377 Phil. 336
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
"The grounds relied upon by defendant in her motion to dismiss being not indubitable and apparently evidentiary in nature which requires trial thereof to substantiate her defense, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied due course.Subsequently, a motion for reconsideration was filed which was likewise denied in an Order dated March 7, 1994.
WHEREFORE, defendant is hereby directed to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."[3]
The petition is devoid of merit.I
RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DEFERRING RESOLUTION OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS GROUNDED ON FAILURE TO STATE A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION UNTIL AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS.II
RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDERS SHORTENING PETITIONER'S PERIOD TO ANSWER FROM FIFTEEN (15) DAYS TO TEN (10) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE ORDER DENYING (DEFERRING) THE MOTION TO DISMISS.[4]
"A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.Briefly stated, lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss, must appear on the face of the complaint itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other.[8] A perusal of the complaint reveals that it sufficiently alleges an actionable breach of an obligation on the part of petitioner. The complaint against herein petitioner as defendant alleges that petitioner's husband loaned a specified sum of money from the private respondents; that a promissory note was executed by the husband in evidence thereof; that upon the death of petitioner's husband, petitioner herself executed a promissory note undertaking to pay the indebtedness. The reasons in support of the motion to dismiss that petitioner could not have assumed the obligation of her husband, and that novation could not have taken place, are defenses that could not be taken into consideration in ruling on the motion. It does not appear clearly from the face of the complaint that the private respondents are not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein warranting the outright dismissal of the same. Hence, the denial of the motion to dismiss is not only justified but is necessary since the issue as to whether petitioner is liable to pay the loan is a question which can better be resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain."[7]
"The summons was received by her on December 15, 1993, and she had been granted by the court another fifteen (15) days after the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days, or up to January 14, 1994. On said date of January 14, 1994, defendant/petitioner filed her motion to dismiss.Consequently, petitioner was declared in default and trial proceeded ex-parte and a judgment in default rendered against her. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Ex Abundanti Cautelam) with the court a quo.
When the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and was ordered to file her answer within ten (10) days from receipt thereof on February 7, 1994, she was not deprived of her day in court. Petitioner received said order of denial of February 7, 1994 on February 14, 1994. She filed her motion for reconsideration to said denial on February 23, 1994 and the same was denied by the respondent court on March 7, 1994, which order was received by petitioner on March 17, 1994. She filed her answer (Ex Abundanti Cautelam) on March 28, 1994 or one (1) day late of the second ten-day period required by the court from date of her receipt of the questioned order on March 17, 1994. x x x."[10]
"Sec. 4. Time to plead. - If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period."[11]This provision has received a categorical interpretation in Matute vs. Court of Appeals[12], wherein this pronouncement was made:
"Rule 11, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court gives the defendant a period of fifteen (15) days after service of summons within which to file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is fixed by the court. However, within the period of time for pleading, the defendant is entitled to move for dismissal of the action on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 16. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he receives notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period (Rule 16, section 4). x x x."Under this provision, where the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant has the entire reglementary period all over again within which to file his answer reckoned from his receipt of the court's order, unless otherwise provided by said court.[13] In the instant case, the court a quo gave petitioner ten (10) days to file answer and this is reasonable as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals considering that "from the date respondent received the summons up to the time she filed her answer on March 29, 1994, she had a total of one hundred three (103) days."