354 Phil. 77
MARTINEZ, J.:
1) the annulment of the orders dated July 26, 1995 and September 5, 1995, issued by respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, wherein said judge voluntarily inhibited himself from Civil Case No. R-82-5792 and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition;The undisputed facts are as follows:
2) the issuance of an order enjoining respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar of Branch 35 of the same court from further acting in Civil Case No. R-82-5792; and,
3) the issuance of an order for respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to reassume jurisdiction over Civil Case No. R-82-5792[2].
“WHEREFORE, both motions are granted and accordingly let a writ of possession over the subject property issue in favor of the herein plaintiffs, Alberto Looyuko and Juan Uy and, further, T.C.T. No. 242 in the name of the Spouses Gutang is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila is ordered to issue another Transfer Certificate of Title over the said property in the name of plaintiffs Juan Uy and Alberto Looyuko, with all existing encumbrances in T.C.T. No. 242 to be carried over thereto.Petitioner Antonia J. Gutang questioned the order before the respondent Court via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35213.
“This is without prejudice to the right of oppositors under Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as decreed in the September 24, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24505 as aforestated.
“SO ORDERED.”
A motion for reconsideration of the aforecited order was denied.[4]
“WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for inhibition is hereby denied.
“However, as aforestated, the Presiding Judge voluntarily inhibits himself from further sitting in this case.
“Let the entire records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Office of the Executive Judge for immediate re-raffle in view of the other pending incidents to be passed upon by the judge to whom this case will be assigned.
“SO ORDERED.”[3]
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which states:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO ANNUL THE ORDERS DATED JULY 25, 1995 AND SEPTEMBER 5, 1995 OF JUDGE MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR. INHIBITING HIMSELF, EVEN AS HE FOUND THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR SAID INHIBITION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS TO COMPEL JUDGE MARINO DELA CRUZ, JR. TO PROCEED IN THE CASE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN NOT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AGAINST JUDGE RAMON MAKASIAR AND IN ANNULLING HIS ORDER DATED MARCH 18, 1996 GRANTING THE ALIAS WRIT OF POSSESSION AND THE ALIAS WRIT OF POSSESSION ITSELF DATED MARCH 25, 1996.
”SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.As correctly pointed out by the public respondent Court of Appeals, the resolution of this case would hinge on the proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph of the above-mentioned provision.
“A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”
“All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or to withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from setting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.”
“. . . But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . . .”[9]Truly, the presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. When circumstances appear that will induce doubt as to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.[10]
“We now proceed to the question of whether co-respondent Judge Ramon Makasiar, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the same Court, to whom said case was re-raffled as a result of the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. may be enjoined or prohibited from further acting in said case. Since the voluntary inhibition of Judge dela Cruz, Jr. was valid, Civil Case No. R-82-5792 must of necessity be re-assigned by raffle to another judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for disposition. Supreme Court Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, provides:`IV. Re-assignment of Cases of Disqualified Judges. - In any case where the Judge concerned is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself, the records shall be returned to the Executive Judge and the case shall be included in the regular raffle for re-assignment. Another case, similar in category to the one re-assigned, shall be assigned by raffle to the disqualified or inhibiting Judge to replace the case so removed from his court.’
"The petition alleges that pursuant to the order of inhibition dated July 26, 1995, the Civil Case No. R-82-57920 was re-raffled and fell on Branch 35 presided by respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar. Be that as it may, and considering that the case was validly re-raffled pursuant to the aforecited Circular No. 7, respondent Judge Ramon P. Makasiar may proceed to take cognizance of the case and may not be enjoined by the writ of prohibition prayed for by the petitioner.”