356 Phil. 979
MENDOZA, J.:
Against this factual backdrop, . . . the following observations could be made, to wit:Accordingly, he ordered Amparo Gatus and private respondent PVDHC as follows:
1. Respondents Phil-Ville and Gatus transacted with complainant for the sale of the subject housing units despite knowing fully well that they are not qualified to buy under the GSIS financing scheme. This is a fact which respondents could have readily known even before proceeding to transact with complainants. Respondents even allowed complainants to use the GSIS policies of other persons in order that complainants can avail of the GSIS loan facility to pay respondent Phil-Ville which is irregular.
2. Respondent Phil-Ville accepted payments and allowed complainants to occupy the subject premises despite knowing that they are not qualified to buy under the GSIS financing scheme and without executing a written instrument modifying the terms and conditions agreed upon between complainants and respondent Gatus.
3. It was only after several years of occupation of the subject premises by complainants that respondent Phil-Ville informed complainants that they are not qualified to purchase the subject premises.
4. Respondent Gatus did not unequivocally inform complainants in her transactions with them that she was merely selling her interests over the subject properties to complainants. Respondent Phil-Ville could have made its relation with respondent Gatus a lot clearer by altogether ignoring the transaction entered into by respondent Gatus with complainants but it chose to transact with complainants and accept payments from the latter.
From the foregoing, the conclusion that thus can be drawn is that respondent Gatus is an agent of respondent Phil-Ville with respect to the sale of the subject properties to complainants. Respondent Gatus is thus duty bound to remit to respondent Phil-Ville all payments made by complainants in connection with the purchase of the subject properties. Respondent Phil-Ville on the other hand is bound to respect the terms and conditions for the purchase of the subject premises as agreed upon by the respondent Gatus and complainants.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered directing respondent Amparo Gatus to remit to respondent Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation the amounts of P40,000.00 and P35,000.00 representing the amounts respectively paid by complainants spouses Raet and Mitra pursuant to the purchase of their respective housing units or in the alternative respondent Gatus is hereby directed to refund the said amounts of P40,000.00 and P35,000.00 to complainants at 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint on April 15, 1991.On appeal, the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB reversed on April 20, 1992 the Housing and Land Use Arbiter on the ground that the issues involved in the case had already been determined by the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan in the ejectment suit between the parties. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on January 18, 1993.
Respondents are further directed to allow complainants reasonable time to look for sources of financing or to pay the balance on the purchase price of P171,994.50 for complainants spouses Mitra and the purchase price of P213,998.00 for complainants spouses Raet.
Finally, for compelling complainants to engage the services of counsel, respondents are jointly and severally directed to pay P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.[13]
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE FACTS AND JUDGMENT RENDERED IN THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONERS, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURTS, WAS A BAR TO THE ACTION OF PETITIONERS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WHICH IS EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD CONTRARY TO THE PROVISION OF SECTION 7, RULE 70, RULES OF COURT AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THAT A JUDGMENT THEREIN IS CONCLUSIVE ONLY WITH RESPECT TO POSSESSION DE FACTO AND THE FACTS THEREIN FOUND ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE SAME PARTIES IN A DIFFERENT CAUSE OF ACTION NOT INVOLVING POSSESSION.The contention has merit. The decision in the ejectment suit is conclusive only on the question of possession of the subject premises. It does not settle the principal question involved in the present case, namely, whether there were perfected contracts of sale between petitioners and private respondent PVDHC involving the units in question. Under §8(11) of E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, as amended by E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, this question is for the HLURB to decide. The said provision of law gives that agency the power to -
Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific performance.This jurisdiction of the HLURB is exclusive. It has been held to extend to the determination of the question whether there is a perfected contract of sale between a condominium buyer and developer.[15] As the Office of the President correctly pointed out in its decision, dated June 29, 1995:
Unquestionably, the instant case stemmed from an action for specific performance regarding agreements or contracts to purchase houses and lots located in the subdivision owned, developed and/or marketed by respondent Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation. As such, it is within the exclusive province of the HLURB to take cognizance of the instant case, involving, as it does, a demand for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations by buyers of subdivision lots against a developer, dealer, broker or salesman.As mentioned earlier, the principal question, however, is whether there were perfected contracts of sale between petitioners and private respondent PVDHC over the subject units. Petitioners also contend that -
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONCLUDING THAT, UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE, THERE WERE NO PERFECTED CONTRACTS OF PURCHASE AND SALE BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE LOTS AND HOUSES WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD.We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the parties in this case had not reached any agreement with regard to the sale of the units in question.
As the Court of Appeals correctly held:Finally, the occupation by petitioners of the units in question for more than three years prior to the ejectment case was merely by virtue of the forbearance of private respondent PVDHC. Since this matter pertains to the issue of possession of the subject premises, the ruling on this point of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan in the ejectment case is conclusive. No presumption as to the existence of any right that may have been acquired by virtue of such occupation can arise from this circumstance.
To our mind, the determinative issue in this case is whether or not petitioners and private respondents have a perfected and enforceable contract of sale or at least an agreement to sell over the disputed housing units. For, without a perfected contract as an independent source of obligation, the binding prestation to do or give and the corollary right to exact compliance do not arise. There can be no specific performance of a contractual obligation as yet non-existent.
Without dispute, no written deed of conveyance has been executed by PHIL-VILLE in favor of private respondents involving the units in question.
As this Court sees it, there was no contract of sale perfected between the private parties over the said property, there being no meeting of the minds as to terms, especially on the price thereof. At best, only a proposed contract to sell obtained which did not even ripen into a perfected contract due at the first instance to private respondents’ inability to secure approval of their GSIS housing loans. As it were, petitioners and private respondents have not hurdled the negotiation phase of a contract, which is the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest on the contract to the time the contract comes into existence - the perfection stage - upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof.[19]
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH WERE DULY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AS FINAL AND BINDING UPON THE AFORESAID APPELLATE COURT.We generally accord great respect to the factual findings of administrative agencies. However, as we have also held, this rule does not apply when the evidence on record calls for a reversal or a modification thereof.[20] As the evidence on record points to factual conclusions opposite those reached by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals correctly refused to give conclusive effect to such administrative findings.