542 Phil. 648
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
4. Having made known their respective stand[s] on the issue of whether or not PNB should be permitted to substitute Maybank in this case, both parties hereby manifest that they will submit the pending incident for the resolution of the Honorable Court without further oral argument and request that the hearing scheduled on 08 August 2002 be cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)By Order[11] of August 15, 2002, the trial court denied PNB’s Motion for Substitution on the ground that it “lacks basis considering that there were no documents to support the dacion en pago agreement and/or deed of assignment between PNB and PNB-RB that asset Pool I accounts of the petitioner were transferred to PNB.” By the same Order, the trial court, finding that a certification on non-forum shopping appeared on Nimfa’s petition, denied PNB’s motion to dismiss. Still by the same Order, the trial court, noting that “the parties [sic]. . . filed a joint manifestation that they were submitting the pending petition (sic) for resolution of the court without need for oral arguments,” granted the petition to cancel the mortgage liens.
The case before the Regional Trial Court was a cadastral case for the cancellation of mortgage liens annotated at the back of three transfer certificates of titles. Without any trial conducted and based on the pleadings submitted, which comprised only of the petition and various motions, the respondent judge issued an order and decided the case based on the merits. This we find to be highly not in order.
. . . By considering the case as submitted for resolution without giving the parties opportunity to present evidence to support their claims is tantamount to denial of due process.
x x x x
With the above incidents and in conjunction with the ruling of the Supreme Court regarding the need for an adversarial proceeding on the matter of canceling and passing upon property rights, we find that . . . PNB was denied of opportunity to present evidence against the claims of private respondent. This resulted to the cancellation of the mortgage liens to the prejudice of petitioner PNB.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the questioned final orders dated August 15, 2002 and October 29, 2002, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. (Underscoring supplied)Its Motion for Reconsideration[18] having been denied by Order of August 15, 2002,[19] petitioner filed the instant Petition[20] for Review on Certiorari, contending that
SO ORDERED. [17]
The petition fails.
- THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT . . . IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO . . . PNB SINCE IT FAILED TO AVAIL OF THE REMEDY OF APPEAL FROM THE ORDER DATED AUGUST 15, 2002 THROUGH ITS OWN FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE . . .
- THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED BY HOLDING THAT LACK OF DUE PROCESS IS AN ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT . . .
- . . . THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT THERE IS LACK OF DUE PROCESS IN THE INSTANT CASE . . . [21] (Underscoring supplied)
It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul for a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. Thus, Macabingkil did not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law. [Emphasis in original]. This doctrine is recognized in other cases:The Joint Manifestation of “the parties”[25] which the trial court noted in its questioned Order of August 15, 2002, submitted for resolution without further oral argument the pending incident, which was PNB’s motion for substitution, not the pending “petition for cancellation of mortgage liens as the trial judge incorrectly read or understood.[26]“x x x There is no question that a final judgment may be annulled. There are, however, certain requisites which must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an action for annulment. Under the present procedure, aside form the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud x x x . [Emphasis omitted.]”On the one hand, extrinsic fraud is the ground to annul a voidable judgment; the declaration of nullity of a patently void final judgment, on the other, is based on grounds other than extrinsic fraud. To say, then, that petitioners can avail themselves only of the ground of extrinsic fraud and no other is to fail to appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of annulment/nullity.[24] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 19. Transfer of interest. ? In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action. (Emphasis supplied),uses the word “may” to denote that the substitution of parties on account of transfer of interest from the original party to another is discretionary. The trial judge’s denial of PNB’s Motion for Substitution may not, under the circumstances, thus be seriously assailed.
Petitioner’s argument that PNB could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment due to its failure to appeal the trial court’s Order dated August 15, 2002 fails. For, since the Motion for Substitution of PNB was denied, PNB had no personality to assail the said order.x x x x
The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the petitioner due process of law. It was not able to allege its defenses in an answer and prove them in a hearing. . . . Over and above every desideratum in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be resolved in favor of fairness.[27]x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the trial court’s denial of its motion to include respondent as defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not petitioner’s fault that respondent was not made a party to the case. But likewise, it was not respondent’s fault that he was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioner’s motion to include respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why. xxx Be that as it may, the undeniable fact remains – respondent is not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 and xxx any portion of the trial court ‘s judgment xxx cannot be binding on him.[32]WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
(“[A void judgment] is, in contemplation of law non-existent and may be wholly disregarded. Such judgment may be assailed any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a separate action or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked. It is not necessary to take any step to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be ignored.”)[29] Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80892, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 178, 186.