541 Phil. 192
GARCIA, J.:
That sometime in June, 1983 up to the present, at Sitio Panagsangan, [Brgy] Murtha, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, both the accused without any permit or authority from the [BFD] director � did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously occupy portion of forest zone for their livestock pasturing and is within [Pilar Farm�s AFFLA No. 82] � [to] its damage �. (Words in bracket added)To the aforesaid complaint, the Gonzaleses filed a Motion and Petition[2] therein praying the MTC to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, to suspend the criminal action on grounds of erroneous venue, violation of the equal protection guarantee and prejudicial question, among others.
The Court has not lost sight of the fact that petitioners quoted a declaration of the B.F.D. District Officer � that the award to respondent [Pilar Farm] by the B.F.D. Central Office was made �despite the B.F.D. District Certification that ----the applied area falls within Southern Mindoro Lumber Corporation and District Forest Occupancy Management Project wherein forest occupants were permanently settled�.Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the above resolution.
Towards the close of hearing on June 4, 1986, public respondents signified that verification of that matter would have to be conducted. This situation adds support for the stand that the entire dispute is still within the sphere of the executive department.
It must be mentioned the petitioners� Motion For Reconsideration of the dismissal of Case No. 525 had been pending as of the date the Order for consolidation was issued; xxx.On April 19, 1988, however, the RTC issued in Civil Case No. 525 a Resolution again dismissing the said case, predicating its action basically on the same reason set forth in its earlier August 20, 1986 ruling. Wrote the court:
The result of the succession of pleadings is that in the first case (No. 525), the Court has to act on the Motion For Reconsideration without any pleading nor comment from any of [the] respondents. In specifically giving a margin for the officials to interpose the Bureau's comment, the Court gave way for that Office to manifest whether any action had been taken by the Bureau on petitioners� claim after the Resolution of dismissal had been issued � that the government was �still locating� an area to be awarded to petitioners, and that the situation depicted in the District Forester's statement would be verified.
On the other hand, petitioners now harp on the abuse-of-discretion-angle, which shifts the jurisdiction to the judiciary.
Definitely � the Court should not seek to substitute its judgment, its assessment, for that of the administration body, the [BFD]. All that is believed now open to be inquired into is the subject of abuse of discretion, the conduct of proceedings which led to that award.xxx xxx xxx
It is understood that the decision on Case No. 525 will be decisive of Case No. 542; hence, no pleading need be filed in Case No. 542 meanwhile. (Underscoring in the original; words in bracket added.)
The fundamental issue � encountered in the beginning was want of jurisdiction for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Dismissal therefore was reconsidered, because petitioners cited a basis for alleging abuse of discretion. In essence, the �abuse� � was the circumstance that the area to which petitioners had been previously instructed by the District Forester to transfer his herd became a part of the area leased to [Pilar Farm]. The impression given � was that the [BFD] Central Office, which granted [AFFLA No. 82] �, disregarded the word of the District Forester, which would have favored petitioners. Giving way to the possibility that the procedure observed � constituted an abuse of discretion, the Court set the case for trial solely on that question.Therefrom, the petitioners went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 15341. On October 18, 1989, the appellate court, on the premise that the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 525 without giving the petitioners the chance to prove that the findings of forestry officials were not supported by the evidence on record, ordered the remand of the case for trial and decision.
Public respondents, moving for reconsideration �, state that the sworn statement of the District Forester (April 3, 1986) to the effect that sometime in 1981, he instructed Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd to the cancelled pasture area of Fidel del Rosario, was a �reversed stand� of that official �. It was deemed a reversal of his letter of September 1, 1982, stating that a suitable place for Pedro Gonzales� herd had not been found. This apparently runs counter to the sworn statement aforecited.
The actuation of the District Forester was regarded by public respondents as an encroachment into the power and authority of the Bureau Director.
The Supplemental Opposition to that Motion reiterated petitioner's reliance on the District Forester's alleged instruction and cited the disregard thereof as abusive.
Replying to that Supplemental Opposition, the public respondents dwelt on the factual, physical justification for the award to private respondent, that is, the finding that during the investigation or inspection in July 1981, [the Gonzaleses] were not occupants of subject area. Moreover, public respondents state that to petitioners� [pasture] lease agreement had expired � and a �Certification� by the Regional Director (February 19, 1985) states that the processing of the application for renewal was held in abeyance pending the location of replacement site.
The determination of whether petitioners� application for lease of an area � was accorded the requisite attention or given the proper action by the [BFD] falls initially on the executive department �. It may be gleaned from the papers now on file (quite voluminous) that the internal organization, the delineation of functions according to the set-up, the detailed instructions and regulations issued, all come into play in the present dispute, and, at this stage, these are not for the Court to dwell upon. The questions of confirming whether the District Forester instructed or authorized Pedro Gonzales to transfer his herd as claimed, and, in the affirmative, whether that was within his power or functions, so as to confer a right on Pedro Gonzales, are all embraced within the administrative aspect - in which, judicial intervention is not authorized.xxx xxx xxx
In resume, since it now appears that the sworn statement relied upon by petitioners is, after all, for the Bureau to consider, the Court is constrained to revise its ruling embodied in the Resolution of June 4, 1987 and declare, as it hereby declares, that the dismissal was warranted. xxx..
- The nature of the petition filed before the RTC basically required the petitioners to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent MNR and BFD officials, but petitioners failed to discharge the burden;
- But assuming that the cases before the RTC partake of an appeal from the MNR, the recourse would still fail owing to submitted evidence showing that:
Thereafter, the petitioners filed a pleading styled �Motion� asking the CA to render a ruling on whether or not the RTC violated procedural due process in not resolving their offer of rebuttal evidence which forced them to make a proffer of proof. In a Resolution[6] dated June 15, 1994, the CA denied the motion.
- AFFLA No. 82 was regularly issued;
- all portions of the leased area applied for under bona fide occupation or claims were excluded from the coverage of AFFLA No. 82;
- that the priority right of Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja over the leased area was acquired ahead of other applicants; and
- that during the investigation and inspections on July 1987, the Gonzaleses were not the occupants of the subject area.
As we see it, all the above three (3) issues or grounds emanate from a single core argument involving the disinclination of the RTC to consider the petitioners� offer of rebuttal evidence.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLINED TO RULE ON WHETHER THE LOWER COURT VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN REFUSING TO ADMIT PETITIONERS� REBUTTAL EVIDENCES, DESPITE A MOTION BY PETITIONERS PRAYING FOR A RULING ON THE MATTER.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT �BY THE NATURE OF THIS PETITION, PETITIONERS TOTALLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH LACK OF JURISDICTION, GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR THE UNLAWFUL NON-PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IMPOSED BY LAW ON PUBLIC RESPONDENTS,� DESPITE ADMISSIONS OR PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
- WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT �THERE NO LONGER EXIST ANY HINDRANCE TO THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 7852 NOR ANY BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS,� DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.
And now comes the decision of respondent [appellate] court which refused to review the most crucial assigned error raised by petitioners. From pages one to twelve thereof, the decision never discussed the issue on whether the trial court �committed obvious errors in its ruling during the trial, showed unusual leniency to respondents and practically ignored the offer of rebuttal evidences, which constrained appellants to submit the pending incidents for resolution without further arguments and to make proffer of proof.� Then on page [13] thereof, respondent court finally concluded that �[w]ith the foregoing disquisition, the Court sees little or no reason to go into minute detail in discussing the appellants� remaining assignments to error�. Hence, the decision of respondent court also ignored the rebuttal exhibits of herein petitioners.[10](Bracketed words added)We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for not striking down the RTC�s refusal to admit petitioners� rebuttal evidence.
Over and above the foregoing considerations, the record is replete with documentary evidence showing the regularity of the award of AFFLA No. 82 in favor of [ Pilar Farm]. xxx.Among the pieces of rebuttal evidence which the petitioners are raising all the way up to this Court concern alterations and/or intercalation allegedly committed by the respondents, acts which petitioners insist as being punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, according to the petitioners:xxx xxx xxx
Absent such stronger countervailing proof as would disprove the evident showing of the foregoing documents, the [CA] is not inclined to disturb the lower court�s affirmance of the Ministry of Natural Resources award of AFFLA No. 82 as well as the findings made in relation thereto.
Respondent court failed to consider that AFFLA No. 82 was purportedly executed on October 8, 1982 between the government and respondent corporation at Quezon City but notarized by a notary public commissioned at the City of Manila. Yet, respondent corporation was incorporated only on March 18, 1983! It appears what was notarized on October 8, 1982 was another document, entered as Doc. No. 258, Page 19, Book No. 53, Series of 1982, in the notarial registry of Atty. Armando Cortez. The lease agreement appears to be falsified. Unwittingly, public respondents admitted under paragraph 3, page 19 of its (sic) Comment to an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning and punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. (Underscoring in the original.)For reference� we quote paragraph 3, page 19 of the public respondents� Comment[12] to this petition:
3. The records of this case also show that AFFLA No. 82 was originally applied for under the name of �Mrs. Pilar Alarcon Paja�, and that the same was changed and put under the name of private respondent corporation after the latter was organized in 1983. Evidently, this explains the discrepancy between the dates of the Contract of Lease of AFFLA No. 82, and the incorporation of private respondent corporation in March 1983.Analyzing the text of the AFFLA, we find no provision therein requiring that the lessee must first be a corporation before it may plant and raise crops necessary for the Alcogas program of the government. Regardless of whether the lessee is a single proprietor, a partnership, a corporation or a cooperative, what matters here is the lessee�s accomplishment of the undertaking to plant and raise said crops.
Article 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.It may be that Pilar Farm was issued its SEC registration certificate only on March 18, 1983. It should be stressed, however, that what Mrs. Paja submitted shortly before that date in behalf of what, for the nonce, may rightly be regarded as an unregistered association in the process of incorporation, was still an �offer.� The meeting of the offer and acceptance occured only on June 16, 1983 when then Minister Teodoro O. Pe�a signed AFFLA No. 82. At that defining time, Pilar Farm had already been duly registered and had acquired a judicial personality.
This is where respondent court erred the most. By refusing to consider the rebuttal exhibits of petitioners, it relied upon respondents� documentary evidences � that were hearsay and self-serving. xxx .We are not impressed.
Section 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. � A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense xxx. The arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigation and file information in court.Lastly, the sub-issue that calls for a clinical analysis of the criminal complaint, or, to a specific point, a determination of whether or not the scene of the crime is situated in the barangay mentioned in the complaint, need not detain us any longer. For, at bottom, this sub-issue involves factual matters that should properly be addressed by the MTC, pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of courts.