335 Phil. 490
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cecilia Carlos was the lessee of a portion of a house and lot owned by a certain Mrs. de Santos.[1] The house and lot were subsequently sold by Mrs. de Santos to private respondent East Asia Realty Corporation (EARC).In due time, Cecilia Carlos filed her answer. With respect to the allegation that she and EARC had entered into a contract of lease for a period of two years and three months, expiring on January 31, 1991, she claimed that she had “no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth” of the allegation. She admitted that she used the premises for her business and that EARC had informed her of its decision not to renew the lease upon its expiry. She alleged that she refused to vacate the premises because she had a right of first refusal. She denied EARC’s allegation that she had subleased the property, the business carried on in the premises being her family business. She contended that the question raised by her complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati was a prejudicial question.[4]
Sometime in 1990, petitioner, together with Lourdes Villamor, filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of their “right of first refusal” or “redemption rights” against private respondent East Asia Realty Corporation. Petitioner and Villamor alleged that in 1987, Mrs. de Santos offered to sell the house and lot to them but despite demands by them, the offer was not put into writing and instead, they were made to sign a blank piece of paper by Mrs. Santos with assurance that their rights would be protected, and that sometime in 1988, they were made to sign an incomplete contract of lease, a copy of which had never been furnished to them.[2] They claimed that the sale of the house and lot to EARC had been made without their consent and in violation of their right of first refusal.
On June 26, 1991, private respondent EARC filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court against petitioner Cecilia Carlos. East Asia Realty alleged that it entered into a lease contract with petitioner Cecilia Carlos for a fixed term of two years and three months beginning November 1, 1986 and expiring on January 31, 1991; that by virtue of that contract, petitioner Cecilia Carlos took possession of the leased premises and used the same for business; that twice on September 19, 1990, it informed Cecilia Carlos in writing of its decision not to renew the contract of lease after January 31, 1991; that the ejectment case was filed as a result of Cecilia Carlos’ refusal to vacate the premises and her non-payment of the rentals; that Cecilia Carlos subleased the property without its written consent and in violation of the lease agreement; and that by way of mitigating its damages, EARC continued to accept rental payments from Cecilia Carlos even after the expiration of the lease until May, 1991, when petitioner stopped paying.[3]
Private respondent EARC appealed to the RTC, which reversed the MTC, basing its decision mainly on its finding that petitioner Cecilia Carlos had signed a lease agreement[5] the pertinent parts of which stated:2. This lease contract shall be for a period of Two (2) years and Three (3) months commencing from November 1, 1988 to January 31, 1991.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the Court is of the conclusion that the court a quo committed error in dismissing the case at bar in favor of defendant-appellee.Petitioner Cecilia Carlos appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, in a decision rendered on March 9, 1993. A motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioner but it was denied on April 26, 1993.
The case at hand is a simple action for Ejectment predicated upon the expiry of the Lease Agreement purportedly entered into between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee (Annex “A” of the Complaint). In her memorandum, it was the vehement contention of defendant-appellee that the subject lease agreement was not voluntarily entered into by her as her signature was procured thru fraud, undue influence or mistake. This is entirely unfounded. In the first place, the foregoing allegation was not invoked as a defense in defendant-appellee’s Answer, consequently, the same is deemed waived pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides in part that “Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived x x x.” In the second place, there was not even a shred of evidence adduced by defendant-appellee in the court below to buttress her allegation of fraud, undue influence or mistake in the procurement of her signature in the lease agreement. In the third place, the subject lease agreement is deemed to have been admitted by defendant-appellee for failure to specifically deny the same in accordance with Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court.[6]
1. The COURT OF APPEALS erred when it decided this case in favor of private respondent and brushing aside issues of fraud, undue influence or mistake raised by petitioner in her answer;The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding, her answer in the MTC alleged fraud, undue influence and mistake in the execution of the lease agreement. This is not true. All that petitioner alleged, so far as pertinent, was —
2. The COURT OF APPEALS erred in not holding that there was an implied renewal of the lease agreement when private respondent continued collecting the monthly rental even after the expiration of the original period of lease;
3. The COURT OF APPEALS erred in not holding that there is indeed a prejudicial question brought about by the pendency of Civil Case No. 90-3444 entitled Cecilia Carlos and Lourdes Villamor vs. East Asia Realty Corporation etc., for first refusal or redemption right and damages.[7]
Nowhere in her answer may such defense of fraud, undue influence or mistake be found. Indeed, reference was made by the petitioner to the case for enforcement of her alleged right of first refusal as against the respondent East Asia Realty Corporation, attaching to her answer a copy of the complaint that she has filed for that purpose in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila where such fraud, undue influence or mistake was averred. Nonetheless, the averment to that effect was not made in her answer to the complaint in this case and if it was at all invoked it was but in her complaint to enforce her alleged right of first refusal. A party’s defenses to be pleaded in an answer cannot be made by simple reference to what is contained in a pleading filed in another case. One’s answer should set forth the negative and affirmative defenses upon which he relies. (Section 4, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court)[9]The reference to the ruling in Universal Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals[10] is inapt because here she not only did not allege the issue of fraud, undue influence and mistake but presented no evidence to prove the allegation, as the RTC said.
4. That last September 19, 1990, plaintiff, acting thru counsel, wrote to the defendant, informing her that plaintiff decided not to renew the contract of lease upon its expiry date (Jan. 31, 1991) and to locate another place and followed up the same with another letter dated January 11, 1991 reiterating its non-renewal of the lease agreement (jointly addressed with a co-tenant, Lourdes Villamor) and vacate premises, machine copy of both letters are hereto attached as Annex “B” and “C” respectively, and made part hereof; However, defendant refused and continue to refuse from vacating the premises leased up to the present;[14]Indeed a notice of termination and non-renewal of the lease agreement and a demand to vacate was unnecessary because the lease agreement expressly provided:
8. No implied renewal shall be understood under this contract, The LESSEE hereby agrees to vacate the said premises exactly at the expiration of the lease term without notice and demand. (emphasis added)
[A]cceptance of tendered payment does not constitute a waiver of the cause of action for ejectment especially when accepted with the written condition that it was “without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit.” Indeed, it is illogical or ridiculous not to accept the tender of payment of rentals merely to preserve the right to file an action for unlawful detainer.[15]Indeed in the case at bar, EARC accepted rental payments only to mitigate losses it would otherwise suffer because of the continued occupation of the premises by petitioner.[16] The receipts issued by it contained a notation that acceptance of such rental payments made by petitioner Cecilia Carlos was without prejudice to the filing of an ejectment suit.[17] It is thus clear that the Court of Appeals committed no error in ruling that there was no implied renewal of lease in this case.
[C]omes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever, the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
The issue of whether private respondent had the right to occupy subject apartment unit should therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit and not in an action for damages where the question of possession is likewise the primary issue to be resolved.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 9, 1993, and its resolution, dated April 26, 1993, are AFFIRMED.
We cannot simply ignore the fact that private respondent, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was aware that an ejectment case against her was forthcoming. It is therefore evident that the filing of the complaint for damages and preliminary injunction was but a canny and preemptive maneuver intended to block the action for ejectment which petitioner was to take against private respondent.
The matter raised in the Regional Trial Court of Manila may be properly determined in the ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court, in consonance with the rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the one for damages does not change the situation of the parties (Rosales vs. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]).