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108 OG No. 2, 153 (January 9, 2012)
[ CR No. 31390, May 20, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHRISTOPHER BARTOLATA Y TRESBALLES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
This is an appeal[1] from the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Br. 258, finding the Accused-Appellant guilty of "Robbery Snatching" in Crim. Case No. 06-1176 and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year, seven (7) months, and ten (10) days of prision correctional, as minimum, to six (6) years, one (1) month, and eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The Facts:[3]
On October 6, 2006, Christopher Bartolata y Tresballes (Accused-Appellant) was charged before the RTC in an Information[4] which reads in part:
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued,[6]
The Version of the Prosecution:
The prosecution presented PO3 John A. Siquig[7] (PO3 Siquig), the victim, as its lone witness.
On September 30, 2006, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Siquig and his sixteen (16)-yearold son, Allan Siquig, were on board a passenger jeepney on their way home to Alabang, Muntinlupa City. PO3 Siquig was sitting at the farthest end from the driver of the jeepney. While they were at Food Terminal, Inc., four (4) men boarded the jeepney. Three (3) of them went inside the jeepney while the fourth (4th) man (later identified as the Accused-Appellant Christopher Tresballes Bartolata) stood on the running board near PO3 Siquig's seat. The latter wondered as to why the fourth (4th) man would rather stand at the end despite the availability of seats inside the jeepney. Hence, he familiarized himself with the face of the person standing at the end. Thereafter, the jeepney reached Malugay Street in East Service Road within the boundary of Taguig City and Paranaque City. As the three (3) men alighted, the fourth (4th) man swiftly snatched PO3 Siquig's bag containing Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) cash and his son's books and identification card. Consequently, PO3 Siquig alighted and drew his service firearm but, due to his unfamiliarity with the area and the tall buildings, he decided not to fire a warning shot as he might hit someone. He subsequently ran after them but failed to pursue them because they entered a dark alley.[8]
PO3 Siquig then went to the Police Community Precinct (PCP) 3 in Parañaque City to report the incident and gave the police a description of the snatcher, who has an elongated face and a high-bridged nose. After two (2) days, a member of the PCP 3, PO3 Richard Sempron (PO3 Sempron), called up PO3 Siquig to inform the latter of the arrest of a person with the same description. Upon his arrival at PCP 3, PO3 Siquig immediately recognized the person who took his bag.[9]
The Version of the Defense:
Lone witness Accused-Appellant[10] testified that he is employed as a machine operator at Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. Located at J.Y. Son Veterans, Taguig, Metro Manila. At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 30, 2006, there was a typhoon, Milenyo, and a total blackout in Parañaque City. Thus, he stayed home and did not report for work. On October 2, 2006, at around 11:20 o'clock in the evening, while accompanying Mark, his visitor whose last name he cannot remember, to the outpost at the comer of Malugay Street, Parañaque City, he was arrested by a police officer in plain clothes and by Barangay Tanod(s) Crisanto Morta and Ruben Salito. His visitor, who was with him at that time, was not arrested. Subsequently, he was brought to the hospital to treat his wound as the side of his head was bleeding after being hit by the police officer with a gun. He was then brought to the PCP 3 where he was detained. He was never informed of the reason for his detention until the next day when PO3 Sempron called PO3 Siquig. The latter was able to identify him by pointing as the culprit while he was inside his cell together with five (5) or six other persons. He added that he did not file any administrative charge against the police officers despite his claim of innocence and the bodily injury he received.[11]
On January 22, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding the Accused-Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of "Robbery Snatching". The decretal portion of its decision reads:
In imputing error on the part of the RTC, the Accused-Appellant raises the lone issue, viz:
The Accused-Appellant claims that the decision of the RTC is utterly erroneous because the records do not show how violence or intimidation was employed upon the person of the victim. He adds that there is also no proof that the alleged taking of the bag was with intent to gain since the same was not found in his possession.[14]
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the abrupt and forceful manner of the snatching of the bag amounts to force and violence; the intent to gain is presumed and the burden to overcome the same lies with the defense; that the non-possession or non-production of the bag does not negate the fact that the taking was with intent to gain, provided the same is established beyond reasonable doubt; that the categorical and positive identification by the victim, PO3 Siquig prevails over the latter's alibi and denial, absent any showing of any ill motive to testify falsely against the Accused-Appellant; and, that it was not physically impossible for the Accused-Appellant to be at the crime scene since his house was only a few minutes away therefrom.[15]
We find partial merit in the appeal.
It is well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their credibility.[16]
At bench, We note that the Accused-Appellant is not contesting his identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Nonetheless, even if he were to question the same, it would merely be an exercise in futility as the records clearly show that PO3 Siquig positively and categorically identified the Accused-Appellant as the person who grabbed his bag and, thereafter, ran away. He remembered the face of the Accused-Appellant as the former was sitting at the end of the jeepney where the latter was hanging on when he boarded the same. Further, there was no proof of animosity or ill motive on PO3 Siquig's part which could have motivated him to falsely testify against the Accused-Appellant. Well-settled is the rule that where there is nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[17] Therefore, the absence of an improper motive on PO3 Siquig's part to falsely against the Accused-Appellant lends full credence to the former's account of the incident and the identification of the latter as the culprit.
Moreover, there is no doubt that the Accused-Appellant's taking of the personal property belonging to PO3 Siquig was done without the latter's consent and with intent to gain. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.[18] The Accused-appellant's acts of grabbing PO3 Siquig's bag and of running away with it manifestly demonstrate his intent to gain. Additionally, the production in court of the stolen property is not an indispensable requisite to sustain conviction as long as there is clear proof of the commission of the crime charged.[19] Thus, in light of the credible testimony of the prosecution against him, the Accused-Appellant's contention that his non-possession of the stolen bag at the time of the arrest and its non-production in court negates intent to gain, is utterly without merit.
On the issue of whether the taking was attended by violence against or intimidation of person, We find that the Accused-Appellant is correct that the records are silent as to how the same was employed.
Both robbery and theft involve the deprivation, with intent to gain, or personal property belonging to another. Significantly, the distinguishing element between these two (2) crimes is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging in another. The said element is present to the crime of robbery while the same is absent in the crime of theft.[20]
In the case at bar, a careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the testimony of PO3 Siquig does not show that violence or intimidation attended the unlawful taking of the bag. He only testified that the Accused-Appellant merely snatched his bag and ran away with it. Therefore, absent proof that the taking without consent was coupled with violence or intimidation, the Accused-Appellant can only be held liable for the crime of theft, and not robbery.
While We are keenly aware that the Accused-Appellant was indicted for "robbery snatching", and not theft, the failure to correctly specify the crime committed, however, will not bar his conviction for the crime of theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[21] In this case, the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.
The penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the thing stolen. The only evidence presented by the prosecution as regards the value of the stolen personal properties is the Three Thousand Peso (PhP3,000.00)-cash. Hence, it is the basis of the penalty. Under Article 309(3) of the Revised Penal Code, if the value of the property stolen is more than Two Hundred Pesos(PhP200.00) but does not exceed Six Thousand Pesos(PhP6,000.00), the imposable penalty is prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods, or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years, and two (2) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. There being no modifying circumstance, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or from one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (2t) days to two(2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days. In view of the foregoing, this Court imposes upon the Accused-Appellant the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.
As to the civil liability of the Accused-Appellant, We rule that the RTC seriously erred in not imposing a civil liability of Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) representing the cash taken from PO3 Siquig. PO3 Siquig's clear and categorical testimony that the stolen bag contained the said amount is sufficient proof as regards the actual value of the amount stolen from him.[22] Furthermore, the Accused-Appellant never presented any evidence to controvert the same. Hence, PO3 Siquig's testimony prevails and, thus, makes the Accused-Appellant liable to PO3 Siquig for the payment of the said amount.
All told, while We uphold the Factual findings of the RTC, We however, find that it erred in concluding that the Accused-Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery-snatching instead of theft and in failing to impose a civil liability upon the same.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the RTC is affirmed with modifications in that the Accused-Appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven(11) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and is ordered to pay PO3 Jhon Siquig the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) as civil liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Tolentino and Ayson, JJ., concur.
Appeal partly granted. Judgment affirmed with modifications.
[1] Notice of Appeal filed on February 1, 2008, and the RTC Order dated February 4, 2008,' approving the same, Rollo, pp. 21-22, respectively.
[2] Dated January 21, 2008, id., pp. 14-19.
[3] As culled from the records.
[4] Information, Records, pp. 1.
[5] Order dated November 7, 2006, Id. p.19.
[6] Order dated February 8, 2007; Id., pp. 78-79.
[7] 40 years old, married, a member of the Philippines National Police Special Action Force of Taguig, and residing at c/o Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City; TSN, April 19, 2007, p. 3.
[8] Exhibit "A" and "A-1"; Records, p. 98.
[9] TSN, April 19, 2007, pp. 9-11.
[10] 29 yrs. Old, single, a machine operator, and residing at No. 367 Malugay St., Parañaque City; TSN, August 28, 2007, p. 3.
[11] TSN, August 28, 2007, pp. 5-20.
[12] Rollo, pp. 18-19, Bracketed insertion supplied.
[13] Rollo, p. 37.
[14] Brief of the Accused-Appellant, Id, pp. 32-42.
[15] Brief for the Appellee; Rollo, pp. 59-79
[16] See Pp. v. Clidoro, et al., G.R.No. 143004 April 9, 2003.
[17] See Pp. v. Clidoro, et al., G.R. No. 143004, April 9, 2003.
[18] See Matrido v. G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009.
[19] See Pp. v. Pp., Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 123816, July 9, 1998.
[20] See Briones v. Pp. G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009.
[21] See Briones v. Pp. G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009.
[22] See TSN, April 19, 2007, p. 9.
The Facts:[3]
On October 6, 2006, Christopher Bartolata y Tresballes (Accused-Appellant) was charged before the RTC in an Information[4] which reads in part:
That on or about the 30th day of September 2006, in the City of Paranaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with THREE (3) John Does, whose true names and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and against the will of the complainant PO3 JOHN SIQUIG Y ADVIENTO by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of said complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and snatch his bag containing cash money, books and school identification cards worth P3,000.00, belonging to said PO3 JOHN SIQUIC Y ADVIENTO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00.When arraigned, the Accused-Appellant, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.[5]
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued,[6]
The Version of the Prosecution:
The prosecution presented PO3 John A. Siquig[7] (PO3 Siquig), the victim, as its lone witness.
On September 30, 2006, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Siquig and his sixteen (16)-yearold son, Allan Siquig, were on board a passenger jeepney on their way home to Alabang, Muntinlupa City. PO3 Siquig was sitting at the farthest end from the driver of the jeepney. While they were at Food Terminal, Inc., four (4) men boarded the jeepney. Three (3) of them went inside the jeepney while the fourth (4th) man (later identified as the Accused-Appellant Christopher Tresballes Bartolata) stood on the running board near PO3 Siquig's seat. The latter wondered as to why the fourth (4th) man would rather stand at the end despite the availability of seats inside the jeepney. Hence, he familiarized himself with the face of the person standing at the end. Thereafter, the jeepney reached Malugay Street in East Service Road within the boundary of Taguig City and Paranaque City. As the three (3) men alighted, the fourth (4th) man swiftly snatched PO3 Siquig's bag containing Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) cash and his son's books and identification card. Consequently, PO3 Siquig alighted and drew his service firearm but, due to his unfamiliarity with the area and the tall buildings, he decided not to fire a warning shot as he might hit someone. He subsequently ran after them but failed to pursue them because they entered a dark alley.[8]
PO3 Siquig then went to the Police Community Precinct (PCP) 3 in Parañaque City to report the incident and gave the police a description of the snatcher, who has an elongated face and a high-bridged nose. After two (2) days, a member of the PCP 3, PO3 Richard Sempron (PO3 Sempron), called up PO3 Siquig to inform the latter of the arrest of a person with the same description. Upon his arrival at PCP 3, PO3 Siquig immediately recognized the person who took his bag.[9]
The Version of the Defense:
Lone witness Accused-Appellant[10] testified that he is employed as a machine operator at Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. Located at J.Y. Son Veterans, Taguig, Metro Manila. At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 30, 2006, there was a typhoon, Milenyo, and a total blackout in Parañaque City. Thus, he stayed home and did not report for work. On October 2, 2006, at around 11:20 o'clock in the evening, while accompanying Mark, his visitor whose last name he cannot remember, to the outpost at the comer of Malugay Street, Parañaque City, he was arrested by a police officer in plain clothes and by Barangay Tanod(s) Crisanto Morta and Ruben Salito. His visitor, who was with him at that time, was not arrested. Subsequently, he was brought to the hospital to treat his wound as the side of his head was bleeding after being hit by the police officer with a gun. He was then brought to the PCP 3 where he was detained. He was never informed of the reason for his detention until the next day when PO3 Sempron called PO3 Siquig. The latter was able to identify him by pointing as the culprit while he was inside his cell together with five (5) or six other persons. He added that he did not file any administrative charge against the police officers despite his claim of innocence and the bodily injury he received.[11]
On January 22, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding the Accused-Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of "Robbery Snatching". The decretal portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused, Christopher bartolata y tresballes, guilty of the crime of ROBBERY SNATCHING as charged against him [in] the information and accused, Christopher bartolata y tresballes is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, seven (7) months and ten (10) days of Prision correccional minimum as minimum to six (6) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision mayor medium as maximum.THE Issue:
No civil liability arises from the offense charged against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In imputing error on the part of the RTC, the Accused-Appellant raises the lone issue, viz:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[13]This Court's Ruling:
The Accused-Appellant claims that the decision of the RTC is utterly erroneous because the records do not show how violence or intimidation was employed upon the person of the victim. He adds that there is also no proof that the alleged taking of the bag was with intent to gain since the same was not found in his possession.[14]
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the abrupt and forceful manner of the snatching of the bag amounts to force and violence; the intent to gain is presumed and the burden to overcome the same lies with the defense; that the non-possession or non-production of the bag does not negate the fact that the taking was with intent to gain, provided the same is established beyond reasonable doubt; that the categorical and positive identification by the victim, PO3 Siquig prevails over the latter's alibi and denial, absent any showing of any ill motive to testify falsely against the Accused-Appellant; and, that it was not physically impossible for the Accused-Appellant to be at the crime scene since his house was only a few minutes away therefrom.[15]
We find partial merit in the appeal.
It is well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial judge was in a better position to determine their credibility.[16]
At bench, We note that the Accused-Appellant is not contesting his identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Nonetheless, even if he were to question the same, it would merely be an exercise in futility as the records clearly show that PO3 Siquig positively and categorically identified the Accused-Appellant as the person who grabbed his bag and, thereafter, ran away. He remembered the face of the Accused-Appellant as the former was sitting at the end of the jeepney where the latter was hanging on when he boarded the same. Further, there was no proof of animosity or ill motive on PO3 Siquig's part which could have motivated him to falsely testify against the Accused-Appellant. Well-settled is the rule that where there is nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[17] Therefore, the absence of an improper motive on PO3 Siquig's part to falsely against the Accused-Appellant lends full credence to the former's account of the incident and the identification of the latter as the culprit.
Moreover, there is no doubt that the Accused-Appellant's taking of the personal property belonging to PO3 Siquig was done without the latter's consent and with intent to gain. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.[18] The Accused-appellant's acts of grabbing PO3 Siquig's bag and of running away with it manifestly demonstrate his intent to gain. Additionally, the production in court of the stolen property is not an indispensable requisite to sustain conviction as long as there is clear proof of the commission of the crime charged.[19] Thus, in light of the credible testimony of the prosecution against him, the Accused-Appellant's contention that his non-possession of the stolen bag at the time of the arrest and its non-production in court negates intent to gain, is utterly without merit.
On the issue of whether the taking was attended by violence against or intimidation of person, We find that the Accused-Appellant is correct that the records are silent as to how the same was employed.
Both robbery and theft involve the deprivation, with intent to gain, or personal property belonging to another. Significantly, the distinguishing element between these two (2) crimes is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging in another. The said element is present to the crime of robbery while the same is absent in the crime of theft.[20]
In the case at bar, a careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the testimony of PO3 Siquig does not show that violence or intimidation attended the unlawful taking of the bag. He only testified that the Accused-Appellant merely snatched his bag and ran away with it. Therefore, absent proof that the taking without consent was coupled with violence or intimidation, the Accused-Appellant can only be held liable for the crime of theft, and not robbery.
While We are keenly aware that the Accused-Appellant was indicted for "robbery snatching", and not theft, the failure to correctly specify the crime committed, however, will not bar his conviction for the crime of theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the Information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[21] In this case, the allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.
The penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the thing stolen. The only evidence presented by the prosecution as regards the value of the stolen personal properties is the Three Thousand Peso (PhP3,000.00)-cash. Hence, it is the basis of the penalty. Under Article 309(3) of the Revised Penal Code, if the value of the property stolen is more than Two Hundred Pesos(PhP200.00) but does not exceed Six Thousand Pesos(PhP6,000.00), the imposable penalty is prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods, or from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years, and two (2) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. There being no modifying circumstance, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the medium of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or from one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty-one (2t) days to two(2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days. In view of the foregoing, this Court imposes upon the Accused-Appellant the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.
As to the civil liability of the Accused-Appellant, We rule that the RTC seriously erred in not imposing a civil liability of Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) representing the cash taken from PO3 Siquig. PO3 Siquig's clear and categorical testimony that the stolen bag contained the said amount is sufficient proof as regards the actual value of the amount stolen from him.[22] Furthermore, the Accused-Appellant never presented any evidence to controvert the same. Hence, PO3 Siquig's testimony prevails and, thus, makes the Accused-Appellant liable to PO3 Siquig for the payment of the said amount.
All told, while We uphold the Factual findings of the RTC, We however, find that it erred in concluding that the Accused-Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery-snatching instead of theft and in failing to impose a civil liability upon the same.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the RTC is affirmed with modifications in that the Accused-Appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven(11) months, and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and is ordered to pay PO3 Jhon Siquig the amount of Three Thousand Pesos (PhP3,000.00) as civil liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Tolentino and Ayson, JJ., concur.
Appeal partly granted. Judgment affirmed with modifications.
[1] Notice of Appeal filed on February 1, 2008, and the RTC Order dated February 4, 2008,' approving the same, Rollo, pp. 21-22, respectively.
[2] Dated January 21, 2008, id., pp. 14-19.
[3] As culled from the records.
[4] Information, Records, pp. 1.
[5] Order dated November 7, 2006, Id. p.19.
[6] Order dated February 8, 2007; Id., pp. 78-79.
[7] 40 years old, married, a member of the Philippines National Police Special Action Force of Taguig, and residing at c/o Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City; TSN, April 19, 2007, p. 3.
[8] Exhibit "A" and "A-1"; Records, p. 98.
[9] TSN, April 19, 2007, pp. 9-11.
[10] 29 yrs. Old, single, a machine operator, and residing at No. 367 Malugay St., Parañaque City; TSN, August 28, 2007, p. 3.
[11] TSN, August 28, 2007, pp. 5-20.
[12] Rollo, pp. 18-19, Bracketed insertion supplied.
[13] Rollo, p. 37.
[14] Brief of the Accused-Appellant, Id, pp. 32-42.
[15] Brief for the Appellee; Rollo, pp. 59-79
[16] See Pp. v. Clidoro, et al., G.R.No. 143004 April 9, 2003.
[17] See Pp. v. Clidoro, et al., G.R. No. 143004, April 9, 2003.
[18] See Matrido v. G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009.
[19] See Pp. v. Pp., Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 123816, July 9, 1998.
[20] See Briones v. Pp. G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009.
[21] See Briones v. Pp. G.R. No. 156009, June 5, 2009.
[22] See TSN, April 19, 2007, p. 9.