388 Phil. 880
BUENA, J.:
"WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record, this Court holds that in view of the facts contained in the records, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering -On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24 October 1994[6] reversing the trial court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to petitioner METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past due loans secured by the subject property."The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.
"1. Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the release or cancellation of the real estate mortgages executed by the deceased defendant Tomas Chia and his wife, defendant Vicenta Chia, over the property described in TCT No. 106901 of the registry of deeds for Quezon City; "2. Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of said TCT No. 106901; and, "3. Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."[5]
Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun,[14]this Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:
"x x x. In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that we erred in reversing the appealed judgment despite the finding that subject property covered by TCT 106901- Quezon City had been sold, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, by the spouses, Tomas Chia and Vicenta Chan, to plaintiff-appellee, and on September 16, 1980, the latter complied with its contractual obligation thereunder by paying the total mortgage debt it assumed, amounting according to Metrobank itself, to P116,416.71, as of September 16, 1980.
"All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so rule, that whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with Metrobank after September 4, 1980, without the conformity of plaintiff-appellee, could not be adjudged as part of the mortgage debt the latter so assumed. We are persuaded that the contrary ruling on this point in Our October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt thereon, the latter inquired from Metrobank about the exact amount of the mortgage debt involved.
"The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same security became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged property with the knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that whatever additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and collectible from plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid cause or ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by appellee."[13]
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage.[15] In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account as of September 15, 1980[16] which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.[17]
"1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; "2. the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts; "3. the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and "4. it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.
"It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. x x x"Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.
"No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist."x x x x x x x x x
"Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. x x x"
"The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party."