397 Phil. 307
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
"That on or about the 28th day of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation with the use of a bladed weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DAISY D. TEREZ against her will.Upon arraignment on September 29, 1993, accused duly assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty.[3] Trial thereafter ensued.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On August 28, 1992, between 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Daisy D. Terez, Maribel Madeja and Erlinda Mendez, all household helpers, were suddenly awakened when appellant gained entrance inside their room (maid's quarter) which adjoins the house of Mrs. Margie Santiago, their employer, at No. 26 Texas Street Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, (TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 3-5), Upon noticing the presence of the intruder, Maribel Madeja screamed, which roused Terez and Mendez from sleep. (Ibid, 5; TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 3). They saw the appellant wearing short pants and polo shirt and holding a knife (TSN, November 8, 1993, 5-6 & 16). At that instance, the fluorescent lamp inside the room was lighted (Ibid., 7 & 14). Appellant stood beside Terez who shared the lower deck with Mendez, as he looked at Madeja who was occupying the upper deck of the double deck bed (Ibid., 15-16). He commanded Madeja to get down from the upper deck and join Terez and Mendez at the lower deck. He said that if they move, he will kill them. For fear that they would be killed, Madeja complied and went down beside her companions at the lower deck (Ibid., 16-17). Appellant, pretending that he had companions, peeped outside the door and said: "Pare akyatin mo na" and told the girls that he had many armed companions who are more fearless than he, adding that if they (the girls) moved they would be killed. The thought that appellant had several other armed companions made them more afraid (Ibid., pp. 18-20). Appellant sat beside them while holding the bladed weapon and asked them if they were married and their ages. When they did not answer, he peeped out of the door again (Ibid., 21). Then, appellant removed his short pants (Ibid., 21-22). He sat beside Terez and placed his left hand on her legs while his right hand held the knife (December 8, 1993, p. 27). She pushed him away and shouted (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 6). That made appellant angry. He went back to Terez and embraced her. Then she pushed him. Appellant became furious and punched her on the chin, stomach and legs (Ibid., 7; December 8, 1993, p. 28). Despite Terez' plea not to hurt her, appellant lay on top of her (November 15, 1993, 7-8). She pushed him away again and she was boxed again. Then, he raised his hand while holding the knife and pointed the knife at her chest and told her that he was going to kill her. At that juncture, her companions were lying beside her, their bodies covered by appellant with a blanket up to their necks (Ibid., 8-9). He pretended talking to his companions, saying: "Pare ang tigas ng ulo" (Ibid., 11). Appellant continued to forcibly lay on top of her. He tried to open her legs. She fought back, but to no avail due to his superior weight and strength (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 11). He cursed her and repeatedly boxed her on the stomach. With her beaten and hurt, appellant lay on top of her and embraced her (Ibid., 11). He tore her shorts and panty with his knife (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 29). He succeeded in opening her legs and, having an erection, told her "magpaparaos lang ako" (TSN, December 8, 1993, p. 28). He inserted his organ ("ari") into her vagina (ari), and she felt pain (mahapdi) (TSN, November 15, 1993, p. 12 & 14). The sexual intercourse lasted for about one (minute) (Ibid., 14).For his part, accused denied the commission of the crime and put up the defense of alibi claiming that at the time the alleged rape incident took place, he was sleeping with his wife in their house at Airport Village, Parañaque.[5] The alibi offered by the accused was corroborated by spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro who were living in the house of the accused since March 1992 who both testified that the accused was inside his room at the time of the alleged incident since they could have easily noticed if accused left the house at that time considering that they were sleeping near the entrance door of the house.
Terez' two companions who were lying beside her were not able to do anything to help her; they could not move as appellant threatened to kill them if they did (Ibid., 15). Appellant stood up, put on his short pants and peeped out of the door. He warned them not to fight back, otherwise, his companions who were more fearless would harm them, including their employer whom he claimed to have been hog-tied upstairs by his companions (Ibid., 15-17). He told them to close their doors so that his companions would not be able to molest them, then he left the room (Ibid, 17).
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, observing that there was silence in the premises, Terez and her companions came out from their quarters and sought the help of their neighbors, namely: Atty. Carbonnel, Mr. Sison, a barangay tanod and others. They found out that the main door of the Santiago house was locked so they woke her through the back door. Mrs. Santiago, who was not harmed or robbed as claimed by appellant, was surprised for she had been completely unaware of the incident as the three helpers relayed the story to her (Ibid., 17-18).
The policemen from Station 5 Bicutan arrived after their neighbors reported the crime. The police examined her (Terez) shorts and torn underwear. The barangay tanod talked with her employer (December 8, 1993, p. 5).
On the same day, accompanied by Mrs. Santiago, Terez reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). At about 2:20 in the afternoon, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, (NBI) Medical Specialist III conducted a medico-legal examination on Terez. The medico-legal expert declared that the Terez suffered from contusions on the chest and chin caused by a hard-blunt object (Living Case No. MG-92-72, Exhibit "D"; TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-7). The medical report further indicated that upon genital examination, Terez suffered "abrasion at the posterior commissure" and that there was "recent genital injury". The vestibule was congested and the hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter. Dr. Reyes testified that the cause of the abrasion at the "posterior commissure" was a forcible attempt to introduce a male organ to the private part of the victim. The hymen of private complainant was distensible, meaning, elastic that is why even with the opening of 2.5 there was no laceration (TSN, May 11, 1994, pp. 3-8). The microscopic examination made on the vaginal smears or specimen from the victim's private part revealed that it was positive of human spermatozoa, indicating that there was recent sexual intercourse, i.e., within 24 hours (NBI Laboratory Report No. S-92-217; TSN, May 11, 1994, p. 11).
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Operations Group (SOG) headed by Executive Officer Atty. Lauro Reyes took the sworn statement of Terez, wherein she narrated the circumstances of her rape and gave a full description of appellant (TSN, June 6, 1994, p. 4). She requested that a cartographic sketch be drawn based on her description (Exhibit "H"; TSN, January 31, 1994, p. 7). Whereupon, the NBI artist drew a complete sketch of appellant, a copy of which was given to the NBI investigator concerned (TSN, June 6, 1994, pp. 4-5; Exhibit "H").
NBI agents were dispatched to undertake close surveillance at Better Living Subdivision. Copies of the cartographic sketch of the suspect (Exhibit "H") were distributed at the tricycle terminal thereat for possible leads. Evidence was gathered from the Santiago residence. During the surveillance operations there were times when Daisy Terez accompanied the NBI agents (June 6, 1994, pp. 7-8).
On September 13, 1992, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, while Erlinda Mendez was buying softdrinks at a nearby store, she saw appellant drinking beer thereat about 14 feet away from her. She relayed this to Mrs. Santiago and other companions and Mrs. Santiago reported the matter to the NBI (May 25, 1994, pp. 10-11; May 27, 1994, p. 2).
In the morning of September 14, 1992, Mrs. Santiago called the NBI and informed Atty. Lauro Reyes that the suspect had been seen at the vicinity. At about 4:30 in the afternoon, NBI agents headed by Atty. Reyes proceeded to the Santiago residence. Between 5:00 and 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the NBI agents were accompanied by Mendez and Mrs. Santiago, since Terez was in school. They positioned themselves at the sari-sari store where the suspect had been seen. They waited for a while, after which Mendez pointed to appellant, who was then walking along the street, as Terez' rapist. Appellant was accosted and brought to the NBI office for questioning. At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Terez, Mendez, the Santiagos and other companions went to the NBI headquarters. There, appellant was positively identified by Terez as the man who raped her (TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 19-21; June 6, 1994, p. 9-13; May 29, 1994, pp. 2-4; December 8, 1993, pp. 32-33 & 41; Jan. 31, 1994, p. 8). NBI personnel then took the statements of Terez and Mendez (TSN, May 27, 1994, p. 4). The NBI agents executed a joint affidavit of arrest regarding the investigation and surveillance conducted in the case (Exhibit I, TSN, June 16, 1994, pp. 13-15). On September 15, 1992, the case was referred to the Fiscal's office for inquest and three other victims namely, Estrella Gobris, Avelina Andrade and Francisca Magdangal, appeared at the Fiscal's office and identified appellant as the person who raped them (TSN, June 6, 1992, p. 15). Atty. Reyes interviewed and took the statements of the three other victims who positively identified the appellant as their rapist. The NBI recommended in their letter transmittal addressed to the Inquest Fiscal (Exhibit "J") the filing of multiple rape charges against appellant (TSN, June 6, 1992, pp. 16-18). Finally, Atty. Reyes prepared an investigation report relative to this case (Exhibit "K", TSN, pp. 19-20).
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused FERNANDO ARELLANO y ROBLES is found guilty of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or life imprisonment; and such accessory penalties as may be provided by law; and to pay the victim DAISY D. TEREZ compensatory and moral damages of P100,000.00; and litigation expenses of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.Hence, accused-appellant files this appeal raising five (5) assignment of errors which can be condensed into whether or not (a) accused appellant was positively identified by Daisy Terez as her rapist; (b) fatal irregularities attended the arrest and identification of the accused; and (c) defense of alibi was sufficiently established by the appellant.
The crime committed by the accused is not yet within the purview of the law on "Heinous Crime" approved on December 13, 1993 otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused is however fully credited to a deduction of the period of his preventive imprisonment during the pendency of the case unless he has been legally ordered detained for another or separate crimes.
SO ORDERED."
"In the cited case of People vs. Hassan, 157 SCRA 263, the witness for the prosecution briefly saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" thereby rendering positive identification wanting in material points. Confrontation between the witness and the supposed assailant was done without prior description of the assailant given to the investigators. In the case at bar, before the appellant was apprehended, Terez and Mendez gave a description of his features which were made the basis of a cartographic sketch.The alibi resorted to by appellant is worthless in the face of the positive identification made by reliable prosecution witnesses who have not been found to have any reason or motive to falsely testify but whose only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who committed the crime.[29] Appellant's alibi that he was in their house sleeping with his wife cannot be accepted in the light of his positive identification by two prosecution witnesses and as the trial court found "it is not impossible for the accused to have been at LOCUS CRIMINIS at the time of the commission of the crime since accused admitted in open court that at the time of the incident, he was merely sleeping some few hundred meters away at Valarao St., Airport Village, Parañaque, from the scene of the crime at No. 26 Texas St., of the Better Living Subdivision in the same locality of Parañaque, that he could traverse the distance by means of brisk walking in thirty eight (38) minutes to his work site at the Fourth Estate, ICA, while passing through the Texas St from his house at Valarao Street." In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that it would only take him ten minutes from his house to reach the house of the victim.[30] The testimonies of defense witnesses, spouses Clemente and Nilda Socorro did not help appellant considering that they testified that they saw appellant enter his room in the evening of August 27, 1992 and saw him again at 4:30 A.M. of August 28, 1992. It was not impossible for the appellant to have surreptitiously left the house at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the morning of August 28, while the couple was sound asleep, and went to the complainant's house and returned afterwards. It was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The case of Natividad vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335, is not applicable to the case at bar, because, similar to Hassan, there was no positive identification of the author of the crime. There were serious and substantial discrepancies in the description given by the witness in her statement to the police as to the physical appearance of the burglar and the witness was not a victim at close range. In the instant case, appellant was positively identified by Terez and Mendez.
The case of People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, cited the causes of misidentification and laid down the factors known as the totality test in the out-of-court identification, thus:Identification testimony has at least three components. First witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must, be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.In the case at bar the show-ups (where the suspect by himself is brought face to face with the witness) was properly done considering that all the six (6) factors, were substantially satisfied: (1) the victim and one eyewitness had more than sufficient time to observe the rapist; (2) Terez and Mendez attention were focused on appellant who struck fear in their hearts, especially Terez who was raped; (3) Terez and her eyewitness, Mendez, gave prior accurate descriptions of appellant which became the source of the cartographic sketch; (4) there is no higher degree of certainty than the testimony of Terez who was raped; (5) the crime was committed on August 28, 1992 and appellant was identified by Mendez on September 13, 1992 while she was buying softdrinks at a store; Terez identified appellant on September 14, 1992; in both instances their memories of appellant were still fresh as only sixteen to seventeen days had passed since the commission of the crime; (6) suggestiveness was non-existent because after the rape, appellant was seen by Mendez at a nearby store and pointed to the authorities. His identity was confirmed by Terez. There is no element of suggestiveness in his identification because the description given by Terez and Mendez came first and was made basis of the cartographic sketch."
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug-shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-up where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out-of-court rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. (People vs. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 95 and 96)
"As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio, this Court held:WHEREFORE, except as modified in order to specify that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua, without any alternative reference to "life imprisonment", the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. No pronouncement as to costs."The Code does not prescribe the penalty of `life imprisonment' for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as `life imprisonment' which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other."