. Manotok, G.R. No. L-14968, October 27, 1961.
[43] Position Paper of Defendant, MTC Records, p. 178.
[44] E. Rommel Realty and Development Corp. v. Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 127636, November 24, 2006.
[45] Cagayan De Oro City Landless Residents Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 106043, March 4, 1996.
[46] Kho v. CA, G.R. No. 53630, September 30, 1992.
[47] P.D. 1529, Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.-A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
[48] MTC records, p. 188.
[49] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1318(2).
[50] Gesmundo v. CA, G.R. No. 119870, December 23, 1999.
[51] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1358(1) in relation to Art. 1403(2)(e).
[52] MTC records, p. 189.
[53] Serina v. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, August 17, 2004.
[54] MTC records, p. 190.
[55] Id. at 191.
[56] Exhibit "6," id. at 183-184; Direct and cross examination of Fermin Carpio, TSN, August 16, 2005.
[57] Exhibit "7," id. at 185-186; Direct and cross examination of Wilfredo Macalino, TSN, February 20, 2007.
[58] Exhibit M8,M id. at 187-188; Direct and cross examination of Gerardo Macalino, TSN, September 11, 2007.
[59] Hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, Direct examination of Leonila Apelit, TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 8-10 (MTC records, pp. 71-73); Direct examination of Leonila Apelit (RTC), TSN, October 26, 2004, pp. 8-11.
[60] Cross examination of Wilfredo Macalino, TSN, February 20, 2007, p. 15; Direct Examination of Gerardo Macalino, TSN, September 11, 2007, p. 10.
[61] Hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, Direct examination of Leonila Apelit, TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 8-11 (MTC records, pp. 71-74).
[62] MTC records, pp. 11-15; Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MTC dated October 16, 2000, MTC records, p. 86.
[63] 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
[64] Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.[65] Hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, direct examination of Leonila Apelit, TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 8-11 (MTC records, pp. 71-74); Direct examination of Gerardo Macalino, TSN, September 11, 2007, pp. 10-12.
***
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planning or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. (363a) Art
451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower, (n) Art.452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land, (n)
***
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)