389 Phil. 118
DE LEON, JR., J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered:On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the aforesaid decision as follows:
1. To reinstate complainant Aurelio Fuerte, to the position he was holding before the demotion, and to reinstate likewise complainant Danilo Leogardo to his former position or in lieu thereof, they be reinstated through payroll reinstatement without any of them losing their seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowance and to their other benefits;
2. To pay AURELIO FUERTE, the sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY-SIX PESOS and 72/100 (280,896.72);
3. To pay DANILO LEOGARDO, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHT PESOS and 67/100 (P241,908.67).
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of December 15, 1994 is hereby modified as follows:Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[4] on April 30, 1996, which the Commission denied in its Resolution dated May 29, 1996.
1. Ordering the reinstatement of complainant Aurelio Fuerte to his former position without loss of his seniority rights but without backwages;
2. Dismissing the complaint of Danilo leonardo [sic] for lack of merit; and
3. Deleting the rests [sic] of the monetary award as well as the award of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor of the complainants also for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent contends that it never terminated petitioners' services. In FUERTE's case, private respondent claims that the latter was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private respondent's employees are required to comply with a monthly sales quota. Should a supervisor such as FUERTE fail to meet his quota for a certain number of consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his supervisor's allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the individual who takes his place. When the employee concerned succeeds in meeting the quota again, he is re-appointed supervisor and his allowance is restored.[9]
I. RESPONDENT COMMISSIONERS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY GRANTED RESPONDENTS APPEAL.
II. RESPONDENT COMMISSIONERS GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FOUND FOR RESPONDENT REYNALDO'S MARKETING PRONOUNCING THAT THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL DESPITE CONTRARY FINDINGS MADE BY THE LABOR ARBITER CONTRARY TO LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
We find otherwise. Complainant Fuerte's failure to meet his sales quota which caused his demotion and the subsequent withdrawal of his allowance is fully supported by Exhibit "4" of respondents' position paper showing that his performance for the months of July 1991 to November 1991 is below par. While it is the policy of the respondent company that an employer who fails to meet his sales quota for three (3) consecutive months, he is stripped of his supervisor's designation and allowance. In the case of Fuerte, the respondents went beyond the three (3) months period before withdrawing his allowance. On this basis, the Labor Arbiter sweepingly concluded that the withdrawal of Fuerte's allowance is illegal since the respondents should have withdrawn the same after Fuerte failed to meet his sales quota for three consecutive months. However, the apparent flaw had been sufficiently reconciled by the respondents when they state that a supervisor like Fuerte, continues to receive his allowance until he is officially stripped of his supervisor's designation and assigned to another job as ordinary employee. This is precisely the reason why complainant Fuerte continued to receive his allowance even beyond the three (3) consecutive months period to meet his sales quota considering that it was only on the fifth consecutive months when the respondent company decided to strip him of his designation as supervisor. This is corroborated by the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "A" - respondents' position paper) of some employees of the respondent company who had been previously demoted for failure to meet their sales quota when they unformably stated:FUERTE nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay.[11] The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. In this regard, constructive dismissal is defined in the following manner:"5. Na alam naming kapagka hindi namin maabot and quotang nabanggit na may ilang buwan, kami'y maaring mademote at kapagka nagkaganoon ang supervisor allowance sampu ng, may mataas na parte sa profit sharing at winnings ay maalis sa amin at maibibigay sa hahalili sa amin.Surprisingly, the Labor Arbiter failed to take into consideration this material allegations of the respondents in his assailed decision except his sweeping statement that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was purposely done with malice to justify respondents' withdrawal of Fuerte's supervisor's allowance. [italics supplied]
an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.[12]Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond the parameters as aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his transfer is actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent never denies that it was really demoting FUERTE for cause. It should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an employee also falls within the category of management prerogatives.[13]
[t]he practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction. (Philippine American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634, 639). In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.[14]Neither can we say that FUERTE's actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship.[15] We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.[16]
"Besides, even assuming arguendo that there was some basis for the demotion, as alleged by petitioner, the case records are bereft of any showing that private respondent was notified in advance of his impending transfer and demotion. Nor was he given an opportunity to refute the employer's grounds or reasons for said transfer and demotion. In Gaco v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was noted that:After reviewing the record, we are sufficiently persuaded that private respondent had offered substantial proof of compliance with this procedural requisite.[18]"While due process required by law is applied on dismissals, the same is also applicable to demotions as demotions likewise affect the employment of a worker whose right to continued employment, under the same terms and conditions, is also protected by law. Moreover, considering that demotion is, like dismissal, also a punitive action, the employee being demoted should as in cases of dismissals, be given a chance to contest the same."
Coming now to the case of complainant Danilo Leonardo, the evidence on record indubitably shows that he abandoned his work with the respondents. As sufficiently established by respondents, complainant Leonardo, after being pressed by the respondent company to present the customer regarding his unauthorized solicitation of sideline work from the latter and whom he claims to be his aunt, he never reported back to work anymore. This finding is bolstered by the fact that after he left the respondent company, he got employed with Dennis Motors Corporation as Air-Con Mechanic from October 12, 1992 to April 3, 1995 (Certification attached to respondents' Manifestation filed June 5, 1996).LEONARDO protests that he was never accorded due process. This begs the question, for he was never terminated;[20] he only became the subject of an investigation in which he was apparently loath to participate. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he was given a memorandum[21] asking him to explain the incident in question, but he refused to receive it.[22] In an analogous instance, we held that an employee's refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due process.[23] So should it be here. We find no reason to disturb the Commission's ruling that LEONARDO had abandoned his position, the instant case being a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.[24] Whether a worker has abandoned his employment is essentially a question of fact.[25] We reiterate that it is not for us "to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its special field."[26]
It must be stressed that while Leonardo alleges that he was illegally dismissed from his employment by the respondents, surprisingly, he never stated any reason why the respondents would want to ease him out from his job. Moreover, why did it take him ten (10) long months to file his case if indeed he was aggrieved by respondents. All the above facts clearly point that the filing of his case is a mere afterthought on the part of complainant Leonardo. In the case of Flexo Mfg. Corp. vs. NLRC, et. al., 135 SCRA 145, the Supreme Court held, thus:"For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a delibarate [sic] unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly shown, mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fatcs [sic] that the employee simply does not want to work anymore."
The well-settled rule confines the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the review of decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC's decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court.WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125303 and 126937 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.