397 Phil. 76
KAPUNAN, J.:
x x x inasmuch as the specimen handwritings submitted by the accused are undated, and there is absolutely no showing on their faces that they were indeed written by the accused herself sometime in the past, said specimen handwritings are at most self-serving that this Court would not swallow them hook, line and sinker. They are handwritings made on pieces of documents, their origin of which were not explained to the satisfaction of the Court. Their credibility as the handwriting of the accused is not at all shown other than the mere assertion of the accused herself.Consequently, the RTC found petitioner guilty of Bigamy and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor.
For the reason that said specimen handwritings were not fully established to be that of the accused written on or at the time the questioned signature was also written, the "significant divergences in handwriting movement, stroke, structures, quality of line, pen lift, spacing and other individual handwriting characteristics" would naturally be found by the Document Examiner.
An examination by this Court of the signature reading "Carmen J. Gilbuena" on Exhibit "B" and the signature reading "Carmelita J. Gilbuena" on Exhibit "D" shows that there is a visible general resemblance between the two signatures. The general resemblance which the Court observes is still visible, notwithstanding the gap of about 6 years between the time the first signature was affixed and that of the second. In the case of Alcos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 823, it was ruled that the Court can by itself also examine questioned documents.[5]
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for being factual and for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment.[6]Subsequently, on January 31, 1996, the Court issued a resolution stating:
It appearing that a copy of the resolution of September 20, 1995 denying the petition for review on certiorari addressed to counsel for petitioner was returned unserved with notation "unclaimed," the Court Resolved to consider aforesaid resolution as SERVED.[7]On February 23, 1996, this Court's resolution denying the petition for review became final and executory. Entry of judgment was made on April 12, 1996.[8]
Completeness of service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time. (Underscoring supplied.)Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals[12] restated the well-settled principles relating to this provision:
The general rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt thereof by the addressee. The exception is where the addressee does not claim his mail within five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, in which case the service takes effect upon the expiration of such period.Aguilar also illustrated how these principles operate by citing previous cases:
Inasmuch as the exception only refers to constructive and not actual service, such exception must be applied upon conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail be sent but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. Notably, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable in the situation. It is incumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service or who contends that his adversary was served with a copy of a final order or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of registered mail sent by the postmaster to prove that the first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee.
The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered.
In Barrameda v. Castillo, we again faulted the trial court for applying the presumption as to constructive service `literally and rigidly, and failing to require the adverse party to present the postmaster's certification that a first notice was sent to opposing party's counsel and that notice was received. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was presented in court. On its face, the envelope bore the notation "Returned to sender. Reason: Unclaimed.' On the back-side of the envelope bore the legend `City of San Pablo, Philippines, Jan. 29, 1966' with the dates `2-3-66 and 2-9-66,' and `R to S, notified 3/3/66.' We stated that the mere exhibition in court of the envelope containing the unclaimed mail is not sufficient proof that a first notice was sent.In the case of Aguilar itself, we held that there was no proof of notice to the addressee since:
In De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, we held as error the trial court's mere reliance on the notations on the envelope of the returned order consisting of `R & S,' `unclaimed' and the stamped box with the wordings `2nd notice' and `last notice' indicating that the registered mail was returned to sender because it was unclaimed in spite of the notices sent by the postmaster to the addressee. No other proof of actual receipt of the first notice was presented in court.
In another case, Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners assailed the following resolution of the appellate court:Considering that the copy of the resolution dated November 29, 1990 served upon counsel for respondent was returned unclaimed on January 3, 1991, and afterwards the same copy sent to the private respondent itself at given address was likewise returned unclaimed on February 28, 1991, the Court RESOLVED to DECLARE service of the said resolution upon the private respondent complete as of February 28, 1991, pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court.We held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that therein petitioner had been duly served with a copy of the assailed resolution, as there was utter lack of sufficient evidence to support the appellate court's conclusion. Nothing in the records showed how, when, and to whom the delivery of the registry notices of the registered mail addressed to petitioner was made and whether said notices were received by the petitioner. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail merely bore the notation `return to sender: unclaimed' on its face and `Return to: Court of Appeals' at the back. We concluded that the respondent court should not have relied solely on these notations to support the presumption of constructive service, and accordingly, we sent aside the questioned resolution and ordered the appellate court to properly serve the same on therein petitioner.
x x x in the Court of Appeals rollo there is no postmaster's certification to the effect that the registered mail was unclaimed by the addressee Atty. Amador and thus returned to sender, after first notice was sent to and received by addressee on a specified date. Thus, there is no conclusive proof that notice was sent to Atty. Amador and actually received by him. Absent such proof, the disputable presumption of completeness of service does not arise as to the registered mail addressed to Atty. Amador.[13]The need for conclusive proof of the first notice was also stressed in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[14] thus:
The finding of respondent court that petitioner and his co-appellees were considered to have received a copy of the decision on 20 June 1995 or five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, in the absence of conclusive proof as it merely relied on the dates of the notices and the notation `Unclaimed: Return to Sender' stamped on the envelope containing its decision, was clearly arrived at arbitrarily. Consequently, certiorari lies.In this case, all that appears in the Rollo[15] is an envelope that contained the Resolution dated September 20, 1995, and addressed to Atty. Roberto C. Abrajano. Stamped on the front of the envelope are the dates indicating the first, second and third attempts to serve the same on petitioner. At the back thereof are the notations "RTS" (meaning, "Return To Sender"), "UNCLAIMED," and "ALWAYS NOBODY HOME." Said envelope, as we have seen above, does not constitute sufficient proof of completeness of service. The fact is, no certification from the postmaster that first notice was sent by him, and actually received by petitioner, appears on record, a point the Solicitor General himself concedes.[16]
x x x eversince, [sic] the letter carrier assigned in that area [Atty. Roberto Abrajano's address] [,] actually deliver[s] registered mails [sic] to the given address and/or addresses Agent [sic] by schedule (M-W-F) and [does] not issue or serve notices to the addressee because he believed, he was able to speed-up deliveries and at the same time, he minimized congestion as people do not have to line up anymore to claim their registered mails.As there is no conclusive proof of service of the Resolution dated September 20, 1995 denying the petition - indeed, petitioner has produced proof to the contrary - said resolution cannot be deemed final and executory. The entry of judgment must be vacated.
1. Death Certificate of Carmen Gilbuena Espinosa (Annex "17"). The death of Carmen, her lying in state for four (4) days and her cremation can easily be verified at the Henry's Funeral Parlor and confirmed by witnesses.The Solicitor General, although of the opinion that these pieces of evidence are not sufficient to reverse petitioner's conviction, does not oppose the presentation of other evidence by petitioner through a new trial. He states:
2. Affidavit of Mrs. Priscila Alimagno (Annex "16") - widow of the late mayor who solemnized the marriage between Mauro Espinosa and Carmen Gilbuena-Espinosa and who is now the only living witness to the said marriage and who was also chosen "ninang". Alimagno was all the while available for presentation during the trial, had petitioner not been persuaded by her former lawyer that there was no need anymore because according to him (former lawyer), nobody from the prosecution not even the complainant NBI nor the witness Local Civil Registrar, personally knew the accused in answer to questions of the Honorable Judge. Such non-identification of the accused according to counsel was fatal to the prosecution.
3. Joint Affidavit (Annex "23") of petitioner's parents - her 76 year old father and her late mother (who died only last July 11, 1997) and who, upon learning about this case, wanted to testify that:a) Her father actually had children with other women, one of whom was Carmen, which fact was even mentioned by petitioner during the trial.4. Affidavit of petitioner's sister Jocelyn Gilbuena (Annex "18") who took charge of the wake and funeral of Carmen Gilbuena-Espinosa being the only one close to her. Had Mauro Espinosa not have a standing warrant of arrest, he could have testified also.
b) As an infant, Carmen was left by her mother, a night-club employee, with petitioner's father. In turn, the common father of both Carmen and Carmelita gave the child to her paternal grandmother and her aunt with whom the child grew up. Petitioner never came to know Carmen's mother. Because their father was a government employee who was afraid of being charged with immorality, Carmen was represented as a daughter of petitioner's mother. There was no contact between Carmen and Carmelita because of the animosity between the legitimate family and the illegitimate children. Moreover, Carmen grew up in the province while Carmelita was in Metro Manila. When Carmen was finally accepted by petitioner's mother, Carmelita was in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
c) [P]etitioner's parents were the ones who gave consent, being the ones fetched, they were indicated as parents with their permission, considering that her father is the real father, who worked in the government and who could not be expected to indicate on record that he had a daughter with another woman. Both parents explained that they would do that to anybody under similar circumstances even to a foundling or informally adopted one.
d) [I]t was even petitioner's mother who accompanied Carmen to a doctor when the latter gave birth in 1969 (Annex "26").
e) Carmen died on April 8, 1996 and was at the Henry's Funeral Parlor for four (4) days (Annex "17").
5. Birth certificate of Carmela Espinosa (Annex "26") proving that Mauro Espinosa and Carmen even had a child.
6. Death Certificate of Carmen Gilbuena Espinosa (Annex "17") proving that she was really a person different from petitioner who is very much alive.
7) Letter of petitioner's husband, Roberto Abrajano (Annex "24"), categorically asking whether or not petitioner resigned or was really dismissed as falsely testified to by complainant NBI.
8) Certification or Reply of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO or formerly CLAO- Annex "1") proving that contrary to the malicious, false/falsified xerox copy of a partial document merely recited by the NBI without presenting anybody to identify the same, petitioner actually resigned.[18]
While the OSG is the counsel of the Republic and the People of the Philippines, it is likewise mandated by law to see to it that justice is done to all citizens in court.The rule is that the client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and relevance of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, his failure to introduce certain evidence, or to summon witnesses or to argue the case, are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetence of the counsel be so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his case.[20] A client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded differently.[21] Petitioner, therefore, is precluded from harping on the alleged tactical blunders of her lawyer, Atty. Calabio.
Considering that it is the petitioner's freedom which is at stake, and considering further that the present proceeding is the very last chance for petitioner to prove her innocence, the OSG will not interpose any objection to the presentation of additional evidence in the trial court by way of new trial to allow petitioner to establish that Carmelita Gilbuena and Carmen Gilbuena are to different persons particularly the official copy of the birth certificate of Carmen Gilbuena-Espinosa issued the National Statistics Office, school and employment records of, and, permits or licenses issued to, petitioner and to Carmen Gilbuena-Espinosa.[19]
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.Another case, Jose vs. Court of Appeals,[25] which involved evidence that was not newly discovered, also demonstrates the attitude by which the Court has applied the rules for a new trial. Consider the following facts:xxx
Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.xxx
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case.xxx
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation." And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioner's record as public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, "while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not suffer.
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words in "People v. CA, et al.," (where substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accused's appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape from confinement) that "if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in the administration of justice," the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence.
x x x petitioner was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the hand grenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice-reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal.The Court, considering these peculiar circumstances, allowed petitioner therein a new trial, describing the same as a "new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice."[26]
x x x grant[ed] the motion for new trial on the broader ground of substantial justice, taking into account the variance in the two aforesaid reports. It is the sense of this Court that such serious discrepancy raised substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused-appellant. Furthermore, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is death. Here is a situation where a rigid application of the rules must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.In the case at bar, the circumstance that petitioner allegedly used the name "Carmen" in her first marriage instead of Carmelita, together with the affidavits she submitted, particularly those of Mrs. Priscila Alimagno, supposedly a witness to Carmen's marriage to Mauro Espinosa, and petitioner's sister Jocelyn Gilbuena, who attested that Carmen is indeed their half-sister, would in our mind probably alter the result of this case. A new trial is therefore necessary if justice is to be served.
The rule for granting a motion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.
Completeness of service. - Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.[12] 310 SCRA 395 (1999).