338 Phil. 635
MENDOZA, J.:
(1) all striking employees including those who were dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike to return to work within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the order; andOn September 22, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and later a supplemental motion for reconsideration, contending that no strike vote had been obtained before the strike was called and the result of strike vote was not reported to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Its motion was, however, not acted upon for the reason that petitioner had already brought the matter to this Court on certiorari, resulting in the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
(2) petitioner to accept all the returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the dispute.
Considering the unreasonable stance adopted by Fil Transit, Inc., vis-a-vis the implementation of the return to work order, and the consequent denial to the workers of their means of livelihood, this office is inclined to grant the union’s prayer for backwages computed from the time the Writ of Execution was first served upon the company. We demur, however, to the amount of P1,364,800.00 backwages as computed by the union. This is a matter which is best discussed and maybe the subject of later proceedings. In the meantime, our paramount concern is the readmission of the workers to forestall further economic suffering arising from their loss income.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the management of Fil Transit, Inc. is ordered to comply strictly with the return to work directive dated September 16, 1986, as sought to be implemented by the writ of execution of November 24, 1987. The list of employees attached to the aforementioned writ is hereby adopted en toto as the sole basis for management’s compliance. . . .[1]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
The Fil Transit, Inc. and Fil Transit Employees Union NFL are hereby directed to file their position papers and evidence with this office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, on the following issues, to wit:
The Order dated 15 May 1990, calling for the compliance with the return to work directive of September 16, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED.Petitioner questioned the order in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with this Court which, however, dismissed the petition on September 23, 1991, for lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order.[3]
No further motions of this same nature shall be entertained.[2]
1. To declare respondent company guilty of unfair labor practice for its continuous defiance of the return to work Order issued by the Department of Labor and Employment.On the other hand, petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. asked that:
2. To pay complainant backwages from the time they were refused of their reinstatement last 1986.
3. To pay individual complainants their separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement considering that complainants are no longer interested to go back to Fil Transit.
4. To pay complainant union attorney’s fees; . . .
1. The Order of 27th August 1991, be amended, to include, among the issues the question of the legality or illegality of the strike;Petitioner asked for another extension of the time for submitting its position paper but as of the date of respondent’s questioned order of July 23, 1992, it had not yet submitted its paper. Without waiting for the paper, the Secretary of Labor ruled the strike of the Union legal and awarded backwages and separation pay to the strikers. The dispositive portion of her decision, dated July 23, 1992, states:
2. Respondent be given an extension of thirty (30) days from today within which to file its position paper;
3. That after the parties shall have submitted their respective position papers the case be set for hearing to afford the respondent the opportunity to cross examine the supposed complainants.
The Director, Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC), this Department, is hereby directed to immediately compute the monetary award, as ordered, which computation shall form part of this order.Hence, this second petition questioning the above order.
1. The Honorable Respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal;First. Petitioner’s main contention is that the strike called by the Union was illegal. Pursuant to Art. 263(c)(f) of the Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows:
2. The strikers, having engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, have lost their employment status;
3. The Honorable Secretary erred in declaring that management refused to comply with the Return to Work Order;
4. The Honorable Secretary erred in disregarding the report of the sheriff;
5. The striking employees are not entitled to backwages;
6. Assuming that backwages could properly be awarded, there was no basis for the amount fixed by the Secretary of Labor.
7. The judgment against Fil Transit is null and void.
(1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;These requirements are mandatory.[4]
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
(3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike.
. . . the records show that a notice of strike was filed by the union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on May 27, 1986, and after a failure of several conciliation conferences due to management’s consistent refusal to appear, the union went on strike on June 17, 1986, after a strike vote was obtained.[5] (Emphasis added)But the Secretary of Labor did not indicate the basis for her statement nor the date the strike vote was allegedly taken. Neither did she mention whether her office had been notified of the strike vote as required by law.
It must be noted in this regard that as shown in the minutes of conciliation conferences (Annex “F”), the parties met in a conciliation conference on June 13, 1986, four (4) days before the June 17, 1986 strike. So even if it is conceded that a strike vote was taken, there would have been non-compliance with the requisite cooling off period and the 7-day strike ban for the simple reason that between June 13, 1986, the day the parties met for conciliation conference and June 17, 1986, the day of the strike, there were only four (4) days.[6]It is nonetheless contended by the Solicitor General that “[a] strike inspired by good faith is not illegal simply because certain requirements were not followed,” citing the case of Ferrer v. CIR.[7] The contention has no merit. In Ferrer, the strikers failed to observe the 30-day cooling off period, but this Court found the strike legal because of the strikers’ belief in good faith that the employer committed unfair labor practice. But, in the case at bar, what is lacking is the strike vote which should have been reported to the DOLE seven days before staging the strike. The importance of the strike vote and reporting of the results to the DOLE cannot be gainsaid as it is the Union itself that the law seeks to protect by ensuring that the majority of its members voted in favor of the strike. As held in National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera:[8]
When the law says “the labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice,” the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that “in any case,” the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting “at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period.” It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.Moreover, petitioner is right that good faith can not be invoked by the Union in this case.
As the records will bear out, the private respondent had clearly acted in bad faith when it went on strike.
Annex “F” of the petition (June 13, 1986 Minutes of Conciliation Proceedings) attached to the records of the case, shows that at the time the strike was staged, conciliation meetings were going on. In fact, said Annex “F” reveals that the parties met in a conciliation meeting on June 13, 1986 and agreed to meet further on June 17, 1986 at 2:00 P.M. (Please see Annex “F”). Instead of meeting with petitioner on the scheduled conciliation meeting on June 17, 1986 as agreed upon, private respondent went on strike. Certainly, this act of the private respondent cannot be characterized as having been made in good faith.[9]
It is contended, by the Company, that several acts of violence were allegedly committed by former employees of the company during the strike. However, in the absence of clear proof that the strikers committed the same by design or policy, only those strikers who committed illegal acts could be held personally responsible therefor. To our mind, a wholesale dismissal of the strikers from their employment on the basis that the strike was attended by violence, is not warranted in the case at bar. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of FEATI Faculty Club v. FEAU University, et al.; G.R. NO. L-31504, to wit:Not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike as to cause the loss of employment of the guilty party. Where acts of violence while the strike lasts are sporadic and not pervasive by design and policy, responsibility therefore is individual and not collective.[11]
To require [employees] to undergo a physical or medical examination as a precondition of reinstatement or return to work simply because of the long pendency of their case which is due to no fault of theirs would not only defeat the purpose of the law and the constitutional and statutory mandates to protect labor but would work to their unfair prejudice as aggrieved parties and give an undue advantage to employers as the offenders who have the means and resources to wage attrition and withstand the bane of protracted litigation.In the present case, although the Union has charged petitioner with unfair labor practice, the matter is still to be resolved. Hence, the ruling in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[16] does not apply.
Hence, the aggrieved workers may be subject to periodic physical or medical examination as old reinstated workers, but not as a precondition to their reinstatement or return to work with the important consequence that if they are found to be ill or suffering from some disability, they would be entitled to all the benefits that the laws and company practices provide by way of compensation, medical care, disability benefits and gratuities, etc. to employees and workers.[15]
For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them. . .For the fact is that petitioner after all accepted all returning employees. If there were workers who were not taken in, they were those who did not return to work on March 8, 1988.
1. That on 01 March 1988, as per appointment, undersigned together with a number of returning employees went to the company (FIL TRANSIT, INC.,) to discuss the final details of the implementation of the Order. The parties sat down with Mr. Virgilio M. Aquino, who represented Management. After a while and upon suggestion of said Mr. Aquino, parties agreed that the employee will return on 08 March 1988, where the returning employee duly covered by and qualified under the Order shall report for work with Management reiterating its willingness to comply strictly with the said Order of this Honorable Office;In Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co.,[18] the unjustified refusal of the striking employees to return to work and comply with the employer’s requirement to undergo a medical examination was considered a waiver of their right to reinstatement.
2. . . . However, it appearing [sic] that only sixty-six (66) employees reported back for work, as evidenced in the yellow pad showing the names and their corresponding signatures. Acting on the same, Management accepted the returning employees. . . .[17]
. . . .
From the foregoing, undersigned is of the opinion that the Order has been complied with upon completion of the above-requirements being requested by Management. . . .
1) The respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal. There is no evidence to show that a strike vote had in fact been taken before a strike was called. Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the strike called by the Union was illegal because of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike ban counted from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. In accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code, any union officer who knowingly participated in the illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status.WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Secretary of Labor is SET ASIDE. The union officers who participated in the illegal strike and those who participated in the commission of illegal acts are deemed to have lost their employment status. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the employees who did not participate in the commission of illegal acts during the strike separation pay.
2) The commission of the illegal acts during the strike rendered it illegal. However, only officers and leaders of the Union and workers guilty of illegal acts are liable. Such employees are deemed to have lost their employment status in accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
3) Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The medical examination, NBI, Police and Barangay Clearances as well as the driver’s and conductor’s/conductress’ licenses and photographs required as conditions for reinstatement were reasonable management prerogatives. However, the other requirements imposed as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that the employees were not being hired for the first time, although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the strikers. If at all, it is the employees’ refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order resulting in loss of their employment status. As both the employer and the employees were, in a sense, at fault or in pari delicto, the nonreturning employees, provided they did not participate in illegal acts, should be considered entitled to reinstatement. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible, they should be given separation pay computed up to March 8, 1988 (the date set for the return of the employees) in lieu of reinstatement.
4) Because the award of backwages was based on the alleged refusal of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order, the same should be set aside for being without basis.