330 Phil. 472
KAPUNAN, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 28 July 1988 is hereby affirmed. Accordingly, to ensure fairness to all the parties and in order to hasten the proceedings, let the election be conducted under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division, this Office, which is hereby directed to immediately set this case for pre-election conference.PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed two (2) separate motions for reconsideration of the above order which were consolidated and treated in an Order dated 22 December 1988, the decretal portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED.[1]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the twin motions for reconsideration are hereby deemed denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, let the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification election proceed without further delay.No further appeal of the above-quoted order was interposed, thus it became final and executory.
No further motion of similar nature shall be hereafter entertained.
SO ORDERED.[2]
1.Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB- - - - - - - - - - - - -318 votesPHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB filed an election protest which was later formalized on 25 May 1989. In the meantime, on 9 May 1989, BUKLOD moved for the opening of the challenged ballots.
2.Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine
Lingerie Corporation- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 412 votes
3.No Union - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17 votes
4.Challenged Supervisors/Confidential
Employees- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 99 votes
TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -855 votes
SPOILED BALLOTS- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -12 votes
On 20 July 1989, the BLR, through its director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:With the above-quoted order, the challenged votes were opened on 3 August 1989 and the results were as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the protest and challenged (sic) of the Alyansang Likha Ng Mga Anak Ng Bayan (ALAB) are hereby denied for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the challenged votes of the supervisors and confidential employees be opened in the presence of the parties under the supervision of the Labor Organization Division (LOD) on 26 July 1989 at 9:00 A.M., Bureau of Labor Relations.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Philippine Lingerie Workers Union-ALAB- - - - - - - - - - 4 votes
Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Phil. Lingerie Corp.- - - - - - - - - - 84 votes
No Union- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 votes
Spoiled- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 votes
TOTAL VOTES CAST- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -99 votes
Not satisfied with the aforequoted order, PHILIPPINE LINGERIE WORKERS UNION-ALAB appealed to the Secretary of Labor but on 26 September 1989, the same was withdrawn and a motion to dismiss appeal with prejudice was filed by the same union. There being no more obstacle to collective bargaining, petitioner negotiated with BUKLOD as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative.xxx xxx xxx
This time movant should now be convinced that the alleged supervisory and confidential employees are more rank-and-file employees.
As early as Resolution dated 16 November 1988, the Bureau had already ruled that the alleged supervisors are not managerial employees (rec. p. 154, First Folder). On motion for reconsideration the Bureau affirmed the aforementioned Resolution in its Order dated 22 December 1988 (rec. p. 302. First Folder). And on 20 July 1989, when R.A. 6715 was already in full force and effect, the Bureau in resolving the protest of ALAB declared that the job descriptions of the alleged supervisors and confidential employees do not in any way suggest that they are indeed supervisors or managerial employees (rec. p. 39, Second Folder).xxx
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Buklod Ng Manggagawa Ng Philippine Lingerie Corporation (now, Barbizon Philippines, Inc.) is hereby certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (formerly Philippine Lingerie Corporation).
The management of Barbizon Philippines, Inc. is hereby directed to immediately start negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the said union.
No further motion of any nature shall hereinafter be entertained by this Office.
SO ORDERED.[4]
WHEREFORE the Motion for Reconsideration of Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI) and the appeal of Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI) are hereby granted and the Orders of this Office and the Med-Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 and 01 September 1992, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.[8] A second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was likewise denied, this time, with finality.[9] Undaunted, petitioner filed a third motion for reconsideration which was also denied for lack of merit.[10]
Accordingly, a new Order is hereby entered in the above-captioned cases directing the conduct of certification election among the subject employees excluded from the coverage of the bargaining unit of the existing CBA of rank and file employees aforestated, not otherwise excluded/disqualified by law. The choices are as follows:
1. Nagkakaisang Superbisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NSBPI)
2. Nagkakaisang Excluded Monthly Paid Employees ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (NEMPEBPI); and,
3. No Union.
Let, therefore, the entire records of these consolidated cases be forwarded to the Regional Office of origin for the immediate conduct of certification election, subject to the usual pre-election conference.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this petition wherein the following issues were raised:Barbizon Philippines, Inc. alleges that this petition only assails the resolution of the public respondent regarding NSBPI and does not include the NEMPEBPI, the union of the excluded monthly paid employees because the separate motion for reconsideration it filed in connection with the latter has not yet been resolved by the NLRC.A
THE RESPONDENT "SUPERVISORS" LOCAL UNION CANNOT FORM A SUPERVISORS UNION, WHEN THEIR MEMBERS ARE INCOMPATIBLY "RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES"; MUCH LESS, CAN IT SEEK REPRESENTATION STATUS FOR SUPERVISORS, WHEN THE EMPLOYEES THEY WANT TO REPRESENT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PURPOSES BELONG IN THE "APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT" OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES ON THE "EMPLOYER WIDE UNIT", WHICH ALREADY HAS A CERTIFIED BARGAINING AGENT: BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG PHILIPPINE LINGERIE CORPORATION.B
WORSE, SINCE THE MEMBERS OF THE RESPONDENT LOCAL UNION BELONG TO THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT OF RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES, THE EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WHICH COVERS THEM, IS (A) "BAR" TO ITS CERTIFICATION ELECTION PETITION.[11]
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner’s daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and-file employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates, and skills. To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny this distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Without the shield of an organization, it will also expose them to the exploitations of management. x x x (Underscoring ours.)In the case at bar, BUKLOD cannot successfully act as the bargaining agent of and duly represent petitioner’s "supervisor" employees since the latter were expressly excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit.
Once again, we enunciate that the proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless compelling reasons exist which deny a certain and distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for purpose of collective bargaining. (See General Rubber & Footwear Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283 [1987].)[20] (Underscoring ours.)As clearly indicated in the aforequoted decision, the "one union - one company" rule is not without exception. The exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the CBA is definitely a "compelling reason" for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no recourse but to group themselves into a separate and distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization. The rationale behind the exception to the aforementioned policy is further elucidated in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja:[21]
1. The suggested bias of the Labor Code in favor of the one company-one union policy, anchored on the greater mutual benefits which the parties could derive, especially in the case of employees whose bargaining strength could undeniably be enhanced by their unity and solidarity but diminished by their disunity, division and dissension, is not without exceptions.The receipt by petitioner’s "supervisor" employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded employees. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. We concur with the findings of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:xxx.
The usual exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution guarantees. (Underscoring ours.)
It is not disputed that the members of both petitioning unions NSBPI and NEMPEBPI are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA entered into between the respondent BPI and Buklod ng mga Manggagawa ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc. (BUKLOD) (pp. 84-85, folder II, records). Thus, respondent BPI being privy to the said exclusion has to accept the inescapable consequences of its act of depriving the excluded employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. We find immaterial and irrelevant the allegation of hereby respondent BPI to the effect that the benefit being enjoyed by the rank and file employees covered by the existing CBA are extended/accorded to the excluded employees. Indeed, what is crucial and of paramount consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees are afforded the right to bargain collectively.The petition for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by the "contract-bar rule,"[23] which finds no application in the present case. The petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as the incumbent bargaining agent of petitioner’s rank and file employees. The petition for certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit--the excluded employees of petitioner. We agree with the ruling of the Undersecretary of Labor, thus:
The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., G.R. No. 74262, October 29, 1987; and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, J and P Coats, Manila Bay, Inc. vs. Hon. Pura Ferrer-Calleja, G. R. No. 80910, August 1, 1988, ruled that the employees excluded from the coverage of the CBA, who not being excluded by law, have the right to bargain collectively. Further, the Supreme Court aptly stated that:
The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were extended to the monthly paid employees, even if true will not preclude them from entering into a CBA of their own. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall petitioner for having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees of their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining. (Underscoring supplied.)[22]
Certainly, one who has been instrumental in the denial of a right otherwise enjoyable by a rank and file, as in membership in its appropriate bargaining unit, cannot now say that he ought to be included in the existing bargaining unit of the rank and file just because that "rank and file" employee is now seeking representation for himself as well as those who like him were specifically excluded from the coverage of the CBA. A rank and file employee, irrespective of his job designation and in whatever form his wages are paid has the unbridled right to the exercise of self-organization. This right cannot, like a chattel, be compromised in the bargaining table so as to deprive him of the same in violation of the constitutional mandate. In this wise, the claim as to the applicability of the contract bar doctrine could have not gained ground. A contract bar applies in a situation where the petition is directed towards one and the same bargaining unit. This does not appear to be so in the case considering the built-in-limitation in the CBA excluding the workers sought to be represented by herein petitioner from its coverage, albeit, their being admittedly rank and file employees. On the same line of reasoning, neither would the substantial mutual interest test hold. So too, is the claim against union turncoatism. In the latter case, the emergence thereof is farfetched considering the defined boundaries of the bargaining units concerned. Let it be stressed, that the certification election as ordered would only affect those rank and file employees who are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA. Those who are already represented in the existing collective bargaining agreement may rest secured in the bargaining unit that considers them as members of its family.[24] (Underscoring ours.)The right to self organization and collective bargaining is an integral part of the protection to labor provision embodied in our Constitution, the essence of which is aptly expressed in Tropical Hut Employees’ Union-CGW v. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc.:[25]
All employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws or rules or regulations, we have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.Finally, we take this opportunity to reiterate the standing rule that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers, hence, an employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. In Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,[26] we held:
Finally, we note that it was petitioner company that filed the motion to dismiss the petition for election. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question a certification election since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 8 February 1994 is hereby LIFTED.