373 Phil. 1013
The record of the case was then returned to the court of origin on September 23, 1992, together with the entry of judgment which had become final and executory.
1. Declaring the ‘Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos’ (Exh. ‘B’) supposedly executed by plaintiff Rosario S. Vda. De Guiao in favor of defendants Trinidad Mandal and Rodolfo Guiao null and void and without force and effect; 2. Ordering defendant spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas to reconvey to plaintiffs, particularly to Rosario S. Vda. De Guiao, the 245.42 square meter lot subject of the repudiated deed of donation; 3. Ordering defendant Rodolfo Guiao to return the amount of P125,000.00 to defendant spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas, representing the purchase price of one-half of the 245.42 square meter lot sold by Rodolfo Guiao to the spouses Tubil, as shown by Exhibit ‘D’; 4. Ordering defendant Trinidad Mandal to return the amount of P16,500.00 to defendant spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas, representing the purchase price of the other half of the 245.42 square meter lot sold by Trinidad Mandal to the spouses Tubil, as shown by Exhibit ‘E’; 5. Ordering all defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs’ counsel, Atty. Wilfredo G. Laxamana, the sum of P5,000.00 representing attorney’s fees; and 6. Ordering all defendants to pay jointly and severally the costs of suit.
On appeal, the above decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the complaint dismissed. Costs against appellees.
1) THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, DESPITE THE EVIDENT VARIANCE BETWEEN THE SAID WRIT AND THE DECISIONS TO WHICH THE LATTER WAS ANCHORED; ANDAnent the second issue, the Court of Appeals said that while the lower court erred in denying petitioners’ notice of appeal, it (the appellate court) was taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari which is allowed under Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court expounded on its reasoning, thus:
2) THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID APPEAL IS ALLOWED BY LAW AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE.
Under the Revised Rules of Court, only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other (vide Rule 41, Sec. 2). But as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the Supreme Court has allowed an exception to said rule. Thus, in the case of Paulino vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court had the occasion to state:The appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari upon the rationale that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of possession in favor of respondents. The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:“Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final and executory judgment is not appealable because otherwise, there would be no end to a case. However, if in the opinion of the defeated party, such order of execution varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, or the terms of the judgment does not allow room for interpretation and the interpretation given by the trial court as contained in its order of execution is wrong, the latter may appeal the order so that the Appellate tribunal may pass upon its legality and correctness.” (G.R. No. 110271, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 475)The respondent court therefore erred when it denied the notice of appeal filed by petitioners below.
Be that as it may, the case is now before us in a petition for certiorari which is likewise allowable not only under the old Rules (Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 516) but also under Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Annotated by Justice Jose Y. Feria, p. 163).
While it is true that the Decision of the then Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals was silent with regard to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of private respondents, we cannot deny the fact that by virtue of the valid donation in favor of private respondents, ownership over the subject property had been transferred to private respondents Rodolfo Guiao and Trinidad Mandal. In the same vein, by virtue of the valid sales made by Rodolfo Guiao and Trinidad Mandal in favor of respondent spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas of the donated property, said private respondents are now the owners of the same. It would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for private respondents to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs, they must submit to court litigations anew and result in multiplicity of suits, which our judicial system abhors. The Supreme Court thus held that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Perez vs. Evite, No. L-16003, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 949).On December 23, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition for review assailing the afore-quoted decision of the Court of Appeals. They make the following assignment of errors:
Thus, the Supreme Court pronounced that, “xxx the adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownerhip which was rejected (Olego vs. Rebueno, No. L-39350, October 29, 1975, 67 SCRA 446). “When title to real or personal is adjudicated in favor of a party, the judgment will be enforced by giving the enjoyment of the property to the party in whose favor title to it has been decided.” (Heirs of Caballero vs. Judge Solano, G.R. 112518, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 660; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, May 10, 1995, 244 SCRA 72).
Petitioners allege that the appellate court erred in ruling on the issue of whether or not the writ of possession was validly issued as this may properly be decided on appeal and not in the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before said court. Petitioners further contend that the appellate court should have ordered the trial court to forward the records of the case for review on appeal upon finding that the court a quo erred in denying petitioners’ notice of appeal.
1. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION DESPITE THE FINDINGS THAT THE ORDER DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS ERRONEOUS; 2. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO FORWARD THE CASE ON APPEAL BUT RULED ON THE ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE APPEAL.
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:Anent the issue of propriety of the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the issue of correctness of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of respondents, the Court finds that it did so only because petitioners themselves made this one of the assigned errors in their petition for certiorari before said appellate court. Petitioners are now estopped from questioning the Court of Appeals’ ruling on an issue which they themselves raised.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Italics supplied)