364 Phil. 281
PUNO, J.:
"l. Vacate the land subject matter of the complaint and to return the peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiffs [herein petitioners] or their representative;Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose. The appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. R-879 and raffled to Branch 45.
2. Jointly and severally pay to plaintiffs [herein petitioners] the sum of twenty five thousand (P25,000.00) pesos for and as attorney's fee;
3. Jointly and severally pay to plaintiffs the sum of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos a month as rental value of the premises, starting July 1994 until the possession thereof is returned to the plaintiffs [herein petitioners], and
4. Jointly and severally pay to plaintiffs [herein petitioners the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos for and as litigation and other incidental expenses and cost."[10]
"In the course of the ocular inspection, it was ascertained that a total of thirty one (31) persons named in the complaint and in the decision of the lower court x x x did not enter the premises in question and they were not found therein at the time of the ocular inspections. Neither was there any showing that they introduced any improvements thereon.Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court but voided it with respect to the thirty one (31) defendants, who were found to have never been relocated to the property in question.
xxx
In its memorandum, appellants [among whom is herein respondent] contend that the area being claimed by the appellees [herein petitioners] is different from the area entered and occupied by the appellants [i.e., the relocated families] and that the appellees [petitioners] are not the owners of said parcel of land. In this connection, as correctly observed by the lower court, the plaintiffs-appellees [herein petitioners] were in the actual physical possession of the said property until they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants, appellants herein [including herein respondent] of said land on July 5, 1994. These findings of the lower court were confirmed in the ocular inspection of the area conducted on February 9, 1995. And, as correctly pointed out by the lower court, the only issue in this case, is the actual physical possession of the land subject matter of the complaint. Such possession had been sufficiently shown to have been with the plaintiffs at the time of the forcible entry of the defendants."[11] [Emphasis ours.]
"The well-settled rule, buttressed and strengthened by [a] long line of cases, is that certiorari will not lie as substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Having lost the right to appeal, a party cannot be permitted to avail of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Respondent Court of Appeals went further. It discussed the untenability of respondent's rehashed argument that petitioners did not have prior possession of that portion of the NFA land earmarked as the relocation site. It ruled:
The only exception to this rule is when if [sic] such right is lost through no fault of the party, which is not so in this case.
When the case was dismissed by this Court, petitioner did not bother to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for review to the Supreme Court. Petitioner just allowed the period to appeal to lapse.
Consequently, this petition must fail for this petition was indeed filed as a substitute for the lost right to appeal."[19]
"The main argument of petitioner to support her petition is that the site where [the] relocated families stayed is not the land being occupied and possessed by private respondent. Thus, it cannot be said that private respondents were deprived of their property.On November 12, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[21] On January 12, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals reversed itself. It granted respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed petitioners' Complaint for Forcible Entry in Civil Case No. 1425. It justified its volte-face in this wise:
We do not agree with petitioner.
In this case, it has been proven that the relocated families forcibly entered the land being occupied by private respondents.
The Municipal Trial Court found that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the land where the squatter families were relocated. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the findings. In fact, an ocular inspection was even conducted by the public respondent to fully appraise himself of the situation and it was confirmed that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the land where the squatter families were relocated. x x x
It is a well settled rule that the findings of fact of trial courts are given great weight on appeal because they are in a better position to examine the real evidence. Findings of fact of a trial court are not to be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked, ignored or disregarded some facts or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the case.
In this case, We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
It cannot be argued that the municipal trial court and the appellate court (RTC) overlooked the fact that private respondents were claiming to have occupied Lot 1626-A while the site where the families were relocated is Lot 1626-C-2.
Whatever may be the number of the lot is no longer important in this case. Evidence clearly appears that the squatter families entered and occupied the land which was then in actual physical possession of private respondents. Whether it be Lot 1626-A or 1626-C, the fact remains that the squatter families occupied a land then in possession of private respondents.
x x x
Moreover, petitioner in her answer before the Municipal Trial Court categorically admitted that the squatter families entered the land owned by NFA and that this land which is owned by NFA is in possession of private respondents. Petitioner averred:"x x xAt this stage, petitioner can no longer insist that private respondents are exercising acts of possessory character over a land different from that land given to the squatter families.
x x x [T]he act of a possessory character done by the Plaintiffs, by virtue of mere tolerance on the part of the National Food Authority, is not sufficient x x x.
Although admittedly, petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title she presented, such evidence however does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title of the property, the party in peaceful, quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Therefore, whatever may be the character of private respondents' prior possession, whether it be legal or illegal, since they had in their favor priority in time, private respondents have the security that entitles them to remain on the property until they are lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria."[20]
"The motion [for reconsideration] is principally anchored on her contention that certiorari is the proper recourse from the assailed decisions which are 'patently null and void' in that the lot occupied by private respondents is different from the land set aside by the provincial government for relocation purposes.On March 17, 1998, the instant Petition for Review by Certiorari was filed by petitioners Rosalia P. Salva and her children, Jesus Ramon, Jose Alberto, Melchor Leon, Alfredo Fausto, Jr., Ma. Teresita, Ma. Rosalyn and Anthony Ralfth, against respondent Governor Josephine R. Sato.
xxx
As a general rule, certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost appeal. However, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, there are some recognized exceptions to the rule. Thus, certiorari has been accepted as a substitute for a lapsed appeal where the equities warrant such recourse and dismissal was based on technicalities; or where rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice x x x or where the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of [or] without jurisdiction x x x.
xxx
In this connection, it is worthy to note that this case arose out of the relocation of squatters who used to live within the vicinity of the San Jose airport in Mindoro Occidental. Their immediate relocation was of paramount importance to re-open the airport and ensure their safety as well as that of airplane passengers. As we had earlier pronounced, petitioner's act in relocating the squatters was 'noble'. x x x
Thus the ends of justice and the greater good of the community would be better served if the case is decided on the merits and the petition be given due course.
Anent petitioner's second argument, we agree with her that a determination of the lot used as a relocation site vis-a-vis that of the area occupied by private respondents is material to the case. Although this issue was properly raised in petitioner's answer to the complaint, this issue was not addressed by the municipal trial court. An ocular inspection should have been conducted by the trial court to ascertain the said issued [sic]. And to complicate matters, the RTC was the one which conducted the ocular inspection. Although the RTC likewise failed to resolve the issue, in conducting the ocular inspection however, the RTC clearly went beyond its jurisdiction because in this case, it was acting in its appellate jurisdiction and should have decided the appealed case solely on the basis of the evidence submitted or presented before the Municipal Trial Court, without anymore receiving new or additional evidence from the parties.
x x x
A judicious scrutiny of the assailed decisions would reveal that both courts skirted or simply brushed aside the point raised by petitioner that the squatters were relocated on a different lot. x x x [S]ince in ejectment cases the only issue to be determined is who had actual prior possession of the property, it is of utmost importance that the lot being claimed by the petitioner is first identified, otherwise the court can not assume jurisdiction over the case, if the lot claimed by the petitioner is different from that occupied by the relocated squatters. This identification was not done by the Municipal Trial Court x x x.
Further, even granting arguendo that the lot occupied by private respondents and the relocation site is [sic] the same, it is not disputed that the said relocation site is titled in NFA's name. In such a case, private respondents would then be occupying a portion of said lot by mere tolerance of NFA. When the squatters were then relocated to a vacant portion of said lot, it cannot be said that private respondents were deprived of their possession or forcibly ejected therefrom. NFA as the titled owner of the said property had every right to allow other people to also occupy the unused or vacant portion of its lot and private respondents have no right, as mere squatters thereon, to allocate for themselves the entire property and deprive its legitimate owner of its right to use the property.
x x x"[22]
"THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT SATO WAS PROPERLY DENIED AS A WRONG REMEDY IN THE DECISION DATED OCTOBER 22,1996 AND THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE SAME UNDER THE ALLEGED RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS OF THE RULE THAT CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL.We grant the petition."B
"THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED, WITHOUT PROPER AND LEGAL EVIDENCE PROVING SUCH ASSUMPTION, THAT RESPONDENT SATO-'S CO-DEFENDANTS ARE ACTUALLY OCCUPYING LOT 1626-C-2 TITLED UNDER THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (NFA)."C
"'SINCE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCES HAVE BEEN PRESENTED PROVING PREVIOUS ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION, FORCIBLE ENTRY WAS PERPETRATED BY RESPONDENT SATO AND HER CO-DEFENDANTS WHOSE STAY IN THE PREMISES IN QUESTION CONTINUOUS [sic] TO BE AN ILLEGAL ACT OF TRESPASS AND SPOLIATION."
"The Court must remind the parties that the case brought up to the Court of Appeals is an extraordinary action that has sought to annul the writs of execution and demolition issued under and by virtue of a final judgment that is alleged to be void for want of jurisdiction. The petition should not thus be used as a strategem to once again reopen the entire controversy and make a complete force of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory x x x."[24]It is a settled rule that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.[25] Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.[26]
Exh. A - Affidavit of Rosalia P. Salva dated September 9, 1994As the records of this case bear out, respondent never repudiated any of these documents. She failed not only to present evidence to support her claims but also to cast doubt on the veracity of petitioners' claims.
Exh. B - Supplemental Affidavit of Rosalia Salva dated September 16, 1994
Exh. C - Sworn Statement of Melchor Leon Salva dated September 9, 1994
Exh. D - Sworn Statement of Pablo Dulay dated September 9, 1994
Exh. E - Sworn Statement of Perlita Gran dated September 9, 1994
Exh. F - Joint sworn statement of Perlita Aguilar and Joel Antaran dated September 12,1994
Exh. G - Sworn statement of Marcelo Abeleda dated September 12,1994
Exh. H - Sworn Statement of Luz Jimenez dated September 9, 1994
Exh. I - Close-up picture of the house of plaintiffs inside the area in question, wherein the picture of the late husband Alfredo Salva appeared
Exh. I-1 - Picture of the portion of the area, showing petitioners' house, the fruit bearing trees and the farmland
Exh. I-2 - Picture of the area, showing some growing trees which were destroyed and cut by the defendants
Exh. I-3 - Picture of the barb wire fence which was destroyed by the defendants
Exh. I-4 - Another picture of the area with fence
Exh. I-5 - Another picture
Exh. I-6 - Another picture showing the poultry house
Exh. I-7 - A picture showing the banana plantation
Exh. I-8 - A picture of the area with picture of the late Alfredo Salva
Exh. J - Receipt of payment for survey authority dated January 21, 1989 issued by Feliciano Cayayon
Exh. K - Realty Tax Receipt No. 9157617 dated April 4, 1975
Exh. L - Realty Tax Receipt No. 015703 dated April 4, 1975
Exh. M - Realty Tax Receipt No. 6452423 dated March 3, 1978
Exh. N - Realty Tax Receipt No. 645309 dated March 3, 1978
Exh. O - Realty Tax Receipt No. 9059517 dated September 18, 1980
Exh. P - Sketch plan prepared for Alfredo Salva by Engr. Tomas Abella dated Nov. 15, 1969
Exh. Q - Realty Tax Declaration No. 10156 dated October 22, 1976
Exh. Q-1 - Another Realty Tax Declaration NO. 10157 dated October 22,1976
Exh. R - Unapproved survey plan of the area occupied by the petitioners since May 21, 1979
Exh. S - Certification issued by CENRO dated September 5, 1994
Exh. T - Official Receipt for payment of certification fee dated September 5, 1994
Exh. U - MTC Lease Application dated September 26, 1978
"Oriental fell into and committed serious procedural lapses which resulted not only in the decision of default becoming final and executory but also in the order dismissing the petition for relief from judgment likewise attaining the character of final and executory order, for which reason both are now beyond the reach and review of any appellate court.Fifth. Respondent insists that while it is true that a petition for certiorari is not proper where appeal was available, the failure to appeal was not her fault.
x x x
We have reiterated in many cases that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal x x x especially a lost appeal. Certiorari should not be allowed where the petitioner has-or had--other remedies available x x x. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive x x x.
Surely, there are cases, where certiorari was allowed although appeal was the proper remedy. The Court has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for certiorari although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the equities warrant such recourse and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval x x x. Where an appeal would not be an adequate remedy under the circumstances, since it would not promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the acts of the inferior court or tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized execution of the judgment, a resort to the special civil action of certiorari may exceptionally be allowed x x x, especially so if the petition is filed while the period for appeal has not expired.
x x x
x x x [P]etitioner squandered its opportunities to question and assail the decision dated July 8, 1986 of the trial court and the order dated February 24, 1987 of the trial court dismissing its petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner, as aforestated, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 24, 1987, which was denied by the trial court in its order dated October 9, 1986. After receiving the denial order, petitioner did not avail itself of the right to appeal; rather, a petition for relief from judgment was filed and when said petition was dismissed in the order of February 24, 1987, petitioner did not interpose an appeal therefrom which it had every right to do so. It is now much too late in the day to resort to the present petition to set aside said decision and orders which have become final and executory."[29]
"Under the Gancayco ruling, the order of reconveyance was premised on the alleged gross negligence of Legarda's counsel which should not be allowed to bind her as she was deprived of her property without due process of law.'At any rate, we find that respondent Governor Sato, as well as the Province of Occidental Mindoro which she represents, were not denied their day in court. Responsive pleadings were filed before the lower courts, and respondent was given all the opportunities to prove her case. Her chosen counsel did not diligently exhaust all legal remedies to advance respondent's cause, yet respondent did not terminate his services. She was aware of the repeated negligence of her counsel and cannot now complain of counsel's errors. Hence, there is no justifiable reason to exempt her from the general rule that clients should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and replace with another even without any justifiable reason.[32]
It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. The chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial and appellate courts but Legarda's counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence to act as an ordinary counsel should have acted, his negligence every step of the way amounting to 'abandonment', in the words of the Gancayco decision. Yet, it cannot be denied that the proceedings which led to the filing of this case were not attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the ensuing sale at public auction. If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not through any machination on his part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of the title in his name were aboveboard, untainted by any irregularity.
x x x
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legarda's counsel. If she may be said to be 'innocent' because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with more reason are respondents truly 'innocent.' x x x In this case, it was not respondents, but Legarda, who misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence."[31]
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing, by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of elementary principles of right dealing and good faith.[38] This applies not only to parties who are plaintiffs, complainants or others who initiated the case by actually filing the action, but also to parties who are defendants or respondents, if the latter fail to timely raise the jurisdictional issue and instead actively participate in the proceedings.[39]
x x x
The doctrine of laches or of 'stale demands' is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x. x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated--obviously for reasons of public policy.
x x x
Upon this same principle is what We said x x x to the effect that we frown upon the 'undesirable practice' of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse x x x."[37]