539 Phil. 623
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Patentee | Emancipation TCT No. | Area | |
| Patent No. | | |
1. Carlito T. Dulay | A-120418 | 026619 | 7,080 sq m |
2. Carlito T. Dulay | A-120422 | 026623 | 156 sq m |
3. Fernando T. Dulay | A-120417 | 026618 | 8,825 sq m |
4. Fernando T. Dulay | A-120421 | 026622 | 162 sq m |
5. Andres R. Dulay | A-120419 | 026620 | 11,716 sq m |
Guiang prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
- That plaintiff, his spouse and children are desirous of personally cultivating these parcels of land and made previous demands for the defendants to vacate the same but said defendants refused to vacate, relying on the provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 and pertinent regulations issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform;
- That, likewise, said defendants, since 1998, refused to pay the agreed lease rentals of 48 cavans of palay at 50 kilos per cavan, relying on the same provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657 and pertinent regulations issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform;
- Plaintiff is of the contention, however, that said PD 27 and RA 6657 and pertinent regulations issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform to implement the said statutes are inapplicable to the lands in question which were acquired by the plaintiff by virtue of a Homestead Patent, relying on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45; and in Alita v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 78517, February 27, 1989 wherein x x x:
x x x x- That Plaintiff is now constrained to come to court and in the process engaged the services of counsel for an agreed professional fee of P25,000.00 plus an appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing.[5]
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:In their Answer, the Dulays alleged that in the 1998 harvest season, they had informed Guiang that his share of the produce was ready for delivery. However, Guiang refused to accept his share because he wanted the property vacated. The Dulays were then impelled to deposit the rentals with the Land Bank of the Philippines. They further insisted that in 1999 and 2000, Guiang received rentals over the property and signed receipts therefor.
- declaring the right of the plaintiff to have a better or superior right than defendants to take possession and cultivation over the land in question, consequently, ordering the said defendants to turn over the possession and cultivation thereof to the plaintiff;
- ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff actual damages of 48 cavans of palay at 50 kilos per cavan for every cropping (at 2 croppings per year) since 1998 up to the time that said defendants shall surrender the possession and cultivation of the land in question to the plaintiff.
- ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00 plus appearance fee of counsel in the amount of P1,000.00 for every hearing;
- ordering the defendants to pay the cost of this suit.[6]
The Dulays failed to allege that they had already acquired ownership over the property as early as 1987, based on the emancipation patents approved by the President and the subsequent issuance of the TCTs in their favor. A copy of the lease contract was appended to the Answer as Annex "A." However, copies of the titles issued in favor of defendants were not appended to the Answer.
- That while it is true that defendants acquired title on their respective parcel of land, the same is not controlling because they never enforce their right thereto as owner and can be shown in their acts of giving the necessary rental to the actual owner which is the plaintiff;
- That defendants' act of bringing the matter for mediation at the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) and admitting therein to be tenants of these parcel of land and not as owners clearly indicates that they were not repudiating the right of the plaintiff but only to enforce their right as tenants and nothing else;
- That to eject these defendants who are poor farmers from their actual cultivation on the said parcel of land without giving them the usual "DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION" is tantamount to giving them the penalty of death.[7]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following matters:Such other relief which is just and equitable under the premises is likewise prayed for.[8]
- declaring the defendants to be the tenants of the plaintiff and to recognize the "LEASE AGREEMENT" to be valid and enforceable;
- declaring the defendants' stay on the land to be lawful and in accordance with the existing laws and in case of ejectment to order the plaintiff to pay the necessary disturbance compensation provided to tenant-tillers.
The parties likewise agreed to litigate the following issues:
- The identity, location and area of the land in question, which is particularly described as Lot I, H-185146 with an area of 34,235 square meters and located in barrios Cabulay and Salvador, municipalities of Echague and Santiago which is now San Isidro, Isabela. That this parcel of land is covered under OCT No. P-9504 and registered in the name of plaintiff Narciso Guiang;
- The capacity of the parties to sue and to be sued, and that the plaintiff Narciso Guiang acquired this piece of land by virtue of homestead patent, as indicated in OCT No. P-9504;
- That this land is an agricultural land and actually planted with rice and that the source of irrigation is provided by the NIA; and that said land is capable of being cultivated twice a year;
- That the average gross production per hectare per cropping is 100 cavans with 50 kilos per cavan;
- That the late father of the defendant Andres Dulay, who is substituted by his heirs was the tenant of Narciso Guiang, as evidenced by a document entitled "Tulag Ti Pinagabang Iti Talon"; and
- That after the death of defendant Andres Dulay on April 15, 1998, his heirs are now succeeding in the cultivation of the land in issue up to this time.[9]
Guiang filed a motion for summary judgment. He contended that as gleaned from the parties' pleadings and what was stipulated upon, no genuine issue had been raised.
- Who between the parties are better entitled to possess and cultivate the land in question?
- Who is entitled to the award of damages and attorney's fees? and
- As a side issue, whether or not the defendants were tenants of the plaintiff?[10]
On October 1, 2002, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for summary judgment. The dispositive portion reads:
- That there is no truth that the above-entitled case has no genuine issue which necessitate the plaintiff to move for a summary judgment;
- That in the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff never admitted that the defendants were his tenants and since the plaintiff never admitted this fact, the issue should be resolved in a full blown trial;
- That if ever it will be considered by this Honorable Court that the defendants were the tenants of the plaintiff, the same could not be ejected from the land they till unless the plaintiff will pay them the allowable disturbance fee as provided by law or if the plaintiff could prove that the defendants violated any of the grounds for ejecting a tenant;
- That the act of the plaintiff in ejecting a tenant by way of filing a case against them is a clear violation of their tenancy right which is equally protected by our laws and to allow this theory will be a clear act of circumventing the law on the matter.[11]
WHEREFORE, as a consequence of all the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.The RTC ruled that the lot was not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 because it had been acquired under a homestead patent. The RTC cited the ruling of this Court in Alita v. Court of Appeals.[13] The court likewise cited the retention limits of original homestead owners or their direct compulsory heirs under Section 6, Article XIII of the Constitution, and Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. According to the RTC, the Dulays, as tenants, were estopped from denying Guiang's title over the property.
Accordingly, the defendants are ordered to deliver possession and cultivation of the parcels of land covered by OCT No. P-9504; ordering them to pay rentals to the plaintiff since 1998 up to the present at the rate of 96 cavans of palay (48 cavans per cropping season) at 50 kilos per cavan of palay and lastly, ordering them to pay attorney's fees of Twenty-Eight Thousand (PhP28,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[12]
They alleged that since a tenancy relationship existed between the parties, it is the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC, which had jurisdiction over the case. They pointed out that all the requisites of a tenancy relationship existed: Guiang is the owner of the agricultural lots; Guiang consented to the lease; the purpose of the leasehold contract was to bring about agricultural production; they actually cultivated the subject property; and there was sharing in the harvest.[27] Petitioners cited the case of Paris v. Alfeche[28] to support their contention that homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law.[29]A.THE PETITIONERS ARE THE TENANTS-BENEFICIARIES OF THE AGRICULTURAL LAND IN QUESTION AS THEY WERE ISSUED FIVE (5) TITLES OF OWNERSHIP BY THEN PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1987 BY AUTHORITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 266 DATED AUGUST 4, 1973, ISSUED IN RELATION TO PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 DATED OCTOBER 21, 1972; (SEE: ANNEXES "U," "V," "W," "X" AND "Y") ERGO, REPUBLIC ACT 6657 APPLIES AND JURISDICTION PERTAINS THEREFOR TO THE DARAB.B.THE PETITIONERS PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE FIVE (5) EMANCIPATION PATENTS IN THEIR FAVOR ARE THE TENANTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT SINCE 1961. IN FACT, THEY EXECUTED AN AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD CONTRACT IN 1982. (See Annex "I-1")C.THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (See: ANNEX "H-1") CLEARLY SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. THIS BEING THE CASE, JURISDICTION PERTAINS THEREFORE TO THE DARAB UNDER SECTION 50 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6657.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Order dated October 1, 2002 and Resolution dated January 8, 2005 but issued on February 8, 2005 of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 36-2894 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING private respondent's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent Judge is hereby enjoined from further hearing the case or otherwise proceeding with the implementation of the aforesaid order and resolution.The CA ruled that, while Guiang had the unqualified right to retain the landholding as the original homestead, it does not follow that the actual and legitimate tenant-tillers are no longer entitled to the protection of the law.[34] The very allegations of the complaint show that the controversy is essentially an agrarian dispute; thus, it is clearly the DARAB and not the RTC which has jurisdiction.[35]
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[33]
The threshold issue is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief, considering the factual circumstances of this case.I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 89214 AND IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 36-2894 AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, BECAUSE SAID DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CLEARLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6, ART. XIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 6, OF RA 6657, AND THE DOCTRINAL RULINGS IN THE CASE OF PATRICIO V. BAYOG, 112 SCRA 45, REITERATED IN ALITA V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 78517, FEBRUARY 27, 1989, WHICH EXEMPT LANDS OBTAINED THROUGH HOMESTEAD PATENT FROM THE COVERAGE OF P.D. 27, AND R.A. 6657.II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DESPITE THE GLARING FACT THAT LANDS OBTAINED THROUGH HOMESTEAD PATENT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE LAND OR AGRARIAN REFORM.III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEN ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THIS CASE IS AN "AGRARIAN DISPUTE" WHICH IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) DESPITE THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION OF HOMESTEAD FROM THE COVERAGE OF LAND OR AGRARIAN REFORM.IV.THE HONORABLE COURT ALSO ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE EVIDENT FACT THAT IT WAS FILED OUT OF TIME.
x x x It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court is to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the subject matter of the action is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.[44]The powers and functions of the DAR are set forth in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. The provision reads:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;Section 1(f), Rule II of the DARAB likewise provides that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the issue, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and emancipation patents which are registered with the Land Registration Authority. And as the Court held in Machete v. Court of Appeals,[48] the failure of agricultural tenants to pay rentals pursuant to a leasehold contract is an issue which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and beyond the legal competence of the RTC.
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and
c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.[47]