349 Phil. 187
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, with a prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.”The Court of Appeals affirmed, in effect, the order[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50, which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss grounded on litis pendentia.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering her:Private respondent filed her answer in the First Case on March 14, 1995, praying:[8]
(1) to respect, abide by and comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement after the Honorable Court shall have upheld its existence and validity;
(2) in the alternative and at the option of the plaintiff, to order the defendant to reimburse and refund the plaintiff of his investments in the property in question in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, with legal interests from January 1994 and until the said amount is fully paid;
(3) to pay the plaintiff moral damages suffered by him in the amount of P1,000,000.00, more or less;
(4) to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00, more or less;
[5] to pay the plaintiff by way of attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00, plus the costs of suit.”
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is respectfully prayed:However, before submitting her answer in the First Case, private respondent[9] filed on January 11, 1995 before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, her own separate complaint against petitioner for “Rescission of Contract, Accounting and Damages,” docketed as Civil Case No. 95-72598, hereafter referred to as “Second Case.” Private respondent prayed for the following reliefs:[10]
- That the complaint be dismissed for lack of cause of action;
- That plaintiff be ordered to render accounting on the rents he received from the stall holders from the time he collected the deposits/advance rentals to the present and to deposit such amounts as were given/deposited with him in court;
- That the Honorable Court orders the collection of the rentals in the stalls and that the same be deposited in court subject to the disposition of the Honorable Court;
- That the plaintiff be ordered to pay the defendant the following:
Defendant prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable in the premises.”
- The amount of P500,000.00 as the unremitted amount of owner’s share of the defendant but which the plaintiff had withheld; the additional amounts which continue to grow because of the continues forbearance by the plaintiff in remittance;
- The amount of P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees;
- To pay moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
- To pay corrective and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that after hear[ing] judgment be rendered:On March 13, 1995, petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the ground of litis pendentia.[11] Subsequently, private respondent filed her opposition to said motion.[12]
- Ordering the deposit of the rental into the Court’s custody for proper disposition of the collected amount in accordance with the judgment of the Court;
- Ordering the defendant the payment of plaintiff’s share in accordance with Annex ‘A’ of this complaint;
- Ordering the defendant to pay his arrears, unremitted to plaintiff in the amount of P245,000 or more;
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P50,000 as actual and compensatory damages and expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees;
- Ultimately ordering the agreement known as Annex ‘A’ as canceled due to violations thereon perpetuated by the defendant making implementation impractical;
- Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs as are just and equitable in the premises.”
“The central issue that is before this Honorable Court is whether or not the two cases, Civil Case No. 94-72363 x x x and Civil Case No. 95-72598, x x x, both of which involve the same contract and same transaction, should be allowed to be litigated independently and separately of each other.”Respondent Court’s Ruling
The Court of Appeals also held that an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss could not be the basis of a petition for certiorari.“Jurisprudence dictates that:Applying the foregoing criteria to the case at bar. We note that except for the identity of parties, there appears to be a great disparity between the cause of action and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 94-72362 and that in Civil Case No. 95-72598.‘x x x x x x x x x
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to sres [sic] adjudicata to the other. (Ramos v. Ebarle, 182 SCRA 245 citing Marapao v. Mendoza, 119 SCRA 97 and Lopez v. Villaruel, 164 SCRA 616.)xxx xxx
In fine, while plaintiff [petitioner herein] in Civil Case No. 94-72362 seeks to enforce the agreement allegedly entered into between the parties on 04 May 1994 or in the alternative, for the reimbursement and refund of his investment in the property subject of the suit plus damages, the plaintiff [private respondent herein] in Civil Case No. 95-72598 prays for judgment ordering the deposit of rentals, damages and the cancellation of the agreement known as Annex “A” for violation of its terms and conditions by the defendant therein.
In recapitulation, Civil Case, No. 94-72362 seeks to enforce the Agreement, Annex “A”, while Civil Case No. 95-72598 is for the repudiation or cancellation of the said agreement on the ground of violation of its terms and conditions. It is therefore clear that the ground relied upon in petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss is without basis in fact or in law. Consequently, this Court does not find that respondent Court acted in any manner in contravention of law to justify the relief prayed for.”
“Generally, this would be true. However, the case before us falls under the exception. While a Court Order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be challenged until final judgment, still, where it clearly appears that the trial Judge or Court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 439, [1959] citing Philippine International Fair, Inc. et al., vs. Ibañez, et al., 94 Phil. 424 [1954]; Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et al., 84 Phil. 674 [1949]; San Beda College vs. CIR, 97 Phil. 787 [1955]). Even a cursory reading of the subject Bill of Lading, in relation to the Charter Party, reveals the Court’s patent lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim.”Additionally, certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion[20] and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Here, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.[21]
“However, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, the Supreme Court has allowed a writ of certiorari (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs. Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jan. 30, 1970; Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., l-45137, Sept. 23, 1985); (3) for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al., L-16598, May 31, 1961 and cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L-29039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975).The foregoing clearly show that the rule invoked by private respondent is not ironclad. As will be shown later, the present case constitutes an exception because the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. An appeal, while available eventually, is cumbersome and inadequate, for it requires the parties to undergo a useless and time-consuming trial. The Second Case constitutes a rude imposition on the time and the docket of the judiciary.
“(a) The former judgment or order must be final;The Court of Appeals held that there can be no res adjudicata because there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases. We do not agree. In the two cases, both petitioner and private respondent brought to fore the validity of the agreement dated May 4, 1994. Private respondent raised this point as an affirmative defense in her answer in the First Case. She brought it up again in her complaint in the Second Case. A single issue cannot be litigated in more than one forum. As held in Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals:[27]
(b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
(c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.”
“The similarity between the two causes of action is only too glaring. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. In Civil Case No. 58713, the action is to enjoin PNB from foreclosing petitioner’s properties, while in Civil Case No. 60012, the action is one to annul the auction sale over the foreclosed properties of petitioner based on the same grounds. Notwithstanding a difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing, i.e. lands covered by TCT No. 27307, and more importantly, the same contentions and evidence as advanced by herein petitioner in this case were in fact used to support the former cause of action.” (Underscoring supplied.)In this light, there is identity of subject matter and of causes of action, for the same evidence presented in the First Case will necessarily be presented in the Second Case, and the judgment sought in the Second Case will either duplicate or contradict any judgment in the First Case.[28] It is beyond dispute, therefore, that a judgment in the First Case will constitute res adjudicata to bar the Second Case.
“We find no merit in this appeal. To begin with, it cannot be disputed that the present case is predicated upon the plea that the power of attorney and the deed of mortgage which were allegedly executed by appellants are null and void on the ground that their consent thereto was obtained through fraud and intimidation. Here, the principal defendant is Michael Kairuz. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 423, the complaint was filed by Michael Kairuz to recover certain amount of money making as defendants the same parties who appear as plaintiffs herein. And in both cases the parties brought to the fore the validity of the same documents. Then, while the second case was pending trial, the court rendered judgment in the first case dismissing the complaint based on the finding that said two documents are null and void. The court even went further. It ordered plaintiffs to pay to defendants the sum of P12,650.00, as damages, plus an additional sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees. These facts show that the two cases really involve the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same cause of action. Indeed, appellants herein not only obtained in the first case the relief they sought to obtain in the second but even obtained a judgment in their favor by way of damages and attorney’s fees. The attitude of appellants in insisting on prosecuting the second case in spite of such favorable judgment is indeed beyond comprehension.”Rules Require Liberal Construction
“Section 2. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”Private respondent’s insistence on the continuation of the Second Case, separate from the First Case, violates this hallowed objective of the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause of action makes a mockery of this Court’s crusade to unclog the dockets of the judiciary.
“Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the following are the relevant considerations in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties.”Since the First Case was filed earlier, it will be in accord with jurisprudence to abate the Second Case.
“”SEC. 1. Grounds. – Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx[12] Rollo, pp. 56-61.
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.”
“In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground that ‘there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause’ [Rule 8, section 1 (d)], the following requisites must concur: (1) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the other. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, p. 169.) Do these requisites concur in the two cases under consideration?[28] Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21, February 1, 1995; Gitgano vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 437, November 29, 1984; Vda. de Vocal vs. Vda. de Suria, 90 SCRA 336, May 31, 1979; Aroc vs. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, 81 SCRA 350, January 31, 1978; Tan vs. Valdehueza, 66 SCRA 61, August 6, 1975; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., 106 Phil. 65, August 21, 1959;. I Martin, pp. 161-162, citing 34 C.J. 805.
An analysis of the facts deducible from the pleadings would reveal an affirmative answer. Note that the present action is for support not only of plaintiff but of her children. The action is predicated on the infidelity of defendant who because of his propensity towards other women made him neglectful of his marital duties. The case of legal separation, on the other hand, asserts adultery on the part of plaintiff which is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Our new Civil Code provides that the obligation to give support shall cease ‘when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance’ [Article 303 (4)], and under Article 921 of the same Code, it shall be sufficient cause for disinheritance ‘when the spouse has given cause for legal separation.’ It further appears that in the separation case the wife interposed an answer wherein, repudiating the charge of adultery, she demanded that she and her children be given the proper maintenance and support to which they are entitled under the law.
All the foregoing show that the two cases raise practically the same issues. There is therefore no need of prosecuting them separately and independently for that would amount to duplicity of action. And as it appears that the case of legal separation was instituted earlier than the one for support, it is fair that the latter be dismissed as was correctly done by the lower court.”
“Section 1. Amendments in general. -- Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.”[30] The similarity in the allegations in both Complaint and Answer is apparent as shown below:
On allegations for cancellation of Contract:[31] 5 SCRA 29, 30-31, May 18, 1962, per Bautista Angelo, J.
In the Answer with Counterclaim in the Second Case (Rollo, pp. 42-43):
“11.13. That the defendant repleads and incorporates the pertinent allegations of the preceding paragraph in this affirmative and special defenses; that by reason of the unlawful withholding by the plaintiff, Juan M. Casil of the share of the defendant’s, defendant wrote the plaintiff for the cancellation of the contract Annex ‘B’ because the same plaintiff has not observed its provisions, much less talk about the matter, the letter of the defendant is hereto attached as Annex ‘3’ and is made an integral part hereof;
11.14. That the plaintiff instead of meeting with the defendant to put the parties in harmony has sent the latter a strongly worded answer which neither admitted that he was remiss of his obligation under Annex ‘4’ nor has alleged that he has fully satisfied the provisions thereof, but assailling the letter, Annex ‘3’ as unchristian and unfriendly and categorically stating that he does ‘not see any possibility of any amicable or friendly settlement of the matter except through the courts’ and in the meantime, plaintiff’s collection remains unabated, refusing to remit the lawful share of the defendant; x x x”
In the Complaint in the First Case (Rollo, pp. 49-50):
“16. That by reason of the unlawful withholding by the defendant of the share of the plaintiff, wrote the defendant in order to cancel the contract Annex ‘A’, because the same defendant has not observed its provisions, much less to talk about the matter, the letter of the plaintiff is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’ and is made an integral part hereof;
17. That the defendant instead of meeting with the plaintiff to put the parties in harmony has sent the latter a strongly worded answer which neither admitted that he was remiss of his obligation under Annex ‘A’ nor has alleged that he has fully satisfied the provisions thereof, but assailing the letter, Annex ‘B’ as unchristian and unfriendly and categorically stating that he does ‘not see any possibility of any amicable or friendly settlement of the matter except through the courts’ and in the meantime, defendant’s collection remains unabated, refusing to remit the lawful share of the plaintiff;”