682 Phil. 1
REYES, J.:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
x x x x
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze’ claim of moral and exemplary damages.
x x x x
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
x x x
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[5]
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.[6]
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
x x x
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[14] (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. – A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis supplied)
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
x x x x
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.[20]
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the former’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila.
x x x x
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Toze’s Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007, thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.
x x x x
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondent’s lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before him for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the respondent’s disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. [21]
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable. Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. “Verily, for transgressing the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.”
“When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.”[28] (citations omitted)