349 Phil. 262
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated December 13, 1994, and all other orders subsequent thereto are hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings.The said decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 8, in turn, set aside the appealed decision[5] of the Municipal Trial Court of Hagonoy in an action for forcible entry with damages. It disposed as follows:
SO ORDERED.”[3]
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs as follows:SO ORDERED.”
- Setting aside the decision appealed from, and finding for the plaintiffs;
- Finding that defendant has illegally deprived plaintiffs of their lawful possession of the property to which they are entitled to immediate restitution;
- Ordering the defendant to forthwith vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and
- Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable compensation for his illegal occupation and use of the property including the value of the crops he had unlawfully planted and harvested; and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees for expenses he was compelled to incur to protect his interests in the instant proceedings and in the lower court.
“The lots in question were originally part of one whole parcel devoted to agriculture owned by one Enrique Bautista. Sometime in 1972, Bautista caused the subdivision of the land. His subdivision survey plan was duly approved by the Land Registration Commission. He then obtained individual transfer certificates of title of the subdivided lots. He likewise obtained a corresponding declaration of property for each lot from the Municipal Assessor. These were approved by the Provincial Assessor reclassifying the lots as residential.As already stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings. Hence, this petition.[7]
In 1979, Bautista sold two (2) lots to plaintiff Gregorio Morales. He also sold four (4) lots to plaintiff Maria Teresa Morales. Teresa in turn, sold three (3) of her purchased lots to three different persons who are likewise plaintiffs in the case.
Plaintiffs assert that the defendant surreptitiously took possession of their lots and prepared them for planting, thereby altering its residential outline and appearance.
Defendant countered with the allegation that reclassification of the land was not approved by the proper authorities and that he was duly constituted as tenant thereof by the previous owner, Enrique Bautista.
The municipal court received evidence on the issue of right of possession and the land’s proper classification.
Finding the land to be agricultural and the fact that tenancy was in issue, the said court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs appealed. The (Regional Trial Court) Judge who heard the case found that the (municipal) court had jurisdiction because the land was duly reclassified from agricultural to residential and that tenancy was not involved. He then proceeded to decide the issues on the merits resulting in a judgment favoring plaintiffs’ recovery of possession of the lots in litigation.
Defendant-petitioner (on appeal by way of certiorari to the Court of Appeals) alleges that the (Regional Trial Court) Judge gravely erred its discretion and lacked jurisdiction to decide the case.”[6]
“The petition has merit.
On the principle that government agencies are duty-bound to adhere to the tenets of the law in the performance of their official functions, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
The respondent court based its finding on this presumption in the absence of evidence disputing it. This court sees no reason to amplify the findings on this matter which the trial court amply discussed in its decision (pp. 5-8). Suffice it to state that the respondent court persuades us to sustain its stand that the case is within the courts’ jurisdiction and not referrable to the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Nonetheless, we do not agree that the respondent court can take cognizance of the case on the merits.
The record discloses that the Municipal Trial Court which had original jurisdiction over the case for ejectment did not resolve the case on the merits. In fact, this was admitted by the private respondents in their comment to the petition.
The applicable rule is provided in Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:‘Sec. 10. Appellate powers of Courts of First Instance where action not tried on its merits by inferior court. – Where the action has been disposed of by an inferior court upon a question of law and not after a valid trial upon the merits, the Court of First Instance shall on appeal review the ruling of the inferior court and may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In the case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.’”[8]
Synthesizing the foregoing, the issues can simply be restated, as follows:“I
Respondent court erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court did not resolve the ejectment case on the merits, in applying Section 10 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and in remanding the case to said court for further proceedings, in spite of its finding that said court did have and has jurisdiction over the case.
II
Respondent court erred in not finding, as urged by petitioners in their ‘Comment (Motion to Dismiss)’, that appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court was available to private respondent, that he failed to avail of it, that said decision became final and executory on January 6, 1995, and that the special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for appeal or a lost one, and in not forthwith dismissing the petition.
III
Respondent court erred in not finding that the petition, assuming it to be procedurally proper, does not make out a case for the special civil action of certiorari since the trial court had jurisdiction over the case and its decision is fully supported by the law and the evidence.”[9]
“Sec. 10. Appellate powers of Court of First Instance where action not tried on its merits by inferior court. -- Where the action has been disposed of by an inferior court upon a question of law and not after a valid trial upon the merits, the Court of First Instance shall on appeal review the ruling of the inferior court and may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied.)Under the present Rules which include the 1997 amendments, the last two lines above (underscored) are reproduced as the last sentence of Sec. 8, Rule 40:
“SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied)We cannot sustain the Court of Appeals. Under the aforequoted provisions, a Regional Trial Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should remand a case in the event it reverses a decision of the MTC which ruled on a question of law, provided that there was no trial on the merits. The significance of this second requirement cannot be overemphasized, for it reveals the rationale for remanding the case. A remand is a due process requirement, because it affords the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the case. Where the parties have presented their respective evidence before the MTC, a remand becomes a useless superfluity, an undue imposition on the time and the dockets of courts.
“Exhibit ‘A’, subdivision plan dated November 8, 1992, Exhibit ‘A-1’ tax declarations Nos. 2768, 2765, 2764, 2763, (formerly agricultural now converted to residential lots); Exhibit ‘B’ - Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gregorio C. Morales, Exhibit ‘B-1’- Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ma. Teresa Morales; Exhibit ‘C’ - Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 59-N-1-D with an area of 389 square meters; Exhibit ‘D’ - Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 59-N-1-I with an area of 417 square meters; Exhibit ‘D-1’ - Tax Declaration No. 0576 in the name of Lucila C. Gatela; Exhibit ‘E’ - Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 59-N-1-H with an area of 394 square meters; Exhibit ‘E-1’ - Tax Declaration No. 0577 in the name of Jayson Gatela; Exhibit ‘F’ - Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 59-N-1-G with an area of 370 square meters; Exhibit ‘F-1’ - Tax Declaration No. 0578 in the name of Micky G. Yagio; Exhibit ‘G’ - Relocation Plan dated March 24, 1988; Exhibit ‘H’, ‘H-1’ and ‘H-2’ - Pictorial view of land; Exhibit ‘I’ - Barangay Certification; Exhibit ‘J’ - Special Power of Attorney; and Exhibit ‘K’ - Joint Affidavit executed by plaintiffs Gregorio C. Morales and Ma. Teresa L. Morales.”[10]The MTC also received the following from private respondent:
“Exhibit ‘1’ - Certification dated May 6, 1993 of Punong Barangay and B.A.R.C. Chairman of Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan; Exhibit ‘2’ - Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay of Alfredo Manalo and Lucio de Jesus dated March 3, 1993; Exhibit ‘3’ - Certification by the Punong Barangay and B.A.R.C. Chairman of Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan; Exhibit ‘4’ to ‘4-B’ - Three (3) pictures of the landholding in question; Exhibit ‘5’ - Certification by the Pangulo ng Samahang Nayon dated May 4, 1993, and Exhibit ‘6’ and ‘6-A’ - Demand Letter of Atty. Ezequiel S. Consulta addressed to the defendant.”[11]Furthermore, during the preliminary conference conducted by the MTC, the parties made the following admissions:
“(1) existence of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Enrique Bautista in favor of Gregorio Morales and Ma. Teresa Morales in 1972, but not as to the authenticity; (2) the land in question was formerly in the possession of a certain Emeterio de Jesus before the year 1978; (3) the defendant was a former employee of Enrique Bautista in 1972 until 1977; and (4) defendant admits that the land in question has been divided into subdivision lots but still being cultivated by defendant.”[12]On the basis of the evidence presented by both parties, the MTC drew a categorical conclusion which strikes at the heart of the instant ejectment case -- the non-existence of forcible entry, viz.:
“As to the manner of entry into possession by the defendant, this Court finds it difficult to believe that he did so through stealth and strategy. Being relatives and not estranged at least up to the time when the issue in this case cropped up, possession of the defendant was open and known to the plaintiff. Likewise, the use of the land is also known to remain as agricultural, particularly devoted to rice production.The Court, therefore, finds no compelling reason to remand the case to the MTC, as the underlying purpose and objective for such remand is already fait accompli. As previously noted, the MTC observed due process; it received necessary evidence to decide the ejectment case under the Rules on Summary Procedure; and it discussed the issue of forcible entry. On appeal, the decision of the RTC was based on the facts adduced by the parties before the MTC. Consequently, remanding the case to the MTC serves no useful purpose, for the parties have already presented their evidence. Besides, there was no allegation that the parties intended to present additional evidence which might warrant a change in the resolution of the case. A remand would unnecessarily impose on the parties the concomitant difficulties and expenses of another proceeding where they would have to present the same evidence again. This clearly runs counter to Section 2 (now Section 6), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, which mandates liberal construction of the Rules to attain just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of any action or proceeding.[14]
It is more in accord with reason to believe that defendant took over from the former tenant Emeterio de Jesus, of the previous owner, Enrique Bautista. The controversy lies in the fact that he is not at present recognized as such by the new owners, the plaintiff(s). Republic Act 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) vests exclusive jurisdiction of agrarian dispute to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).”[13]
“Sec. 10 [of Rule 40] provides for the procedure when the case was not tried on the merits but was merely disposed of on a question of law, as where the case was dismissed for improper venue or lack of jurisdiction. No trial having been held, the Court of First Instance on appeal merely affirms or reverses the order of dismissal, and in case of reversal, remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, where the question of law involves lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but the case was tried on the merits by the inferior court, the parties may submit to the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and the appealed case need not be dismissed (Sec. 11; Cf. Zulueta vs. Mariano, et al., L-29360, Jan. 30,1982).”