541 Phil. 395
AZCUNA, J.:
Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to, real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order] from the Philippines against Ignacio E. Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to include specific performance and damages.
In her amended complaint, respondent averred inter alia that she bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio Rubio [and] the heirs of Luz Baloloy, namely: Alejandrino, Bayani, and other co-heirs; that said vendors executed a contract of sale dated April 10, 1990 in her favor; that Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy received [a down payment] or earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and P450,000, respectively; that it was agreed in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificate[s] of [title]; that Ignacio Rubio refused to receive the other half of the down payment which is P[100,000]; that Ignacio Rubio refused and still refuses to deliver to [respondent] the certificates of title covering his share on the two lots; that with respect to the heirs of Luz Baloloy, they also refused and still refuse to perform the delivery of the two certificates of title covering their share in the disputed lots; that respondent was and is ready and willing to pay Ignacio Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy upon presentation of their individual certificates of title, free from whatever lien and encumbrance;
As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor; and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s title.
In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged inter alia the following:
For the heirs of Luz Baloloy (Baloloys for brevity):
Respondent has no cause of action, because the subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or before May 1, 1990.
For petitioners Ignacio Rubio (Rubio for brevity) and Corazon Escueta (Escueta for brevity):
Respondent has no cause of action, because Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virginia Rubio Laygo Lim (Lim for brevity) who was the one who represented him in the sale of the disputed lots in favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
The Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial. Upon motion of respondent, the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. They then filed a motion to lift the order declaring them in default, which was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 27, 1991. Consequently, respondent was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision dated July 23, 1993 against the Baloloys, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] and against [petitioners, heirs] of Luz R. Balolo[y], namely: Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy. The [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are ordered to immediately execute an [Absolute] Deed of Sale over their hereditary share in the properties covered by TCT No. 74392 and TCT No. 74394, after payment to them by [respondent] the amount of P[1,050,000] or consignation of said amount in Court. [For] failure of [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy to execute the Absolute Deed of Sale over their hereditary share in the property covered by TCT No. T-74392 and TCT No. T-74394 in favor of [respondent], the Clerk of Court is ordered to execute the necessary Absolute Deed of Sale in behalf of the Baloloys in favor of [respondent,] with a consideration of P[1,500,000]. Further[,] [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are ordered to jointly and severally pay [respondent] moral damages in the amount of P[50,000] and P[20,000] for attorney’s fees. The adverse claim annotated at the back of TCT No. T-74392 and TCT No. T-74394[,] insofar as the shares of Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy are concerned[,] [is] ordered cancelled.
With costs against [petitioners] Alejandrino Baloloy and Bayani Baloloy.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994 and supplemental petition dated July 7, 1994. This was denied by the trial court in an order dated September 16, 1994. Hence, appeal to the Court of Appeals was taken challenging the order denying the petition for relief.
Trial on the merits ensued between respondent and Rubio and Escueta. After trial, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, as follows:
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision, but reversed the later decision. The dispositive portion of its assailed Decision reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the complaint [and] amended complaint are dismissed against [petitioners] Corazon L. Escueta, Ignacio E. Rubio[,] and the Register of Deeds. The counterclaim of [petitioners] [is] also dismissed. However, [petitioner] Ignacio E. Rubio is ordered to return to the [respondent], Rufina Lim[,] the amount of P102,169.80[,] with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from April 10, [1990] until the same is fully paid. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing premises considered, this Court rules:
- the appeal of the Baloloys from the Order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment and Orders dated July 4, 1994 and Supplemental Petition dated July 7, 1994 is DISMISSED. The Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
- the Decision dismissing [respondent’s] complaint is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered. Accordingly,
- the validity of the subject contract of sale in favor of [respondent] is upheld.
- Rubio is directed to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale conditioned upon the payment of the balance of the purchase price by [respondent] within 30 days from the receipt of the entry of judgment of this Decision.
- the contracts of sale between Rubio and Escueta involving Rubio’s share in the disputed properties is declared NULL and VOID.
- Rubio and Escueta are ordered to pay jointly and severally the [respondent] the amount of P[20,000] as moral damages and P[20,000] as attorney’s fees.
- the appeal of Rubio and Escueta on the denial of their counterclaim is DISMISSED.
Briefly, the issue is whether the contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid.I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED BY THE BALOLOYS.II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REINSTATING THE COMPLAINT AND IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT RUFINA L. LIM CONSIDERING THAT:
- IGNACIO E. RUBIO IS NOT BOUND BY THE CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN VIRGINIA LAYGO-LIM AND RUFINA LIM.
- THE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN RUFINA LIM AND VIRGINIA LAYGO-LIM IS A CONTRACT TO SELL AND NOT A CONTRACT OF SALE.
- RUFINA LIM FAILED TO FAITHFULLY COMPLY WITH HER OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT TO SELL THEREBY WARRANTING THE CANCELLATION THEREOF.
- CORAZON L. ESCUETA ACTED IN UTMOST GOOD FAITH IN ENTERING INTO THE CONTRACT OF SALE WITH IGNACIO E. RUBIO.
III
THE CONTRACT OF SALE EXECUTED BETWEEN IGNACIO E. RUBIO AND CORAZON L. ESCUETA IS VALID.IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIMS.
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the above-cited rule. “The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.”[13] As aptly put by the appellate court:
The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23, 1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60 day period therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the 60 day period. Moreover, the records further show that the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13, 1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the petition for relief may be granted.[14] There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that “prevents a party from having a trial x x x or from presenting all of his case to the court”[15] or an “accident x x x which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, and by reason of which the party applying has probably been impaired in his rights.”[16] There is also no proof of either a “mistake x x x of law”[17] or an excusable negligence “caused by failure to receive notice of x x x the trial x x x that it would not be necessary for him to take an active part in the case x x x by relying on another person to attend to the case for him, when such other person x x x was chargeable with that duty x x x, or by other circumstances not involving fault of the moving party.”[18]
The Baloloys[,] apparently in an attempt to cure the lapse of the aforesaid reglementary period to file a petition for relief from judgment[,] included in its petition the two Orders dated May 6, 1994 and June 29, 1994. The first Order denied Baloloys’ motion to fix the period within which plaintiffs-appellants pay the balance of the purchase price. The second Order refers to the grant of partial execution, i.e. on the aspect of damages. These Orders are only consequences of the partial decision subject of the petition for relief, and thus, cannot be considered in the determination of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for relief.
Art. 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:Applying the above-quoted provision to the special power of attorney executed by Ignacio Rubio in favor of his daughter Patricia Llamas, it is clear that she is not prohibited from appointing a substitute. By authorizing Virginia Lim to sell the subject properties, Patricia merely acted within the limits of the authority given by her father, but she will have to be “responsible for the acts of the sub-agent,”[19] among which is precisely the sale of the subject properties in favor of respondent.
(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one x x x.
Art. 1317. x x xIgnacio Rubio merely denies the contract of sale. He claims, without substantiation, that what he received was a loan, not the down payment for the sale of the subject properties. His acceptance and encashment of the check, however, constitute ratification of the contract of sale and “produce the effects of an express power of agency.”[20] “[H]is action necessarily implies that he waived his right of action to avoid the contract, and, consequently, it also implies the tacit, if not express, confirmation of the said sale effected” by Virginia Lim in favor of respondent.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.