336 Phil. 602
BELLOSILLO, J.:
x x x xThe protestants vehemently argued that compliance with the Circular was not required in election contests. Nonetheless, on 6 June 1994, eighteen (18) days after the election cases were filed, protestants submitted the required certification with prayer that the same be admitted as integral part of their protests.[2]
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and, (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.
x x x x
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action against the guilty party.
x x x x
We do not agree x x x that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not applicable to election cases x x x x There is nothing in the Circular that indicates that it does not apply to election cases. On the contrary, it expressly provides that the requirements therein, which are in addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, "shall be strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Nor are we persuaded x x x that considering that the MCTC has after all the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the election protest, the certification was unnecessary since the private respondent could not have filed the case anywhere else. The argument fails to consider the possibility of a party availing, rightly or wrongly, of other legal remedies; or of filing the same election protest in more than one MTC, despite the erroneous venues; or of even being unaware of the original exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC over such election protests and filing one of the protests in the RTC by mistake.
In this case, it is a fact that the certification of non-forum shopping was filed by the private respondent on 19 May 1994, a day after he filed the election protest. Since the proclamation of the results of the election was made by the barangay board of canvassers on 10 May 1994, the private respondent, pursuant to Section 9 of R.A. 6679, had ten (10) days therefrom or until 20 May 1994 within which to file an election protest. The filing of the certification was therefore still within the period for filing an election protest. Accordingly, although the certification was not filed simultaneously with the initiatory pleading, its filing within the reglementary period was a substantial compliance with Administrative Circular No. 04-94.In the instant case, we cannot consider the subsequent filing of the required certification a substantial compliance with the requirements of the Circular, the same having been submitted only after the lapse of eighteen (18) days from the date of filing of the protests. Quite obviously, the reglementary period for filing the protest had, by then, already expired.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether desregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.[7]