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349 Phil. 898
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 120652, February 11, 1998 ]
EUGENIO DE LA CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND CRISTINA MADLANGSAKAY VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
The oft-debated
issue of ownership based on acquisitive prescription submits itself before the
Court anew, involving a four hundred and seven (407) square meter residential
lot located at Barangay San Jose, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz claims to be the owner and actual
possessor of the lot, having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly,
notoriously, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner,
for more than thirty years,[1] at the commencement of this
controversy on September 28, 1987. Private respondent Cristina Madlangsakay Villanueva is a purchaser of
the same lot from the Ramos brothers, Rogelio and Augusto, Jr., who claim to be
successors-in-interest of a previous possessor of the same.
In October 1959,
petitioner contracted a loan from the parents of private respondent, Anastacio
Sakay and Lourdes Manuel, in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00),
mortgaging the disputed land as security. Sometime in 1973, the land became the subject of an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)[2] by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that, under said Act, they had
a better claim than petitioner, being successors-in-interest of a previous
possessor of the land. Petitioner
seasonably opposed the application which, after trial, was denied on the ground
that the land, not having been reclassified for other purposes, remained part
of the forest reserve, hence, inalienable.[3] Consequently, the opposition was
dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the brothers successfully pursued the
reclassification of the land and were granted ownership of the same. It was
after this occurrence that private respondent came to purchase the disputed
land from the Ramoses.
Oblivious of the
Ramoses’ success in claiming the land, petitioner was later surprised to learn
that its ownership had been bestowed upon them, and that it was subsequently
sold to private respondent. Petitioner, as plaintiff in Civil Case No.
520-M-87, entitled “Eugenio De La Cruz versus Cristina Madlangsakay
Villanueva,” filed a complaint on September 28, 1987 for reconveyance with
damages against private respondent, defendant therein. The complaint was
dismissed.
On appeal,
plaintiff-appellant elucidated that an uncle of his had given the land to his
mother, after having purchased it from a Cecilio Espiritu in 1930.[4] He sought a reversal of the
decision of the lower court, praying for a reconveyance of the land in his
favor. The appealed decision was
affirmed in toto by the appellate court. A motion for reconsideration, for lack of merit, did not prosper.
The persistent
petitioner, filing this petition for review, opined that the questioned
decision of the trial court was incompatible with the ruling in Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al.,[5] where this Court held that the
primary right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in
good faith, much prior to its classification, must be recognized and should not
be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated.[6] He relies on the equitable
principle of estoppel, alleging that, by virtue of the contract of
mortgage, private respondent and her parents thereby tacitly acknowledged him
as the true and lawful owner of the mortgaged property. As such, they are estopped from claiming for
themselves the disputed land. He prays
for the reconveyance of the lot in his favor; moral damages in the amount of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00); exemplary damages of like amount; and
attorney’s fees of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), plus one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00) per court appearance and the costs of the suit.[7]
This petition
cannot be given due course.
The several
decades when petitioner possessed and occupied the land in question may not be
considered in his favor after all. “In
an action for reconveyance, what is sought is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name,
to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This (sic) is what reconveyance is all
about.”[8]
The crucial
point for resolution is this: Is petitioner vested with a better right over the
residential lot to which he devoted an abundance of time, effort and resources
in fencing and cultivating the same? It
is sad that even the magnanimous compassion of this Court cannot offer him any
spark of consolation for his assiduous preservation and enhancement of the
property.
We answer in the
negative.
Unfortunately
for him, Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al.[9] is inapplicable in the present
case. In said case, the disputed land
was classified after the possession and cultivation in good faith of the
applicant. The Court stated that “the primary right of a private individual who
possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such
classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events
which could not have been anticipated.”[10] Land Classification Project No. 3
was certified by the Director of Lands on December 22, 1924, whereas the
possession thereof commenced as early as 1909.[11] Petitioner therein was not deprived
of his possessory rights by the subsequent classification of the land. Although
the classification of lands is a government prerogative which it may opt to exercise
to the detriment of another, still, private interests regarding the same are
not prejudiced and the possessor in good faith is respected in his right not be
disturbed. This was the auspicious situation of petitioner in the abovecited
case.
Here, petitioner
possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the
Government as part of the forest zone. In fact, the land remained part of the forest reserve until such time
that it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the
Ramoses. As succinctly stated by this
Court in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,[12] a positive act of the Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have been properly declared to be available for
other purposes, there is no disposable land to speak of.[13] Absent the fact of declassification
prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the
property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which
he could not have acquired by prescription.[14]
Clearly, the
effort to apply Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Miguel Marcelo, et al.
in the case at bar is futile. No similarity of facts or events exist which
would merit its application to the case presented by petitioner.
Neither may the
rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by petitioner, as it is an
iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. The
lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioner cannot be counted in his
favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which
property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable. Under Article
1113 of the Civil Code:
“All things which
are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.” (Italics supplied).
Further,
jurisprudence is replete with cases which iterate that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private property.[15] Possession of the residential lot
by petitioner, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership. This Court is constrained to
abide by the latin maxim “(d)ura lex, sed lex.”[16]
The fact that
the disputed land was used for a dual private purpose, namely, as a residential
lot and as part of the ricemill business of private respondent’s parents, is
immaterial. As held in Heirs of Jose
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,[17] the classification of forest land,
or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Recourse to the
principle of estoppel must likewise fail. Petitioner invokes this principle in light of the contract of
mortgage between him and the parents of private respondent. While it is true
that the mortgagees, having entered into a contract with petitioner as
mortgagor, are estopped from questioning the latter’s ownership of the
mortgaged property and his concomitant capacity to alienate or encumber the same,[18] it must be considered that, in the
first place, petitioner did not possess such capacity to encumber the land at
the time for the stark reason that it had been classified as a forest land and
remained a part of the patrimonial property of the State. Assuming, without admitting, that the
mortgagees cannot subsequently question the fact of ownership of petitioner
after having dealt with him in that capacity, still, petitioner was never
vested with the proprietary power to encumber the property. In fact, even if the mortgagees continued to
acknowledge petitioner as the owner of the disputed land, in the eyes of the
law, the latter can never be presumed to be owner.
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, we are
bound by the findings of the appellate court and are constrained to AFFIRM the
same in toto. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, p.
9.
[2] As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529.
[3] Rollo, p.
56.
[4] The appellate court found that petitioner was not
able to convincingly prove the existence of the Deed of Sale between his uncle,
Anselmo Hilario, and Cecilio Espiritu. Presentation of secondary evidence
likewise failed because petitioner, not being familiar with the signature of
Espiritu, could not have had the capacity to testify regarding the due
execution of the deed.
[5] 168 SCRA 77 (1988).
[6] Republic vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[7] Rollo, p.
11.
[8] Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396 (1987).
[9] Supra.
[10] Supra.
[11] Supra.
[12] 178 SCRA 708 (1989).
[13] Heirs of Proceso Bautista vs. Barza, 208 SCRA
454 (1992).
[14] Director of Forest Administration vs.
Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121 (1990).
[15] Republic vs. IAC, 186 SCRA 88 (1990); Director
of Lands vs. CA, 178 SCRA 708 (1989).
[16] “The law is hard, but that is the law.”
[17] 126 SCRA 69 (1983)
[18] Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides: “Through estoppel
an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making
it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.” While the provision applies
directly to the one making the representation (petitioner herein), estoppel
may be applied by analogy to the other parties (mortgagees herein) who deal
directly with the former.