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352 Phil. 79
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 122633, April 20, 1998 ]
NAGA COLLEGE FOUNDATION
EDUCATION WORKERS ORGANIZATION (NCFEWO), GERARDO J. SAMAN, EDUARO C. LAURELES,
NESTOR P. AVENIDO, AND OLIVE CEA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. VITO C. BOSE,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER, REGIONAL ARBITRATION BRANCH NO. V,
LEGASPI CITY, AND NAGA COLLEGE FOUNDATION AND DR. MELCHOR T. VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners were
employees of the Naga College Foundation of which private respondent Melchor T.
Villanueva is the president. In 1990,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Naga City for unfair labor
practice, reinstatement, backwages, and damages against private respondents,
alleging illegal dismissal. On the
other hand, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for
conducting an illegal strike.
The cases were
consolidated and referred to the public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter
(ELA) in Legaspi City. On August 20,
1992 the ELA rendered a decision, ordering the reinstatement of petitioners and
the payment of backwages to them. The
dispositive portion of his decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, directing Naga College Foundation and Dr. Melchor T. Villanueva or any responsible official to immediately reinstate the individual complainants to their respective former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay their backwages thru this Branch within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, as follows:
1. Eduardo C. Laureles ....P 81,671.85
2.
Olivia E. Cea ................ 80,521.55
3.
Ramon V. Surara.......... 87,285.35
4.
Nestor P. Avenido........ 73,619.70
5.
Gerardo J. Saman......... 91,587.50
GRAND TOTAL
===== P414,685.95
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Private
respondents appealed. On January 19,
1993, while the appeal was pending, petitioners moved for the execution of the
portion of the decision insofar as it granted reinstatement.[2] The motion was made pursuant to
Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by §12 of R.A. No. 6715.
On February 23,
1993, the parties entered into an agreement whereby private respondents agreed
to reinstate petitioners in the payroll effective September 21, 1992, the date
of receipt by them of the ELA’s decision. Private respondents agreed to pay petitioners their monthly salary
beginning March 30, 1993, plus the additional amount of P3,000.00, as
monthly installment on the salaries which had accrued, plus interest. The agreement was approved by the ELA in his
order, dated March 26, 1993.
However, after
paying three installments of the accrued salaries of petitioners, private respondents
failed to make further payments to petitioners. Petitioners asked the ELA for assistance and, as no action was
taken on their request,[3] petitioner Laureles on October 19,
1993 filed a motion for execution directly with the NLRC in Manila.[4]
Meanwhile, on
June 15, 1993, the NLRC rendered a decision affirming that of the Labor
Arbiter.[5] Private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied.[6] They filed a petition for certiorari,
which this Court likewise dismissed in its resolution of July 11, 1994 (G.R.
No. 113621).[7] Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on August 31, 1994 and, on October 3,
1994, entry of judgment was made.[8]
On January 30,
1995, petitioner Eduardo Laureles filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
execution.[9] He filed other motions on February
13, 1995[10] and March 10, 1995,[11] reiterating his prayer for a writ
of execution.
On March 16,
1995,[12] respondent ELA denied the motions
on the ground that the records of the case were still in the NLRC in
Manila. He stated, however, that he
would execute the decision once he received the records.
On March 24,
1995,[13] petitioners again moved for the
execution of the decision on the basis of information that the records of the
case had already been remanded to the ELA as early as January of 1994. It appears that although the records had
indeed been returned to the ELA in January 1994, they were subsequently
borrowed by the Solicitor General for the preparation of the comment on the
Supreme Court petition for certiorari filed by private respondents. When the Solicitor General returned the
records of the case, they were returned to the NLRC branch in Naga City,
instead of Legaspi City. It was not
until public respondent inquired from the NLRC in Manila on April 11, 1995 that
the error was discovered.
Anyway, the
records were finally received by the ELA in Legaspi City on April 21, 1995.[14] But execution was held off because
of the failure of petitioners to submit evidence of income which they earned
during their dismissal.[15] Petitioners insisted on execution
according to the tenor of the original decision, without need of determining
how much they might have earned during the period of their dismissal. They claimed that for the ELA to consider
and deduct the income earned by them would be for him to amend the decision in
their favor, which had already become final and executory.
On November 27,
1995, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus to compel the ELA to
resolve the matters pending before him and to issue a writ of execution.
On November 28,
1995, the ELA finally acted on petitioners’ motion. He denied execution on the ground that by filing a motion for
execution in the NLRC in Manila, petitioners had abandoned their motions in the
Legaspi office. At the same time,
however, noting that the incidents relating to the execution of the decision
had caused friction between the parties and strained their relations, thus
allegedly making the reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions
impracticable, the ELA ordered that, in lieu of reinstatement, petitioners be
given separation pay.
On December 21,
1995, petitioners asked for a reconsideration of the ELA’s order.[16] As private respondents deposited
with the ELA four checks for P142,332.00, representing the separation
pay of the four individual complainants, allegedly to stop the running of the
period in relation to backwages,[17] petitioners in addition filed
another manifestation[18] objecting to the payment. Petitioners denounced the payment as nothing
but a scheme to circumvent the original decision, already final, which ordered
their reinstatement and not the payment of separation pay.
On January 5,
1996,[19] the ELA treated the manifestations
of petitioners as an appeal from his order dated November 28, 1995 and directed
the records of the case to be sent to the NLRC in Manila for review.
On January 12,
1996, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, denying that they had
intended to appeal from the order of the Labor Arbiter and arguing that to
consider their manifestations as notice of intention to appeal would be to make
litigation endless.
On March 15,
1996, petitioners filed a manifestation in this case, praying that the January
5, 1996 order of the ELA be set aside and that the ELA be restrained from
acting further in the case. Petitioners
contended that the reinstatement portion of the decision had already been the
subject of a compromise agreement and, therefore, the order deleting the order
of reinstatement and awarding separation pay in lieu thereof in effect amended
a final and executory order. Petitioners claimed that they had been forced to file a motion directly
in the NLRC because of the ELA’s failure to act upon their motions, but that
they had no intention at all of abandoning their motion in the ELA’s office.
Petitioners submit the following issues for
resolution:
1) Whether or not petitioners abandoned the agreement when they moved for the execution of the decision, and whether by doing so, the Executive Labor Arbiter could freely consider supervening events;
2) Whether or not the Executive Labor Arbiter committed a grave abuse of discretion in considering as an appeal the manifestation of petitioners re the granting of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and the opposition to the compliance of the private respondents; and
3) Whether petitioners are entitled to full backwages.
It is alleged in
private respondents’ comment that petitioner Ramon V. Surara was paid on October
3, 1995 P172,980.50, representing three (3) years backwages and six
years’ separation pay as full payment of all his claims against private
respondents.[20] On the other hand, Gerardo Saman,
Olivia Cea, and Nestor Avenido have allegedly been given their separation pay
in the amounts of P47,772.00, P21,000.00, and P41,600.00,
respectively,[21] and only have to be paid
backwages. Only Eduardo Laureles would,
therefore, appear to still have an interest in this case. This allegation need not be determined in
this case, being more appropriately taken up in the execution of the decision
of the NLRC.
First. It is contended that the ELA no longer had jurisdiction to
order payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement because the June 15,
1993 decision of the NLRC, ordering reinstatement of petitioners, had already
become final and executory. Indeed, in
the compromise agreement made on February 23, 1993, private respondents
undertook to reinstate petitioners.
The Solicitor
General contends, however, that by asking for the execution of the decision of
the NLRC petitioner in effect abandoned or rescinded the compromise agreement,
leaving the ELA free to consider supervening events, such as the strain in
relations of the parties, in the resolution of the motion for execution. There is no basis in the record for
supposing that petitioners gave up their claim for reinstatement. The subject of the compromise agreement was
their reinstatement as ordered in the decision of August 20, 1992 of the
ELA. The subject of the NLRC decision,
dated June 15, 1993, which they sought to enforce in the motion for execution
which they filed on January 30, 1995, was also their reinstatement.
Whichever one it
is, no supervening event rendering execution unjust can be considered. For one, petitioners did not occupy any
managerial or confidential position in the Naga College Foundation which might
be affected by any bad feeling which might have been engendered as a result of
the execution of the decision. For
another, it was private respondents who appear to have caused a strain in the
relation of the parties. Any bad
feeling was caused by its failure to comply in good faith with their
undertaking under the compromise agreement.
As held in Globe-Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission:[22]
Obviously, the principle of “strained relations” cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one’s right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.
Nor can it be
argued that petitioners had abandoned the benefits of the compromise agreement
by resorting to the NLRC. Petitioners
were frustrated at the undue delay in the resolution of their motions by the
ELA and they thought of turning to the NLRC in Manila in the hope of obtaining
assistance. Abandonment was far from
their intention. It was clearly grave
abuse of discretion for the ELA to order separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and to consider the motion for execution of petitioners
abandoned.
Second. It was bad enough for the ELA to order separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. It was worse for him
when, after private respondents had deposited four (4) checks for the
separation pay and petitioners objected, the ELA considered petitioners’
opposition and manifestation as an appeal, which would mean further delay in
the realization of the fruits of petitioners’ victory.
Indeed, the case
was already in the final stages of execution of the judgment. In the first place, there was no
justification for the modification by the ELA of the decision which was already
final. To treat petitioners’ objection
to its modification as an appeal would make litigation endless. The ELA did this (i.e., consider the
alleged supervening event) after failing for several months to resolve
petitioners’ motion for execution. He
acted only after this petition for mandamus had been filed in this Court. Hence, the claim that the ELA order in
question was an undisguised attempt to moot the pending action in this Court.
Third. Anent the award of backwages, petitioners contend that they are entitled
to full backwages without deduction because the decision of the ELA
(affirmed by the NLRC on appeal and upheld by the Supreme Court) awarded them
backwages without any qualification. They argue that any deduction from the backwages due to them would
constitute an amendment of the final and executory decision in their favor.
At the time the
decision was rendered by the ELA on August 20, 1992, the doctrine of Ferrer v. NLRC[23] was the prevailing rule. In that case, we held that income earned during the period of
illegal dismissal should be deducted from the backwages due to employees.
But petitioners
invoke our recent ruling in Bustamante v. NLRC[24] that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to
full backwages without deduction or qualification in accordance with R.A. No.
6715, if the cause of action accrued after March 21, 1989, the date of
effectivity of R.A. No. 6715.
Private
respondents oppose the stand of petitioners and the Solicitor General. They
contend that, since at the time the decision in this case became final and
executory the Ferrer case was the prevailing rule, the Bustamante
case can not be applied.
There is no
question that R.A. 6715 was already in force at the time petitioners were
illegally dismissed. However, even
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 on March 21, 1989, the Court had applied
the rule in Mercury Drug v. CIR,[25] which limited recovery of backwages
to three years until the decision in the Ferrer case was handed down on
July 5, 1993.
With the ruling
in Bustamante v. NLRC giving full effect to R.A. No. 6715, however,
illegally dismissed employees now are entitled to the payment of full backwages
as long as the cause of action accrued after March 21, 1989.[26]
Private
respondents contend that, whatever the later rule is, under the doctrine of
“law of the case” the Ferrer case should be applied to this case because
it was the prevailing rule at the time the decision in this case attained
finality. The decision of the ELA was
rendered on August 20, 1992, and that of the NLRC, affirming the ELA decision,
was rendered on June 15, 1993, while the decision in Ferrer v. NLRC was
rendered only on July 5, 1993. How
could the ruling in Ferrer have been impliedly embodied in the decision
of the ELA? Nor is there any ruling in
this case applying to it the Ferrer doctrine which could be considered
to have settled the question of backwages under the doctrine of “law of the
case.” The fact is that the decision of
the ELA ordered the payment of backwages to petitioners without any deduction
or qualification and that decision has become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, and the
orders of the public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter dated November 28, 1995
and January 5, 1996 are hereby annulled and set aside. Private respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate
petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority and to pay them
full backwages, subject however to any agreement the parties may have entered
into. The public respondent is ordered
to issue forthwith the corresponding writ for the execution of his decision of
August 20, 1992 in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Petition, Annex A, p. 9; Rollo, p. 28.
[2]
Id., Annex B; id., pp. 29-30.
[3]
Id., Annexes E and F; id., pp. 37 and p. 39.
[4]
Id., Annex E; id., p. 38.
[5]
Id., Annex G; id., p. 43-54.
[6]
Id., Annex H; id., pp. 56-57.
[7]
Id., Annex J; id., p. 79.
[8]
Id., Annex K; id., p. 80.
[9]
Id., Annex L; id., pp. 82-83.
[10]
Id., Annex L-1; id., pp. 84-85.
[11]
Id., Annex T; id., pp. 100-101.
[12]
Id., Annex R; id., p. 97-98.
[13]
Id., Annex M-1; id., p. 88.
[14]
Comment of the Solicitor General, pp. 16-17; id., pp. 219-220.
[15]
Petition, Annex W; id., pp. 113-114.
[16]
Petitioners’ Manifestation, Annex B; id., pp. 177-179.
[17]
Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 180-181.
[18]
Id., Annex C; id., pp. 182-183.
[19]
Id., Annex D; id., p. 184.
[20]
Private Respondents’ Comment, p. 6; id., p. 271.
[21]
Id., p. 16; id., p. 281.
[22]
206 SCRA 701, 712 (1992).
[23]
224 SCRA 410, 423 (1993).
[24]
265 SCRA 61, 70 (1996).
[25]
56 SCRA 694 (1974).
[26]
Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497 (1997).