361 Phil. 401
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was shot at pointblank range by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo at Purok 9, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao.
“On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an affidavit positively identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. (Annex C, Rollo, p. 34).
“On September 20, 1993, private respondents Jonathan Cerbo executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the shooting was accidental (Annex D: Rollo, pp. 35-36).
“On October 6, 1993, the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation, found “sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief” that the crime of murder has been committed by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao (Annex E, Rollo, pp. 37-38).
“After [an] information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing (Annex F, Rollo, p. 39), supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, alleging “in addition” to her previous statement that:‘3. In addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and freely aver as follows:“Private respondent Billy Cerbo Submitted a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of both petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy and Elsa B. Gumban (Annex H, Rollo, pp. 41-42).
‘a) I vividly recall that while my mistress Rosalinda Go and I were in the office of Billy Cerbo at about 11:45 a.m. on August 30, 1993, Mr. Cerbo personally instructed me to fetch the food from the kitchen [and to bring it] to the office instead of the dining room.
‘b) While bringing the food, Mr. Cerbo again instructed me to place the food [o]n a corner table and commanded me to sit behind the entrance door and at the same time Mr. Cerbo positioned Rosalinda [on] a chair facing the entrance door for an easy target.
‘c) Immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Mr. Billy Cerbo called his son Jonathan who was running, but did not and ha[s] never bothered to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or even apply first aid.
‘d) To my surprise, Mr. Billy Cerbo, instead of bringing Rosalinda to the hospital, brought her to the funeral parlor and immediately ordered her to be embalmed without even informing her children or any of her immediate relatives xxx.’ Annex G, Rollo, p. 40.)
“On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a “Motion for leave of court to reinvestigate the case” (Annex I. Rollo, pp43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in an order dated April 28, 1994 (Annex J, Rollo, p. 45).
“In his resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad recommended the filing of an amended information including Billy Cerbo ‘xxx as one of the accused in the murder case xxx’ (Annex K: rollo, pp. 46-49).
“Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued on May 27, 1994 (Rollo, p. 27).
“Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause (Rollo, p. 27).
“On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest[;] the dispositive portion of [the order] reads:'IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [an] order is hereby issued DISMISSING the case as against Billy Cerbo only.”“Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the respondent judge in his second assailed order dated August 18, 1994 (Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31-33).”[3]
‘Let, therefore, the warrant of arrest, dated may 27, 1994, be RECALLED.
‘The prosecution is hereby ordered to withdraw its Amended Information and file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.
‘SO ORDERED.’ (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
“The ruling is explicit. If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exist must either call for the complainant and the witnesses or simply dismiss the case.In sum, the Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Valles did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant of arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and subsequently dismissing the Information for murder filed against the private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate such charge.
“Petitioners question the applicability of the doctrine laid down in the above[-]mentioned case, alleging that the facts therein are different from the instant case. We rule that the disparity of facts does not prevent the application of the principle.
“We have gone over the supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban and taking into account the additional facts and circumstance alleged therein, we cannot say that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case as against private respondent Billy Cerbo for lack of probable causexxx xxx xxx
"The prosecution, if it really believed that Billy Cerbo is probably guilty by conspiracy, should have presented additional evidence sufficiently and credibly demonstrating the existence of probable cause.xxx xxx xxx[5]
Hence, this petition.[6]On the other hand, the solicitor general posits this sole issue:The Assigned Errors
Petitioner Dy avers:
“1) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge had the authority to reverse [the public prosecutor’s] finding of probable cause to prosecute accused xxx and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.
“2) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in fully and unqualifiedly applying the case of Allado, et. al. vs. PACC, et. al. G.R. No. 113630, [to] the case at bench despite [the] clear difference in their respective factual backdrop[s] and the contrary earlier jurisprudence on the matter.”[7]
“Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondents Billy Cerbo.”[8]Essentially, the petitioners are questioning the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal, for want of evidence, of the Information for murder against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
xxx xxx xxx
“In this special civil action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices ‘to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
“It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.
“Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor – i. e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of the information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused.xxx xxx xxx”
“It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence , in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. xxx Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.”This broad prosecutorial power is however not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus, for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts preliminary investigations are usually conducted. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[13] we discussed the purposes and nature of a preliminary investigation in this manner:
“The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.Judicial Determination of
"Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.”
“The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, “must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.” At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon, we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor’s initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant insufficient, as in the present case.xxx xxx xxx
“In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for the purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceedings or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
“Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence or non-existence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence of non-existence of probable cause is lodge in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
“Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as the Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.xxx xxx xxx”
Epilogue
“We agree with respondent court that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[17] CA Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 52-53.
"Probable cause has been defined in the leading case of Buchanan v. Vda. De Esteban, as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
“Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does nor mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of the evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.” Italics supplied. Citations omitted.
“Section 4. Non-appealable cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a Resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.On October 17, 1995, DOJ Order 233 was amended, but the scope of appealable cases remained unchanged. See also Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, August 4, 1994.
“An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the filing of the information in court.” (Italics supplied.)